^  PRINCETON,  N.  J.  ^ 

A 

Presented    b^Vr-o-^.  UVj  rB.(^X-cS<2/V^e/ ^ZD.-^D. 


BL  53  .L48  1912 

Leuba,  James  Henry,  1868- 

1946. 
A  psychological  study  of 

r<alirfir»n  --,  ^ — _    


A   PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY   OF    RELIGION 

ITS  ORIGIN,  FUNCTION,  AND  FUTURE 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON   •    CHICAGO 
DALLAS   •    SAN    FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN   &   CO.,  Limited 

LONDON   •    BOMBAY   •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY 
OF  RELIGION 

ITS  ORIGIN.  FUNCTION.  AND  FUTURE 


BY 
JAMES    H.    LEUBA 

PROFESSOR   OF   PSYCHOLOGY,    BRYN   MAWR 
COLLEGE,  U.S.A. 


Nefa  §0rk 

THE    MACMILLAN   COiMPANY 

1912 

jlll  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1912, 
By  the  macmillan  company. 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     Published  September,  ign. 


J.  8.  Gushing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


MY   TEACHERS 
OF  MANY   YEARS   AGO 

PRESIDENT   G.    STANLEY   HALL 
PRESIDENT   EDMUND    SANFORD 

AS   AN   EXPRESSION   OF  GRATITUDE 
AND  REGARD 


PREFACE 

In  April,  1896,  there  appeared  in  the  American  Journal 
of  Psychology  my  doctor's  thesis,  Stttdies  in  the  Psychology 
of  Religions  Phenomena,  a  study  of  Christian  conversion. 
Since  then  I  have  continued  to  devote  what  time  I  could 
to  psychological  investigations  of  religious  life,  and  from 
time  to  time  I  have  published  in  various  periodicals  pro- 
visional fragments  belonging  to  different  parts  of  the 
somewhat  systematic  scheme  I  have  in  mind.  A  list  of 
these  papers  will  be  found  on  page  361. 

In  this  volume  I  have  endeavored  to  deal  with  the  topics 
announced  in  the  subtitle,  as  scientifically  as  their  nature 
permits.  Light  comes  to  the  problems  of  origins  from 
three  sources  :  the  present  customs  and  beliefs  of  the  most 
primitive  peoples  known  to  us ;  the  behavior  and  ideas  of 
children ;  and  the  teachings  of  general  psychology.  I 
trust  that  my  information  in  these  several  provinces  has 
been  on  the  whole  sufficient  to  keep  me  on  the  right  road. 
For  data  I  have  had  to  depend  upon  the  work  of  students 
of  anthropology,  sociology,  and  psychology,  and  upon 
documents  I  have  gathered  myself,  at  first  hand,  either  by 
questionnaires  or  by  private  correspondence. 

The  explanations  of  religion  which  the  psychologist  and 
the  sociologist  can  give  leave  unanswered,  of  course,  the 
question  of  ultimate  origin.  But  science  does  not  come  up 
against  impassable  limits  any  sooner  when  it  occupies  itself 
with  religious  experience  than  when  it  takes  as  its  object 
any  other  phase  of  psychic  life.     It  is  a  gross  error  to  hold 

vii 


Viii  PREFACE 

that,  whereas  in  the  study  of  non-religious  phenomena  sci- 
ence offers,  or  may  hope  to  offer,  complete  explanations, 
in  religious  experience  it  finds  its  limits  much  earlier,  and 
is,  therefore,  in  that  field,  of  comparatively  little  conse- 
quence. The  ultimate  mysteries  before  which  science 
pauses  are  behind  not  only  religious  consciousness  but 
conscious  life  as  a  whole,  and  the  scope  of  psychology  is 
no  more  restricted  in  religion  than  in  other  fields. 

In  the  chapter  on  "  The  Relation  of  Psychology  to  The- 
ology," I  have  taken  a  stand  against  the  opinion  that  psy- 
chology, since  the  transcendental  is  beyond  its  ken,  can 
have  nothing  to  say  upon  the  existence  of  the  God  of 
Christianity.  I  show  in  that  chapter  that  the  gods  of  re- 
ligion are  inductions  from  experience,  and  are  therefore 
proper  objects  of  science. 

Although  in  the  preparation  of  this  book  I  have  been 
moved  by  scientific  interests,  it  would  be  idle  for  me  to 
pretend  that  my  concern  has  been  purely  scientific.  Re- 
ligion is  too  vital  a  matter  to  leave  even  the  theoretically 
minded  person  altogether  indifferent  to  its  destiny.  It 
needs  as  much  as  any  other  practical  activity  the  kind  of 
purification  and  guidance  that  science  provides.  It  needs 
in  particular  the  insight  into  the  dynamics  of  conscious  life 
which  can  be  contributed,  not  by  studies  in  comparative 
religion  nor  by  criticism  of  sacred  texts,  but  only  by 
psychology. 

Every  once  in  a  while  theologians,  finding  their  skein 
hopelessly  tangled,  raise  a  cry  for  a  return  to  origins,  by 
which  they  mean  a  return  to  the  Church  Fathers  and  to 
the  sacred  writings.  The  cry  of  the  psychologist  is  not 
for  a  return  to  the  teachings  of  any  man  or  group  of  men, 
but  to  human  nature.  He  does  not  inquire,  for  instance, 
what  any  particular  person  or  group  of  persons  taught 


PREFACE  IX 

concerning  saving  practices  and  beliefs;  but  he  tries  to 
discover  the  psychological  processes  involved  in  the  expe- 
rience called  salvation,  and  he  knows  that  success  will 
mean  the  great  initial  step  toward  a  scientific  control  of 
the  factors  entering  into  that  experience.  The  great  task 
of  the  psychologist  in  the  field  of  religious  life  is  to  return, 
through  the  distortions  and  worthless  accretions  resulting 
from  centuries  of  groping,  to  what  is  fundamental  and 
essential  in  human  nature. 

In  the  present  stage  of  our  knowledge  certain  conclu- 
sions regarding  religion  appear  to  me  unavoidable.  And 
I  think  my  opinion  confirmed  by  the  beliefs  actually  enter- 
tained, though  not  always  expressed,  by  the  intellectual  and 
ethical  leaders  of  our  generation.  I  shall  neither  avoid 
the  utterance  of  these  conclusions,  nor  hide  them  in  vague 
formulations.  If,  because  of  outspokenness  on  these 
points,  I  am  reproached  for  dogmatism  and  radicalism, 
I  shall  find  comfort  in  the  thought  that  nowadays  liberalism 
in  religion  means  too  often  either  careless  indifference  to 
truth,  or  a  timorous  refusal  to  draw  conclusions  logically 
unavoidable,  or  concealment  of  one's  opinions  for  motives 
not  always  creditable.  As  for  the  accusation  of  radicalism, 
it  will  be  made,  if  at  all,  only  by  those  who  do  not  know 
how  far  the  contemporary  world  of  thought  is  controlled 
by  men  with  whose  opinions  in  matters  rehgious  I  am  in 
substantial  agreement. 

That  which  rehgion  has  most  to  fear  is  not  outspoken- 
ness but  intellectual  timidity  and  intellectual  dishonesty 
among  the  supporters  of  the  established  cults.  I  cannot 
persuade  myself  that  frank  dealing  with  religion  can  be 
detrimental  to  society,  even  though  the  advent  of  psycho- 
logical analysis  and  explanation  should  bring  about  a  crisis 
more  painful,  because  more  profound,  than  the  one  due  to 


X  PREFACE 

the  less  recent  appearance  of  the  comparative  history  of 
religions  and  the  literary  criticism  of  sacred  writings.  In 
such  matters  the  pain  is  directly  proportional  to  the  value 
of  the  new  readjustments  of  which  it  is  symptomatic. 

I  had  perhaps  better  add  that  I  am  not  a  materialist 
either  in  theory  or,  I  trust,  in  practice.  Perhaps  the  term 
"empirical  idealist"  best  fits  my  philosophical  position. 

I  take  pleasure  in  acknowledging  here  my  indebtedness 

to  Miss  Elisabeth  Hutchin  and  Miss  Edith  Orlady,  and  in 

particular  to  Miss  Ruth  ColUns  for  valuable  assistance  in 

the  preparation  of  this  book. 

JAMES  H.   LEUBA. 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS 
PART  I 

CHAPTER   I 

PACK 

Religion  as  a  Type  of  Rational  Behavior  ....  3 
A  preliminary  sketch  of  the  nature  and  function  of  religion 
and  of  its  relation  to  the  rest  of  life  —  Three  modes  of  be- 
havior differentiated ;  religious  life  one  of  them  —  The 
advantages  sought  or  expected  by  the  worshipper  —  The 
unsought  results  —  Public  religious  practices  are  always 
mixed  with  non-religious  activities. 


'&' 


CHAPTER    II 

Constructive  Criticism  of  Current  Conceptions  of  Re- 
ligion   23 

Three  classes  of  definition  criticised  —  The  place  of  thought 
and  of  feeling  in  conscious  life  —  The  "feeling  of  value"  or 
the  "  making  sacred  "  as  the  specific  characteristic  of  religion. 

PART   II 
THE  ORIGIN  OF  MAGIC  AND   OF  RELIGION 

CHAPTER   III 

The  Mental  Requirements  of  the  Appearance  of  Magic 

AND  of  Religion 57 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  Impersonal  Powers    ...      70 

xi 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  V 


PAGE 


The  Several  Origins  of  the  Ideas  of  Unseen  Personal 

Beings 85 


CHAPTER   VI 

The  Making  of  Gods  and  the  Essential  Characteristics 

OF  A  Divinity 1 1 1 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Emotions  in  Religious  Life 126 

The  earlier   religious   emotions  —  The    emotions    in    the 


course  of  the  development  of  religion. 


CHAPTER   VIII 


The  Origin  of  Magical  and  of  Religious  Practices    .        -151 

The  varieties  and  classification  of  magic  —  The  origin  of 
magical  practices  —  The  origin  of  religious  practices. 


CHAPTER   IX 

Corollaries  regarding  the  Respective  Nature  of  Magic 

AND  Religion  and  their  Relations  to  Each  Other        .     176 

Religion  and  magic  have  had  independent  origins  —  What 
did  magic  contribute  to  the  making  of  religion?  —  The  simpler 
forms  of  magic  probably  existed  prior  to  religion  —  Magic 
and  religion  are  often  closely  associated  —  Religion  is  social 
and  beneficent ;  magic  is  dominantly  individual  and  often 
evil  —  Magic  is  of  shorter  duration  than  religion  —  Magic  and 
the  origin  of  science  —  Summary  of  the  forms  assumed  by 
magic  and  religion. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 


PART    III 

RELIGION  IN  ITS  RELATION  TO  MORALITY,  MYTHOL- 
OGY, METAPHYSICS  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

CHAPTER  X 

FAGB 

Morality    and    Religion  —  Mythology    and    Religion  — 

Metaphysics  and  Religion 195 

CHAPTER  XI 

Theology  and  Psychology 207 

(i)  The  situation  ;  the  propositions  of  empirical  theology; 
the  documental  evidence — (2)  Religious  knowledge  as  im- 
mediately given  in  specific  experiences  —  The  manner  in 
which  God  acts  in  the  soul  —  (3)  Theology  as  a  body  of 
induced  propositions  —  The  exclusion  of  the  transcendent 
from  the  sphere  of  science  —  The  inductive  method  and 
empirical  theology  —  The  act  of  faith  and  its  motives  — 
(4)  The  task  of  psychology  in  the  study  of  religious  life. 


PART   IV 

THE  LATEST  FORMS  AND  THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION 

CHAPTER   Xn 

The  Latest  Forms  of  Religion 281 

Original  Buddhism  —  Pantheism  and  immanence  in  theol- 
ogy—  Psychotherapic  cults:  Christian  Science,  Mind-Cure, 
New  Thought  —  The  Religion  of  Humanity. 

CHAPTER  Xni 

The  Future  of  Religion 314 

The  present  situation  —  Pantheism  :  pros  and  cons  —  The 
fundamental  insufficiency  of  Positivism  as  a  basis  for  reli- 
gion—  The  independence   of  moral  appreciation  from  tran- 


xiv  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

scendental  belief  —  The  latent  idealism  of  naturalistic 
religious  movements  —  The  Ethical  Culture  Societies  —  The 
philosophical  basis  necessary  to  religion. 

APPENDIX 

Definitions  of  Religion  and  Critical  Comments  .        .    339 

Intellectualistic  point  of  view  —  Affectivistic  point  of  view 
—  Voluntaristic  or  practical  point  of  view. 


PART    I 
THE   NATURE   OF   RELIGION 


A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF 

RELIGION 

CHAPTER  I 
RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE   OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR 

A  PRELIMINARY  SKETCH  OF  THE  NATURE  AND  FUNCTION  OF 
RELIGION  AND  OF  ITS  RELATION  TO  THE  REST  OF  LIFE 

It  is  altogether  natural  that  man  in  his  strivings  for 
physical  and  "spiritual  "  ^  life  should  endeavor  to  make  use 
of  every  kind  of  power  in  the  existence  of  which  he  believes. 
If  forces  of  several  different  natures  appear  to  him  to  be 
active  in  the  world,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  they  will  all 
be  eagerly  and  uncritically  pressed  into  service,  each  one 
according  to  its  nature.  Thus,  for  instance,  the  land  Dyaks 
of  Borneo,  in  addition  to  making  use  of  the  ordinary 
means  of  cultivating  their  land,  invoke  at  certain  great 
agricultural  festivals  Tuppa,  the  highest  of  their  gods,  a 
great  Malay  potentate,  and  a  powerful  and  benevolent 
Englishman,  Sir  James  Brooke.^  Similarly,  the  Christian 
mother  who  prays  to  God  or  to  the  Virgin  mother  that  her 
son  may  be  kept  pure,  does  not  fail  to  endeavor  also  by 
natural  means  to  ward  off  bad  company  and  to  make  of 
his  body  the  docile  instrument  of  his  will. 

One  may  expect   to  find  in  use  as  many  varieties  of 

1 1  mean  by  "  spiritual  life  "  merely  conscious  existence  —  impulses,  desires, 
volitions,  feelings,  ideas. 

2  Morris,  M.,  Harvest  Gods  of  the  Land  Dyaks  of  Borneo,  Jr.  of  American 
Oriental  Soc,  Vol.  XXVI,  p.  166. 

3 


4  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

methods  aiming  at  the  gratification  of  human  desires  as 
there  are  conceivable  varieties  of  agents  or  forces  capable 
of  response  to  such  methods.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  man 
has  developed  three  distinct  types  of  behavior,  each  one 
adapted  to  a  specific  kind  of  power.  A  concrete  illustra- 
tion will  bring  them  before  us  more  forcibly  than  an  abstract 
characterization.  A  stoker  in  the  hold  of  a  ship,  throw- 
ing coal  into  the  furnace,  represents  one  of  them.  His 
purpose  is  to  produce  propelling  energy.  The  amount  of 
coal  he  shovels  in,  together  with  the  air  draught,  the  con- 
dition of  the  boiler,  and  other  factors  of  the  same  sort,  de- 
termines, as  he  understands  the  matter,  the  velocity  of  the 
ship.  The  same  man,  playing  cards  of  an  evening,  and 
having  lost  uninterruptedly  for  a  long  time,  might  get  up 
and  walk  round  the  table  backwards  in  order  to  change 
his  luck.  He  would  thus  illustrate  a  second  mode  of  be- 
havior. If  a  storm  threatened  to  sink  the  ship,  the  stoker 
might  be  seen  falling  on  his  knees,  lifting  his  hands  to 
heaven,  and  addressing  in  passionate  words  an  invisible 
being.  These  are  three  differentiated  kinds  of  responses 
that  he  has  learned  to  make,  the  three  ways  by  which  he 
endeavors  to  make  use  of  the  forces  about  him  in  his 
struggle  for  the  preservation  and  the  enrichment  of  life. 
These  three  modes  of  behavior,  conditioned  by  three  con- 
cepts of  power,  are  found  among  all  peoples.  For  in- 
stance, the  behavior  of  the  Melanesians  towards  sick- 
ness is  determined  by  their  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  its  cause.  Codrington  tells  us  that  before  acting  these 
people  make  up  their  minds  whether  the  disease  is  natural 
or  not.  If  it  is  not  natural,  they  try  to  discover  further 
whether  it  is  due  to  the  impersonal  force  they  call  Mana, 
or  to  personal  ghosts,  spirits,  or  gods.-^ 

^  Codrington,  R.  H.,  The  Melanesians,  their  Anthropology  and  Folk-lore^ 
Oxford,  Clarendon  Press,  1891,  p.  194. 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR       5 

These  three  types  of  behavior  may  be  designated :  — 

1.  The  mechanical  behavior. 

2.  The  coercitive  behavior,  or  magic. 

3.  The  anthropopathic  behavior,  which  includes  religion. 

The  mechanical  behavior  differs  from  the  anthropo- 
pathic by  the  absence  of  any  reference  to  powers  endowed 
with  intelligence  and  feelings ;  therefore,  in  the  sphere 
within  which  it  obtains,  threats  and  presents  are  equally  in- 
effective. It  impUes  instead  the  practical  recognition  of  a 
fairly  definite  and  constant  quantitative  relation  between 
cause  and  effect.  The  amount  of  coal  used  corresponds 
roughly  to  the  velocity  of  the  ship  ;  the  distance  the  arrow 
flies,  to  the  tension  of  the  string ;  the  size  of  the  stone,  to 
its  breaking  power,  etc.  It  is  in  this  form  of  behavior  that 
science  finds  its  beginning. 

Magic  separates  itself,  on  the  one  hand,  from  mechanical 
behavior  by  the  absence  of  implied  quantitative  relations, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  from  anthropopathic  behavior  by 
the  failure  to  use  means  of  personal  influence  ;  punishment 
and  reward  are  just  as  foreign  to  magic  as  to  mechanical 
behavior.  Even  when  magic  is  supposed  to  take  effect 
upon  persons  and  gods,  it  is  not  by  an  appeal  to  their  in- 
telligence or  to  their  heart.  They  are  coerced  by  a  mys- 
terious power  into  doing  what  the  magician  wants  them  to 
do. 

As  to  the  anthropopathic  type  of  activity,  it  includes  the 
ordinary  relations  of  men  with  men  and  with  animals,  as 
well  as  those  with  superhuman  spirits  and  with  gods. 
One's  frame  of  mind  and  behavior  when  dealing  with  hu- 
man beings  resembles  religion  so  closely  that  it  is  proper 
to  place  them  in  the  same  class.  The  closeness  of  the  re- 
semblance becomes  evident  when  we  compare  our  attitude 
towards  a  person  exalted  far  above  us  with  that  assumed 
by  the  savage  or  even  by  the  civiHzed  man  towards  his  god. 


6  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

It  is  clear  that  according  as  man  is  dealing  with  one  or 
another  of  these  powers,  his  feeling-attitude  will  vary  pro- 
foundly, even  though  the  form  of  his  action  should  remain 
the  same. 

In  primitive  culture  the  coercitive  behavior  (magic), 
either  separately  or  in  close  alliance  with  religion,  is  every- 
where in  evidence.!  But,  as  one  ascends  from  the  lowest 
stages  of  culture,  magic  falls  gradually  into  disrepute  and 
finally  loses  official  recognition.  Among  us,  it  is  reduced 
to  a  surreptitious  existence ;  yet  it  still  possesses  consider- 
able influence.  A  list  of  magical  superstitions  that  have 
retained  a  hold  among  Christian  nations  would  be  found 
tediously  long.  A  numerous  class  of  them  includes  the 
gambler's  methods  of  securing  luck.  So-called  "  religious  " 
practices  may  really  be  merely  magical.  The  cross,  the 
rosary,  relics,  and  other  accessories  of  worship  acquire  in 
the  mind  of  many  Christians  a  power  of  the  coercitive  type. 

1  "  From  the  moment  of  his  initiation,  his  life  [that  of  the  Melanesian  youth] 
is  sharply  marked  into  two  parts.  He  has  first  of  all  what  we  may  speak  of 
as  the  ordinary  life,  common  to  all  the  men  and  women,  associated  with  the 
procuring  of  food  and  the  performance  of  corrobhorees,  the  peaceful  monotony 
of  this  part  of  his  life  being  broken  now  and  again  by  the  excitement  of  a  fight. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  has  what  gradually  becomes  of  greater  and  greater 
importance  to  him,  and  that  is  the  portion  of  his  life  devoted  to  matters  of  a 
sacred  or  secret  nature.  As  he  grows  older  he  takes  an  increasing  share  in 
these,  until  finally  this  side  of  his  life  occupies  by  far  the  greater  part  of  his 
thoughts.  The  sacred  ceremonies  which  appear  very  trivial  matters  to  the 
civilized  man  are  most  serious  matters  to  him."      (Codrington,  R.  H.,  oJ>.  cit., 

PP-  33-34-) 

"  A  Catholic  missionary  observes  that  in  New  Guinea  the  fiepu  or  sorcerers 
are  everywhere.  .  .  .  Nothing  happens  without  the  sorcerer's  intervention  : 
wars,  marriages,  diseases,  deaths,  expeditions,  fishing,  hunting,  always  and 
everywhere  the  sorcerers."   (J.  G.  Frazer,  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I, 

P-  337-) 

According  to  Flinders  Petrie,  magic  was  a  main  part  of  the  beliefs  of  the 

Egyptians  of  the  early  kingdom  as  long  as  the  old  religion  lasted.  (^Aspects  of 
Egyptian  Religion,  Transactions  of  Third  International  Congress  of  the  His- 
tory of  Religions,  Vol.  I,  p.  192.) 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR       7 

Such  is,  for  instance,  the  case  when  the  sign  of  the  cross, 
of  itself,  without  the  mediation  of  God  or  Saint,  is  felt  to 
be  effective,  or  when  "  saying  one's  beads  "  is  held  to  pos- 
sess a  curative  virtue  of  the  kind  ascribed  to  sacred  relics 
by  the  superstitious.  Even  when  the  symbolism  of  the 
sign  of  the  cross,  and  the  meaning  of  the  Ave  Maria  are 
realized,  it  happens  not  infrequently  that  signing  oneself 
and  saying  one's  beads  are  regarded  as  acting  upon  the 
Virgin  Mary,  Jesus  Christ,  or  God  in  the  manner  of  an 
incantation,  i.e.  coercitively,  magically. 

It  is  commonly  said  that  religion  is  characterized  by 
specific  impulses  or  by  specific  purposes,  or  yet  by  specific 
emotions,  and  that  thus  it  differentiates  itself  from  the  rest 
of  life.  An  analysis  of  religious  life  discloses  the  falsity 
of  this  opinion.  Any  impulse,  any  desire,  may  lead  to  re- 
ligious activity,  and  in  it  no  type  of  emotion  is  to  be  found 
which  is  not  represented  also  outside.  The  fear  of  death, 
the  pain  of  hunger,  the  lust  of  the  flesh,  as  well  as  the  need 
of  affection,  of  fellowship,  of  moral  wholeness,  and  the 
self-sacrificing  cravings,  may,  one  and  all,  manifest  them- 
selves either  in  relisrious  or  in  secular  behavior.  That 
which  makes  life  reHgious,  in  the  historical  sense  of  the 
term,  is  standing  in  relation  with,  or  attempting  to  make 
use  of,  a  particular  kind  of  power.  The  will-to-live  comes 
to  expression  as  religion  when  an  appeal  is  made  to  a 
class  of  powers  which  may  be  roughly  characterized  as 
psychic,  superhuman,  and  usually,  but  not  necessarily, 
personal. 

As  religion  develops,  however,  certain  human  needs 
tend  to  be  excluded  from  it  and  to  appear  exclusively  in 
the  secular  life,  while  other  needs  become  at  particular 
stages  of  civilization  the  ordinary  and  perhaps  the  only 
stimuli   to  religious  life.     In  Christian   countries,  for   in- 


8  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

stance,  religious  means  would  not  be  used  to  secure  the 
gratification  of  desires  recognized  as  bad.  But  the  selection 
depends  not  upon  a  specifically  "reUgious"  quality  be- 
longing to  certain  desires  or  needs,  but  upon  quite  other 
causes,  such  as  the  character  attributed  to  the  object  of 
worship.  It  would,  for  instance,  be  absurd  to  expect  from 
a  god  that  of  which  he  does  not  approve.  And  if  he  were 
supposed  to  govern  the  physical  world  by  fixed  laws,  the 
logical  tendency  would  be  not  to  importune  him  concerning 
physical  matters,  but  to  seek  in  him  only  spiritual  comforts. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  religion  serves  more  and  more  exclu- 
sively in  the  attainment  or  preservation  of  that  which  is 
not  otherwise  easily  securable  and  of  that  which  it  is  found 
most  successful  in  securing. 

If  any  one  should  be  tempted  to  point  to  communion  or 
union  with  God  as  a  religious  need  per  se,  I  would  observe 
that  communion  with  God  is  a  way  of  dismissing  the  worry- 
ing complication  of  this  world,  of  escaping  a  dreaded  sense 
of  isolation,  of  entering  into  a  circle  of  solacing  and  elevat- 
ing thoughts  and  feelings,  of  forgetting  and  of  surmount- 
ing evil.  These  needs  are  felt  more  or  less  intensely  by 
all  men,  and  their  gratification  is  secured  by  non-religious 
as  well  as  by  religious  means.  So  that  it  is  not  the  needs 
which  are  distinctive  of  religion,  but  the  method  whereby 
they  are  gratified.  It  might  also  be  objected  that  the 
Happy  Hunting  Grounds  of  the  American  Indian,  the 
Paradise  of  the  Christian,  the  Nirvana  of  the  Buddhist,  are 
specific  religious  ends.  But  here  again  what  belong  ex- 
clusively to  rehgion  are  not  the  impulses,  the  desires,  and 
yearnings  to  which  these  conceptions  of  a  blessed  future 
owe  their  existence,  but  merely  the  conceptions  them- 
selves. A  similar  remark  would  be  equally  effective 
against  "  perfection,"  should  it  be  considered  a  specific 
religious  goal. 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR       9 

With  regard  to  the  emotions,  it  will  be  sufficient  to  re- 
mark here  that  neither  fear,  which  was  the  dominant 
emotion  in  perhaps  all  "primitive"  religions,  nor  the 
tender  emotions,  which  have  gradually  displaced  fear,  nor 
yet  awe,  reverence,  nor  any  other  namable  emotion  belongs 
exclusively  to  the  religious  life. 

Religion  has  sometimes  been  labelled  an  instinct.  But 
no  one  who,  following  contemporary  psychology,  under- 
stands by  instinct  an  action  performed  without  foresight  of 
the  end,  can  for  a  moment  regard  religion  as  an  instinct. 
It  is  of  course  true  that  religion  is  rooted  in  instinctive  im- 
pulses and  in  instincts,  —  in  fear,  acquisitiveness,  pugnacity, 
curiosity,  love,  etc.  The  religious  forms  of  behavior  have 
been  acquired  in  struggles,  both  blind  and  intelligent,  for 
the  gratification  of  instinctive  needs  and  the  fulfilment  of 
social  requirements.  But  the  relation  that  instinct  bears  to 
religion  is  no  other  than  that  obtaining  between  instinct 
and  commerce  or  any  complex  social  activity.  Instincts 
and  instinctive  tendencies  are  everywhere  to  be  found  as 
the  springs  of  human  action. 

In  a  subsequent  chapter  I  shall  try  to  show  that  the  be- 
liefs in  the  existence  of  agents  —  ghosts,  personified  natural 
phenomena,  creators  —  with  whom  man  feels  himself  in 
practical  relation  are  unavoidable  beliefs,  that  they  arise 
naturally  from  a  normal  use  of  ordinary  mental  powers,^ 
and  that,  in  their  crudest  forms,  they  are  but  Httle  beyond 
the  capacity  of  the  higher  animal.  The  origin  of  religion  is 
thus  entirely  within  the  powers  of  men,  even  of  the  crudest. 
If  the  terms  "  superhuman  "  and  "  supernatural  "  have  any 
relevancy  in  religion,  it  is  merely  with  reference  to  the  gods 

1  There  are,  no  doubt,  diseases  of  religion;  but  it  would  be  as  absurd  to 
brand  religion  itself  because  of  its  anomalies  as  it  would  be  to  condemn  the 
sexual  life  because  of  sexual  perverts. 


^1 


lO  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

and  their  action  on  man,  should  they  have  an  existence 
outside  the  mind  of  the  believer.  As  to  the  word  "  sacred," 
it  would  continue  to  have  validity  even  should  the  gods  be 
no  more  than  mental  creations;  but  then  only  in  the  sense 
in  which  sacredness  belongs  to  primordial  instincts  and  to 
the  loftier  purposes  which,  little  by  little,  appear  as  human 
nature  unfolds  its  fairest  aspects.  The  sacredness  of  reli- 
gion would  in  this  alternative  be  derived  solely  from  the 
sacredness  of  life :  of  generation,  of  birth  and  death,  of 
hunger  and  thirst,  of  love  and  hate,  of  joy  and  sorrow,  of 
good  and  evil.  Where  else  could  "  sacredness  "  find  more 
significant  and  potent  roots  .■• 

If  I  offer  the  alternative  between  the  objective  and  the 
merely  subjective  existence  of  the  gods,  it  is  simply  in  order 
not  to  prejudge  the  question.  I  cannot  persuade  myself 
that  divine  personal  beings,  be  they  primitive  gods  or  the 
Christian  Father,  have  more  than  a  subjective  existence. 
There  are,  however,  those  who  hold  that  no  other  proof  of 
the  truth  of  the  "  central "  belief  of  religion  is  needed  than 
its  endurance  in  diverse  forms  throughout  the  history  of 
mankind,  and  the  abundance  and  beauty  of  its  fruits. 
They  say  that  the  "naturalistic  "  theory  of  the  origin  of 
gods  must  be  rejected  because,  among  other  defects,  "  it 
makes  of  religious  beliefs  a  system  of  hallucinatory  images," 
a  "nightmare  of  untrained  minds";  "an  error,  and  espe- 
cially an  organized  system  of  errors,  could  not  endure."  The 
fact  is  that  even  though  the  gods  should  have  a  merely  sub- 
jective existence,  and  that  there  should  be,  therefore,  in 
religion,  low  and  high,  no  interference  of  divine  beings, 
nevertheless  its  origin,  its  continuance,  and  the  high  value 
;  attached  to  it  would  be  easily  explicable.  Let  us  pass 
in  review  the  benefits  which  would  accrue  to  mankind 
from  a  belief  in  non-existent  gods.     They  may  be  divided 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     ii 

into  the  effects  expected  by  the  worshipper  and  those  not 
expected. 

I.   The  advantages  sought  or  expected  by  the  worshipper. 

(a)  The  control  of  pJiysical  nature — making  rain,  ward- 
ing off  thunder,  guiding  the  arrow,  etc.  If  the  sum  total 
of  the  value  of  religion  to  primitive  man  consisted  in  these 
external  physical  effects,  the  non-objective  existence  of  his 
gods  would  involve  the  utter  inefficiency  of  his  religion. 
The  proof  of  this  inefficiency  is,  however,  not  easily  ob- 
tained. Need  the  reader  be  reminded  in  this  connection 
that  prayers  for  rain  are  still  offered  in  Christian  churches  .? 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  rain  ceremonies  are  not  infre- 
quently followed  more  or  less  closely  by  rain,  and  offer- 
ings for  success  in  the  hunt  are  often  apparently  rewarded 
according  to  expectation. 

{b)  The  action  of  gods  and  spirits  upon  human  bodies  and 
upon  the  mind.  —  It  is  here  that  abounds  what  must  to  the 
savage  appear  unquestionable  proof  of  the  effectiveness 
of  religion.  One  need  not  at  this  point  affirm  that  all 
these  effects  are  subjectively  caused.  It  is  sufficient  for 
the  present  purpose  to  note  the  confident  declaration  of 
science  regarding,  at  least,  most  of  them,  that  they  are  the 
outcome  of  the  influence  of  the  mind  upon  the  body. 
"  Suggestion  "  is  a  most  effective  agent  upon  the  credulous 
and  excitable  savage.  Many  cures  are,  no  doubt,  per- 
formed in  that  manner  by  the  medicine-men.  Davenport, 
speaking  of  tribes  of  Puget  Sound,  says :  "  Their  cure  for 
disease  consists  in  the  members  of  the  cult  shaking  in  a 
circle  about  a  sick  person,  dressed  in  ceremonial  costume. 
The  religious  practitioner  waves  a  cloth  in  front  of  the 
patient,  with  a  gentle  fanning  motion,  and,  blowing  at 
the  same  time,  proceeds  to  drive  the  disease  out  of  the 
body,  beginning  at  the  feet  and  working  upward.  The 
assistant  stands  ready  to  seize  the  disease  with  his  cloth. 


12  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

when  it  is  driven  out  of  the  head !  And  they  are  ready 
to  boast  of  many  real  cures."  ^  A  psychologist  is  not  in- 
clined to  doubt  the  report  of  Curr,  that  among  the  aborig- 
ines of  Victoria  persons  who  knew  themselves  to  have 
been  destined  to  destruction  with  magical  ceremonies  have 
pined  away  and  died  ;  ^  nor  that  of  Howitt,  who,  referring 
to  the  habit  of  the  medicine-men  of  certain  tribes  to  knock 
a  man  insensible  in  order  to  remove  the  kidney  fat  for 
magical  purposes,  writes,  "  In  the  Kurnai  tribe,  men  have 
died,  believing  themselves  to  have  been  deprived  of  their 
fat."^  Codrington  relates  the  following:  "A  striking 
story  was  told  me  by  Edwin  Sakalraw  of  Arra  of  what  he 
saw  himself.  A  man  in  that  islet  was  known  to  have  pre- 
pared a  tamatetiqa,  and  had  declared  his  intention  of 
shooting  his  enemy  with  it  at  an  approaching  feast ;  but 
he  would  not  tell  who  it  was  that  he  meant  to  kill,  lest 
some  friend  of  his  should  buy  back  the  power  of  the  charm 
from  the  wizard  who  had  prepared  it.  To  add  force  to 
the  ghostly  discharge,  he  fasted  so  many  days  before  the 
feast  began  that  when  the  day  arrived  he  was  too  weak  to 
walk.  When  the  people  had  assembled,  he  had  himself 
carried  out  and  set  down  at  the  edge  of  the  open  space 
where  the  dancing  would  go  on.  All  the  men  there  knew 
that  there  was  one  of  them  he  meant  to  shoot ;  no  one 
knew  whether  it  was  himself.  There  he  sat  as  the  dancers 
rapidly  passed  him  circling  round,  a  fearful  object,  black 
with  dirt,  and  wasted  to  a  skeleton  with  fasting,  his  tama- 
tetiqa within  his  closed  fingers,  stopped  with  his  thumb, 

^  Davenport,  F.  M.,  Primitive  Traits  in  Religious  Revivals,  Macmillan, 
(1905),  p.  36;  quoted  from  the  Fourteenth  Annual  Report  of  the  Amer. 
Bureau  of  Ethnology,  p.  761. 

2  Curr,  E.  M.,  The  Australian  Race,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  547,  as  quoted  by  Frazer, 
The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  13. 

'Howitt,  A.  W.,  The  Native  Races  of  South-East  Australia,  London,  Mac- 
millan, 1904,  p.  373. 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     13 

his  trembling  arms  stretched  out,  and  his  bleared  eyes 
watching  for  his  enemy.  Every  man  trembled  inwardly 
as  he  danced  by  him,  and  the  attention  of  the  whole 
crowd  was  fixed  on  him.  After  a  while,  bewildered  and 
dazed  by  his  own  weakness,  the  rapid  movement  of  the 
dancers,  and  the  noise,  he  mistook  his  man ;  he  raised  his 
arm  and  lifted  his  thumb.  The  man  he  aimed  at  fell  at 
once  upon  the  ground,  and  the  dancers  stopped.  Then 
he  saw  that  he  had  failed  and  that  the  wrong  man  was  hit, 
and  his  distress  was  great ;  but  the  man  who  had  fallen 
and  was  ready  to  expire,  when  he  was  made  to  understand 
that  no  harm  was  meant  to  him,  took  courage  again  to 
live,  and  presently  revived.  No  doubt  he  would  have 
died  if  the  mistake  had  not  been  known."  ^ 

When  religious  behavior  seems  at  times  to  be  effective 
upon  inanimate  nature,  thanks  to  coincidences,  and  at  other 
times  is  actually  effective  upon  human  bodies  —  sugges- 
tively, and  not,  as  the  savage  thinks,  through  the  action  of 
spirits  —  can  the  non-civihzed  man  be  expected  to  disabuse 
his  mind  of  the  belief  in  the  objective  existence  of  the  gods 
he  worships  ?  The  twentieth-century  school-trained  indi- 
vidual is  not  expected  to  do  so  much. 

2.  The  unsought  results  of  religion.  —  The  usefulness  of 
religion  illustrated  in  the  preceding  instances  would  per- 
haps of  itself  explain  its  continuance.  But  it  is  far  from 
the  whole  of  its  value.  The  most  noteworthy  of  the  by- 
products to  be  taken  into  account  are  :  — 

{a)  The  gratification  of  the  htst  for  power  and  of  the  de- 
sire for  social  recognition.  —  The  priest  is  the  mediator  be- 
tween mysterious,  superior  powers  and  his  fellow-men. 
His  sense  of  intimacy  with  these  powers,  and  the  fear, 
awe,  and  respect  with  which  he  is  regarded  by  the  people 
are  not  imaginary  values,  even  though  his  gods  should  be 

1  Codrington,  R.  H.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  205-206. 


14  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

unreal.  His  appreciation  of  these  advantages  would  tend 
to  make  him  disregard  the  disappointments  of  unrealized 
expectations  and  to  render  him  blind  to  a  natural  explana- 
tion of  his  successes. 

{d)  Less  obvious,  perhaps,  but  not  less  influential  is  f/ie 
general  mental  sthnulus  provided  by  the  ideas  of  ghosts^ 
hero-a?tcestors,  spij'its,  and  gods,  living  zinseen  in  one's  vicin- 
ity, intelligence  as  well  as  the  feelings  is  quickened.  The 
mere  belief  in  the  existence  in  a  supraterrestrial  world 
of  a  company  of  powerful,  mysterious  beings,  good  and 
bad,  stirs  the  imagination,  sets  into  activity  the  rational 
powers,  and  provides  objects  of  attention  able  to  sum- 
mon forth  in  the  struggle  for  life  the  hidden  potencies 
of  the  mind.  And  in  so  far  as  the  gods  are  held  to  be 
benevolent,  belief  in  them  generates  a  feeling  of  confidence 
and  optimism  which  is  of  high  dynamic  value.  This  dyna- 
mic value  of  religious  belief  must  be  reckoned  among  the 
mighty  influences  contributing  to  the  development  of  the 
human  race.  It  tends  to  keep  religion  alive,  indirectly 
through  the  operation  of  natural  selection,  and  directly 
through  the  attractiveness  and  stimulating  effect  of  the 
invisible  world. 

{c)  From  the  very  first,  gods  have  exercised  a  regulative, 
moralizing  influence,  for  they  have  been  made  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  ideals  of  the  community.  Thus  they  have 
been,  and  still  are,  powerful  factors  in  the  work  of  social 
consolidation,  whether  objectively  real  or  not.  The  unify- 
ing, socializing  power  of  religion  has,  perhaps,  nowhere 
been  so  strikingly  illustrated  as  among  the  ancient 
Hebrews,  and  more  recently  during  the  Christian  reorgan- 
ization of  the  ancient  world. 

One  may  therefore  affirm  with  confidence  that  the  mere 
belief  in  gods  may  of  itself  produce  results  sufficient  to  make 
of  religion  a  factor  of  the  highest  biological  importance,  if  I 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF   RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     15 

may  be  allowed  to  use  this  term  in  its  broadest  sense.  Its 
unsought  results  make  its  continuance  intelligible,  even  in 
the  face  of  repeated  failures  to  provide  the  things  solicited 
by  propitiation  and  prayer,  and  despite  the  intellectual 
doubts  arising  from  other  sources  in  the  later  phases  of  its 
development. 

The  foregoing  conception  of  religion  may  appear  to  some 
open  to  the  accusation  of  gross  utilitarianism.  They  will 
object  that  far  from  being  a  mere  scheme  of  self-protection 
and  self-aggrandizement,  religion  is  the  source  of  the 
noblest  feelings,  of  the  purest  and  loftiest  aspirations  of  the 
human  heart ;  and  they  will  mention  reverence,  resignation, 
and  self-sacrifice  as  the  very  essence  of  piety.  But  why 
should  any  one  understand  the  phrase  I  have  used,  "  grati- 
fication of  needs,  of  desires,"  to  refer  only  to  the  lowest 
needs  and  desires  ?  Self-sacrifice  as  an  ideal  is  not  incom- 
patible with  self-aggrandizement  in  the  comprehensive 
sense  in  which  I  take  the  word.  The  terms  indicate  rather 
two  aspects,  one  positive  and  the  other  negative,  of  one  and 
the  same  life-process ;  for,  if  certain  impulses  and  desires 
are  to  be  fostered,  others  must  be  suppressed.  If  the 
Buddhist  wages  war  upon  desire  that  he  may  be  delivered 
from  the  miseries  of  sorrow,  disease,  old  age,  death,  rebirth, 
it  is  in  order  to  obtain  the  endless  peace  of  Nirvana.  If 
the  Christian" renounces  the  flesh,  it  is  in  order  that  the 
spirit  may  live.  In  his  barbarous  self-renunciations,  the 
ascetic  manifests  a  greed  unsurpassed  in  intensity  by  that 
of  the  most  unrelenting  money-lender.  But  the  objects  of 
their  greed  are  of  different  orders  :  the  one  lusts  after 
things  of  this  world  ;  the  other  hungers  after  the  "  things  of 
the  spirit."  Those  who,  like  Tiele,  look  upon  adoration  as 
the  essence  of  all  religion,  have  to  recognize  that  it  includes 
"a  desire  to  possess  the  adored  object,  to  call  it  entirely 


1 6  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

one's  own."  The  goal  of  the  Christian  is  to  be  defined  in 
terms  both  of  self-sacrifice  and  of  self -increase  ;  these  terms 
represent  respectively  the  social  and  the  individualistic  side 
of  religion.^ 

Religion,  then,  like  the  rest  of  life,  is  concerned  with  the 
gratification  of  human  needs,  physical  and  spiritual ;  indi- 
vidual and  social ;  selfish  and  altruistic.  The  three  follow- 
ing prayers,  different  as  they  are  from  one  another,  belong 
with  equal  right  to  the  religious  life. 

"  I  wish  to  kill  a  Pawnee !  I  desire  to  bring  horses  when 
I  return,  I  long  to  pull  down  an  enemy !  I  promise  you 
a  calico  shirt  and  robe.  I  will  give  you  a  blanket  also,  O 
Wakanda,  if  you  allow  me  to  return  in  safety  after  killing 
a  Pawnee."  ^ 

"  If  God  will  be  with  me  and  will  keep  me  in  this  way 
that  I  go,  and  will  give  me  bread  to  eat  and  raiment  to  put 
on  so  that  I  come  again  to  my  father's  house  in  peace,  then 
shall  the  Lord  be  my  God.  And  this  stone  which  I  have 
set  up  for  a  pillar,  shall  be  God's  house ;  and  of  all  that 
God  shall  give  me,  I  will  surely  give  the  tenth  unto  thee." ' 

"  Not  my  will  but  Thine  be  done."* 

The  purpose  of  every  true  founder  of  religion  is  well 
expressed  in  the  words  attributed  to  Christ,  "  I  came  that 
they  may  have  life  and  may  have  it  abundantly." 

Since  the  end  of  religion  is  to  maintain  and  perfect  life, 
the  biological  point  of  view  affords  the  larger  and  more 
fruitful  outlook.     From  this  point  of  vantage  religion  ap- 

1"  Every  self-sacrifice  is  at  the  same  time  self-preservation,  namely  preserva- 
tion of  the  ideal  self  ;  indeed,  it  is  the  proudest  kind  of  self-assertion  for  me 
to  sacrifice  myself,  for  me  to  stake  my  life,  in  battling  for  a  good  which  I 
esteem  higher  than  my  life."     (Paulsen,  A  Systet?t  of  Ethics,  p.  389.) 

2  Dorsay,  G.  Owen,  A  Study  of  Siouan  Cults,  Eleventh  Amer.  Report 
Bureau  of  Ethnology,  1889-1890,  p.  376. 

8  Jacob  bargaining  for  Yahve's  assistance,  Genesis  xxviii,  20-22. 

^John  X.  10. 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     17 

pears  as  a  part  of  the  struggle  for  life ;  the  part  involving 
relations  with  superhuman,  psychic  powers,  real  or  imag- 
inary. 

In  its  earlier  stages,  when  the  individual  is  still  lost  in 
the  tribe,  the  gods  are  preeminently  national  gods,  and  the 
reUgious  end  is  a  national  one.  During  that  period  the  re- 
hgious  effort  aims  at  the  preservation  and  increase  of  the 
community.  At  a  later  time,  when  the  individual  has 
gained  a  clearer  sense  of  his  personality,  religion  may  pass 
through  an  individualistic  phase.  It  is  then  concerned 
essentially  with  subjective,  internal  experiences.  It  strives 
towards  the  establishment  of  inward  peace  by  the  triumph 
of  the  superior  impulses  and  tendencies.  In  persons  keenly 
sensitive  to  ethical  values  this  internal  warfare  claims  a 
large  share  of  attention.  It  may,  even  in  particular  cir- 
cumstances, determine  momentous  crises.  This  work  of 
inner  psychic  adaptation,  as  I  have  called  it  elsewhere,  is 
without  any  doubt  of  the  utmost  significance  to  the  devel- 
opment of  modern  society. 

But  whether  in  a  communistic  or  in  an  individualistic 
phase,  religion,  when  its  end  is  defined  as  preservation  and 
aggrandizement,  includes  the  two  directions  which  the  life 
instincts  necessarily  assume  in  individuals  living  in  society  : 
regard  for  self  and  regard  for  others  ;  egoism  and  altruism. 

Religion  should,  therefore,  be  looked  upon  as  a  func- 
tional part  of  hfe,  as  that  mode  of  behavior  in  the  struggle 
for  life  in  which  use  is  made  of  powers  characterized  here 
as  psychic,  superhuman,  and  usually  personal.  In  its  ob- 
jective manifestations,  reUgion  appears  as  attitudes,  rites, 
creeds,  and  institutions ;  in  its  subjective  expression,  it 
consists  of  impulses,  desires,  purposes,  feelings,  emotions, 
and  ideas  connected  with  the  religious  actions  and  institu- 
tions. According  to  this  biological  view  the  necessary  and 
natural  spring  of  religious  and  non-religious  life  alike  is  the 
c 


i8  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

"  procreant  urge  "  in  all  or  some  of  its  multiform  appear- 
ances. The  current  terms  "  religious  feelings,"  "religious 
desires,"  "  religious  purpose,"  are  deceptive,  if  they  are  in- 
tended to  designate  specific  affective  experiences  or  dis- 
tinctive desires  and  purposes.  It  is  the  belief  in  several 
kinds  of  powers  which  has  made  possible  the  differentia- 
tion of  types  of  behavior  and  in  particular  the  division 
into  secular  and  religious  life.  The  objective  existence  of 
personal  divinities  or  equivalent  psychic  powers  is  an  as- 
sumption necessary  to  religion  ;  but  the  mere  belief  in  their 
existence  is  quite  sufficient  to  account  for  the  important 
place  it  has  occupied  and  still  occupies  among  the  factors 
of  human  development. 

The  persistent  effort  to  maintain  life  and  realize  its  ideals 
through  the  assistance  of  religious  sources  of  power  has  re- 
sulted in  the  introduction  into  religion  of  peculiar  attitudes 
and  modes  of  consciousness  favorable  to  the  achieve- 
ment of  its  end.  Meditation,  contemplation,  the  faith- 
state,  trance,  ecstasy,  are  as  many  different  states  of  con- 
sciousness empirically  tried,  selected,  and  incorporated  into 
the  body  of  religious  practices  because  of  their  efficacy, 
an  efficacy  due  to  the  high  degree  of  suggestibility  they 
induce. 

Public  religious  practices  are  always  mixed  with  non- 
religious  activities.  —  Very  few  human  activities  proceed 
from  a  single  motive,  or  involve  but  one  means  of  secur- 
ing the  end  at  which  they  aim.  The  original  purpose  of 
a  horse  show  is  to  exhibit  fine  specimens  of  that  noble 
animal  and  to  increase  its  aesthetic  and  practical  value. 
But  a  horse  show  serves  several  other  purposes,  chief 
among  which  is  the  gratification  of  social  instincts.  The 
death  of  a  man  calls  for  a  memorial  service,  but  it  may  be- 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE   OF   RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     19 

come  the  occasion,  as  in  the  historical  case  of  M.  Valerius 
Levinus,  for  long  and  wild  festivities. 

Probably  no  activities  are  so  overlaid  with  extraneous 
accretions  as  are  the  religious.  This  fact  is  of  consider- 
able consequence ;  because  it  tends  not  only  to  conceal  the 
real  nature  of  religion,  but  also  to  make  it  seem  the  cause 
of  certain  results  due  partly  or  wholly  to  its  associates. 
Thus  there  arises  an  exaggerated  idea  of  the  value  of  re- 
ligion. This  gathering  of  disparate  activities  around  re- 
ligion I  purpose  to  illustrate  briefly. 

The  attempt  to  gain  one  and  the  same  end  by  two  dif- 
ferent modes  of  behavior  results  among  primitive  peoples 
in  the  well-known  association  of  magic  with  religion.  They 
are  so  closely  interwoven  that  many  students  of  prim- 
itive religion  have  not  been  able  to  separate  them,  and  so 
have  formed  wrong  notions  of  both. 

Among  the  North  American  Indians,  religious  practices 
have  become  connected  with  elaborate,  non-religious  func- 
tions aiming  at  social  and  aesthetic  pleasures.  A  good  ex- 
ample is  provided  in  the  Navajo  Great  Mountain  Chant.^ 
Its  purpose  of  curing  disease  is  obscured  to  a  large  extent 
by  the  addition  of  amusements.  During  a  considerable 
part  of  the  nine  days,  the  curing  of  disease  is  forgotten,  and 
the  people  enjoy  themselves  in  different  ways.  Among 
the  songs  not  connected  with  the  religious  and  magical 
ceremonies  proper  may  be  cited  the  purely  poetical  effusion 
called  The  Twelfth  Song  of  the  TJiimdcr :  — 

"  The  voice  that  beautifies  the  land  ! 
The  voice  above, 
The  voice  of  the  thunder 
Within  the  dark  cloud 
Again  and  again  it  sounds, 
The  voice  that  beautifies  the  land  ! 

^  See  especially  the  last  night's  entertainment  described  at  length  by  Dr. 
Washington  Matthews,  Fifth  Annual  Report  Bureau  of  Ethnology,  1883- 
1884,  pp.  431  ff. 


20  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

"  The  voice  that  beautifies  the  land  ! 
The  voice  below, 
The  voice  of  the  grasshopper 
Among  the  plants 
Again  and  again  it  sounds, 
The  voice  that  beautifies  the  land."  ^ 

"  The  ordinary  type  of  Hebrew  worship  was  essentially 
social,  for  in  antiquity  all  religion  was  the  affair  of  the 
community  rather  than  of  the  individual.  A  sacrifice 
was  a  public  ceremony  of  a  township,  or  of  a  clan,  and 
private  householders  were  accustomed  to  reserve  their 
offerings  for  the  annual  feasts,  satisfying  their  religious 
feelings  in  the  interval  by  vows  to  be  discharged  when  the 
festal  season  came  along.  Then  the  crowds  streamed  into 
the  sanctuary  from  all  sides,  dressed  in  their  gayest  attires, 
marching  joyfully  to  the  sound  of  music,  and  bearing  with 
them,  not  only  the  victims  appointed  for  the  sacrifice,  but 
stores  of  bread  and  wine  to  set  forth  the  feast.  The  law 
of  the  feast  was  open-handed  hospitality ;  no  sacrifice 
was  complete  without  guests,  and  portions  were  freely 
distributed  to  rich  and  poor  within  the  circle  of  a  man's 
acquaintance.  Universal  hilarity  prevailed,  men  ate,  drank, 
and  were  merry  together,  rejoicing  before  their  God.  .  .  . 
Everywhere  we  find  that  a  sacrifice  ordinarily  involves 
a  feast.  .  .  .  The  identity  of  religious  occasions  and 
festal  seasons  may  indeed  be  taken  as  the  determining 
characteristic  of  the  type  of  ancient  religion  gener- 
ally. .  .  ."2 

Everywhere  rehgious  ceremonies  have  served  as  the  nu- 
cleus around  which  gathered  attractions  of  the  most  va- 
ried kinds,  —  above  all,  those  dependent  upon  a  concourse 

^  A  Mountain  Chant,  Dr.  W.  Matthews,  Fifth  Annual  Report  Bureau  of 
Ethnology,  1883-1884,  pp.  379-467- 

'^  Smith,  W.  Robertson,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  pp.  236-237. 


RELIGION  AS  A  TYPE  OF  RATIONAL  BEHAVIOR     21 

of  people.^  From  the  hymns  sung  at  the  feasts  of  Dionysus 
arose  comedy ;  and  tragedy,  according  to  Aristotle,^  had 
a  similar  birth.  What  was  true  in  ancient  times  remains 
true  to-day.  Comparing  Protestantism  with  CathoUcism, 
WilHam  James  writes  :  "  The  latter  offers  a  so  much  richer 
pasturage  and  shade  to  the  fancy,  has  so  many  cells  with 
so  many  different  kinds  of  honey,  is  so  indulgent  in  its 
multiform  appeals  to  human  nature  that  Protestantism 
will  always  show  to  Catholic  eyes  the  almshouse  physi- 
ognomy." 3  And  yet  even  in  Protestant  worship  aesthetic 
delight  is  with  many  a  leading  motive.  One  of  my  corre- 
spondents writes,  for  instance  :  "  While  I  am  not  at  all 
musical,  sacred  music  affects  me  powerfully.  It  is  physi- 
cal pain  and  sweetest  rapture,  causing  extreme  exhilaration 
or  depression."  The  religious  interest  of  Protestants  can- 
not be  correctly  measured  by  church  attendance.  More 
than  one  thoughtful  person  has  described  the  American 
churches  as  social  clubs.  Meanwhile  the  church-going 
public,  and  even  outsiders,  credit  religion  with  all  the  good 
accomplished  by  the  congregations  ;  and  in  consequence 
belief  in  church  tenets  is  greatly  strengthened. 

As  long  as  religion  exists,  it  will  provide  the  best  illus- 
tration of  the  synergism  by  which  many  interests  manifest 
themselves  together  ;  and  therefore  the  majority  of  people 
will  continue  to  be  deceived  regarding  the  value  both  of 
religion  itself  and  of  its  tenets. 

The  natural,  naive  tendency  to  combine  diverse  interests 
and  pleasures  has  often  been  reenforced  by  a  deliberate 

1  See  the  festival  of  the  month  Quecholli  among  the  ancient  Mexicans, 
H.  H.  Bancroft,  Amative  Races,  Vol.  II,  pp.  334  flF.  Regarding  ancient 
Greece,  see  A.  Mommsen,  Feste  der  Stadt  Athen,  1S98,  pp.  349  ff.  ;  P.  Fou- 
cart,  Le  Culte  de  Dyonysos  en  Attique,  Memoire  de  I'lnstitut  National, 
Vol.  XXXVII,  Part  2,  pp.  107,  113-121. 

2  Aristotle,  Poetics,  Vol.  IV. 

3  James,  William,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  461. 


22  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

purpose  to  use  in  the  interest  of  religion  any  extraneous 
means  available.  One  may  grant  this  without  going  to 
the  length  of  claiming  with  von  Hartmann  that  "  the  ad- 
mission of  art  into  religious  services  has  never  been  any- 
thing else  but  a  secular  bait  to  entice  the  great  mass  of 
persons  in  whom  the  religious  sentiment  has  not  been 
strong  enough  by  itself  to  support  and  prolong  much  de- 
votion and  contemplation,  without  the  aid  of  such  external 
means  of  excitement."  ^ 

^  Hartmann,  Eduard  von.  The  Religion  of  the  Future,  p.  36. 


CHAPTER   II 

CONSTRUCTIVE    CRITICISM    OF    CURRENT  CONCEP- 
TIONS   OF    RELIGION^ 

A  FAVORITE  custom  among  the  more  philosophically  in- 
clined students  of  religion  has  been  to  condense  the  results 
of  their  labor  into  little  formulae  called  definitions  of  re- 
ligion. An  examination  of  several  typical  definitions  will 
serve  as  a  summary  of  past  and  present  opinions,  and  thus 
provide  an  historical  background  for  our  study.  The  dis- 
covery of  the  causes  of  the  obvious  contradictions  and  in- 
adequacies of  the  definitions  that  have  been  given  will 
pave  the  way  for  the  acceptance  of  the  more  inclusive 
concept  presented  in  the  preceding  chapter. 

It  must  be  admitted  that  the  lack  of  agreement  among 
students  of  religion  regarding  fundamental  points  affords 
a  rare  opportunity  to  the  scoffer  bent  on  disparaging  the 
value  of  their  work,  and  perhaps,  by  implication,  the 
value  of  religion  itself.  Martineau,  for  instance,  affirms 
that  religion  is  "  a  belief  in  an  Ever-living  God,  that  is,  a 
Divine  mind  and  will  ruhng  the  universe  and  holding  moral 
relation  with  mankind  "  ;  and  Romanes  adds,  "  To  speak 
of  the  religion  of  the  unknowable,  the  religion  of  Cosmism, 
the  religion  of  Humanity,  and  so  forth,  when  the  personal- 
ity of  the  First  Cause  is  not  recognized,  is  as  unmeaning  as 
it  would  be  to  speak  of  the  love  of  a  triangle  or  the  ration- 

^This  chapter  is  a  revision  and  a  development  of  a  paper  published  in  1901 
in  the  Monist,  under  the  title  Introduction  to  a  Psychological  Study  of  Religion. 

23 


24  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ality  of  the  equator."  ^  Brinton,  however,  flatly  contradicts 
them  both  :  "  No  mistake  could  be  greater  than  to  sup- 
pose that  every  creed  must  teach  a  behef  in  a  God  or  Gods, 
in  an  immortal  soul,  and  in  the  Divine  government  of  the 
world.  .  .  .  The  religion  of  to-day  which  counts  the  largest 
number  of  adherents,  Buddhism,  rejects  every  one  of  these 
items."  ^  Science,  anathematized  by  some  theologians,  is 
by  others  declared  to  be  a  twin  sister  to  religion.  "True 
science  and  true  religion  are  twin  sisters.  .  .  .  Science 
prospers  exactly  in  proportion  as  it  is  religious."  ^  "  The 
discipline  of  science  is  superior  to  that  of  our  ordinary 
education  because  of  the  religious  culture  it  gives."  * 
Some  thinkers  regard  religion,  even  in  its  crudest  begin- 
ning, as  the  admirable  manifestation  of  God  in  man  ;  others 
do  not  hesitate  to  term  it  mere  superstition,  the  product 
of  an  intellectual  error,  unavoidable  in  the  infancy  of 
mankind,  but  to  be  outgrown  as  soon  as  possible ;  and  a 
few  go  even  so  far  as  to  declare  religion  a  "  pathological 
manifestation."^ 

Despite  this  confusion,  a  classification  into  three  groups 
makes  room  for  most  of  the  more  seriously  established 
formulae.^  In  the  first  group,  a  specific  intellectual  function 
or  purpose  is  chosen  as  the  essence  or  the  distinguishing 
mark  of  religion  ;  in  the  second,  specific  feelings,  senti- 
ments, or  emotions  are  singled  out  as  the  religious  differ- 

^  Romanes,  G.  J.,  Thoughts  on  Religion.     See  also  Appendix,  p.  343. 

2  Brinton,  D.  G.,  Religions  of  Primitive  Peoples.     See  Appendix,  p.  358. 

2  Huxley,  Thomas.  *  Spencer,  Herbert,  Education. 

^  Sergi,  G.,  Les  Emotions,  p.  404. 

^  Several  other  classifications  are,  of  course,  possible.  See,  for  instance, 
that  of  Wundt  in  Appendix,  {Logic,  I,  chap.  2),  into  three  groups:  i.  the 
autonomous  theories  (Schleiermacher) ;  2.  the  metaphysical  theories  (Spencer 
and  Hegel);  3.  the  ethical  theories  (Kant).  I  give  preference  to  the  classi- 
fication in  the  text  because  it  brings  into  relief  the  faulty  psychology,  which  is 
responsible  for  so  large  a  share  in  the  lamentable  confusion  of  ideas  about 
religion. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  25 

entiae;  in  the  third,  the  will  —  this  term  being  used  in  its 
wider  meaning,  to  include  desire,  cravings,  and  impulses  — 
is  given  the  place  occupied  by  the  intellect  or  the  feelings 
in  the  other  groups.  According  to  this  last  view,  religion 
becomes  an  "instinct,"  or  a  particular  mode  of  behavior,  or 
an  endeavor  to  realize  a  certain  type  of  being.  One  or  two 
definitions  from  each  group  may  be  considered  here  by 
way  of  illustration.  There  are,  of  course,  definitions  which 
do  not  fall  completely  within  any  one  of  these  three  divisions, 
—  for  instance,  those  centering  around  the  notion  of  value. 
These  I  shall  consider  separately. 

First  class.  —  This  class  represents  what  may  be  called 
the  intellectual  attitude.  Martineau's  definition  quoted 
above  illustrates  this  point  of  view.  Romanes  holds  simi- 
larly that  "  religion  is  a  department  of  thought  having  for 
its  object  a  self-conscious  and  inteUigent  Being."  ^  Ac- 
coixling  to  Max  Miillcr  (see  Appendix),  religion  "is  a 
faculty  or  disposition,  which  independent  of,  nay  in  spite 
of,  sense  and  reason,  enables  man  to  apprehend  the  Infi- 
nite under  different  names  and  under  varying  disguises." 
In  his  Thcosophy'^  we  read  that  religion  is  a  bridge  between 
the  visible  and  material  world  and  the  invisible  and  spirit- 
ual world.  This  bridge  is  described  as  establishing  a  rela- 
tion between  the  Infinite  that  man  discovers  in  nature  and 
the  Infinite  that  he  discovers  in  himself.  These  Infinites  are 
such  particular  stuffs  that  a  special  faculty  is  needed  for 
their  apprehension  :  "  There  will  be  and  can  be  no  religion 
until  we  admit  that  there  is  in  man  a  third  faculty,  which  I 
call  simply  the  faculty  of  apprehending  the  Infinite,  not 
only  in  religion  but  in  all  things  —  a  power  independent  of 
sense  and  reason,  but  yet  a  very  real  power."     There  is 

1  Romanes,  G.  J.,  Thoughts  on  Religion,  1895,  P*  4^* 

2  Miiller,  Max,  Theosophy,  p.  360.     See  a  fuller  discussion  in  the  Appendix, 

P-  339- 


26  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

something  in  this  passage  which  makes  one  think  of  the 
Cabala. 

Max  Miiller's  conception  would  make  a  chasm  between 
religious  and  secular  life ;  but  a  definition  of  religion  in 
terms  so  widely  different  as  "a  mental  faculty,"  "  a  bridge 
between  the  visible  and  material  world  and  the  invisible 
and  spiritual  world,"  "an  apprehension  of  the  Infinite," 
"a  perception  of  the  Infinite,"  "a  concomitant  sentiment, 
or  presentiment  of  the  Infinite,"  can  hardly  be  taken  seri- 
ously. The  use  here  made  of  the  term  "infinite  "  reminds 
one  of  Felix  Holt's  remarks  concerning  "  those  who  have 
no  particular  talent  for  the  finite,  but  a  general  sense  that 
the  infinite  is  the  right  thing  for  them.  .  .  .  They  might 
just  as  well  boast  of  nausea  as  a  proof  of  a  strong  inside." 

Herbert  Spencer  may  stand  for  us  as  the  representative 
par  exccllejice  of  intellectualism  in  religion.  His  prob- 
lem in  First  Principles  is  to  find  some  fundamental  idea 
which  may  serve  as  a  basis  for  a  reconciliation  of  religion 
and  science.  After  passing  in  review  the  more  important 
religious  conceptions,  he  concludes  that  in  every  form  of 
religion  is  found  "  an  hypothesis  which  is  supposed  to 
render  the  Universe  comprehensible.  Nay,  even  that  which 
is  commonly  regarded  as  the  negation  of  all  Religion  — 
even  positive  Atheism  —  comes  within  the  definition ;  for 
it,  too,  in  asserting  the  self-existence  of  space,  matter,  and 
motion,  which  it  regards  as  adequate  causes  of  every  ap- 
pearance, propounds  an  a  priori  theory  from  which  it  holds 
the  facts  to  be  deducible.  Now  every  theory  tacitly  asserts 
two  things  :  first,  that  there  is  something  to  be  explained  ; 
secondly,  that  such  and  such  is  the  explanation.  Hence, 
however  widely  different  speculators  may  disagree  in  the 
solutions  they  give  of  the  same  problem,  yet  by  implica- 
tion they  agree  that  there  is  a  problem  to  be  solved.  Here, 
then,  is  an  element  which  all  creeds  have  in  common.     Re- 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  27 

ligions,  diametrically  opposed  in  their  overt  dogmas,  are 
yet  perfectly  at  one  in  the  tacit  conviction  that  the  existence 
of  the  world  with  all  it  contains  and  all  which  surrounds  it 
is  a  mystery  ever  pressing  for  interpretation.  On  this 
point,  if  on  no  other,  there  is  entire  unanimity." 

"  That  this  is  the  vital  element  in  all  religions  is  further 
proved  by  the  fact  that  it  is  the  element  which  not  only 
survives  every  change,  but  grows  more  distinct  the  more 
highly  the  religion  is  developed." 

"  Nor  does  the  evidence  end  here.  Not  only  is  the 
omnipresence  of  something  which  passes  comprehension, 
that  most  abstract  belief  which  is  common  to  all  religions, 
which  becomes  the  more  distinct  in  proportion  as  they  de- 
velop, and  which  remains  after  their  discordant  elements 
have  been  mutually  cancelled  ;  but  it  is  that  belief  which 
the  most  unsparing  criticism  of  each  leaves  unquestionable 
—  or  rather  makes  ever  clearer.  It  has  nothing  to  fear 
from  the  most  inexorable  logic ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  is  a 
belief  which  the  most  inexorable  logic  shows  to  be  more 
profoundly  true  than  any  religion  supposes.  For  every 
religion,  setting  out  though  it  does  with  the  tacit  assertion 
of  a  mystery,  forthwith  proceeds  to  give  some  solution  of 
this  mystery,  and  so  asserts  that  it  is  not  a  mystery  passing 
human  comprehension.  But  an  examination  of  the  solu- 
tions they  severally  propound  shows  them  to  be  uniformly 
invalid.  The  analysis  of  every  possible  hypothesis  proves, 
not  simply  that  no  hypothesis  is  sufficient,  but  that  no  hy- 
pothesis is  even  thinkable.  And  thus  the  mystery,  which 
all  religions  recognize,  turns  out  to  be  a  far  more  tran- 
scendent mystery  than  any  of  them  suspect  —  not  a  rela- 
tive, but  an  absolute  mystery. 

"  Here,  then,  is  an  ultimate  religious  truth  of  the  highest 
possible  certainty."  ^ 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  First  Principles,  pp.  43-46,  abbreviated.  See  also 
Appendbc. 


28  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  primary  dependence  of  religion  upon  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  great  mystery  is  once  more  emphasized  in  the 
chapter  on  "  The  Reconciliation,"  in  which  he  declares 
that  what  makes  a  religion  become  more  religious  is  that  it 
"rejects  those  definite  and  simple  interpretations  of  nature 
previously  given."  "That  which  in  religion  is  irreligious 
is,  that,  contradicting  its  deepest  truth,  it  has  all  along 
professed  to  have  some  knowledge  of  that  which  transcends 
knowledge ;  and  has  so  contradicted  its  own  teachings," 
its  supreme  verity. 

The  criticism  to  be  passed  upon  Spencer  is  that  he  does 
not  treat  of  religion  at  all.  The  recognition  of  a  mystery 
pressing  for  interpretation  may  be  at  the  beginning  of 
philosophical  thinking,  but  the  "insoluble  mystery"  is  res- 
olutely set  aside  by  the  religious  consciousness.  Religion 
begins  when  the  tnystery  has  been  given  some  solution,  naive 
or  critical,  making  possible  practical  relations  with  the 
"  ultimate."  The  fact  that  positive  Atheism  falls  within 
Spencer's  definition  of  religion  shows  sufficiently  that  he  is 
concerned  with  philosophical  conceptions  or  assumptions 
implied  in  religion,  and  not  with  religion  itself. 

The  value  of  religion  to  humanity  has  been,  and  is,  in- 
comparably greater  than  the  value  assigned  to  it  in  these 
quotations.  If  me  71  have  ^^  lived  by  religion^'  it  is  not  be- 
cause they  have  recognised  the  mystery,  but  rather  bccatise 
they  have,  in  their  1  merit ical purposive  way,  transcended  the 
mystery,  and  have  posited  a  solutioji  of  which  they  were 
able  to  make  practical  tise. 

Religion  differentiated  from  pJiilosophy.  —  The  confusion 
of  pedagogical  theories  with  education,  or  of  aesthetic 
theories  with  art,  seems  impossible,  yet  just  such  an  error, 
in  the  sphere  of  rehgion,  is  made  by  those  who  uphold 
conceptions  of  the  intellectual  class ;  the  philosophy  of 
religion  is  confused  by  them  with  religion  itself.     This 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS   OF  RELIGION  29 

error  is  the  outcome  of  an  illusion  to  which  the  philosopher 
is  most  susceptible  :  to  the  thinker,  nothing  is  so  real  as  the 
thought  processes.  It  is  unnecessary  to  review  at  this 
point  the  mischief  wrought  by  intellectualism  in  religion ; 
but  it  may  be  noted  in  passing  that  to  its  influence  is  due 
the  regrettable  fact  that  the  formulation  of  rational 
grounds  for  the  belief  in  God  and  the  determination  of  his 
attributes,  a  purely  ontological  question,  has  become  for 
many  the  only  religious  problem. 

Where  is  to  be  drawn  the  line  of  demarcation  between 
religion  and  philosophy }  Professor  Fraser  in  his  Gifford 
Lectures  ^  takes  up  a  purely  philosophical  question  —  the 
philosophy  of  Theism  —  which  he  formulates  thus:  "Is 
the  immeasurable  reahty  in  which  I  find  myself  living,  and 
moving,  and  having  my  being,  rooted  in  Active,  Moral 
Reason,  and  therefore  absolutely  worthy  of  faith ;  or  is  it 
hollow  and  hopeless  because  at  last  without  meaning  ? " 
He  states  in  this  passage  not  only  his  problem,  but  also  his 
motives  for  deaHng  with  it.  The  latter  are  even  more 
clearly  formulated  in  the  following :  "  Reflecting  men  have 
been  moved  to  the  final  inquiry  because  they  wanted  to  find 
reasonable  security  that  the  commonly  supposed  Cosmos 
is  not  finally  chaos,  so  that  the  world  may  be  trusted 
in.  ,  .  ."  And  again  elsewhere,  "  According  to  the  an- 
swer practically  given  to  this  question,  our  surroundings 
and  our  future  are  viewed  with  an  ineradicable  expectation 
and  hope,  or  with  literally  unutterable  doubt  and  despair. 
It  is  this  question  which  Natural  Theology  in  the  widest 
sense  of  the  term  has  to  determine."  The  motive  for  the 
metaphysical  activity  of  this  writer  is  thus  clearly  stated. 
He  turns  to  the  ultimate  problem  because  he  cannot  live 
contented  without  the  assurance  that  Moral  Reason  rules. 
Suppose,  now,  that  at  some  point  in  his  meditations  he 

1  Fraser,  Alexander  Campbell,  Tie  Philosophy  of  Theism,  pp.  22,  23. 


30  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

became  impressed  with  the  strength  of  his  arguments, 
and  suddenly  felt,  as  men  at  times  do  feel,  something 
which  he  thought  to  be  the  presence  about  him  of  the 
Great  Spirit,  and  that  for  a  moment  he  entered  into  dy- 
namic relation  with  it,  was  attuned  to  the  universal  har- 
monies, and  that  out  of  this  experience  proceeded  a  sense 
of  peace,  of  confidence,  of  strength.  An  experience  such 
as  this  is  common  with  those  who  are  religiously  inclined; 
it  is,  in  fact,  the  very  essence  of  mystical  communion. 
This  attitude  would,  of  course,  be  clearly  and  radically  dif- 
ferent from  that  in  which  the  book  was  thought  out  and 
written.  The  latter  is  characterized  by  the  presence  of  a 
desire  to  solve  a  problem  and  the  consequent  starting  of 
the  mental  machinery  by  which  knowledge  is  gathered  and 
dealt  with  according  to  logical  canons.  In  the  former,  a 
solution  is  accepted,  albeit  temporarily,  and  is  used  to 
gratify  the  needs  the  author  has  declared  to  be  the  motive 
for  his  work. 

The  religious  experience  consists,  not  in  seeking  to  under- 
stand God,  but  in  feeding  upon  Him,  in  finding  strength 
and  joy  in  Him.  Now,  it  is  a  fact  that  not  only  the  intel- 
lectually gifted,  but  also  the  commonplace  person  passes 
more  or  less  frequently  from  the  religious  to  the  philosoph- 
ical attitude.  Tom,  Dick,  and  Harry  may  rise  from  their 
knees  to  become  metaphysicians,  and  declare  that  they 
see  plainly  "  the  logical  necessity  of  the  more  produc- 
ing the  less;  the  capacity  of  the  more  to  produce  the  less; 
and  therefore  the  eternal  preexistence  of  the  Perfect,  of 
the  Omnipotent,  of  the  Absolute,  of  God."  ^  My  conten- 
tion is  for  the  recognition  of  the  radical  difference  of  these 
two  attitudes  and  for  the  admission  that  we  have  in  this 
difference  the  true  ground  of  separation  between  philosophy 
and   religion.     Philosophy  searches   for  explanations,  for 

J  Arreat,  L.,  Le  Sentiment  Religieux  en  France,  Appendix,  Observation  G. 


CURRENT   CONCEPTIONS  OF   RELIGION  31 

intellectual  unification  ;  religion  assumes  knowledge  and 
maintains  dynamic  relations  with  psychic  powers  greater 
than  man.  The  distinction  may  be  expressed  thus :  the^ 
religious  consciousness  seeks  being ;  the  philosophical 
consciousness  seeks  knowledge.  Considered  from  the 
intellectual  side,  religion  postulates,  philosophy  inquires. 
Both  are  normal  forms  of  consciousness.  In  the  twinkling 
of  an  eye  consciousness  passes  from  one  attitude  to  the 
other,  now  religious  and  now  philosophical,  in  rapid  alter- 
nation. In  religion,  God  is  felt  and  used.  So  long  as  He 
proves  Himself  sufficiently  useful.  His  right  to  remain 
in  the  service  of  man  is  unquestioned.  The  religious 
consciousness  asks  for  no  more.  Does  God  really  exist.'' 
how  does  He  exist.^  what  is  He .-'  are  questions  held  to 
be  satisfactorily  answered  by  the  gratification  of  man's 
needs.^  The  religious  consciousness  refuses  to  deal  with 
intellectual  problems.  It  will  not  make  life  wait  upon 
logical  solutions  ;  instead,  it  adopts  working  hypotheses. 

The  fact  that  in  both  attitudes  God  may,  in  a  sense,  be  the 
goal  of  one's  desire  and  effort,  and  that  one  passes  with 
ease  and  frequency  from  one  attitude  to  the  other,  accounts 
for  much  of  the  difficulty  experienced  in  separating  the 
philosophy  of  religion  from  religion  itself.  In  some  per- 
sons, the  two  are  so  inextricably  bound  up  with  each  other 
that  it  seems  as  if  every  momc  .t  of  their  existence  were 
both  religious  and  speculative. 

The  desire  for  knowledge,  however,  is  not  excluded 
from  the  religious  life ;  all  desires,  all  needs,  may  be 
springs  of  religious  life,  but  under  this  condition,  —  that 
the   gratification    of   these   desires   be  sought  through   a 

1  Ample  substantiation  of  this  statement  will  be  given  in  the  forthcoming 
studies.  The  interested  reader  can  find  some  documents  bearing  on  this 
point  in  the  Monist,  Vol.  XI  (1901),  pp.  536-573,  and  in  Studies  in  the  Psy- 
chology of  Religious  Phenomena,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  309-385. 


32  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

psychic,  superhuman  power.  Then,  and  only  then,  will 
the  desire  for  knowledge  make  a  part  of  a  religious 
moment  This  condition  is,  of  course,  not  realized  by  philos- 
ophers of  the  type  of  Professor  Fraser,  Maine  de  Biran,  or 
William  James.  However  ardently  they  may  seek  for  a 
source  of  religious  power,  they  do  not  expect  to  be  put  in 
possession  of  it  by  way  of  answer  to  prayer,  or  as  the 
result  of  any  form  of  mystical  communion.  The  value  of 
their  work  to  religion  is  evidently  not  a  legitimate  ground 
for  identifying  their  philosophical  search  after  God  with 
religion. 

Luther  and  Saint  Augustine  were  too  profoundly  reli- 
gious to  fall  into  the  errors  of  intellectuaHsm.  "  How  then 
do  I  seek  Thee,  O  Lord  .-* "  exclaims  the  Bishop  of  Hippo, 
and  he  answers,  "  When  I  seek  Thee,  my  God,  I  seek  a 
happy  life.  I  will  seek  Thee  that  my  soul  may  live.  For 
my  body  liveth  by  my  soul ;  and  my  soul  by  Thee."  ^  In 
the  following  comment  on  the  first  commandment  in  the 
Longer  Catechism,  Luther  carries  one's  thought  forward  to 
Feuerbach's  radical  belief  that  the  gods  are  the  children  of 
man's  thirst  for  happiness.  "  What  is  it  to  have  a  God,  or 
what  is  God  .■'  A  God  denotes  that  something  by  means 
of  which  man  shall  be  aware  of  all  good  things  and  wherein 
he  shall  have  a  refuge  in  every  necessity." 

Second  class.  —  In  the  second  class  of  definition,  a  par- 
ticular emotion  or  sentiment,  usually  termed  "  feeling,"  is 
seized  upon  as  the  religious  differentia.  The  affective 
experiences  most  frequently  singled  out  for  this  purpose 
are  fear,  awe,  reverence,  adoration,  piety,  dependence,  love, 
and  "cosmic  feeling."  For  Herbart,  "sympathy  with  the 
universal  dependence  of  man  is  the  essential  natural  prin- 

^  Augustine,  Saint,  Confessions,  Bk.  X,  29,  p.  198  (Pusey's  translation  in  the 
Library  of  the  Fathers). 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS    OF  RELIGION  33 

ciple  of  all  religion."  ^  Hoffding,  although  hardly  to  be 
classed  here,  gives  predominance  to  feeling.  The  essence 
of  religious  experience  is,  according  to  him,  the  religious 
feeling,  i.e.  "  a  feeling  determined  by  the  fate  of  values  in 
the  struggle  for  existence."  Dependence  is  conspicuous 
in  many  definitions ;  in  that  of  Tiele,  for  instance,  who 
describes  the  essence  of  religion  as  "  that  pure  and  reveren- 
tial disposition  or  frame  of  mind  which  we  call  piety." 
"  The  essence  of  piety,  and  therefore  the  essence  of  religion 
itself,  is  adoration  .  .  .  adoration  necessarily  involves  the 
elements  of  holy  awe,  humble  reverence,  grateful  acknowl- 
edgment of  every  token  of  love,  hopeful  confidence,  lowly 
self-abasement,  a  deep  sense  of  one's  own  unworthiness  and 
shortcomings,  total  self-abnegation,  and  unconditional  con- 
secration of  one's  whole  Hfe,  of  one's  whole  faculties.  .  .  . 
But  at  the  same  time  —  therein  consists  its  other  phase  — 
adoration  includes  a  desire  to  possess  the  adored  object, 
to  call  it  entirely  one's  own."  ^ 

Schleiermacher  is  the  best-known  representative  of  this 
class.  In  his  celebrated  Discourse  on  the  Nature  of  Religion,  ^ 
he  attacks  vigorously  the  intellectual  conception :  "  Religion 
cannot  and  will  not  originate  in  the  pure  impulse  to 
know.  .  .  .  What  you  may  know  or  believe  about  the 
nature  of  things  is  far  beneath  the  sphere  of  rehgion.  .  .  . 
Any  effort  to  penetrate  into  the  nature  or  the  substance  of 
things  is  no  longer  religion,  but  seeks  to  be  a  science  of 
some  sort."  The  peculiar  sphere  of  religion  "  is  neither 
thinking  nor  acting,  but  intuition  and  feehng,"  —  the  feel- 
ing  that   arises   in   the  contemplation  of   any   particular 

1  Herbart,  J.  F.,  Science  0/ Education,  Heath,  p.  171. 

2  Tiele,  C.  P.,  Elements  of  the  Science  of  Religion.,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1 98- 1 99. 
See  also  Appendix,  p.  348. 

3  Schleiermacher,  F.,  The  Nature  of  Religion,  pp.  49,  57,  etc.  See  also 
Appendix,  p.  346. 

D 


34  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

object,  i.e.  of  any  part  of  the  Universe  when  it  is  received, 
felt,  as  a  part  of  the  whole.  And  again,  speaking  of  the 
conception  of  God  and  of  immortality,  he  writes :  "  Only 
what  in  either  is  feeling  or  immediate  consciousness  can 
belong  to  religion."  Pure  religion  is  pure  feeling;  that  is, 
feeling  disconnected  from  thought  and  from  action : 
"  What  we  feel  and  are  conscious  of  in  religious  emotions 
is  the  operation  of  things  upon  us,  not  our  reaction  to  the 
received  impressions."  "  If  you  could  imagine  it  implanted 
in  man  quite  alone,  it  would  produce  neither  these  nor  any 
other  deed.  The  man  .  .  .  would  not  act,  he  would  only 
feel."  In  a  subsequent  work.  The  Doctrine  of  Faith,  he 
reaches  the  well-known  formula,  "  The  essence  of  religion 
consists  in  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  upon  God." 

This  class  of  definition  reminds  one  of  Faust's  exclama- 
tion :  — 

«  Nenn's  Cluck  !     Herz  !     Liebe  !    Gott  ! 
Ich  habe  keinen  Namen 
Dafiir,  Gefiihl  ist  alles." 

How  is  one  to  account  for  conceptions  apparently  so 
utterly  at  variance  as  are  those  falling  under  the  intel- 
lectual and  the  affective  classes  .-'  It  is,  of  course,  true  that 
in  order  to  enter  into  relation  with  the  divine  power,  one 
must  have  "  thought  "  it ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
religion  rests  upon  various  conceptions  regarding  the  world 
and  man.  But  to  identify  that  philosophical  basis,  or  the 
search  for  it,  with  religion  itself  shows  a  misunderstanding 
of  the  facts.  It  is  also  true  that  there  are  present  in  reli- 
gious life  feelings,  emotions,  and  sentiments,  commonly 
tenacious  and  intense ;  but  to  use  them  as  a  means  of  dif- 
ferentiating religion  from  the  rest  of  life  is  to  give  proof  of 
ignorance  as  to  the  place  of  feeling  in  our  life.  A  belief 
or  a  feeling  can  at  best  constitute  a  prominent  or  a  domi- 
nant component  of  the  total  religious  experience ;  but  prom- 


CURRENT   CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  35 

inence  or  dominance  is  not  synonymous  with  "  essence " 
or  with  "  vital  element."  The  error  of  the  definitions  we 
have  considered  consists  in  identifying  with  religion  itself 
mere  aspects  of  religious  life. 

One  of  the  fundamental  and  best  established  generaliza- 
tions of  psychology  is  that  tlie  unit  of  conscious  life  is 
neither  thought  nor  feeling,  but  both  of  them  in  a  synthe- 
sis, cooperating  toward  the  attainment  of  an  end.  This 
fact  contains  in  itself  a  sufficient  condemnation  of  any 
definition  which  singles  out  one  or  the  other  of  these  com- 
ponents as  constituting  religion  or  the  essence  of  religion. 
I  shall  reserve  until  later  the  development  of, this  funda- 
mental argument,  and  shall  limit  myself  for  the  present  to 
showing  that  not  one  of  the  "  feehngs  "  used  in  the  defi- 
nitions of  the  second  class  is  really  distinctive  of  religion. 
These  feelings  are  all  met  with  in  the  secular  life  as  well. 
They  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  means  of  unequivocal  discrim- 
ination between  the  religious  and  non-rehgious  experience. 
That  this  is  true  of  fear,  of  awe,  of  reverence,  cannot  be 
denied.  The  feeling  of  dependence  cannot  serve  any  more 
effectively  than  fear  as  a  distinctive  characteristic  of  reli- 
gion. A  feeling  of  dependence  is  the  ever  present  back- 
ground of  human  and,  I  suppose,  of  higher  animal  life. 
No  beings  express  a  more  pathetic  sense  of  dependence 
than  certain  of  our  domestic  animals.  In  all  human  rela- 
tions, business,  social,  or  religious,' the  consciousness  of  de- 
pendence lurks  in  the  background,  when  it  does  not  obtrude 
itself  upon  us.  How  then  could  religion  be  made  to  cover 
every  experience  dominated  by  a  feeling  of  dependence  } 
But  the  meaning  of  Schleiermacher,  it  may  be  urged,  is  that 
only  one  variety  of  the  feeling  of  dependence  constitutes 
religion, —  the  variety  arising,  as  he  puts  it,  when  any  part 
of  the  universe  is  experienced  or  felt  as  a  part  of  the  whole, 


36  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

"  not  as  limited  and  in  opposition  to  other  things,  but  as 
an  exhibition  of  the  infinite  in  our  lives."  ^  To  hold  that 
the  larger  power  upon  which  one  feels  dependent  is,  in  the 
case  of  religion,  necessarily  infinite  is  to  misinterpret  ordi- 
nary experience.  In  his  religious  moments,  man  is  not,  as 
we  shall  see  in  another  section,  usually  conscious  of  dealing 
with  the  unlimited.  His  transactions  take  place  between 
himself  and  a  greater  power,  the  degree  of  greatness  of 
which  he  does  not  usually  consider.  He  may  be  ready  to 
admit,  if  not  the  inferiority  of  his  deity,  at  least  the  exist- 
ence by  his  side  of  other  deities,  each  omnipresent  in  his 
own  sphere.  But  even  if  the  object  of  the  feeling  of  de- 
pendence were  in  rehgion  always  the  Whole,  the  Infinite,  it 
would  still  be  futile  to  try  to  use  the  feeling  of  depend- 
ence arising  out  of  that  situation  as  a  means  of  differentiat- 
ing religious  from  non-religious  life.  Between  the  feeling  of 
dependence  upon  the  Whole  and  the  feeling  of  dependence 
upon  the  Larger,  the  Greater,  there  exists  no  introspective 
difference  sufficient  to  make  discrimination  possible.  If, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  discriminate  without  hesitation,  be- 
tween the  feeling  of  dependence  upon  Wall  Street,  upon  a 
father,  upon  Yahve,  upon  a  mistress,  or  upon  the  Absolute, 
it  is  not  because  the  feeling  is  in  each  case  qualitatively  dif- 
ferent, but  because  the  objects  are  clearly  distinguishable. 
Similarly,  it  is  the  difference  in  the  object  or  in  the  deter- 
mining cause  of  fear  and  love  that  makes  possible  discrimi- 
nation between  religious  and  secular  fear  and  love.  And 
when  external  perceptions  are  slighted,  confusion  is  apt  to 
take  place.  For  instance,  Madame  Guyon  in  her  relations 
with  her  confessor,  Father  LaCombe,  came  to  the  point 
where  Father  LaCombe  and  God  fused  together,  as  it  were. 
She  admits  with  some  nalvet6  that  "  Ce  n'etait  plus  qu'une 
entiere  unite,  cela  de  mani^re  que  je  ne  pouvais  plus  le  dis- 

1   Schleiermacher,  op.  cit.,  p.  49. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  37 

tinguer  de  Dieu."^  The  Christian  mystics  frequently  use 
God  and  Christ  interchangeably.  Even  the  Virgin  Mary 
may  lose  her  identity  and  be  assimilated  to  Christ  and  God. 
This  vagary  does  not  matter  to  these  mystics,  since  what 
they  want  is  the  affective  experience.  I  do  not  mean  to 
affirm  that  the  emotion  or  sentiment  remains  necessarily 
strictly  the  same  when  the  object  changes,  but  only  that  the 
affective  experiences  characteristic  of  our  relations  with 
religious  objects  are  not,  on  affective  grounds,  usually  intro- 
spectively  separable  from  other  affective  experiences  of 
the  same  sort,  and  cannot,  therefore,  provide  the  needed 
ground  of  differentiation. 

Concerning  "adoration  "  as  a  means  of  differentiation,  it 
must  be  said  that  the  expression  "feeling  of  adoration,"  as 
commonly  used,  designates  not  one  specific  emotion,  but  a 
sequence  of  complex  emotions  and  sentiments.  Awe, 
reverence,  respect,  admiration,  dependence,  love,  etc.,  may 
all  enter,  combined  and  in  sequence,  into  the  affective  ex- 
perience accompanying  the  act  or  attitude  called  adoration. 

It  is  somewhat  surprising  that  the  definitions  I  have 
cited,  and  others  like  them,  have  apparently  been  so  fruit- 
ful a  source  of  satisfaction  and  comfort.  Who  would  not 
regard  as  ridiculous  such  definitions  as  these :  trade  is  a 
belief  in  the  productivity  of  exchange  ;  commerce  is  greed 
touched  with  a  feeling  of  dependence  on  society  ;  morahty 
is  a  belief  in  virtue ;  virtue  is  a  feeling  of  absolute  depen- 
dence upon  truth  .■'  Absurd  as  these  are,  they  are  neither 
worse  nor  better  than  many  a  far-famed  definition  of 
religion. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is,  then,  that  each  and  every 
human  emotion  and  sentiment  may  appear  in  religion,  and 
that  no  affective  experience  as  such  is  distinctive  of  religious 
life.     The  temperament  of  the  worshipper,  his  habits,  the 

1  Madame  Guyon,  Autobiography. 


38  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

nature  he  attributes  to  his  God,  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  finds  himself,  —  all  these  determine  the  affective 
character  of  his  religious  experiences.  It  may  be  domi- 
nantly  fear,  or  awe,  or  reverence,  or  love.  In  any  case,  a 
sense  of  dependence,  more  or  less  complete,  is  necessarily 
present,  as  in  every  kind  of  relation  whatsoever.  The 
differentiation  is  made  possible,  not  by  the  affective  ex- 
perience itself,  but  by  the  idea,  or  group  of  ideas,  constitut- 
ing its  object.  The  expression  "  religious  feeling,"  when 
it  is  understood  to  designate  affective  experiences  specific 
to  religious  life,  is,  therefore,  misleading.^ 

Third  class.  —  It  must  be  admitted  that  many  of  the 
more  recent  definitions  of  religion  are  based  upon  a  better 
psychology  than  are  those  I  have  criticised.  Such  are  the 
definitions  of  Feuerbach,  Schopenhauer,  Comte,  Sabatier, 
Reville,  and  those  of  most  anthropologists.  Religion  is 
now  rarely  defined  by  means  of  one,  and  only  one,  aspect  of 
mental  life ;  more  inclusive  terms  are  used.  It  is  not  in- 
frequently described  as  "the  consciousness  of  our  practical 
relation  to  an  invisible  spiritual  order."  Now  practical  re- 
lations necessarily  include  states  of  feeling  as  well  as  pur- 
poses ;  they  involve  the  whole  man.  The  following  illus- 
trations will  show  what  room  remains  for  divergences 
within  the  general  conception. 

No  one  before  Feuerbach  had  seen  so  clearly  as  he  the 
creative  role  of  desire  in  the  making  of  gods  and  religions; 
or,  at  any  rate,  no  one  had  attempted  to  explain  so  fully 
the  Christian  religion  as  entirely  the  product  of  man's  "in- 
stinct for  happiness."     The  following  quotation  illustrates 

^  Comp.  pp.  I2I-I22,  125  ff.,  341-342  of  Professor  Stratton's  book,  The 
Psychology  of  the  Religious  Life,  London,  George  Allen  &  Co.,  1911.  This 
valuable  book,  written  on  the  whole  with  a  concern  for  problems  other  than 
those  dealt  with  in  the  present  volume,  reached  me  when  mine  was  already 
in  the  hands  of  the  publisher. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF   RELIGION  39 

his  position :  "  In  short,  religion  has  essentially  a  practical 
aim  and  foundation.  The  instinct  from  which  reUgion 
arises  is  the  instinct  for  happiness."  ^  Again  he  says  : 
"  Man  believes  in  God  not  only  because  he  has  imagination 
and  feeling,  but  also  because  he  has  the  instinct  for  happi- 
ness. He  believes  in  a  blessed  being  not  only  because  he 
has  a  conception  of  blessedness,  but  because  he  himself 
would  be  blessed  ;  he  believes  in  a  perfect  being  because  he 
himself  wishes  to  be  perfect;  he  believes  in  an  immortal 
being  because  he  himself  desires  immortality.  .  .  .  If  man 
had  no  desires,  then  he  would  have,  in  spite  of  imagination 
and  feeling,  no  religion,  no  God."  ^  "  God  is  the  manifested 
inward  nature,  the  expressed  self  of  a  man."^ 

F.  H.  Bradley  expresses  himself  thus  :  "  We  have  found 
that  the  essence  of  religion  is  not  knowledge,  and  this  cer- 
tainly does  not  mean  that  the  essence  consists  barely  in 
feeling.  Rehgion  is  rather  the  attempt  to  express  the 
complete  reality  of  goodness  through  every  aspect  of  our 
being."  ^ 

"In  the  widest  possible  sense,"  writes  William  James  in 
T/w  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience, "  man's  religion  might 
be  identified  with  his  attitude,  whatever  it  might  be, 
towards  what  he  felt  to  be  the  primal  truth.  ...  In  the 
broadest  and  most  general  terms  possible,  one  might  say 
that  religious  life  consists  of  the  belief  that  there  is  an  un- 
seen order  and  that  our  supreme  good  lies  in  harmoniously 
adjusting  ourselves  thereto.  This  belief  and  this  adjust- 
ment are  the  religious  attitude  of  the  soul."  In  the  ordi-' 
nary  sense  of  the  word,  however,  no  attitude  is  accounted 
religious  unless  it  is  grave  and  serious ;  the  trifling,  sneer- 

1  Feuerbach,  Ludwig,  Werke,  Bd.  VIII,  p.  258.  ^  jf,id.^  p,  257. 

8  Feuerbach,  Ludwig,  The  Essence  of  Christianity,  tr.  by  Marian  Evans,  3d 
ed.  (Vol.  VII  of  Feuerbach's  works),  pp.  12-13. 

*  Bradley,  F.  H.,  Appearance  and  Reality,  ist  ed.,  p.  453. 


\ 


40  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ing  attitude  of  a  Voltaire  must  be  thrown  out  if  we  would 
not  strain  too  much  the  ordinary  use  of  language.  More- 
over, there  must  be  something  solemn,  serious,  and  tender 
about  any  attitude  which  we  call  religion.  If  glad,  it  must 
not  grin  or  snicker;  if  sad,  it  must  not  scream  or  curse. 
The  sallies  of  a  Schopenhauer  and  of  a  Nietsche  "lack 
the  purgatorial  note  which  religious  sadness  gives  forth." 
And  finally,  we  must  exclude  also  the  chilling  reflections 
of  Marcus  Aurelius  on  the  eternal  reason,  as  well  as  the 
passionate  outcry  of  Job.  ^ 

For  A.  Sabatier,  religion  "is  a  commerce,  a  conscious 
and  willed  relation  into  which  the  soul  in  distress  enters 
with  the  mysterious  power  on  which  it  feels  that  it  and  its 
destiny  depend."  ^ 

Siebeck  defines  religion  as  "the  understanding  and  the 
practical  realization  of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  the  trans- 
cendental world,  and,  in  connection  with  this,  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  salvation.  On  the  theoretical  side,  it  is  char- 
acterized by  a  world-view  which  denies  the  adequacy  of  the 
world  of  the  senses  and  affirms  the  existence  of  a  transcen- 
dental world,  conceived  both  as  highest  existence  and 
highest  value.  On  the  practical  side,  it  consists  in  the 
passage  from  the  things  of  this  world  to  a  conception  and 
experience  of  the  reaUty  of  the  transcendental  world,  and 
thus  to  salvation  from  the  world."  ^ 

The  views  just  exemplified  should  not,  however,  lead  us 
to  believe  that  feeling  is  no  longer  regarded  as  the  essence, 
or  the  vital  element,  or  the  differentia  of  the  rehgious  life. 
The  battle  against  the  intellectual  and  affective  conceptions 
of  religion  is  not  yet  won.     The  recent  definitions  of  Tiele 

1  James,  William,  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience.,Y^.  53,  38.     See  Ap- 
pendix, p.  352. 

2  Sabatier,  A.,    Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  27. 

8  Siebeck,  Yl^xra3.vi\x,  Lehrbuch  der  Religionsphilosophie,  1893,  P-442. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  41 

and  of  Kaftan  show  clearly  how  strong  a  tendency  yet 
remains  to  identify  religion  with  some  emotion  or  senti- 
ment. It  is,  moreover,  quite  possible  for  one  to  declare 
that  "  in  religion  all  sides  of  the  personality  participate. 
Will,  feeling,  and  intelligence  are  necessary  and  inseparable 
constituents  of  religion;  "  and  yet  one  may  misunderstand 
the  functional  relation  of  these  three  aspects  of  psychic  life ; 
just  as  one  may  be  acquainted  with  the  three  branches  of 
government  —  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  —  and 
nevertheless  grossly  misunderstand  their  respective  func- 
tions. Pfleiderer,  for  instance,  hastens  to  add  to  the 
sentences  last  quoted,  "  Of  course  we  must  recognize  that 
knowing  and  willing  are  here  (in  religion)  not  ends  in  them- 
selves, as  in  science  and  in  morality,  but  rather  subordinate  to 
feeling  as  the  real  centre  of  religious  consciousness."  Thus 
feeling  reappears  as  the  centre  of  religious  life. 

A  similar  criticism  is  applicable  to  Max  Miiller  and 
to  Guyau.  The  latter  begins  promisingly  with  a  criti- 
cism of  the  one-sided  formulae  of  Schleiermacher  and  of 
Feuerbach,  and  declares  that  these  definitions  should  be 
combined.  "The  religious  sentiment,"  says  he,  "is 
primarily  no  doubt  a  feeling  of  dependence.  But  this 
feeling  of  dependence,  really  to  give  birth  to  religion,  must 
provoke  in  one  a  reaction  —  a  desire  for  deliverance."  So 
far,  so  good ;  but  on  proceeding  the  reader  discovers  that 
the  opinion  which  the  book  defends  is  that  "  Religion  is 
the  outcome  of  an  effort  to  explain  all  things  —  physical, 
metaphysical,  and  moral  —  by  analogies  drawn  from  human 
society,  imaginatively  and  symbolically  considered.  In 
short,  it  is  a  universal  sociological  hypothesis,  mythical  in 
form."  1  What  is  this  but  once  more  the  intellectual  posi- 
tion ?  Religion  arises  from  an  effort  to  explain  —  religion 
is  an  hypothesis !     It  is  Herbert  Spencer  over  again,  with 

1  Guyau,  M,  J.,  The  Non-religion  of  the  Future,  p.  2. 


42  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

an  additional  statement  concerning  the  way  in  which  man 
attempts  to  explain  "the  mystery  "  pressing  for  interpreta- 
tion. 

The  place  of  thought  and  of  feeling  in  conscious  life.  — 

There  remains  an  interesting  group  of  very  recent  defi- 
nitions, closely  allied  to  those  of  the  second  class,  yet  suffi- 
ciently different  from  them  to  warrant  separate  considera- 
tion. I  refer  to  those  definitions  which  make  use  of  the 
conception  of  value.  Before  discussing  them,  however,  it 
will  be  advisable  to  direct  attention  to  a  most  consequential 
change  of  point  of  view  in  contemporary  psychology,  — 
namely,  the  adoption  of  the  evolutionary,  dynamic  concep- 
tion of  mental  life  as  opposed  to  the  pre-Darwinian,  static 
conception.  This  new  point  of  view  has  given  rise  to  a 
group  of  related  principles  of  systemization  variously 
called  voluntarism,  functionalism,  instrumentalism,  prag- 
matism. If  religion  is  to  be  at  all  adequately  under- 
stood, it  must  be  in  the  new  light  that  has  come  from  this 
change. 

Almost  all  of  the  definitions  that  have  been  reviewed 
attempt  to  say  what  rehgion  is.  According  to  them,  it  may 
be  almost  anything  one  pleases:  a  belief,  a  feeling,  an  idea, 
an  attitude,  a  relation,  even  a  faculty.  Definitions  of  this 
kind  are  completely  out  of  harmony  with  the  new  point  of 
view.  The  most  significant  and  useful  question  concerning 
religion,  or  any  other  human  activity,  to  one  who  realizes 
the  pregnant  meaning  of  development,  is  not  what  are  the 
essential  or  dominant  components  of  religion,  but  what 
is  its  function  in  human  Hfe,  and  how  is  this  function  per- 
formed. The  question  of  composition  is  subsidiary  to 
these,  and  the  significance  of  the  study  of  origin  is  found 
in  the  light  it  throws  upon  function. 

Voluntarism  conceives  of  life  as  an  expression  of  will,  — ■ 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF   RELIGION  43 

this  word  being  used  to  cover  impulses  and  tendencies,  as 
well  as  volitions.  Sensations  and  feelings  exist  only  as  a 
part  of  a  conative  act.  They  are  never  experienced  in  isola- 
tion ;  they  have  no  separate  existence ;  they  are  not  functional 
units.  It  is,  then,  absurd  to  make  them  stand  for  the 
essence  of  religion,  or  to  specify  one  of  them  as  expressing 
its  nature.  *'  Every  act  of  will  presupposes  a  feeHng  with 
a  definite  and  peculiar  tone  ;  it  is  so  closely  bound  up  with 
this  feeling  that,  apart  from  it,  the  act  of  will  has  no  reality 
at  all.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  all  feeling  presupposes  an 
act  of  will."  1 

In  swinging  back  from  intellectualism  to  voluntarism, 
modern  psychology  has,  after  all,  not  made  a  new 
departure,  but  rather  has  returned  to  the  fundamental  cue 
provided  by  Aristotle  in  his  characterization  of  man  as 
thinking-desire.2  "Will  is  not  merely  a  function  which 
sometimes  accrues  to  consciousness  and  is  sometimes  lack- 
ing ;  it  is  an  integral  property  of  consciousness."  ^  Will 
without  inteUigence  may  be  possible;  but  intelligence 
without  will  is  not,  not  even  in  the  case  of  so-called  disin- 
terested, theoretical  thinking.  That  is,  there  can  be,  no 
thinking  without  desire,  intention,  or  purpose.  "  The  one 
thing  that  stands  out,"  says,  for  instance.  Professor  Dewey, 
"  is  that  thinking  is  inquiry,  and  that  knowledge  as  science 
is  the  outcome  of  systematically  directed  inquiry."  Thought 
absolutely  undirected  would  not  even  be  a  dream  —  it  would 
be  a  meaningless,  chaotic  mass  of  intellectual  atoms.  It  is 
the  intention,  the  purpose,  which  makes  thought  significant. 
To  discover  ways  and  means  of  gratifying  proximate  or 
distant  desires,  needs,  cravings,  is  the  function  of  intelli- 

1  Wundt,  W.,  Ethics,  tr.  by  M.  F.  Washburn,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  6. 

2  Since  desire  for  an  object  includes  liking,  Aristotle's  expression  is  com- 
plete;  it  does  not  leave  out  the  affective  element. 

8  Wundt,  op.  cit,,  p.  6. 


/ 


44  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

gence.  The  psychologist  speaks,  therefore,  of  the  instni- 
viental  character  of  thought,  and  considers  cognition  to  be 
a  function  of  conduct.^ 

Every  pulse  of  consciousness  is  an  expression  of  will  in 
which  feeling  and  thought  appear  as  constituent  parts. 
Successive  moments  can  differ  from  each  other  neither  in 
the  absence  of  one  of  these  constituents,  nor  in  the  essential 
relation  which  they  bear  to  the  total  process,  but  only  in 
their  intensity  and  vividness.  This,  then,  is  the  double 
teaching  of  psychology,  in  this  matter:  (i)  feeling  and 
thought  enter  in  some  degree  into  every  moment  of  con- 
sciousness that  can  be  looked  upon  as  an  actuality  and  not 
merely  as  an  abstraction,  and  they  are  necessary  constitu- 
ents of  fully  developed  consciousness  ;  (2)  the  unit  of  con- 
scious life  is  neither  thought  nor  feeling,  but  both  in  a 
movement  toward  an  object,  toward  something  to  be  se- 
cured or  avoided,  immediately  or  ultimately. 

If  with  this  conception  in  mind  we  turn  to  religion,  we 
shall  understand  it  to  have  as  its  source,  purposes  and 
ideals  ;  that  is,  something  to  be  attained  or  maintained.  In 
other  words,  we  shall  see  in  religion  an  expression  of  the 
will  to  live  and  grow,  in  which  thought  and  feeling  are 
present  and  perform  the  function  that  characterizes  them 
I  whenever  and  wherever  they  appear.  Feeling  and  iatellect 
have  in  rehgion  no  other  place  than  the  one  belonging  to 
them  in  the  general  economy  of  animal  and  of  human 
existence. 

The  application  of  current  psychological  teaching  to  re- 

1  This  conception  receives  material  support  from  the  organization  of  the 
nervous  system,  which  makes  clear  the  relation  existing  between  sensation  and 
its  elaboration  (thought),  on  the  one  hand,  and  conation  and  desire  on  the 
other.  On  this  point  I  cannot  here  do  more  than  refer  to  recent  psychological 
work.  For  a  semipopular  exposition,  see  the  address,  The  Reflex  Arc  and 
Theism,  in  William  James's  The  Will  to  Believe  and  Other  Essays,  or  Miinster- 
berg's  Psychology  and  Life,  pp.  91-99. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  45 

ligious  life  leads  us,  then,  to  regard  religion  as  a  particular 
kind  of  activity,  as  a  mode  or  type  of  behavior  ;  and  makes 
it  as  impossible  for  us  to  identify  it  with  any  particular 
emotion  or  with  any  particular  belief,  as  it  would  be  to 
identify,  let  us  say,  family  life  with  affection.  We  shall, 
however,  have  to  remember  that  religion  is  multiform, 
and  that  at  certain  moments  certain  ideas,  emotions,  and 
purposes  appear  in  it  prominently,  and  at  other  times, 
other  ideas,  emotions,  and  purposes. 

In  speaking  of  religion  as  an  activity  or  as  a  type  of  be- 
havior, I  do  not  mean  to  exclude  from  it  whatever  does 
not  express  itself  in  overt  acts,  in  rites  of  propitiation,  sub- 
mission, or  adoration ;  because,  just  as  man's  relations  with 
his  fellow-men  are  not  all  directly  expressed  or  expressible 
in  actions,  so  his  relations  with  gods,  or  their  impersonal 
substitutes,  may  not  have  any  visible  form.  They  may 
remain  purely  subjective  and  none  the  less  exercise  a  defi- 
nite guiding  and  inspiring  influence  over  his  life.  In  a 
subsequent  chapter  these  religious  relations  will  be  sepa- 
rated, under  the  name  passive  religiosity,  from  the  active 
forms. 

The  "feeling  of  value"  or  "the  making  sacred"  as  the 
specific  characteristic  of  religion.  —  Very  recently  several 
attempts  have  been  made  to  characterize  religion  by  means 
of  "feelings  of  value,"  and  in  particular  by  the  value-feel- 
ing called  sacredness.  These  definitions  might  have  been 
placed  in  our  second  class ;  but  for  various  reasons  it 
seems  advisable  to  deal  with  them  separately.  These  con- 
ceptions start  from  the  self-evident  and  fundamental  fact 
that  the  experiences  making  up  our  lives  have  a  signifi- 
cance, an  import,  a  value,  for  the  person  to  whom  they  be- 
long. Every  object  of  desire  has  for  the  one  desiring  it  a 
value  dependent  upon  the  kind  and  the  intensity  of  the  de- 


46  A   PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

sire,  and  upon  the  kind  and  degree  of  gratification  afforded 
by  the  object  when  secured. 

The  distinguished  Danish  philosopher,  Harold  Hoffding, 
set  forth  in  his  Philosophy  of  Religion  a  doctrine  which  at- 
tracted immediate  and  widespread  attention.  In  substance 
it  is  this.  Existence  is  a  battlefield  in  which  contend  values 
of  all  sorts.  "  The  feeling  which  is  determined  by  the  fate 
of  values  in  the  struggle  for  existence  is  the  religious  feel- 
ing," ^  and  "the  fundamental  axiom  of  religion,  that  which 
expresses  the  innermost  tendency  of  all  religions,  is  the 
axiom  of  the  conservation  of  value."  ^  Rehgion  is  thus  at 
bottom  not  concerned  with  the  understanding  of  existence, 
but  with  the  valuation  of  it.  The  kernel  of  religion  is  "  a 
belief  in  the  persistency  of  value  in  the  world  {ein  Glaiibe 
ail  der  ErJialtung  des  Wcrthes)."  Religion  thus  defined  in- 
volves an  experience  of  limitation,  of  dependence  upon  a 
greater  than  man.  For  the  concern  of  man  in  the  fate  of 
that  to  which  he  attributes  worth,  and  in  the  triumph  of  the 
highest  values,  means  that  he  is  not  complete  master  of  the 
world  of  value;  it  implies  the  recognition  of  his  depen- 
dence upon  an  order  of  things  wider  than  the  sphere  of  his 
own  powers. 

The  chief  inadequacy  of  this  definition  appears  to  con- 
sist in  the  assignment  to  man  of  a  purely  passive  function. 
He  is  represented  as  contemplating  the  fate  of  that  to 
which  he  attributes  value ;  and  the  feelings  arising  in  him 
under  these  conditions  are  considered  to  be  the  essential 
religious  feelings.^  But  man  is  not  only  a  spectator  in  the 
struggle ;  he  is  also  an  actor.  An  adequate  definition  of 
religion  includes  the  pursuit  of  values  and  not  only  the 

1  Hoffding,  Harold,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  107.  2  jn^^^  p.  215. 

3  For  a  characterization  of  religious  feeling,  see  Hoffding's  Psychology,  VI, 
C,  8  b,  and  his  investigation  of  religious  phenomena  from  the  ethical  stand- 
point in  his  Ethics,  Chaps.  XXXI-XXXIII. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  47 

wish  for  their  conservation  and  increase.  Moreover, 
this  pursuit  must  involve  the  assistance  of  powers  of  a 
specific  kind  —  powers  not  yet  adequately  defined  in  these 
pages. 

In  so  far  as  this  definition  attempts  to  characterize  re- 
ligion by  means  of  a  specific  religious  feeling,^  I  would 
urge  against  it  the  arguments  offered  against  the  defini- 
tions of  the  second  class.  I  must  add,  however,  that  I  am 
under  the  impression  that  Professor  Hoffding  has  in  mind 
one  aspect  of  religion,  whereas  I  speak  of  religion  in  its 
entirety.  In  that  case,  my  criticism  would  be  irrelevant, 
and  we  should  be  in  essential  agreement. 

In  The  Tree  of  Life,  Ernest  Crawley  is  concerned  chiefly 
with  the  origin  of  religion.  He  reaches  the  conclusion 
that  "  religion  may  arise  and  subsist  without  any  belief 
either  in  God  or~the  soul."  "  The  source  of  religious  feel- 
ings and  their  constant  support  is  not  the  belief  in  spirits." 
"  The  primary  function  of  religion  is  to  affirm  and  to  con- 
secrate  life."  "  The  religious  emotion  is  no  separate  feel- 
ing, but  that  tone  or  quality  of  any  feeling  which  results 
in  making  something  sacred,  .  .  .  Consecration  —  the 
making  sacred  —  of  elemental  facts  is  the  normal  result 
of  the  religious  impulse  and  of  this  alone." 

But,  what  are  the  things  possessing  sacredness,  and 
why  have  they  that  character  ?  The  larger  part  of  Craw- 
ley's book  is  an  answer  to  these  questions.  That  which 
primitive  tribes  regard  as  sacred  are  the  elemental  interests 
of  life,  —  birth,  puberty,  marriage,  death,  burial,  food,  war. 
"Throughout  primitive  habit,  it  is  the  fundamental   pro- 

1 "  Wesentlich  ist  religiose  Erfahrung  religioses  Gefiihl.  Ihr  unmittelbares 
Objekt  ist  der  innere  Zustand  des  Gemiits  wahrend  des  Laufes  der  inneren 
und  ausseren  Ereignisse."  "  Dieses  durch  das  Schicksal  der  Werte  im  Kampfe 
urns  Dasein  bestimmte  Gefiihl  ist  das  religiose  Gefiihl.  Dasselbe  ist  also  bes- 
timmt  durch  das  Verhalten  des  Wertes  zur  Wirklichkeit."  (Hoffding,  Harold, 
Religionsphilosophie,  pp.  95,  96.) 


48  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

cesses  of  organic  life  that  are  invariably  the  subject  first 
of  secrecy  and  then  of  consecration."  "  Life,  then,  we 
may  take  it,  is  the  key  to  our  problem.  The  vital  instinct, 
the  feeling  of  life,  the  will  to  live,  the  instinct  to  preserve 
life,  is  the  source  of,  or  rather  is  identical  with,  the  reli- 
gious impulse  and  is  the  origin  of  religion."^ 

With  Crawley's  vigorous  and  reiterated  affirmation  that 
the  vital  instinct  is  the  source  of  religion,  I  am  in  hearty 
agreement.  I  have  repeatedly  made  the  same  statement, 
but  have  added  with  equal  emphasis  that  the  love  and  lust 
of  life  is  the  source  of  all  human  conduct  and  not  of  reli- 
gion alone.  Crawley's  essential  propositions — that  Ql|;k- 
iQ&  sacred  is  the  specific  function  of  religion,  and  that  the 
belief  in  gods  is  not  necessary  to  its  existence  —  reappear 
in  a  somewhat  different  form  in  a  book  by  Irving  King,  a 
much  more  systematically  and  carefully  thought  out  work, 
which  I  shall  now  consider. 

In  King's  conception  of  religion,  ideas  play  a  minimal 
r61e.  He  defines  religion  without  reference  to  superhuman 
powers.  Neither  belief  in  them  nor  the  use  of  them  is 
held  to  be  necessary  to  the  existence  of  religion.  The  dis- 
tinguishing mark  of  religious  hfe  is,  to  use  his  favorite 
phrase,  "  a  valuational  attitude  "  of  a  particular  kind.  The 
word  "  attitude^^'lsHsedTTTake  it,  to  make  it  clear  that  the 
religious  differentia  is  not  merely  a  matter  of  affective  ex- 
perience, but  that  it  includes  a  readiness  to  act  in  response 
to  the  situation  calling  forth  the  feehng.  But  what  kind 
of  valuational  attitude  does  he  mean  .■'  Crawley  says  that 
the  values  with  which  religion  is  concerned  are  those  pos- 
sessing "  sacredness."  King  uses  preferably  the  adjectives 
highest,  permanent,  abiding,  universal,  ultimate,  to  charac- 
terize the  religious  value.     It  is  evident,  however,  that  the 

1  Crawley,  A.  E.,  The  Tree  of  Life  (Hutchinson  &  Co.,  1905),  pp.  178,  185, 
270,  209,  213,  214. 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS   OF   RELIGION  49 

experiences  to  which  these  words  are  applicable  are  gen- 
erally, if  not  always,  those  to  which  the  term  "sacred" 
also  belongs. 

The  primary  concern  of  The  Development  of  Religion  is 
to  determine  the  circumstances  under  which  the  religious 
attitude  has  been  differentiated  from  those  other  conscious 
states  which  may  also  be  described  as  valuational.  The 
thesis  which  he  defends  with  anthropological  learning  and 
psychological  insight  is  this  :  ^  "  The  social  group  may  be 
said  to  furnish  the  matrix  from  which  are  differentiated  all 
permanent  notions  of  value,  and  these  are  primarily  con- 
scious attitudes  aroused  in  connection  with  activities  which 
mediate  problems  more  or  less  important  for  the  perpetua- 
tion of  the  social  body,"  —  as,  for  instance,  the  tribal  rites 
and  customs  connected  with  birth,  puberty,  marriage, 
burial,  the  securing  of  food,  war.  The  stronger  the  social 
bond,  and  the  more  highly  organized  the  community,  the 
higher,  the  more  permanent  and  "universal"  are  the  valua- 
tional attitudes  developed;  that  is,  the  more  religious,  or 
the  more  nearly  religious,  they  will  be.  King  does  not 
deny  that  values  can  be  developed  independently  of  the 
social  group  considered  as  a  whole,  but  he  urges  that  the 
atmosphere  of  the  group  is  more  favorable  for  the  develop- 
ment of  values  than  is  that  of  the  individual.  It  is  in 
man's  relations  to  the  whole  group  that  the  highest  values 
best  develop,  for  the  group  stands,  in  a  way,  in  the  mind 
of  the  savage,  for  the  absolute,  for  finality. 

But  the  problem  of  the  origin  and  development  of  values 
is  irrelevant  to  the  immediate  issue.  The  point  under  dis- 
cussion is  the  possibility  of  differentiating  religion  from  the 
rest  of  life  by  means  of  particular  values.  King  recognizes 
that  valuational  attitudes  are  of  the  essence  of  life  itself ; 

*King,  Irving,  The  Development  of  Religion,  Macmillan  &  Co.,  1910.  See, 
in  particular,  pages  32,  84,  202-203,  227,  81. 


E 


50  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

they  are  coextensive  with  it  and  do  not  belong  to  religion 
alone :  "  There  are,  of  course,  many  values  that  are  not  re- 
ligious, and  there  are  consequently  many  value-attitudes 
that  have  no  religious  significance."  The  particular  values 
that  differentiate  religion  are,  according  to  him,  those  pos- 
sessing the  greatest  significance,  the  greatest  permanence, 
the  highest  power.  Now,  all  the  recognized  values  can  be 
arranged  in  a  graded  series,  each  term  of  which  will  better 
deserve  the  epithets  permaHenf,  of  /n'^/i  power,  than  the  pre- 
ceding term.  Where,  then,  is  the  line  to  be  drawn  between 
those  that  are  to  be  called  religious  and  those  that  are  not .-' 
Wherever  it  may  be  drawn,  it  will  mark  only  a  difference 
of  degree  between  religion  and  the  rest  of  life.  The  ex- 
periences on  one  side  of  the  line  will  be  only  of  greater 
value,  more  permanent,  more  inclusive,  than  those  on  the 
other  side. 

It  turns  out,  then,  that  King  has  singled  out  a  means  of 
connecting  together  the  whole  of  life,  and  not  one  that  can 
be  used  to  differentiate  any  particular  portion  of  it.  One 
is  not  surprised,  therefore,  to  find  him  unsuccessful  in  his 
effort  to  separate  religion  from  magic,  and  from  aesthetic 
and  other  practical  activities.  In  reference  to  religion  and 
magic,  he  writes :  "  The  point  we  have  wished  to  make  in 
this  discussion  is  not  that  religion  is  essentially  social  and 
magic  essentially  individual "  [although  he  believes  this  to 
be  true],  "  but  that  the  former  develops  more  readily  in  the 
atmosphere  of  the  group,  and  the  latter  is  relatively  an  in- 
dividualistic affair.  ...  In  a  community  of  .  .  .  loose  or- 
ganization, magic  might  be  so  thoroughly  taken  up  by  the 
group  as  to  be  indistinguishable  from  religion."  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  there  is  between  magic  and  what  is  com- 
monly called  religion  not  only  a  difference  of  degree  as 
King's  premises  force  him  to  conclude,  but,  as  we  have  al- 
ready begun  to  see,  a  specific  qualitative  distinction.     This 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  51 

means  of  differentiation  he  deliberately  rejects:^  "While 
deities  are  usually  associated  with  religion,  they  are  only  one 
of  the  means  through  which  the  religious  consciousness  may 
find  expression,  and  it  is  to  that  attitude  itself  one  must  turn 
if  one  is  to  gain  a  really  adequate  notion  of  the  difference 
between  the  two.  This  religious  attitude  is,  as  we  have 
pointed  out,  one  in  which  appreciative  and  valuational  ele- 
ments predominate,  particularly  such  as  are  determined  by 
social  intercourse  and  by  the  social  atmosphere  generally. 
If  religion  is  the  distinctive  product  of  such  conditions,  it  is 
not  strange  that  the  conception  of  worth,  the  valuational 
attitudes  thus  socially  determined,  should  be  associated  in 
some  way  with  persons.  .  .  .  The  primitive  man,  to  be 
sure,  thought  of  all  these  activities  as  conditioned  in  many 
ways  by  spiritual  essences  or  powers,  but  that  of  itself 
made  his  acts  no  more  religious  than  are  ours  when  we 
treat  live  wires  with  caution." 

The  word  "religion"  has,  after  all,  a  fairly  well  estab- 
lished meaning.  It  is  not  concerned  only  with  objects  of 
the  highest,  of  ultimate,  value  to  the  individual  or  to  soci- 
ety, but  with  the  preservation  and  advancement  of  life  in 
matters  small  and  great.^     And  this  is  also  more  or  less 

^  Crawley  is  in  the  same  predicament  ;  he  has  discarded  the  only  means  of 
distinguishing  magic  from  religion :  "  A  large  proportion  of  that  early  cere- 
monialism which  is  dismissed  as  magic  ...  is  really  the  process  of  making  a 
thing  sacred.  Magic  is  the  means,  but  religion  is  the  end.'  (Crawley,  ibid., 
p.  246.) 

2  Among  sociologists  who  regard  sacredness  as  the  distinguishing  mark  of 
religion  should  be  mentioned  Emile  Durkheim.  In  the  Revue  Philosophique, 
Vol.  LXVII,  1909,  p.  17,  he  declares  that  the  character  of  sacredness  intro- 
duces a  specific  difference  between  objects.  Only  those  possessing  it  can  be 
religious  objects.  "  Entre  les  uns  et  les  autres,  il  n'y  a  pas  de  commune 
mesure." 

Professor  Ames  writes  similarly  :  "  The  religious  consciousness  is  just  the 
consciousness  of  the  greatest  interests  and  purposes  of  life,  in  their  most 
idealized  and  intensified  forms."     •'  The  ideal  values  of  each  age  and  of  each 


52  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  aim  of  every  other  part  of  life.  It  seems  to  me  that  King 
has  given  to  the  word  "rehgion"  a  meaning  at  variance 
with  common  usage,  and  in  so  doing  has  deprived  himself 
of  the  only  natural  and  adequate  means  of  differentiating 
religion  from  the  rest  of  life. 

So  much  concerning  our  survey  of  the  most  important 
types  of  religious  conceptions.  Before  passing  on,  in  the 
next  chapter,  to  the  consideration  of  the  origin  of  religion, 
and  to  the  formulation  of  a  more  exact  definition  of  the 
religious  power  than  has  so  far  been  offered,  I  shall  state 
again  the  theses  for  which  I  am   contending. 

That  which  differentiates  reHgion  from  other  forms 
of  conduct  is  the  kind  of  power  upon  which  dependence 
is  felt  and  the  kind  of  behavior  elicited  by  the  power. 
A  natural  line  of  cleavage  between  rehgious  and  non- 
religious  behavior  is  made  possible  by  the  presence  in 
man  of  ideas  of  forces  of  different  character.  Some  of 
these  forces  are  of  the  sort  to  which  the  name  "  physical " 
is  applied ;  others  respond  to  intelligence  and  feeling, 
as  if  they  themselves  had  mind  and  heart.  Religion  is 
that  part  of  human  experience  in  which  man  feels  him- 
self in  relation  with  powers  of  psychic  nature,  usually 
personal  powers,  and  makes  use  of  them.  In  its  active 
forms,  it  is  a  mode  of  behavior,  aiming,  in  common  with 
all  human  activities,  at  the  gratification  of  needs,  desires, 
and  yearnings.  It  is,  therefore,  a  part  of  the  struggle  for 
Ufe. 

Nothing  is  less  an  abstraction  than  the  religious  life; 
it  includes  the  whole  man.  A  belief  in  psychic  powers, 
personal  or  impersonal,  is  but  one  of  the  conditions  of  its 

t5rpe  of  social  development  tend  to  reach  an  intensity  and  volume  and  a 
symbolic  expression  which  is  religious."  (E.  S.  Ames,  Religion  and  the 
Psychic  Life,  Inter.  Jr.  of  Ethics,  October,  1909,  "Vol.  XX,  pp.  49,  52.) 


CURRENT  CONCEPTIONS  OF  RELIGION  53 

existence.  It  cannot  be  adequately  defined  either  in  terms 
of  feeling  or  of  purpose.  The  current  expressions,  "re- 
ligious desire,"  "  religious  purpose,"  "  religious  emotion," 
are  misleading,  if  they  are  intended  to  designate  affective 
experiences,  desires,  and  purposes,  met  with  in  religious 
life  alone. 

In  its  objective  aspect,  active  rchgion  consists,  then,  of 
attitudes,  practices,  rites,  ceremonies,  institutions;  in  its 
subjective  aspect,  it  consists  of  desires,  emotions,  and  ideas, 
instigating  and  accompanying  these  objective  manifesta- 
tions. 

The  reason  for  the  existence  of  religion  is  not  the  ob- 
jective truth  of  its  conceptions,  but  its  biological  value. 
This  value  is  to  be  estimated  by  its  success  in  procuring 
not  only  the  results  expected  by  the  worshipper,  but  also 
others,  some  of  which  are  of  great  significance. 

The  conception  of  religion  here  presented  does  not  admit 
of  that  frequent  excessively  broad  use  of  the  term  which 
includes  anything  that  is  of  considerable  value  to  man,  — 
music,  science,  civilization,  democracy,  duty.  I  cannot,  for 
instance,  agree  with  those  who  say  that  "  habitual  and 
regulated  admiration  "  is  worthy  to  be  called  a  religion, 
and  that  "  art  and  science  are  not  secular  ...  it  is  a 
fundamental  error  to  call  them  so  ;  they  have  the  nature  of 
religion."  1  Neither  do  I  find  satisfaction  in  Professor 
Ames's  affirmation  that  "to  the  psychologist  it  remains 
clear  that  the  man  is  genuinely  religious  in  so  far  as  his 
symbols,  ceremonials,  institutions,  and  heroes  enable  him 
to  share  in  a  social  life.  It  is  also  psychologically  evident 
that  the  man  who  tries  to  maintain  religious  sentiment 
apart  from  social  experience  is  to  that  extent  irreligious, 
whatever  he  may  claim  for  himself ;  while  the  man  who 

1  Seeley,  J.  R.,  Natural  Religion,  Boston,  1882,  pp.  122,  120. 


54         A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

enters  thoroughly  into  the  social  movements  of  his  time  is 
to  that  extent  genuinely  religious,  though  he  may  charac- 
terize himself  quite  otherwise."  ^  This  is  not  putting  new- 
wine  into  old  bottles ;  it  is  refusing  to  admit  the  existence 
of  the  bottle  !  To  bestow  upon  one  the  appellation  rehg- 
ious  because  he  enters  thoroughly  into  the  social  movements 
of  his  time  is  to  cause  confusion  by  juggling  with  the  word. 
But  if  the  conception  I  defend  excludes,  on  the  one  hand, 
those  excessively  broad  interpretations  destructive  of  all  pre- 
cise meaning,  it  includes,  on  the  other  hand,  the  primitive 
religions  in  which  low  desires  find  gratification  through 
grossly  anthropomorphic  beings,  as  well  as  the  highest  of 
the  historical  religions.  It  finds  room  even  for  the  experi- 
ences of  those  who  feel  themselves  in  relation  with  an 
Impersonal  Absolute,  a  mere  "  Principle  of  unity  in  a 
world  of  which  we  are  not  only  spectators  but  parts."  ^ 
These  experiences  I  would,  however,  distinguish  from 
those  which  have  given  rise  to  the  historical  religions  by 
classifying  them  und&r  passive  religiosity. 

^  Ames,  E.  S.,  Non-religious  Persons,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Theol.,  Vol.  XIII, 
p.  543;  published  later  as  a  part  of  The  Psychology  of  Religious  Experience. 

^  In  a  vigorously  written  little  book.  Marcel  Hebert  distinguishes  between 
"the  realistic"  and  "  the  idealistic  form  "  of  the  religious  feeling,  and  he 
provides  instances  of  the  latter.  The  experiences  in  which  one's  goal  is 
characterized  by  the  terms  "perfect"  and  "ideal"  is  included  in  what  I  call 
religion,  whenever  these  experiences  involve  relations  with  a  spiritual  power. 
(Marcel  Hebert,  La  Forme  Idealiste  du  Sentiment  Peligieux,  Paris,  Emile 
Nourry,  1909.) 


PART    II 

THE   ORIGIN    OF   MAGIC   AND    OF 

RELIGION 


CHAPTER   III 

THE    MENTAL    REQUIREMENTS    OF    THE    APPEAR- 
ANCE  OF  MAGIC   AND   OF  RELIGION' 

Since  religion  involves  the  whole  man,  its  origin  is 
manifold.  We  shall  have  to  take  up  in  successive  chapters 
the  primary  forms  and  the  origin  of  the  ideas  conditioning 
(religion  the  ideas  of  hyperhuman,  unseen  beings);  the 
original  rehgious  emotions  ;  and,  finally,  the  primary  forms 
and  the  origins  of  rcUgious  behavior. 

In  this  chapter  I  do  not  hesitate  to  take  the  reader  for 
a  while  into  the  field  of  animal  psychology ;  for  it  seems 
to  me  that  a  comparison  of  animal  and  human  behavior  is 
the  best  means  of  gaining  a  knowledge  of  the  mental  pro- 
cesses which  make  possible  magic  and  religion.  I  link 
together  these  two  kinds  of  activity  because  they  are  so 
closely  connected  in  primitive  culture  that  a  study  of  them 
side  by  side  is  of  decided  advantage  to  the  understanding 
of  each.  The  existence  of  both  magic  and  religion  depends 
upon  traits  which  animals  lack ;  these  traits  I  shall  try  to 
single  out  in  this  first  chapter. 

Which  of  the  three  modes  of  behavior  practised  by  man 

1  In  this  and  the  following  chapters  of  Part  II,  I  have  made  use  of  con- 
siderable portions  of  my  little  book.  The  Psychological  Origin  and  the  Nature 
of  Religion,  published  by  Archibald  Constable  and  Co.,  1908,  95  pp.,  and  sold 
in  the  United  States  by  the  Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 

The  reader  will  observe  that  among  recent  books  three  have  been  espe- 
cially useful  to  me  in  this  Part :  The  Golden  Bough,  by  J.  G.  Frazer;  The  De- 
velopment of  Religion,  hy  Irving  King;  and  The  Threshold  of  Religion,  by 
R.  R.  Marett. 

57 


58  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

are  also  practised  by  animals  ?  All  the  higher  animals 
show  by  their  behavior  a  "working  understanding"  of  the 
more  common  physical  forces.  They  adapt  their  actions 
more  or  less  exactly  to  weight,  resistance,  and  distance, 
when  climbing,  swinging  at  the  end  of  boughs,  breaking, 
carrying,  etc.  I  remember  observing  a  chimpanzee  trying 
to  recover  a  stick  which  had  fallen  through  the  bars  of  his 
cage  and  had  rolled  beyond  the  reach  of  his  arm.  He 
looked  around,  walked  deliberately  to  the  corner  of  the 
cage,  picked  up  a  piece  of  burlap,  and  threw  the  end  of  it 
over  the  stick.  Then,  pulling  gently,  he  made  the  stick 
roll  until  it  was  near  enough  for  him  to  seize  it  with  his 
hand.  This  ape  dealt  successfully  with  certain  physical 
forces;  he  practised  what  I  have  called  mechanical  be- 
havior. 

The  behavior  of  animals  towards  one  another  and 
towards  men  is  different  from  their  behavior  towards  in- 
animate things.  A  dog  may  express  love  and  hate  in  his 
relation  with  living  beings,  but  these  elemental,  emotional 
reactions  do  not  appear  when  he  deals  with  ordinary 
physical  objects.  He  will  beg  from  a  man ;  he  will  not 
beg  from  a  ham  suspended  beyond  his  reach ;  nor  will  he 
waste  any  affection  upon  inanimate  things,  however  well 
he  may  like  them,  and  however  strongly  he  may  wish  to 
possess  them.  It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  certain  animals 
attach  themselves  to  their  masters  with  a  devoted  affection, 
and  that  they  feel  blame  and  approbation  without  regard 
to  physical  punishment  and  reward.  Darwin  relates  of 
his  own  dog,  which  had  never  been  beaten,  that  when 
caught  stealing  a  chop  from  the  table,  he  dropped  the 
chop  and  crept  under  the  sofa  in  a  shamefaced  manner.^ 

The  higher  animals,  then,  do  undoubtedly  practise  both 
the  mechanical  and  the  anthropopathic  types  of  behavior. 

1  Darwin,  Charles,  The  Descent  of  Man,  new  ed.,  1886,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  III. 


]V1\GIC,   RELIGION  AND  THE  ANIMAL  MIND         59 

How  do  animals  learn  to  react  differently  to  impersonal 
and  to  personal  forces  ?  The  reactions  characterizing  the 
behavior  of  the  highest  animals,  complex  as  they  are,  are 
established  in  the  absence  of  abstract  ideas  about  forces. 
Before  they  gain  any  general  notion,  animals  learn  to  deal 
very  well  with  physical  and  personal  forces  present  to  their 
senses.^  The  study,  under  experimental  conditions,  of  the 
establishment  of  new  reactions  in  animals  reveals  clearly 
the  nature  of  the  learning  process.  Imagine  a  cat  shut 
up  in  a  box  the  door  of  which  can  be  opened  by  pressing 
down  a  latch.  When  weary  of  confinement,  the  cat  begins 
to  claw,  pull,  and  bite  here,  there,  and  everywhere.  After 
half  an  hour  or  an  hour  of  this  purposive  but  unreasoned 
activity,  it  chances  to  put  its  paw  upon  the  latch  and  es- 
capes. If  put  into  the  cage  again,  it  does  not  know 
exactly  how  to  proceed.  Yet  something  has  been  gained 
by  the  first  experience ;  for  now  the  clawing,  pulling,  and 
biting  are  directed  more  frequently  towards  the  part  of  the 
cage  occupied  by  the  latch.  Because  of  this  improvement, 
it  finds  itself  released  sooner  than  the  first  time.  The 
repetition  of  the  experiment  shows  the  cat  learning  to 
bring  its  movements  to  bear  more  and  more  exclusively 
upon  the  door  or  its  immediate  surroundings.  The  psycho- 
physiological endowment  required  for  learning  of  this  kind 
involves  no  abstract  ideas,  but  only  (i)  the  desire  to  es- 
cape; (2)  the  impulse  and  ability  to  perform  the  various 
movements  we  have  named  ;  (3)  a  tendency  to  repeat  suc- 

^  H.  B.  Davis  has  this  to  say  on  the  power  of  generalization  of  the  raccoon, 
a  very  intelligent  animal:  "  When  an  animal  (raccoon)  is  forced  to  approach 
an  old  fastening  from  a  new  direction,  it  is  often  as  much  bothered  by  it  as  by 
a  new  fastening.  Nevertheless,  in  course  of  time  the  animals  seem  to  reach  a 
sort  of  generalized  manner  of  procedure  which  enables  them  to  deal  more 
promptly  with  any  new  fastening  (not  too  different  from  others  of  their  ex- 
perience)." {The  Raccoon  :  A  Study  in  Animal  Intelligence,  Amer  Jr.  of 
Psychology,  October,  1907,  p.  486.) 


6o  A   PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

cessful  movements  when  the  animal  finds  itself  again  in 
the  situation  in  which  success  was  achieved. 

Imitation  does  not  play  so  extensive  a  role  in  animal  life 
as  is  generally  beheved.  But,  however  that  may  be,  the 
method  of  learning  that  I  have  just  described  —  the  trial- 
and-error  method  —  is  of  itself  sufficient  to  provide  animals 
with  the  mechanical  mode  of  behavior.  Their  reactions  to 
feeUng  beings  —  anthropopathic  behavior  —  are  also  the 
result  of  the  same  learning  process,  either  alone  or  in 
combination  with  imitation.  In  other  words,  anthropopa- 
thic reactions,  like  mechanical  reactions,  are  independent 
of  abstract  ideas  regarding  the  nature  of  their  object  or  of 
the  appropriateness  of  the  means  employed.  We  are,  of 
course,  not  concerned  here  with  the  origin  of  whatever  may 
be  instinctive  in  the  activities  involved. 

The  trial-and-error  method,  by  which  animals  learn  to  deal 
with  the  forces  in  the  midst  of  which  they  live,  has  a  much 
wider  range  of  application  in  human  life  than  is  generally 
supposed.  The  child's  mode  of  learning  is  dominantly  the 
unreflective,  concrete  method  in  which  frequent  chance 
successes  slowly  lead  to  the  elimination  of  ineffective  move- 
ments. In  the  adult  this  method  is  far  from  being  entirely 
given  up  for  more  rational  ones.  It  is  in  this  way,  on  the 
whole,  that  one  learns  to  ride  a  bicycle,  to  play  tennis,  or 
to  perform  any  other  act  requiring  motor  skill.  If  at  any 
time  the  learner  realizes  the  rationale  of  his  procedure,  it  is 
usually  after  it  has  been  established  by  the  method  of  trial- 
and-error.  The  role  ascribed  to  abstract  ideas  and  to  clear 
reasoning  in  ordinary  human  behavior  is  vastly  exagger- 
ated. What  abstract  notions  are  present,  for  instance,  in 
the  mind  of  the  stoker  when  he  thinks  of  the  power  of 
coal }  What  in  the  mind  of  the  gambler  when  he  tries  to 
coerce  fate  .■'  What  in  the  mind  of  the  necromancer  when 
he  summons  the  shades  of  spirits  }     Nothing  need  be  pres- 


MAGIC,   RELIGION  AND  THE  ANIM.\L  MIND         6i 

ent  to  consciousness,  and  probably  in  most  cases  nothing 
actually  is  present,  beyond  a  knowledge  of  the  concrete 
thing  to  be  done  in  order  to  secure  the  desired  results,  and 
the  anticipation  of  these  particular  results.  The  stoker 
thinks  of  what  he  sees  and  feels  :  the  coal,  in  burning, 
gives  heat ;  the  heat  makes  the  water  boil ;  the  steam 
pushes  the  piston-rod,  and  so  forth.  He  thinks  vaguely  of 
each  one  of  the  successive  links  in  the  chain  as  striving  to 
bring  about  the  following  one.  This  is  how  he  under- 
stands the  coal-power.  And  what  does  the  average  person 
know,  for  instance,  about  electricity  ?  He  merely  knows 
what  is  to  be  done  in  order  to  start  the  dynamo,  to  light  the 
lamp,  to  switch  the  current,  and  what  the  effect  will  be  in 
each  case.  The  gambler  and  the  superstitious  person, 
whether  they  belong  to  an  African  tribe  or  to  modern 
Anglo-Saxon  civilization,  understand  in  no  other  than  this 
practical  way  their  good  and  their  ill  luck.^ 

Animals  learn,  then,  by  the  trial-and-error  method,  the 
mechanical  and  anthropopathic  behaviors  —  the  latter  as 
far  as  it  is  called  forth  by  an  actually  present  person  or 
animal. 

If  trial-and-error  were  sufficient  to  account  in  addition 

^  I  remember  the  delight  shown  by  an  elderly  lady  when  a  brood  of  swal- 
lows fell  down  our  sitting-room  chimney.  "  It  will  bring  luck  to  the  house- 
hold," she  said.  I  tried  in  several  ways  to  find  out  the  sort  of  notion  this  lady 
had  regarding  the  nature  of  the  power  that  was  to  bring  about  the  fortunate 
events  predicted,  and  also  to  discover  her  idea  of  the  connection  existing  be- 
tween the  fall  of  the  swallows  and  the  exertion  of  this  "power"  in  our  behalf. 
I  had  to  conclude  that  there  was  no  idea  whatsoever  in  her  mind  beyond  those 
expressed  by  "  swallows-down-the-chimney  "  and  "  happy-events-coming." 
These  two  ideas  were  directly  associated  in  her  mind,  ^^^len  I  declared  my 
inability  to  see  the  causal  connection  between  the  two,  she  complained  of  my 
abnormal  critical  sense  !  In  the  mind  of  the  civilized  superstitious  person,  as 
well  as  in  the  mind  of  the  savage,  nothing  more  need  be  looked  for  than  the 
immediate  association  of  an  antecedent  with  its  consequent.  This  is  sufficient 
for  most  practical  purposes. 


62  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

for  the  coercitive  behavior  and  the  religious  variety  of  the 
anthropopathic  reaction,  the  origin  of  the  three  modes  of 
human  behavior  would  be  brought  back  to  one  kind  of  learn- 
ing: the  unreflective,  concrete,  trial-and-error  method.  But 
even  a  superficial  consideration  discloses  serious  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  this  attractively  simple  theory,  and  compels 
the  admission  that  magical  art  and  religion  involve  mental 
powers  not  required  for  the  establishment  of  the  mechanical 
and  the  non-religious  anthropopathic  behavior  observable 
in  animals. 

In  order  to  discover  what  these  necessary  powers  are, 
let  us  analyze  certain  actions  which  are  beyond  animal 
capacity.  Dancing,  when  it  is  mere  play,  is  not,  of  course, 
altogether  peculiar  to  man ;  but  special  dances  thought  to 
influence  the  fate  of  war  or  of  the  hunt,  found  among  many 
primitive  peoples,  do  not  exist  among  animals.  These 
dances  possess  a  magical  or  religious  significance.  Certain 
"religious  "  dances  of  the  North  American  Indians  are  in 
part  rehearsals  of  an  approaching  fight  and  of  the  brave 
deeds  expected  of  the  warriors  ;  or  they  are  representations 
of  the  bringing  into  camp  of  the  animals  they  hope  to 
capture.  Such  dances  combine  amusement  with  the  serious 
purpose  of  lending  aid  to  the  warriors  and  hunters.  An- 
other common  magical  custom  is  to  eat  some  part  of  a 
strong  and  courageous  animal,  such  as  the  heart  or  liver, 
in  order  to  acquire  courage.  Again,  characteristic  parts 
of  a  dangerous  animal,  — a  tiger's  tooth  or  claw  —  will  be 
worn  by  way  of  protection.  Still  other  practices  involve 
the  addressing  of  requests,  supplications,  and  offerings  to 
invisible  beings.  These  magical  and  religious  performances 
are  important  constituents  of  the  life  of  uncivilized  man  ; 
they  are  conspicuously  absent  from  the  animal  world.  Why 
this  absence .''  It  points  to  a  double  mental  difference  be- 
tween men  and  animals. 


MAGIC,   RELIGION  AND  THE  ANIMAL  MIND         63 

(i)  If  a  particular  action  is  to  be  learned  by  an  animal, 
the  gratification  of  the  actuating  desire  must  follow  immedi- 
ately upon  the  chance  performance  of  the  successful  act, 
and  must  be  repeated  at  short  intervals.  If  the  door  had 
opened  not  every  time  the  cat  pressed  the  latch,  but  only 
every  tenth  time,  or  if  it  had  opened  an  hour  or  even  a  few 
minutes  after  the  movement,  he  would  never  have  learned 
to  make  his  escape.  Nor  would  he  have  learned  the  trick 
if  he  had  not  been  placed  in  the  cage  repeatedly  and  at 
short  intervals.  It  is  otherwise  with  the  results  of  magic 
and  religion ;  they  follow  the  act  very  irregularly,  often 
after  a  long  interval,  and  sometimes  there  is  no  result  at 
all.  This  close  dependence  of  animals  upon  actual  ex- 
perience does  not  proceed  from  their  inability  to  retain 
impressions.  Their  mental  retentiveness  is  ineffective  be- 
cause they  cannot  relate  experiences  which  do  not  occur 
in  quick  succession.  The  connection  of  experiences  sep- 
arated by  a  time  interval,  or  of  those  involving  recogni- 
tion of  relations  other  than  contiguity  —  such  as  likeness 
and  difference  —  does  not  seem  to  lie  within  their  powers. 
Codrington  tells  of  the  Melanesians  that  the  friends  of  a 
wounded  man  get  possession  of  the  arrow  that  wounded 
him  and  put  it  in  a  cool  place  so  that  inflammation  may  be 
slight.  The  passing,  in  this  instance,  from  the  heat  of  an 
angry  wound  to  the  cooling  of  the  cause  of  the  wound,  and, 
further,  the  connecting  of  the  two  in  a  relation  of  cause 
and  effect  is  possible  only  to  man.  On  being  hit  with  an 
arrow,  an  animal  will  learn  to  dread  and  avoid  it.  This 
involves  simply  the  connection  of  two  simultaneous  or  con- 
tiguous events,  —  the  pain  and  the  sight  of  the  arrow,  — 
while  the  magical  practice  of  the  Melanesians  involves  the 
thought  of  the  cool  arrow  when  it  is  not  experienced  as 
cool,  and  the  idea  of  a  causal  relation  between  the  cool 
arrow  and  the  subsidence  of  the  inflammation,  which  is  also 


64  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

not  actually  experienced.  These  mental  processes  are  of 
a  higher  type  than  those  which  suffice  to  account  for  the 
behavior  of  animals ;  they  involve  the  presence  of  free 
ideas,  i.e.,  ideas  appearing  in  the  mind  in  the  absence  of 
the  objects  to  which  they  owe  their  origin  or  to  which  they 
refer.  To  go  back  into  the  past,  to  single  out  some  particu- 
lar occurrence,  and  to  think  of  it,  in  its  absentee,  as  the 
cause  either  of  an  actual  or  of  an  anticipated  experience  is 
the  prerogative  of  man  only. 

An  interesting  example  of  the  gradual  undoing  of  a 
habit  in  consequence  of  the  absence  of  the  sensory  results 
that  had  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  action  is  reported 
by  Lloyd  Morgan.^  He  had  brought  up  in  his  study  a 
brood  of  ducks.  They  had  had  a  bath  every  morning  in  a 
tin  tray.  After  a  while,  the  tray  was  placed  empty  in  its 
accustomed  place.  The  ducks  got  into  it  and  went  through 
all  their  ordinary  ablutions.  The  next  day  they  again  en- 
joyed the  missing  water,  but  not  so  long  as  on  the  first  day. 
On  the  third  day  they  gave  up  the  useless  practice  of  bath- 
ing in  an  empty  tray.  In  three  days  ducklings  give  up  a 
habit  which  has  become  useless,  while  generation  after 
generation  of  men  goes  through  innumerable  time-wasting 
ceremonies,  often  costly  and  painful,  for  the  sake  of  results 
secured  rarely  and,  as  we  think,  never  directly  by  the 
magical  or  the  religious  ceremonies  themselves.  There  is 
here  a  curious  psychological  fact :  animals  establish  habits 
under  the  guidance  of  immediate  results,  while  man  de- 
velops the  magical  art  and  religion  in  spite  of  the  usual 
absence  of  the  results  desired.  This  very  possibility  of 
man's  deceiving  himself  reveals  a  superiority  of  man  over 
animals  ;  for  self-deception  requires  a  degree  of  independ- 
ence from  sense-observation,  a  capacity  for   constructive 

1  Morgan,  C.  Lloyd,  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psychology  (The  Con- 
temporary Science  Series,  1894),  p.  89. 


MAGIC,   RELIGION  AND   THE   ANIMAL   MIND         65 

imagination,  a  susceptibility  to  auto-suggestion,  not  to  be 
found  in  animals.  That  the  first  glimmer  of  these  capaci- 
ties should  have  plunged  man  into  the  darkness  of  primitive 
magic  and  religion,  and  should  have  made  him  the  ridicu- 
lous lunatic  that  he  frequently  appears  to  be  by  the  side  of 
the  matter-of-fact,  intelligent  animal,  is,  however,  a  very 
singular  fact. 

In  the  preceding  paragraph  I  have  written,  "in  spite  of 
the  usual  absence  of  the  results  desired."  I  must  remind 
the  reader,  in  this  connection,  that  the  expected  results  of 
religion  and  magic  are  but  a  part,  and  usually  the  lesser 
part,  of  their  usefulness.  This  fact  modifies  considerably 
the  significance  of  the  foregoing  statement. 

(2)  Animals  never  act  toward  unperceived  objects  as  if 
they  were  present ;  a  dog  never  welcomes  by  gambols  an 
absent  friend.  Whereas  primitive  man  appears  in  religion 
and  at  times  in  magic  in  more  or  less  systematic  relations 
with  invisible  powers.  When  the  Shaman  draws  lines 
upon  the  sand,  describes  various  curves  with  his  arms,  and 
utters  sundry  incantations,  he  does  not  address  a  power  he 
actually  perceives,  or  even  one  he  has  really  seen,  although 
he  may  believe  that  he  or  some  one  else  has  seen  it.  This 
difference  between  man  and  animal  is  again  due  to  the 
absence  in  the  latter  of  free  ideas,  or  to  the  inability  of  the 
free  ideas  to  lead  to  action. 

The  overcoming  of  these  two  deficiencies  marked  an  era 
in  the  history  of  conscious  beings.  Before  this  advance, 
the  universe  was  made  up  for  them  simply  of  what  they 
actually  sensed.  Afterward  the  world  assumed  new  pro- 
portions ;  it  included  the  world  of  imagined  things,  the 
limitless,  mysterious  realm  of  the  invisible. 

That  this  fundamental  difference  between  men  and  animals  was  en- 
tirely missed  by  Auguste  Comte  and  partly  by  Herbert  Spencer  is 
shown  in  the  latter's  discussion  of  the  opinion  of  Comte  that "  fetichistic" 

F 


66  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

conceptions  are  formed  by  the  higher  animals.  Spencer  cannot  fully 
agree  with  this  view,  yet  he  relates  the  following  observation  concerning 
a  retriever  who  had  learned  for  herself  to  perform  '*an  act  of  propitia- 
tion." The  dog  had  associated  the  fetching  of  game  with  the  pleasure 
of  the  person  to  whom  she  brought  it.  and  so  ''after  wagging  her  tail  and 
grinning,  she  would  perform  this  act  of  propitiation  as  nearly  as  practi- 
cable in  the  absence  of  the  dead  bird.  Seeking  about,  she  would  pick 
up  a  dead  leaf,  a  bit  of  paper,  a  twig  or  other  small  object,  and  would 
bring  it  with  renewed  manifestations  of  friendliness."  Spencer  adds, 
"  Some  kindred  state  of  mind  is,  I  believe,  what  prompts  the  savage  to 
fetichistic  observances."  ^  The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the  dog  had 
merely  learned  to  substitute  for  the  game  various  other  objects  ;  she  had 
not  learned  to  bring  these  to  an  unperceived  master  in  the  hope  of  ex- 
periencing the  effect  of  his  pleasure.  I  know  of  nothing  in  animal  be- 
havior that  could  properly  be  termed  magic,  although  certain  tricks 
learned  under  the  tuition  of  man  resemble  it  somewhat.  I  have  in 
mind,  for  instance,  a  dog's  raising  his  forepaws,  even  though  no  one  is 
present,  when  he  wishes  to  be  liberated  from  a  cage.  There  is  here  no 
quantitative  or  qualitative  relation  between  the  lifting  of  the  forepaws 
and  the  opening  of  the  door,  and  yet  it  is  not  magic.  The  dog's  action 
is  not  determined  in  the  same  way  as  that  of  a  magician ;  for  the  latter 
would  perform  the  same  magical  rite  in  a  great  variety  of  external  cir- 
cumstances, while  the  dog  will  seek  liberation  by  lifting  his  paws  only 
when  in  the  particular  cage  in  which  he  has  learned  the  trick,  or  in  one 
similar  to  it.  This  apparently  slight  dissimilarity  points  to  the  import- 
ant differences  between  the  mental  processes  of  men  and  of  animals,  to 
which  I  have  drawn  attention. 

That  the  behavior  of  animals  is  influenced  by  their  past  perceptions 
and  actions  is,  of  course,  undoubted ;  but  whether  these  actions  imply 
the  possession  of  free  ideas  is  still  an  open  question.  If  a  dog  shows 
depression  in  the  absence  of  his  master,  it  may  be  simply  because  he 
suffers  from  the  lack  of  an  accustomed  set  of  stimuli,  —  the  master's 
presence,  his  voice,  his  smile,  or  his  caresses,  —  and  yet  does  not 
think  of  the  absent  master  as  the  cause  of  his  discomfort.  We  usually 
credit  animals  with  higher  mental  processes  than  are  necessary  to  pro- 
duce their  actions.  Lloyd  Morgan,  in  his  Animal  Life  and  Intelligence 
reports  the  instructive  instance  of  a  cow  deprived  of  her  offspring.    She 

1  Spencer,  Herbert,  Principles  of  Sociology,  3d  ed.,  1885,  Vol.,  i.  Appendix 
A,  p.  788. 


MAGIC,   RELIGION  AND   THE  ANIMAL   MIND         67 

was  apparently  pining  away  for  the  absent  calf.  When  the  stuffed  skin 
of  the  calf  was  presented  to  her,  she  licked  it,  apparently  with  maternal 
devotion,  until  the  hay  stuffing  came  out  ;  then  she  placidly  ate  the  hay. 
The  movements  of  animals  in  dreams  may  be  purely  automatic.^ 

Bentley  writes :  ''  The  primary  use  of  the  image  .  .  .  was  to  carry 
the  organism  beyond  the  limits  of  the  immediate  environment  and  to 
assist  in  foreseeing  and  providing  for  the 'future'  .  .  It  was  a  means 
to  what  we  may  term  remote  adaptation."  ^ 

In  order  to  explain  this  inability  to  deal  with  invisible  objects,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  deny  that  animals  have  images ;  although  some  recent 
psychologists  do  deny  this  for  all  animals  below  the  apes.  It  is  sufficient 
to  admit  that  revived  experiences  cannot  have  in  animals  the  influence 
that  actual  perception  would  exert.  It  is  not  enough  for  a  dog  to  have  an 
image  of  his  master  in  order  to  beg  for  food.  The  image  must  lead  to 
the  action.  It  must  be  connected  with  an  impulse  to  beg,  an  impulse 
strong  enough  to  bring  about  the  action.  Either  the  absence  of  images 
or  their  lack  of  motor  power  accounts  for  this  particular  deficiency  in 
animals. 

I  have  spoken  as  if  the  gods  of  primitive  races  were  merely  reproduc- 
tions of  beings  at  times  present  to  the  senses.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
spirits  and  gods  with  whom  men  think  themselves  in  relation  are  prob- 
ably never  mere  representations  of  formerly  known  beings.  The  powers 
addressed  are  to  a  certain  degree  mental  creations,  instead  of  reproduc- 
tions of  sense  data.  This  transforming  activity  of  the  human  mind 
removes  man  still  further  from  the  animal. 

There  are  on  record  observations  from  which  one  might  infer  that 
there  is  occasionally  in  the  mind  of  certain  higher  animals  something 
akin  to  the  savage's  personification  of  natural  events.  This  would 
involve,  of  course,  the  possession  of  images.  Sometimes  dogs  are 
thrown  into  paroxysms  of  fear  by  peals  of  thunder,  and  run  into  hiding. 
Darsvin  relates  how  his  dog,  "  full  grown  and  very  sensible,"  growled 
fiercely  and  barked  whenever  an  open  parasol  standing  at  some  distance 
was  moved  by  a  slight  breeze.  He  believes  that  the  dog  "  must  have 
reasoned  to  himself,  in  a  rapid  and  unconscious  manner,  that  movement 

^  For  a  brief  discussion  of  these  questions,  see  Margaret  Washburn,  The 
Animal  Mind,  pp.  270-272. 

2  The  Memory  Image  and  its  Qualitative  Fidelity,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psychology, 
Vol.  XI,  1899,  P-  18. 


68  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

without  any  apparent  cause  indicated  the  presence  of  some  strange 
living  agent,  and  that  no  stranger  had  a  right  to  be  on  his  territory."  ^ 
Romanes,  in  a  short  and  interesting  paper  entitled  "  Fetichism  in 
Animals,"  ^  after  giving  the  preceding  illustration,  relates  this  observa- 
tion about  a  remarkably  "  intelligent,"  "  pugnacious,"  and  "  courageous  " 
dog.  "The  terrier  (Skye)  in  question,  like  many  other  dogs,  used  to 
play  with  dry  bones  by  tossing  them  in  the  air,  throwing  them  to  a 
distance,  and  generally  giving  them  the  appearance  of  animation,  in 
order  to  give  himself  the  ideal  pleasure  of  worrying  them.  On  one 
occasion,  therefore,  I  tied  a  long  and  fine  thread  to  a  dry  bone,  and 
gave  him  the  latter  to  play  with.  After  he  had  tossed  it  about  for  a 
short  time,  I  took  an  opportunity,  when  it  had  fallen  at  a  distance  from 
him,  and  while  he  was  following  it  up,  of  gently  drawing  it  away  from  him 
by  means  of  the  long,  invisible  thread.  Instantly  his  whole  demeanor 
changed.  The  bone,  which  he  had  previously  pretended  to  be  alive, 
now  began  to  look  as  if  it  really  were  alive,  and  his  astonishment  knew 
no  bounds.  He  first  approached  it  with  nervous  caution,  as  Mr.  Spencer 
describes,  but  as  the  slow  receding  motion  continued,  and  he  became 
quite  certain  that  the  movement  could  not  be  accounted  for  by  any 
residuum  of  the  force  which  he  had  himself  communicated,  his  astonish- 
ment developed  into  dread,  and  he  ran  to  conceal  himself  under  some 
articles  of  furniture,  there  to  behold  at  a  distance  the  uncanny  spectacle 
of  a  dry  bone  coming  to  life."  ^  Certain  instances  of  instinctive 
fear  of  harmless  things  may  help  to  interpret  the  preceding  observa- 
tions. G.  Stanley  Hall  mentions  a  little  girl  who  would  scream  when 
she  saw  feathers  floating  through  the  air.  To  place  a  feather  in  the 
keyhole  was  sufficient  to  keep  another  child  in  a  room.* 

Shall  we  hold  that  these  animals  interpreted  the  unusual  experiences 
reported  above  as  the  work  of  hidden  beings  of  the  kind  known  to  them, 
or  shall  we  agree  with  Lloyd  Morgan,  Romanes,  Spencer,  and  others 
in  thinking  that  their  behavior  indicated  simply  surprise,  astonishment, 
and  fear,  at  the  unexpected  movements  of  familiar  objects  ?  The  latter 
explanation  is  probably  sufficient.     The  failure  of  an  object  to  fit  in 

1  Darwin,  Charles,  The  Descent  of  Man,  New  York,  1871,  Vol.  I,  p.  64. 

2  Romanes,  G.  J.,  Nature,  Vol.  XVII  (1877-1878),  pp.  168-169,  Comp. 
Lloyd  Morgan,  Introduction  to  Comparative  Psychology,  p.  92  ff. 

^  Comp.  Lloyd  Morgan's  experiment  with  dogs  and  soap  bubbles,  Intro- 
duction to  Comparative  Psychology,  p.  93. 

*  Hall,  G.  Stanley, /4  Study  in  Pears,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psychology  (1897),  ^o\. 
VIII,  p.  166. 


MAGIC,   RELIGION  AND  THE  ANIMAL  MIND         69 

with  the  psycho-physiological  attitude  of  expectation  which  past  expe- 
rience has  taught  us  to  assume  brings  about  the  sudden  disturbance 
called  surprise,  astonishment,  or  fear.  It  is  what  would  happen  to  any 
person  if,  on  opening  his  bed  in  the  dark,  his  hands  came  in  contact 
with  some  object  concealed  there.  Personification  of  the  unexpected 
object  is  not  necessary  to  cause  fright.  And  yet  who  will  say  that  in 
none  of  these  instances  there  is  anything  corresponding  to  the  anthro- 
pomorphic interpretation  of  natural  events  so  common  among  men  of 
little  culture.  It  would  seem  to  me  an  unjustifiably  dogmatic  assertion 
to  say  that  no  animal  can  think  of  thunder  as  caused  by  a  being  like 
those  with  which  his  senses  have  made  him  familiar.  Creative  imagi- 
nation is  no  more  needed  for  such  an  interpretation  than  for  the  belief 
in  survival  after  death,  when  this  is  suggested  by  apparitions  in  dreams 
or  trances. 

Unless,  however,  there  exists,  in  addition,  a  way  of  fixing,  by  means 
of  communicable  signs,  the  animistic  interpretations  that  may  chance 
to  flit  across  the  animal's  consciousness,  they  cannot  become  a  perma- 
nent part  of  his  mental  life.  Without  speech,  which  holds,  clarifies, 
and  keeps  alive  impressions  of  this  evanescent  nature,  no  stable  belief 
deserving  the  name  animism  could  have  been  established.  The  impor- 
tant role  played  by  language,  in  this  connection,  appears  clearly  when 
one  considers  the  part  it  takes  in  introducing  dream  experiences  into 
waking  life.  The  evanescence  of  dreams  which  are  caught  sight  of  on 
awaking  is  familiar  to  all.  Unless  one  succeeds  in  putting  them  into 
words,  they  are  soon  completely  lost ;  it  is  through  verbal  expression 
that  they  become  part  and  parcel  of  our  mental  possessions. 


CHAPTER   IV 
ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL  POWERS  ^ 

We  have  seen  that  neither  magic  nor  religion  can  be 
produced  by  the  method  of  trial  and  error,  but  that  the 
establishment  of  each  implies  ideas  of  unseen  powers. 
What  are  the  experiences  out  of  which  these  ideas  arise  ? 

Until  recently,  the  accepted  view  was  that  set  forth  in 
1877  by  Edward  B.  Tylor  in  Prifuitive  Culture ?  A  brief 
statement  of  his  theory  will  serve  as  a  convenient  starting 
point  for  our  discussion.  Tylor  seeks  to  demonstrate  that 
out  of  naive  thinking  about  the  visions  of  dreams  and 
trances,  and  from  comparisons  of  life  with  death,  and  of 
health  with  sickness,  arose  a  belief  in  the  existence  of 
spirits  as  the  powers  animating  nature.  "What  men's 
eyes  behold  is  but  the  instrument  to  be  used,  or  the  material 
to  be  shaped,  while  behind  it  there  stands  some  prodigious 
but  half  human  creature,  who  grasps  it  with  his  hands  or 
blows  it  with  his  breath."  This  belief,  which  according  to 
him  represents  the  first  philosophy  of   nature,   he   calls 

1  Although  I  take  up  the  origin  of  the  concepts  fundamental  to  magic 
and  religion  before  magical  and  religious  behaviors,  I  do  not  hold  that 
concepts  appear  full-fledged  before  action.  I  believe  that  active  experi- 
ence is  a  necessary  factor  in  the  formation  of  ideas.  But  the  particular  ex- 
periences out  of  which  arose  the  ideas  of  unseen  powers  antedated  the 
appearance  of  magic  and  religion.  This  fact  is  the  reason  for  the  order  of 
topics  here  adopted.  It  is,  of  course,  quite  true  that  although  the  origin  of 
these  concepts  preceded  the  modes  of  behavior  in  question,  their  elaboration 
con'Cva.yx^A  pari  passu  with  the  development  of  magic  and  of  religion. 

2  Tylor,  Edward  B.,  Fritniiive  Culture,  Vol.  I,  Chap.  XI. 

70 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL   POWERS      71 

anhnism.  The  phenomena  mentioned  generated  initially 
the  ideal  of  the  double,  also  called  ghost  or  soul.  Each 
man  was  believed  to  have  a  ghost,  which  could  tempora- 
rily leave  the  body  and  appear  at  a  distance  from  it. 
By  a  process  of  extension  souls  were  ascribed  to  animals 
and  even  to  plants.  The  separation  which  takes  place  at 
death  between  the  double  and  the  body  is  responsible,  ac- 
cording to  this  view,  for  the  production  of  spirits ;  so  that, 
at  their  simplest,  spirits  are  the  souls  of  men,  animals,  or 
plants,  liberated  from  a  body.  Spirits  may  enter  and 
inhabit  any  organism,  but  they  do  not  belong  to  it  as  a  soul 
belongs  to  its  body.  A  soul,  it  is  true,  can  also  leave  its 
body,  but  only  for  a  short  time,  under  conditions  such  as  { 
sleep ;  otherwise  death  follows.  Thus,  in  the  mind  of  the  / 
savage,  the  world  is  animated  by  untold  numbers  of  souls 
and  spirits  or  free  souls.  ^ 

^  "  Animism  is,  in  fact,  the  groundwork  of  the  philosophy  of  religion,  from 
that  of  savages  up  to  that  of  civilized  men.  ...  It  is  habitually  found  that 
the  theory  of  animism  divides  into  two  great  dogmas  forming  parts  of  one 
consistent  doctrine:  first,  concerning  souls  of  individual  creatures,  capable  of 
continued  existence  after  the  death  or  destruction  of  the  body;  second,  con- 
cerning other  spirits,  upward  to  the  rank  of  powerful  deities.  .  .  .  Animism, 
in  its  full  development,  includes  the  belief  in  controlling  deities  and  subordi- 
nate spirits,  in  souls,  and  in  a  future  state,  these  doctrines  practically  resulting 
in  some  kind  of  active  worship."  (E.  B.  Tylor,  Primitive  Culture,  Vol.  I, 
Chap.  XI,  pp.  385,  386.)     This  is  his  definition  of  a  "  minimum  of  religion." 

In  Vol.  II,  Chap.  XIV,  p.  99,  he  passes  from  the  fundamental  doctrine  of 
souls  to  the  derived  doctrine  of  spirits.  "The  doctrine  of  souls,  founded  on 
the  natural  perceptions  of  primitive  man,  gave  rise  to  the  doctrine  of  spirits." 
"  The  conception  of  a  human  soul  served  as  a  type  or  a  model  on  which  he 
framed  not  only  his  idea  of  other  souls  of  lower  grade,  but  also  his  idea  of 
spiritual  beings  in  general,  from  the  tiniest  elf  that  sports  in  the  long  grass  up 
to  the  heavenly  Creator"  (p.  100). 

Credit  must  be  given  Hobbes  for  having  clearly  anticipated  the  Tylorian 
animism.  In  the  Leviathan  we  read :  "  And  for  the  matter,  or  substance  of 
the  Invisible  Agents,  so  fancyed,  they  could  not  by  naturall  cogitation,  fall 
upon  any  other  conceit,  but  that  it  was  the  same  with  that  of  the  Soule  of 
man;   and  that  the  Soule  of  man  was  of  the  same  substance  with  that  which 


72  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

This  doctrine  of  souls  and  spirits,  in  so  far  as  it  purposes 
to  express  the  first  philosophy  of  nature,  is  rapidly  giving 
way  under  the  combined  weight  of  anthropological  and  of 
psychological  data.  An  increasingly  large  number  of  com- 
petent writers  would  now  place  earlier  than  the  Tylorian 
animism,  or  at  least  side  by  side  with  it,  another  fundamen- 
tal and  universal  belief,  arising  from  commoner  and  sim- 
pler experiences  than  visions  ;  namely,  a  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  an  omnipresent,  non-personal  power  or  powers. 

The  names  best  deserving  mention  in  this  connection 
are  probably  those  of  Daniel  Brinton,  in  the  United  States, 
and  of  R.  R.  Marett,  in  England.  In  his  Lectures,  pub- 
lished in  1897,  Brinton^  advanced  the  theory  that  "  the 
hidden  and  mysterious  power  of  the  universe  "  is  at  first 
expressed  in  terms  denoting  "  infinite  will."  He  quotes 
from  Miss  Fletcher  that  the  Wakan  of  the  Dakota 
Indians,  "  is  the  deification  of  that  peculiar  quality  or  power 
of  which  man  is  conscious  within  himself  as  directing  his 
own  acts,  or  willing  a  course  to  bring  about  certain  results," 
and  he  continues,  "  The  universal  postulate,  the  psychic 
origin  of  all  religious  thought,  is  the  recognition,  or,  if  you 
please,  the  assumption,  that  conscious  volition  is  the  ulti- 
mate source  of  all  Force.  It  is  the  belief  that  behind  the 
sensuous,  phenomenal  world,  distinct  from  it,  giving  it 
form,  existence,  and  activity,  lies  the  ultimate,  invisible, 
immeasurable  power  of  Mind,  of  conscious  Will,  of  Intelli- 

appeareth  in  a  Dream,  to  one  that  sleepeth;  or  in  a  Looking-glasse,  to  one 
that  is  awake;  which,  men  not  knowing  that  such  apparitions  are  nothing 
else  but  creatures  of  the  Fancy,  think  to  be  reall  and  externall  Substances; 
and  therefore  call  them  Ghosts,  as  the  Latines  called  them  hnagines  and 
Umbrae;  and  thought  them  Spirits,  that  is,  thin  aereall  bodies;  and  those 
Invisible  Agents,  which  they  feared,  to  bee  like  them;  save  that  they  appear, 
and  vanish  when  they  please."  {^Leviathan,  ed.  A.  R.  Waller,  1904,  Chap. 
XII,  p.  71.) 

1  Brinton,  Daniel  G.,  Religions  of  Primitive  Peoples,  1897,  pp.  60,  47,  164. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL  POWERS     73 

gence,  analogous  in  some  way  to  our  own  ;  and  —  mark  the 
essential  corollary  —  that  man  is  in  communication  with 
it."  And  again  :  "  The  idea  of  a  World-Soul,  manifesting 
itself  individually  in  every  form  of  matter  from  the  star  to 
the  clod,  is  as  truly  the  belief  of  the  Sioux  or  the  Fijian 
cannibal  as  it  was  of  Spinoza  or  Giordano  Bruno."  He 
holds  further  that  this  Will  Power,  this  World-Soul,  is  first 
posited  in  moments  of  ecstasy  or  trance,  in  periods  of  rap- 
ture, intoxication,  or  frenzy.  "This  influence  is  at  first 
vague,  impersonal,  undefined,  but  is  gradually  differentiated 
and  personified." 

The  striking  features  of  this  theory  are:  (i)  that  the 
idea  of  personal  beings  was  not  man's  first  explanation  of 
movement  and  action  in  the  world  ;  (2)  that  man  began 
with  a  quasi-impersonal  notion,  which  Brinton  defines  in 
terms  of  "will,"  —  "All  Gods  and  holy  objects  were  merely 
vehicles  through  which  Life  and  Power  poured  into  the 
world  from  the  inexhaustible  and  impersonal  source  of 
both";  (3)  that  this  notion  was  first  revealed  in  ecstasies 
and  trances.     A  psychologist  might  call  it  an  automatism. 

It  is  unfortunate  that  into  this  most  interesting  concep- 
tion of  man's  earliest  philosophy  and  its  derivation  from 
the  sense  of  our  own  will  Brinton  has  introduced  notions 
unnecessarily  complex  and  of  much  later  origin.  At  cer- 
tain points  he  seems  ready  to  attribute  to  primitive  man 
some  of  Emerson's  ideas  about  the  Over-Soul. 

R.  R.  Marett,  in  an  important  essay  entitled  Pre- Animistic 
Religion}  urges  "that  primitive  or  rudimentary  religion, 
as  we  actually  find  it  amongst  savage  peoples,  is  at  once  a 
wider  and,  in  certain  respects,  a  vaguer  thing  than  '  the 
belief  in  spiritual  beings  '  of  Tylor's  famous  '  minimum  defi- 
nition.' "     "  The  animistic  idea  represents  but  one  among 

*  First  published  m  Folk-lore  in  1900,  and  reprinted  in  1909  in  The  Thresh- 
old of  Religion,  Methuen  and  Co.,  London. 


74  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

a  number  of  ideas,  for  the  most  part  far  more  vague  than 
it  is,  and  hence  more  liable  to  escape  notice  ;  all  of  which 
ideas,  however,  are  active  in  savage  religion  as  we  have  it, 
struggling  one  with  the  other  for  supremacy  in  accordance 
with  the  normal  tendency  of  reHgious  thought  towards  uni- 
formity of  doctrinal  expression."  Marett,  Hke  Brinton,  is 
disposed  to  see  in  man's  sense  of  will  power  the  archetype 
of  the  original  conception  of  the  Mysterious  Power;  but 
he  avoids  the  latter's  error  of  including  too  much  in  the 
primitive  conception.  His  conclusion  may  be  stated  in  his 
own  words  thus  :  "The  attitude  of  Supernaturalism  towards 
what  we  should  call  inanimate  nature  may  be  independent 
of  animistic  interpretations."  ^ 

In  the  Monist  for  1906,  Arthur  O.  Lovejoy  offers  a  criti- 
cism of  Marett  which  deserves  attention. ^  The  latter,  as 
we  have  seen,  finds  the  essence  of  the  preanimistic  belief 

1  Marett,  R.  R.,  The  Threshold  of  Religion,  pp.  30,  17.  In  another  chap- 
ter of  the  same  book  (p.  137),  where  he  endeavors  to  push  the  origin  of  reh- 
gion  a  step  farther  back  than  animism,  he  concludes  that  "  Mana,  or  rather  the 
tabu-mana  formula,  has  solid  advantages  over  Animism,  when  the  avowed  ob- 
ject is  to  found  what  Dr.  Tylor  calls  a  minimum  definition  of  religion.  Mana 
is  coextensive  with  the  supernatural ;  Animism  is  far  too  wide.  Mana  is  al- 
ways Mana,  supernatural  power,  differing  in  intensity,  —  in  voltage,  so  to  speak, 
—  but  never  in  essence  ;  Animism  splits  up  into  more  or  less  irreducible  kinds, 
notably  '  souls,'  '  spirits,'  and  '  ghosts.'  Finally,  Mana,  whilst  fully  adapted  to 
express  the  immaterial,  —  the  unseen  force  behind  the  scene,  —  yet  conformably 
with  the  incoherent  state  of  rudimentary  reflection,  leaves  in  solution  the  dis- 
tinction between  personal  and  impersonal,  and,  in  particular,  does  not  allow 
any  notion  of  a  high  individuality  to  be  precipitated."  I  maintain  that  in 
seeking  to  replace  belief  in  personal  agents  (animism)  by  Mana,  "  which  leaves 
in  solution  the  distinction  between  personal  and  impersonal,"  Marett  disre- 
gards the  only  definite  line  of  cleavage  which  can  be  used  to  differentiate 
religious  from  non-religious  life;  that  is,  the  line  separating  the  attitudes  and 
actions  that  involve  the  idea  of  personal  power  from  those  that  do  not.  In 
my  view  of  the  matter,  when  the  distinction  between  personal  and  impersonal 
is  in  solution,  religion  itself  is  likewise  in  solution. 

2  Lovejoy,  Arthur  O.,  The  Fundamental  Concept  of  the  Primitive  Philoso- 
phy, Monist,  1906,  Vol.  XVI,  pp.  357-382. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL   POWERS      75 

to  be  the  apprehension  "  of  the  supernatural  or  supernor- 
mal as  distinguished  from  the  natural  and  the  normal," 
and  so  he  proposes  the  term  "  supernaturalism,"  or  pref- 
erably "teratism"  as  a  name  for  this  primitive  attitude. 
"  But,"  says  Lovejoy,  "  Mr.  Marett  appears  to  me  to  place 
the  emphasis  on  the  wrong  side.  .  .  .  The  preanimistic 
belief  —  the  beUef  which  is,  at  all  events,  independent  of 
animism  —  is  not  best  described  as  "supernaturalism,"  or 
"  teratism,"  for  the  fundamental  notion  in  it  is  not  that  of 
the  unpredictable,  abnormal,  and  portentous,  but  that  of 
a  force  which  is  conceived  as  working  according  to  quite 
regular  and  intelligible  laws  —  a  force  which  can  be  studied 
and  controlled.  A  better  name,  then,  for  this  group  of 
beliefs  would  be  Primitive  Energetics  "  (p.  381). 

I  question  the  appropriateness  of  the  expression  "  quite 
regular  and  intelHgible  laws,"  There  is  without  doubt,  I 
should  say,  much  that  is  unpredictable  in  the  behavior  of 
Wakonda,  or  Manitou,  or  Mana.  And,  in  any  case,  the 
means  used  to  bring  into  play  the  mysterious  Power  does 
not  indicate  the  apprehension  of  a  definite  and  stable 
quantitative  relation  between  this  means  and  the  effects 
produced.  The  Power  invoked,  therefore,  is  not  a  me- 
chanical Power,  but  a  magical  force. 

Irving  King,^  in  a  chapter  entitled  "  The  Mysterious 
Power,"  brings  together  the  philological  and  other  data 
bearing  upon  this  subject.  The  terms  iI/(a'«zV^//  (Algonquin), 
Wakonda  (Sioux),  Orenda  (Iroquois),  Mana  (Melanesian), 
designate  anon-personal  Power  or  Potency  considered  to  be 
at  the  basis  of  all  natural  phenomena.  The  same  notion 
is  found  among  the  Australians.  It  appears  in  particular 
in  their  use  of  the  Chiringa,  or  bull-roarer. 

^  King,  Irving,  The  Development  of  Religion,  Macmillan  and  Co.,  19 10.  Any 
one  interested  in  this  point  will  find  a  good  summary  of  the  evidence  in  Chap- 
ter VI  of  Irving  King's  book,  or  in  Lovejoy's  shorter  article  quoted  above. 


76  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

1  shall  not  attempt  to  put  before  the  reader  the  linguis- 
tic and  historical  evidence  that  can  be  adduced  to  show 
that  the  belief  in  non-personal  forces  is  prior  to  animism. 
It  is  now  generally  admitted  that  among  nearly  all  primi- 
tive peoples  of  whom  we  have  accurate  knowledge  the 
generic  and  widely  used  words  previously  thought  to  mean 
a  personal  divinity  and  often  a  "  High  God,"  really  desig- 
nate afar  less  definite  conception,  —  that  of  power  or  force. 
Originally  these  words  no  more  designated  personal  gods 
than  does  Mana,  which  Codrington  defines  thus :  "  That 
invisible  power  which  is  believed  by  the  natives  to  cause 
all  such  effects  as  transcend  their  conception  of  the  regu- 
lar course  of  nature,  and  to  reside  in  spiritual  beings, 
whether  in  the  spiritual  part  of  living  men  or  in  the  ghosts 
of  the  dead,  being  imparted  to  them,  to  their  names  and  to 
various  things  that  belong  to  them,  such  as  stones,  snakes, 
and  indeed  objects  of  all  sorts,  is  that  generally  known  as 
Mana.  .  .  .  No  man,  however,  has  this  power  of  his  own; 
all  that  he  does  is  done  by  the  aid  of  personal  beings,  ghosts 
or  spirits ;  he  cannot  be  said,  as  a  spirit  can,  to  be  Mana 
himself  ...  he  can  be  said  to  have  Mana."  ^ 

With  regard  to  the  historical  evidence,  it  is  now  gener- 
ally conceded  that  as  one  approaches  the  original  conditions 
of  the  race,  religious  practices  dwindle  away,  while  magical 
behavior  is  everywhere  in  evidence.  Howitt  declares  that 
"  if  religion  is  defined  as  being  the  formulated  worship  of  a 
divinity,"  the  Australian  savage  has  no  religion.^  Frazer 
reflects  the  views  of  Spencer  and  Gillen,  of  Howitt,  and 
probably  of  every  recent  first-hand  student  of  Australia, 
when  he  writes  :  "  Among  the  aborigines  of  Australia,  the 
rudest  savages  as  to  whom  we  possess  accurate  information, 

^  Codrington,  R.  H.,  The  Melanesians  (Clarendon  Press,  1891),  p.  191. 

2  Howitt,  A.  W.,  Australian  Ceremonies  of  Initiation,  Jr.  of  the  Anthrop 
Institute  (British),  1884,  Vol.  XIII,  p.  432. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL   POWERS      77 

Magic  is  universally  practised,  whereas  Religion,  in  the 
sense  of  a  propitiation  or  conciliation  of  the  higher  powers, 
seems  to  be  nearly  unknown.  Roughly  speaking,  all  men 
in  Australia  are  magicians,  but  not  one  is  a  priest ;  every- 
body fancies  he  can  influence  his  fellows  or  the  course  of 
nature  by  sympathetic  magic,  but  nobody  dreams  of 
propitiating  gods  by  prayer  and  sacrifice."  ^ 

Because  of  the  presence  of  magic  and  the  absence  of  re- 
ligious rites  among  the  most  primitive  tribes  known  to  us, 
some  argue  that  belief  in  the  non-personal  powers  implied 
in  magical  behavior  antedated  the  belief  in  the  unseen  per- 
sonal being  involved  in  our  conception  of  religion.  This 
deduction  is  unwarranted  ;  for  the  Australians,  although 
they  are  without  religious  customs  and  ceremonies,  believe 
in  the  existence  of  some  sort  of  Great  Being.  It  is  not  my 
chief  intention,  however,  to  prove  the  priority  of  the  belief 
in  non-personal  powers  to  the  belief  in  unseen  personal 
agents ;  but  to  maintain  the  independent  origin  of  these 
beliefs.  The  question  of  precedence  loses  much  of  its 
importance  when  these  two  concepts  are  not  supposed  to 
stand  to  each  other  in  a  genetic  relation.  It  seems  to  me 
probable,  however,  that  the  non-personal  view  preceded 
animism. 

TJie  theses  which  I  maintain  in  this  chapter  are :  first, 
that  the  belief  in  non-personal  powers  is  neither  a  deriva- 
tive of  animism  nor  a  first  step  leading  up  to  it,  but  that  the 
two  beliefs  have  had  independent  origins ;  a7td,  secondly, 
that  ani^nism,  appeared  second  in  order  of  time. 

I  have  begun  by  giving  the  opinions  of  certain  writers 
and  referring  to  some  historical  facts  upon  which  these 
opinions  are  based.  The  psychologist  in  search  of 
knowledge  concerning  origins  turns  naturally  to  the  child 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  The  Beginnings  of  Religion,  Fortn.  Rev.,  Vol.  LXXVIII 
(1905) >  P-  162.     Comp.  The  Golden  Bough-,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I  pp.  71-73. 


78  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

to  supplement  anthropological  data.  What  are  the  first 
explanatory  concepts  of  the  child  ?  In  response  to  what 
experiences,  and  in  what  order,  were  they  evolved  ?  Un- 
fortunately the  available  data  here  are  also  meagre  and 
often  indefinite.-^ 

Long  before  a  child  speaks,  he  uses  things.  His  inter- 
est early  extends  to  causes,  and  when  language  appears, 
with  the  questions,  "What  for?  "and  "Why?"  he  is 
already  in  possession  of  the  abstract  ideas  of  cause  and 
effect.^  At  the  end  of  the  third  year  begins  that  period  of 
incessant  questioning  so  wearisome  to  parents.  Children 
wish  not  only  to  complete  their  information  about  the  ap- 
pearance and  the  other  sensible  qualities  of  objects,  but,  first 
of  all,  to  know  for  what  purpose  things  exist,  and  how  they 
came  to  be.  Before  the  end  of  his  third  year,  Preyer's 
boy  asked,  referring  to  the  creaking  of  a  carriage  wheel, 
"  Was  maclitmir  so  ?  "  and  not  very  much  later  children  will 
ask,  "What  makes  the  wind  ?  "  "What  makes  the  train 
move  ? "  "  How  do  we  move  our  eyes  ? "  (girl  four  years 
and  seven  months).  "  When  there  is  no  Qgg,  where  does 
the  hen  come  from  ?  When  there  was  no  Qgg,  I  mean, 
where  did  the  hen  come  from  ?  "  (five years  old).  "  If  I  had 
gone  upstairs,  could  God  have  made  it  that  I  had  not  ? " 
(boy  four  years  old).  From  this  age  on,  for  many  years 
the  interrogation  point  is  always  wriggling  in  the  mind  of 
the  child. 

1  Sully,  J.,  Studies  in  Childhood,  Chaps,  III,  IV,  pp.  91-108  ;  Tracy, 
Chap.  II,  pp.  4,  5,  III,  p.  3  ;  Alexandre  Chamberlain,  The  Child  (The 
Contemporary  Science  Series),  1900,  pp.  147-148;  Perez,  The  First  Three 
Years  of  Childhood. 

'^The  following  instance  shows  how  early  concepts  appear  in  the  child. 
A  boy  eight  months  old  had  enjoyed  stuffing  things  into  a  tin  box.  After- 
wards he  looked  for  holes  in  all  his  toys.      (Perez,  ibid.,  p.  199.) 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  soon  some  one  will,  by  systematic  observations  of 
the  child,  complete  the  present  meagre  and  scattered  data,  and  so  aid  in  the 
elucidation  of  the  present  problems. 


ORIGIN   OF  THE  IDEA   OF  IMPERSONAL  POWERS      79 

Now,  inquiries  concerning  the  causes  of  things  imply  an 
idea  of  power,  for  power  means  at  its  simplest  merely  that 
which  produces  something.  I  believe  that  this  primary 
idea  of  power  which  a  child  possesses  before  the  end  of  his 
third  year  is  not  the  idea  of  a  personal  power,  and  is  not 
derived  from  the  idea  of  persons.  It  would  seem  to  me 
preposterous  to  suppose  that  the  first  "  What  does  that  ?  " 
of  the  infant  implies  the  idea  of  a  personal  cause.  Is  it 
not  much  simpler,  as  well  as  quite  sufficient,  to  conceive 
that  for  him  the  cause  of  an  event  is  that  which  appears  to 
his  senses  as  preceding  it?  (I  waive  for  a  moment  the 
question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  crudest  idea  of  causation 
includes  more  than  the  idea  of  necessary  sequence.) 

That  very  young  children  do  conceive  of  non-personal 
causes  seems  indicated  in  the  following  instance :  a  child 
one  year  and  eleven  months  old  wanted  her  mother  to  lift 
her  up  that  she  might  see  the  wind.  Is  there  any  sufficient 
reason  for  thinking  that  this  child  expected  to  see  a 
human  being  or  an  animal .''  To  my  mind,  she  simply 
expected  to  see  something  passing  by.  "  Something  "  is 
a  much  simpler  notion  than  that  of  an  animal  or  human 
being.  This  expected  thing  was,  for  her,  what  plucked 
her  dress,  moved  the  tree,  etc.  Why  should  she  have  gone 
to  the  length  of  imagining  an  object,  known  only  in  this 
way,  to  have  the  definite  characteristics  of  men  or  animals  } 
Her  actual  experience  with  the  wind  was  with  something 
which  had  not  these  characteristics ;  it  was  known  to  her 
only  as  that  which  pushed  or  pressed  against  her.  Why 
not  conclude,  then,  that  she  simply  expected  to  see  some 
familiar  natural  object,  such  as  smoke,  vapor,  cloud.'* 

It  may  be  argued  that  because  the  child  speaks  of  these 
things  as  alive,  he  identifies  them  with  men  and  animals. 
That  he  is  usually  ready  to  attribute  life  to  these  inanimate 
causes,  is  not  to  be  doubted.     Some  little  children  when 


8o  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

asked  what  things  in  the  room  were  alive  replied  "  smoke," 
"fire."  C  said  his  cushion  was  alive,  because  it  sUpped 
from  under  him.  The  same  child,  on  being  told  that  a 
certain  stick  was  too  short  for  him,  answered,  "  Me  use  it 
for  walking  stick  when  stick  be  bigger."  ^  The  wind,  the 
smoke,  the  clouds,  anything  having  the  appearance  of 
self-movement,  falls  in  the  category  of  "  living "  things. 
But,  although  for  the  child  a  man  and  the  wind  may  both 
be  alive,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  conceives  of  the  wind 
under  the  likeness  of  man.  The  concept  "  life "  is  for 
him  wider  than  that  designated  by  the  same  word  in  the 
mind  of  the  civilized  adult.  "  Life,"  it  seems,  means  to 
the  child  merely  the  capacity  of  self-movement ;  while  the 
concepts  "man"  and  "animal"  involve  in  addition  cer- 
tain ideas  of  structure  —  head,  mouth,  limbs  —  and  modes 
of  behavior. 

Because  this  idea  of  forces  capable  of  self-movement  or 
of  producing  movement  and  change,  is  simpler  than  the 
concept  "  person,"  it  may  be  expected  to  appear  earlier. 
The  relevant  facts  of  child  psychology  all  confirm  this 
view.  It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  much  more  com- 
plex notion  of  personality  does  not  lag  far  behind.  It 
includes,  for  the  child,  men  and  animals,  and  is  readily  ex- 
tended so  as  to  include  certain  physical  objects,  — the  mov- 
ing, puffing,  and  smoking  locomotive,  for  instance.  Having 
reached  this  stage,  does  he  gradually  come  to  conceive  of 
all  causes  as  personal  ?  If  so,  he  would  pass  through  a 
second  stage  in  his  philosophical  development,  a  stage 
which  it  would  be  proper  to  call  animism.  I  prefer  to  think 
that  non-personal  causes  continue  to  do  duty  side  by  side 
with  personal  agents  throughout  childhood.  There  are,  in- 
deed, many  facts,  some  of  which  are  cited  in  this  and  in  an- 
other chapter,  which  justify  the  opinion  that  the  original  idea 

^  Sully,  J.,  Diary,  in  Appendix  to  Studies  in  Childhood. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL   POWERS      8i 

of  non-personal  causes  remains  in  the  mind,  and  that  at  no 
time,  either  in  the  history  of  the  child  or  of  the  race,  does 
the  term  "  animism  "  represent  adequately  the  philosophy 
of  primitive  man, 

I  have  represented  the  original  notion  of  causal  power 
as  independent  of  the  sense  of  personal  effort.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  moment  soon  comes  when  one's 
intimate  experience  of  striving  is  projected  into  the  world 
of  external  causes, 

A  passage  from  G.  F.  Stout  will  set  clearly  before  us  the  point  in 
question.  ''Causation  for  the  'plain  man'  involves  more  than  mere 
priority  and  subsequence  ;  it  carries  with  it  a  vague,  and,  for  science,  a 
futile  representation  of  what  Professor  Pearson  calls  '  enforcement.' 
The  traces  of  this  bias  are  often  found  even  in  scientific  exposition. 
Thus  it  is  plainly  in  evidence  whenever  '  force  '  is  referred  to  as  a  cause 
of  motion  or  as  a  reason  why  a  body  moves.  ...  In  common  language 
such  words  as  pressure,  strain,  stress,  energy,  resistance,  impact,  imply 
something  more  than  can  be  included  in  a  mere  description  of  the 
space  relations  of  the  parts  of  matter.  This  something  more  is  cer- 
tainly rather  indistinctly  conceived.  There  is,  however,  no  room  for 
doubting  that  it  consists  in  an  assumed  inner  state  of  material  bodies, 
—  a  state  imperceptible  to  the  external  observer  and  uninterpretable  in 
terms  of  the  data  yielded  by  external  observation.  Hence  it  follows  of 
necessity  that  the  only  source  from  which  the  material  for  these  ideas  of 
force,  enforcement,  etc.,  springs  is  our  own  mental  life."^ 

The  projection  of  the  feeling  of  effort  into  natural  forces  I 
would  place  midway  between  the  earliest  idea  of  non-per- 
sonal causal  power  and  the  fully  developed  idea  of  personal 
power.  The  little  girl  who  says  to  her  brother,  "  If  you  eat 
so  much  goose,  you  will  be  quite  silly  "  ;  the  man  who  holds 
that  his  luck  changed  because  he  married  a  shrew,  or  be- 
cause so-and-so  died  ;  or  the  man  who  thinks  his  fortune 
returned  because  he  wore  a  "  lucky  "  suit,^  —  can  hardly  be 

1  Stout,  G.  F.,  Analytic  Psychology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  178-179. 

2  Jast row,  Joseph, /ar/  and  Fable  in  Psychology,  p.  252.  On  the  use  of 
analogy,  see  pp.  236-274. 

G 


82  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

supposed  to  invest  the  causes  of  these  effects  with  the  will- 
effort  feeHng.  He  has  simply  remained  at  the  lower  con- 
ceptual level,  or  has  reverted  to  it.  I  afifirm,  then,  that 
there  exists  a  class  of  causes  into  which  no  will-effort  feel- 
ing is  projected,  and  that  this  class  not  only  arises  first,  but 
persists  after  more  complex  notions  of  power  have  been 
added. 

It  is  to  be  noted  further  that  a  cause  conceived  under 
the  analogy  of  a  will-effort  is  not  necessarily  a  personal 
cause.  Even  civilized  man,  as  Stout  reminds  us,  commonly 
endows  physical  causes  with  something  of  the  sense  of  ef- 
fort which  he  himself  experiences,  but,  nevertheless,  he 
does  not  conceive  of  these  causes  as  truly  personal.  Facts 
show  that  in  most  communities,  at  certain  periods,  the  idea 
of  will  power  has  been  seized  upon  and  used  as  an  explana- 
tory category.  There  is,  for  instance,  a  variety  of  magic 
called  will-magic,  because  the  magical  deed  is  supposed  to 
be  due,  in  part,  at  least,  to  the  will-effort  of  the  magician. 
Such  a  notion  is  common  among  the  North  American 
Indians.  According  to  Miss  Fletcher,  "  The  Sioux  Ind- 
ian has  deified  the  power  of  which  he  is  conscious 
within  himself,  the  power  by  which  he  directs  his  own 
acts  or  wills  a  course  by  which  to  bring  about  certain  re- 
sults." They  have  a  word  Wa-zhm-dke-dhe,  for  which 
there  is  no  word  in  English  unless  it  be  "telepathy." 
"  Dhe-dhe  is  *to  send,'  and  Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe  signifies  to 
send  forth  one's  thoughts  and  will  power  towards  another 
in  order  to  supplement  his  strength.  .  .  .  For  instance, 
when  a  race  is  taking  place,  a  man  may  bend  his  thought 
and  his  will  upon  one  of  the  contestants  ...  in  the  be- 
lief that  this  act  of  his,  this  sending  of  his  mind,  will  help 
his  friend  to  win."  Similarly,  when  a  man  is  on  the  war- 
path, a  group  of  people,  usually  women,  will  gather  about 
his    tent   and    sing    certain    songs    called     We-ton-wa-an. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  IDEA  OF  IMPERSONAL  POWERS      83 

"  These  songs  are  the  medium  by  which  strength  is  con- 
veyed to  the  man  facing  danger  ;  the  act  is  Wa-zhin-dhe- 
d/ic."  1  But  we  must  remember  that  we  are  not  dealing 
here  with  a  really  primitive  people.  One  need  not  revert 
to  the  American  Indian  to  find  illustrations  of  this  belief. 
The  idea  of  action  exerted  at  a  distance  by  a  person's  will 
is  very  common,  even  among  us. 

Miss  Fletcher,  like  Brinton  and  others,  fails  to  mark 
the  important  distinction  between  a  power  conceived  under 
the  analogy  of  our  will-effort,  and  a  complete  personifica- 
tion. The  will  power  sent  off  by  a  person  may  be  spoken  of 
as  having  "  life,"  in  the  sense  in  which  the  child  first  uses 
this  word.  But  that  it  is  not  identical  with  a  person  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  the  power  is  detachable  in  various 
amounts  from  a  person,  and  is  owned  and  controlled  by  a 
person. 

The  original  idea  of  non-personal  power  possesses  but'; 
one  necessary  characteristic  :  it  is  dynamic,  it  does  things,  i 
Man's  attitude  towards  it  shows  plainly  that  neither  intel- 
ligence nor  feeling  is  a  necessary  element  in  its  composi- 
tion. As  the  workings  of  this  power  are  to  a  great  extent 
unforeseen  and  uncontrollable,  it  evokes  frequently  dread 
and  awe  ;  but  in  so  far  as  man  thinks  himself  able  to  con- 
trol and  use  it,  it  loses  its  mysteriousness  and  awfulness 
and  becomes  a  familiar  power.  As  it  is  not  definitely  con- 
ceived as  intelligent  will,  the  attitudes  and  the  behavior  it 
can  elicit  on  the  part  of  man  are  fundamentally  different 
from  those  produced  by  the  belief  in  personal,  unseen 
powers.  The  former  gives  rise  to  magic  ;  the  latter,  to 
religion. 

For  that  conception  of  nature  which  most  probably  pre- 

^  Fletcher,  Alice  C,  Notes  on  Certain  Beliefs  concerning  Will  Power 
among  the  Siottx  Tribes,  Science  (New  York),  N.  S,,  Vol.  V,  1897,  PP-  Zi^t 
334- 


84  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ceded  the  Tylorian  animism,  or  at  least  existed  side  by 
side  with  it,  I  would  suggest  the  name  dynamism.  This 
term  seems  to  me  preferable  to  supernaturalism,  because  it 
does  not  thrust  forward  a  distinction  between  nature  and 
something  above  it;  and  preferable  also  to  teratism,  proposed 
by  Marett,  because  dynamism  does  not  direct  the  attention 
exclusively  to  the  mysterious  and  wonderful  as  if  these 
characteristics  were  fundamental  to  the  conception.  It  is 
the  idea  of  active  power  which  is  dominant  in  the  conception 
of  Impersonal  Force,  and  this  idea  is  well  expressed  by 
dynamism.  I  prefer  this  term  also  to  manitouism,  proposed 
by  Lovejoy,  because  dynamism  suggests  to  most  people 
the  idea  of  power,  while  manitouism  either  is  without 
significance  or  conveys  a  meaning  not  intended. 


CHAPTER   V 

THE  SEVERAL  ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS   OF  UNSEEN, 

PERSONAL   BEINGS 

An  inquiry  into  the  origin  of  the  belief  in  unseen,  per- 
sonal powers  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  individual 
geniuses  of  the  social  groups  considered.  From  time  to 
time  new  ideas  come  to  birth  in  the  minds  of  specially  gifted 
individuals,  and  through  them  become  the  possession  of  the 
community.  This  fact  should  be  kept  in  mind  throughout 
the  chapter.  But  the  statement  that  the  conceptions  out 
of  which  the  gods  arise  are  of  individual  origin  is  not  incon- 
sistent with  the  fact  that  religion  is,  in  a  very  real  sense, 
the  product  of  the  social  group. 

It  is,  I  suppose,  the  passion  for  simplicity  and  unity 
that  has  led  anthropologists  and  historians  stubbornly 
to  seek  the  origin  of  superhuman,  personal  powers  in  some 
one  class  of  phenomena.  According  to  Tylor,  the  idea  of 
gods  had  its  starting-point  in  dreams,  visions,  swoons, 
trances.  Spencer  is  even  more  emphatic  in  deriving  gods 
and  worship  from  one  original  source, — the  worship  of 
the  dead.  Max  Miiller  also  ascribes  to  the  gods  one  origin ; 
he  holds  that  the  god-ideas  proceed  from  the  personifica- 
tion of  natural  objects.  This  unfortunate  assumption  of 
the  unitary  source  of  the  ideas  of  gods  is,  I  believe,  one  of 
the  chief  causes  of  the  unsatisfactory  condition  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  origin  and  the  development  of  religion. 
In   this  chapter  I    shall   advance   brief   arguments,  both 

85 


86  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

psychological  and  historical,  in  support  of  the  four  follow- 
ing propositions  :  — 

1.  Gods  grew  out  of  several  different  ideas  of  super- 
human beings. 

2.  These  beings  had  independent  origins. 

3.  The  attributes  of  the  gods  differ  according  to  their 
origin. 

4.  The  historical  gods  are  usually  mongrel  gods,  the 
outcome  of  the  combination  of  characteristics  belonging  to 
superhuman  beings  of  different  origins. 

The  need  of  accounting  for  observed  phenomena  gives 
rise  to  one  class  of  sources  of  the  belief  in  unseen,  super- 
human beings ;  the  affective  and  moral  needs  give  rise  to 
another  class. 

Class  I.  —  This  class  contains  several  independent  groups 
of  external  and  internal  phenomena.  They  are  by  far  the 
most  prolific  sources  of  ideas  of  superhuman  beings. 

(a)  Apparitions  of  animals  and  persons  yet  living,  seen 
in  sleep  and  in  the  hallucinations  of  fever  or  insanity,  lead 
to  the  belief  in  "  doubles  "  and  "  ghosts."  When  these 
apparitions  come  after  the  death  of  the  person  they  repre- 
sent, they  produce  the  belief  in  "  souls  "  or  "  spirits." 

(d)  States  of  seeming  death  followed  by  apparent 
return  to  life  —  sleep,  trances,  and  other  states  of  temporary 
loss  of  consciousness  —  suggest  a  belief  similar  to  the 
preceding. 

(c)  The  spontaneous  personification  of  striking  natural 
phenomena  such  as  thunder,  Ughtning,  fire,  flood,  and 
tempest ;  or  the  sudden  appearance  of  animal  or  vegetable 
life,  may  well  lead  to  belief  in  personal  agents  behind 
visible  nature. 

(d)  The  problem  of  creation  no  doubt  forces  upon  the 
primitive  mind  very  early  the  necessity  of  a  Maker.     It 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS      87 

may  be  that  a  crude  conception  of  a  Creator  is  attained 
even  earlier  than  that  of  a  soul  or  double. 

(e)  The  facts  of  conscience  :  the  feeling  of  duty,  the 
categorical  imperative ;  transformations  of  personality, 
Christian  conversion,  etc. 

(/)  Various  experiences  included  under  the  terms  clair- 
voyance, divination,  monition,  etc. 

(£■)  Striking  motor  and  sensory  abnormalities,  such  as 
are  met  with  in  hysteria. 

The  desire  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  the  last  three 
groups  implies  a  considerable  degree  of  mental  develop- 
ment ;  therefore  before  these  causes  could  become  opera- 
tive, man  must  have  been  already  in  possession  of  a  variety 
of  ideas  of  superhuman  beings  and  of  gods.  But  if  these 
phenomena  could  hardly  have  become  sources  of  original 
god-ideas,  they  have  undoubtedly  led  to  important  modi- 
fications of  them  by  the  ascription  to  the  gods  of  the 
moral  qualities  and  of  the  powers  implied  in  these  expe- 
riences. With  the  appearance  of  the  moral  conscience,  for 
instance,  gods  became  promoters  of  morality.^ 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  metaphysical  arguments  for 
the  existence  of  God,  —  for  instance,  the  cosmological  and 
the  ontological  proofs  and  the  argument  from  design,  — 
stand  in  a  different  relation  from  the  facts  here  classified 
to  the  belief  in  superhuman  beings.  The  metaphysical 
proofs  are  primarily  arguments  by  which  man  sought  to 
establish  the  objective  validity  of  god-ideas  already  in 
existence.     These  proofs  have  also  served  to  give  greater 

^  The  storm-gods  of  the  Vedic  worship  "  are  in  many  respects  presented 
in  perfect  harmony  with  the  physical  action  of  storms.  They  are  glorious 
youths,  rushing  through  the  heavens  on  golden  chariots,  shaking  the  sky  and 
mountains,  while  the  forests  bend  in  fear  before  them."  But  when  wisdom 
and  righteousness  are  ascribed  to  them,  it  is  clear  that  another  motive  than 
the  original  one  of  explaining  storms  has  come  into  play.  Comp.  Stratton, 
Psychology  of  the  Religious  Life.,  pp.  230-231. 


88  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

precision  to  the  god-ideas,  and  to  modify  their  content. 
How  radically  the  metaphysical  and  the  naive  empirical 
methods  differ,  becomes  evident  in  a  comparison  of  the  cos- 
mological  argument  with  the  manner  in  which  non-civilized 
man  comes  to  beUeve  in  a  Maker. 

Class  II.  —  The  affective  and  the  moral  needs.  These 
needs  become  potent  relatively  late  in  human  history  ;  so  that 
when  they  appear  as  factors  in  the  making  of  gods,  beliefs 
in  superhuman  beings  have  already  come  into  existence 
through  the  agency  of  phenomena  of  the  first  class.  The 
experiences  of  this  second  class  result,  therefore,  in  a 
transformation  of  existing  superhuman  beings  by  the 
ascription  to  them  of  affective  and  moral  qualities.  In  an 
essay  on  a  group  of  Christian  mystics,^  I  have  indicated 
four  kinds  of  affective  needs,  only  two  of  which  need  be 
mentioned  here :  — 

{a)  TJie  needs  of  the  Jieart.  —  Affection  and  love  seek 
perfect  objects  that  they  may  be  perfectly  gratified.  Under 
stress  of  this  need  a  Nature-god  or  the  Impassible  Absolute 
may  be  transformed  into  the  Great  Friendly  Presence,  the 
benevolent  Father,  even  the  Passionate  Lover, 

{b^  The  needs  of  conscience  (not,  as  in  Class  I,  the  inier- 
pretatioji  of  the  facts  of  conscience). —  We  crave  strength  in 
order  to  fulfil  its  imperative  commands.  These  cravings 
are  father  to  the  belief  in  a  being  who  is  able  and  willing 
to  assist  in  the  conflicts  of  the  "  spiritual  "  against  the 
"  natural "  man.  Here  might  be  placed  also  the  conviction 
that  justice  must  be  fulfilled,  either  in  this  life  or  in 
another.  This  conviction  is  usually  connected  with  the 
belief  in  a  Dispenser  of  punishment  and  reward,  a  FulfiUer 
of  the  law  of  justice. 

The  modern  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  rests  nearly 

^  Leuba,  James  H.,  Les  Tendances  Religieuses  chez  itn  Groupe  de  Mystiques 
Chretiens,  Rev.  Phil.,  Tome  LIV  (1902),  pp.  1-36,  441-487. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF   UNSEEN  BEINGS      89 

entirely  upon  the  subjective  experiences  of  Class  II 
Dreams,  hallucinations,  trances,  personification  of  striking 
phenomena,  the  idea  of  a  Maker,  —  these  empirical  data, 
together  with  the  metaphysical  arguments,  have  lost,  as  far 
as  the  educated  are  concerned,  all,  or  almost  all,  the  value 
they  had  once  as  prompters  of  the  belief  in  God. 

Apparitions  in  dreams  and  trances,  and  in  states  of 
seeming  death. —  I  proceed  to  a  few  remarks  concerning 
the  first  four  groups  of  the  first  class,  and  I  begin  with 
groups  a  and  b. 

Most  anthropologists  seem  to  be  of  the  opinion  that  the 
idea  of  the  "  double  "  or  "  ghost  "  is  the  exclusive  source  of 
the  original  belief  in  souls,  in  invisible  spirits,  and  conse- 
quently in  gods.  Very  recently,  however,  a  distinguished 
sociologist,  E.  Durkheim,  has  vigorously  attacked  this  view.^ 
He  maintains  that  the  conception  of  soul  did  not  have  its 
origin  in  dreams,  visions,  and  trances,  although  the  concep- 
tion may  be  of  service  in  an  attempt  to  account  for  some  of 
these  phenomena.  As  the  point  raised  by  Durkheim  is  of 
considerable  importance,  I  give  his  chief  objections  under 
four  heads,  and  offer  answers  which  seem  to  me  sufficient 
to  refute  his  arguments. 

1.  The  belief  in  soul  is  not  the  simplest  way  to  account 
for  dreams,  visions,  etc.  Why  should  not  man,  instead, 
have  imagined  that  he  could  see  at  a  distance  through  all 
kinds  of  obstacles  ?  This  is  a  simpler  idea  than  that  of  a 
double  made  of  a  semi-invisible,  ethereal  substance. 

2.  Many  dreams  are  refractory  to  the  ghost-interpreta- 
tion ;  for  instance,  dreams  of  things  that  we  have  done  in 

1  Durkheim,  E.,  Examen  Critique  des  Systemes  Classiques  sur  la  Pensee 
Religieuse,  Rev.  Phil.  Vol.  LXVII,  1909,  pp.  10-15.  What  he  regards  as  the 
origin  of  the  soul  I  do  not  know,  for  at  the  present  writing  the  book  of  which 
the  above  is  to  be  a  chapter  has  not  appeared. 


90         A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  past.  The  double  might  transport  himself  into  the 
future,  but  how  could  he  live  over  again  the  past  existence 
of  the  body  to  which  he  belongs  ?  How  could  a  man  when 
awake  really  believe  that  he  has  taken  part  in  events  which 
he  knows  to  have  taken  place  long  ago  ?  It  is  much  more 
natural  that  he  should  think  of  memories,  since  these  at 
least  are  familiar  to  him. 

3.  How  could  he  be  so  stupid  and  non-inquisitive  as  not 
to  be  impressed  by  the  fact  that  the  person  whose  alleged 
double  has  conversed  with  his  own  double  while  he  slept 
had  also  had  dreams  that  same  night  and  was  with  another 
person  than  his  own  double  ?  There  is,  thinks  Durkheim, 
some  naivete  in  the  blind  credulity  ascribed  to  primitive 
man  by  this  theory. 

4.  Even  though  the  ghost-explanation  should  be  sufficient 
to  account  for  all  dreams,  it  would  remain  unlikely  that 
man  ever  sought  for  an  explanation  of  his  dreams ;  they 
are  too  common  occurrences.  "  What  is  dream  in  our  life  } 
How  small  a  place  it  holds  .  .  .  and  how  surprising  it  is 
that  the  unfortunate  Australian  spends  so  much  energy  in 
evolving  a  theory  of  it." 

Let  it  be  observed  first  that  whatever  objection  there 
may  be  to  the  ghost-hypothesis  as  a  means  of  interpreting 
the  phenomena  in  question,  the  savage  actually  does 
account  for  them  by  that  notion.  This  fact,  which  even 
Durkheim  admits,  causes  many  of  his  arguments  to  lose 
their  relevancy.  Sir  Everard  im  Thurn  relates  the  follow- 
ing incident  in  his  book.  The  Indians  of  Guiana :  "  One 
morning,  when  it  was  important  to  me  to  get  away  from 
camp  on  the  Essequibo  River  at  which  I  had  been  detained 
for  some  days  by  the  illness  of  some  of  my  Indian  compan- 
ions, I  found  that  one  of  the  invalids,  a  young  Macusi, 
though  better  in  health,  was  so  enraged  against  me  that  he 
refused  to  stir,  for  he  declared  that,  with  great  want  of  con- 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS       91 

sideration  for  his  weak  health,  I  had  taken  him  out  during 
the  night  and  had  made  him  haul  the  canoe  up  a  series  of 
difficult  cataracts.  Nothing  could  persuade  him  that  this 
was  but  a  dream,  and  it  was  some  time  before  he  was  so  far 
pacified  as  to  throw  himself  sulkily  in  the  bottom  of  the 
canoe.  At  that  time  we  were  all  suffering  from  a  great  scarc- 
ity of  food,  and,  hunger  having  its  usual  effect  in  produc- 
ing vivid  dreams,  similar  effects  frequently  occurred.  More 
than  once  the  men  declared  in  the  morning  that  some  absent 
man,  whom  they  named,  had  come  during  the  night,  and 
had  beaten  or  otherwise  maltreated  them  ;  and  they  insisted 
on  much  rubbing  of  the  bruised  parts  of  their  bodies."  ^ 

That  man  should  have  originally  regarded  as  memories 
vivid  dreams  in  which  he  feels  and  hears  himself  walking 
and  talking  with  another  person,  whose  face  he  sees  and 
whose  voice  he  hears  as  clearly  as  in  waking  life,  seems  to 
me  an  impossible  supposition ;  and  to  try  to  explain  the 
dreadful  experience  of  feeling  the  hand  of  one's  enemy 
around  one's  neck  and  choking  in  his  grasp,  on  the  ground 
of  remembrances  seems  mere  mockery.  I  do  not  know 
any  explanation  simpler  than  the  assumption  that  the 
person  one  has  felt  and  seen  was  actually  present.  If  by 
chance  one  knows  that  person  to  have  been  at  the  same 
moment  in  one  or  several  other  places,  then  the  immedi- 
ate inference  is  that  he  is  double,  triple,  or  quadruple. 
Certain  savages  believe,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  that  men  have 
four  souls.  One  may,  of  course,  offer  objections  to  this 
interpretation  ;  but  the  savage  does  not  realize  the  diffi- 
culties  that  thrust  themselves  upon  the  reflecting  mind. 
Observations  of  the  beliefs  of  intellectually  inferior  persons 
of  civilized  races  show  that  for  most  of  them  there  is  no 

1  Quoted  by  Edward  Qodd  in  Animism,  Archibald  Constable  and  Co.,  1905, 
PP-  31-32. 


92  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

contradiction  sufficient  to  make  them  give  up  an  explana- 
tion to  which  they  have  become  attached.  Durkheim 
alludes  to  other  simpler  and  more  adequate  explanations 
of  dreams,  but  these  he  does  not  himself  advance. 

In  the  life  of  young  children  are  found  indications  of 
the  possibility  of  the  dream  origin  of  the  idea  of  doubles. 
Preyer  relates  of  his  child,  then  in  his  fourth  or  fifth  year, 
that "  he  sometimes  cried  out  in  the  night  and  imagined  that 
a  pig  was  going  to  bite  him.  He  seemed  to  see  the  animal 
as  if  it  were  actually  there ;  he  could  not  conceive  that  it 
was  not  there  even  after  his  bed  was  brightly  lighted  up."  ^ 
In  the  Diary  of  a  Father,  published  as  an  appendix  to 
Sully's  Studies  of  Childhood,  we  read  of  C,  four  years  old  : 
"  He  evidently  takes  his  dream-pictures  for  sensible  reali- 
ties, and  when  relating  a  dream  insists  that  he  has  actually 
seen  the  circus  horses  and  fairies  which  appear  to  him 
while  asleep."  ^  Yet  he  knows  that  he  has  spent  the  night 
in  a  room  into  which  horses  could  not  enter ;  but  it  does 
not  seem  to  be  one  of  the  wishes  of  children  to  get  rid  of 
contradictions  otherwise  than  by  dismissing  the  thought  of 
them.  The  non-civilized  adult  behaves  similarly,  and  in 
this  he  differs  simply  in  degree  from  ourselves.  It  is  un- 
necessary to  multiply  similar  instances,  yet  the  following 
may  not  be  out  of  place  as  an  illustration  of  the  manner 
in  which  a  child  deals  with  a  situation  resembling  in  one 
respect  that  by  which  primitive  man  is  confronted  in  the 
explanation  of  his  dreams  and  visions.  A  boy  of  my  ac- 
quaintance, nearly  four  years  old,  had  been  deeply  im- 
pressed by  the  dragon  in  a  performance  of  the  Play  of 
Saint  George.  He  was  told  that  it  was  a  skin  inside 
which  a  person  roared  and  gave  lifelike  movements  to  the 

1  Preyer,  W.,  The  Mind  of  the  Child,  Part  I,  D.  Appleton  and  Co.,  New 
York,  1896,  pp.  168-169. 

^  Sully,  J.,  Studies  of  Childhood,  p.  455. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS      93 

skin.  He  seemed  readily  to  understand  and  to  accept  the 
explanation,  yet  he  still  firmly  believed  the  dragon  to  be 
alive.  In  order  to  complete  the  explanation,  the  dragon's 
skin  was  brought  to  the  child,  and  in  his  presence  a  man 
got  into  it,  roared,  and  moved  about.  The  child,  of  course, 
understood,  yet  the  next  day  he  was  ready  to  go  hunting 
for  the  dragon,  and  this  was  not  simply  in  play,  if  a  care- 
ful observer  can  judge  at  all  what  is  and  what  is  not  play 
in  a  child's  behavior.  What  happened  in  this  case  is  a 
common  experience ;  emotion  made  it  impossible  for  him 
to  bring  his  knowledge  and  his  critical  sense  to  bear  upon 
the  problem.  An  occasional  terrifying  vision  would  be 
sufficient,  it  seems,  to  establish  and  keep  up  the  belief  in 
doubles.  Regarding  the  frequency  of  hallucinations  among 
savages,  Mary  Kingsley  writes  of  the  West  Africans  :  "  I 
also  know  that  the  African,  in  spite  of  his  hard-headed 
common  sense,  is  endowed  with  a  supersensitive  organiza- 
tion; he  is  always  a  step  nearer  delirium,  in  a  medical 
sense,  than  an  Englishman  ;  a  disease  that  will,  by  a  rise  of 
bodily  temperature,  merely  give  an  Englishman  a  headache, 
will  give  an  African  delirium  and  its  visions."  ^ 

The  four  objections  just  reviewed  are  offered  by  Durk- 
heim  as  an  argument  against  animism.  That  theory  taken 
as  an  original  philosophy  of  life,  I  do  not  defend ;  nor  in- 
deed do  we  need  to  concern  ourselves  with  it  at  all.  The 
question  in  point  is  simply  whether  dreams,  visions,  and 
the  like  have  been  an  original  source  of  belief  in  ghosts  or 
doubles.  I  see  nothing  in  Durkheim's  criticisms  to  invali- 
date Marett's  assertion  that  it  is  "one  among  the  few  rela- 
tive certainties  which  anthropology  can  claim  to  have 
established  in  the  way  of  theory."  ^ 

1  Kingsley,  Mary  H.,  The  Forms  of  Apparitions  in  West  Africa.,  Proc.  of 
the  Soc.  for  Psy.  Res.,  Vol.  XIV,  1898-1899,  p.  331. 

2  Marett,  R.  R.,  The  Threshold  of  Religion.,  Methuen  and  Co.,  London,  p.  9. 


94  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  personification  of   striking  natural  phenomena.  — I 

am  ready  to  grant  that  the  spontaneous  personification  of 
striking  nature  phenomena,  such  as  thunder,  fire,  floods, 
cataracts,  and  heavenly  bodies,  etc.,  by  bestowing  upon 
them  either  human  or  animal  attributes,  was  a  factor  of 
less  importance  than  dreams  and  trances.  This  mode  of 
origin  seems,  however,  to  have  played  an  uncommonly 
important  role  among  the  old  Aryans,  who  worshipped 
"the  heavenly  ones,"  "the  shining  ones,"  that  is,  the 
powers  of  the  luminous  heaven.  More  frequently,  per- 
haps, the  tendency  to  personify  served  to  confirm  behefs 
in  powerful  invisible  beings  and  to  give  to  them  new 
characteristics. 

Conclusions  as  to  the  probability  of  this  origin  may  be 
drawn  from  the  behavior  of  the  child.  Many  a  child 
barely  able  to  speak  forms  the  habit  of  ascribing  human 
or  animal  nature  to  what  is  for  the  adult  simply  non-per- 
sonal. He  personifies  not  only  because  it  is  for  him  a 
natural  form  of  explanation,  but  also  because  he  finds  an 
inexhaustible  source  of  delight  in  the  fictitious  world  he 
creates.  Who  can  make  the  division  between  belief  and 
pretence  in  this  mythopoeic  world  .''  It  was  during  his 
fourth  year  that  C  began  "  to  create  fictitious  persons  and 
animals,  and  to  surround  himself  by  a  world  unseen  by 
others  but  terribly  real  to  him."  ^  In  this  connection 
one  should  keep  in  mind  the  great  individual  differences. 
Some  children  live  almost  entirely  in  the  real  world,  and 
many  probably  never  confuse  make-believe  with  reality. 
But  there  are  also  those  who  hold  firmly  to  the  reality 
of  a  world  of  their  own  creation.  It  is  these  believing 
children  who  make  the  traditions  and  the  dogmas  of  child- 
hood. Is  it  improbable  that  savages  should,  both  in  ear- 
nest and  in  play,  have  placed  personal  and  animal  beings 

1  SuUy,  J.,  op.  cit.,  p.  453. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS      95 

behind  certain  striking  phenomena?  How  otherwise  could 
they  better  gratify  at  once  a  demand  for  explanation  and 
a  love  of  dramatic  play  ?  ^ 

The  personifications  of  the  primitive  man,  as  well  as 
those  of  the  child,  often  are  classed  as  animal  forms. 
Nothing  could  be  more  natural.  Is  not  the  animal  world 
more  varied  and  mysterious  to  the  savage  than  the  hu- 
man ?  The  size,  appearance,  and  behavior  of  animals  are 
so  exceedingly  diverse  that  one  may  expect  almost  any- 
thing that  shows  self-movement  to  be  an  animal.  Why, 
for  instance,  should  not  the  savage  believe  that  the  sun  is 
an  animal .-'  Is  its  shape  too  simple,  or  its  motion  too 
regular  ?  I  do  not  see  how  uncivilized  man  could  set 
limits  to  the  shapes  of  animals.  And  as  to  the  sun's 
movements,  they  are  not,  after  all,  so  regular  as  the 
scientist  would  make  them.  The  sun  rises  at  different 
points  winter  and  summer,  and  traverses  the  heavens  by 
different  paths.  It  hides  away  for  long  periods,  and  then 
shows  itself  constantly  for  many  days.  Even  its  heat  is 
variable. 

But  even  though  the  personification  of  natural  phenom- 
ena is  to  be  expected  of  savages,  it  is  perplexing  to  find 
people  as  far  advanced  as  the  old  Egyptians,  for  instance, 
continuing  to  worship  nature-gods.  One  must  in  this  case 
reckon  with  the  momentum  of  psychic  habits  just  as  one 
does  with  physical  inertia.     Habits  once  formed  and  ex- 

1  I  have  given  some  details  concerning  an  unusual  instance  of  fondness  for 
personifying  in  The  Personifying  Passion  in  Youth,  'iviih  Remarks  upon  the 
Sex  and  Gender  Problem,  Monist,  Vol.  X,  1900,  pp.  536-548. 

The  effect  produced  by  great  scenery  frequently  points  to  the  tendency  to 
personify  nature.  One  of  my  correspondents  writes  that  "  Places  in  which  the 
sense  of  the  sublime  is  appealed  to  always  call  forth  religious  emotions.  .  .  . 
The  last  time  I  noticed  this  feeling  was  at  the  sight  of  Niagara  Falls  about 
two  years  ago.  I  had  to  restrain  myself  from  kneeling  down  when  I  first  came 
near  the  Falls." 


96  A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

pressed  in  venerated  institutions  cannot  easily  be  cast  aside. 
But  something  else  contributes  also  to  the  production  of 
this  paradox  :  the  literal  assumes  a  poetic  or  a  moral  sense, 
and  the  change  remains  long  unrecognized  or  unacknowl- 
edged. The  ease  with  which  most  men  pass,  without  know- 
ing it,  from  a  genuine  belief  in  God  to  one  which  is  merely 
conventional  or  is  maintained  for  aesthetic  or  moral  reasons, 
is  a  fact  as  amazing  as  it  is  pregnant  with  sociological  con- 
sequences. One  may  observe  among  us  at  present  the 
passage  from  a  vital  belief  in  the  traditional  personal  God 
to  a  survival-belief  of  the  kind  just  mentioned.^ 

The  problem  of  creation,  —  This  very  early  and  potent 
source  of  the  idea  of  great  unseen  beings  has  been  very 
insufficiently  taken  into  account.  The  idea  of  a  mighty 
Maker  of  things  may  safely  be  attributed  to  men  as  low 
in  intelligence  as  are  the  lowest  tribes  now  extant,  for  it 
appears  very  early  in  the  child.  The  first  definite  inquiries 
about  causes  are  usually  made  towards  the  end  of  the 
second  year.  After  that  time  the  question  "  What  makes 
that?"  is  for  many  months  frequently  on  the  child's  lips. 
At  first  his  inquiries  bear  upon  particular  things  and  not 
upon  the  origin  of  things  in  general.  Moreover,  he  does 
not  necessarily  think  of  personal  causes.     A  little  later  on, 

^  1  The  theory  of  Max  Miiller  and  of  Adelbert  Kuhn,  according  to  which  the 

starting-point  of  rehgion  was  the  personification  of  the  more  striking  natural 
objects,  bears  only  a  superficial  resemblance  to  the  theory  that  the  origin  of 
superhuman  beings  was  by  the  direct,  spontaneous  personification  with  which 
we  are  concerned.  The  process  of  personification  which  these  authors  de- 
scribe is  an  accident  due  to  the  distorting  action  upon  thought  of  an  in- 
sufficiently definite  language.  Natural  objects,  they  explain,  were  originally 
described  by  their  effects,  in  terms  similar  to  those  used  to  name  the  actions 
of  human  beings.  The  sun,  for  instance,  was  "  the  one  which  darts  shafts 
of  light."  T/ie  one,  because  of  linguistic  indefiniteness  and  the  natural  tend- 
ency to  conceive  movement  as  arising  from  a  personal  cause,  came  to  be 
understood  in  a  personal  sense.  Thus,  according  to  this  theory,  arose  the 
nature-gods  and  the  myths  clustering  around  them. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS      97 

however,  he  passes  from  particular  problems  to  the  general 
one,  and  thinks  of  a  personal  Creator.^  Many  persons 
have  had  the  good  fortune  of  being  present  at  the  child's 
sudden  awakening  to  this  problem  and  his  immediate  solu- 
tion of  it  by  the  assumption  of  a  great  Maker  conceived 
vaguely  as  a  human  being.  A  child  notices  a  curiously 
made  stone  and  asks  who  made  it.  He  is  told  that  it  was 
formed  in  the  stream  by  the  water.  Then  suddenly  he 
throws  out  in  quick  succession  questions  that  are  as  much 
exclamations  of  astonishment  as  queries  :  "Who  made  the 
streams  ?  Who  made  the  mountains  ?  Who  made  the 
earth  ? "  If  children  five  years  old  begin  of  themselves 
to  inquire  into  the  origin  of  the  world,  one  must  admit  the 
presence  of  such  queries  in  the  mind  of  the  most  intelli- 
gent individuals  of  the  lowest  tribes. 

The  Great  Maker  or  Makers  usually  take  on  a  human 
shape,  probably  because  men  and  not  animals  are  to  prim- , 
itive  man  the  constructors  of  things.  The  nests  of  birds 
and  lairs  of  animals  are  no  better  than  the  huts  of  the 
savage  himself,  and  animals  make  no  implements  of  any 
sort.  The  making  of  weapons  and  other  necessary  objects 
is  one  of  primitive  man's  vital  occupations.  One  may  well 
suppose,  therefore,  that  when  he  thought  of  the  making 
of  things  about  him,  he  placed  the  Great  Maker  in  the 
human  rather  than  in  the  animal  group.      Nevertheless,  it 

1  Before  her  eighth  year,  Helen  Keller,  who  is  blind,  deaf,  and  mute,  had 
begun  to  ask  questions  regarding  the  origin  of  things  and  of  herself.  Her 
teacher,  Miss  Sullivan,  thought  it  preferable  to  delay  an  explanation,  and  told 
her  that  she  was  too  young  to  understand.  Her  inquiries  became  more  and 
more  urgent.  In  May,  1890  (she  was  born  in  June,  1880)  she  wrote  on  her 
tablet,  "  \\Tio  made  the  earth  and  the  sea  and  everything  ?  What  makes  the 
sun  hot  ?  Where  was  I  before  I  came  to  my  mother  ?  "  See  Miss  Sullivan's 
report  of  1891,  republished  in  the  supplement  to  The  Story  of  My  Life,  h^ 
Helen  Keller,  Doubleday,  Page  and  Co.,  New  York,  1909.  It  is  not  uncom- 
mon for  a  normal  child  to  puzzle  about  these  questions  from  his  fifth  year  or 
even  earlier. 
H 


98         A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

is  not  impossible   that  in  some  cases  the  Great  Maker 
should  have  assumed  an  animal  form. 

In  the  discussion  of  non-personal  causes,  it  was  said  that 
in  many  primitive  societies  certain  names  supposed  to  desig- 
nate high  personal  gods  have  been  found  by  later  scholars 
to  have  only  a  non-personal  significance.  If  we  accept  both 
this  conclusion  and  the  one  now  reached  concerning  belief 
in  a  Great  Maker,  we  shall  expect  to  find  among  primitive 
peoples  one  name  for  a  general  non-personal  force  and  an- 
other for  a  great  Creator.  But  after  a  time  the  non-personal 
power  may  naturally  enough  in  many  tribes  have  com-e  to 
assume  personal  characteristics,  either  by  direct  personifi- 
cation, or  by  fusion  with  the  creator-idea. 

The  consequences  of  the  presence  of  ideas  of  superhuman 
beings  of  several  independent  origins.  —  I  know  of  no  suffi- 
cient reasons,  either  psychological  or  historical,  for  denying 
any  of  the  following  propositions.  Each  appears  to  me 
possible  and,  under  appropriate  circumstances,  probable. 

1.  Several  of  the  sources  may  have  operated  simulta- 
neously in  the  formation  of  diverse  ideas  of  superhuman 
beings  and  subsequently  of  gods,  so  that  several  gods  of 
different  origins  may  have,  from  the  first,  divided  the  at- 
tention of  the  community. 

2.  These  sources  may  have  been  effective  not  simulta- 
neously, but  successively.  A  ghost-ancestor  may  have  first 
attained  dominance  and,  later  on,  a  Great  Maker. 

3.  Any  order  of  succession  is  possible.  It  is  nearly 
simultaneously  that  the  belief  in  unseen  personified  causes 
of  external  events  arises  in  the  child's  mind,  that  dreams  be- 
gin to  play  a  part  in  his  waking  life,  and  that  the  problem 
of  creation  presents  itself  to  him.  The  question  as  to  which 
is  the  first  cannot  be  given  a  universally  valid  answer.  If  we 
imagine  a  group  of  children  living  in  close  companionship, 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS      99 

uninfluenced  by  adults,  we  may  conceive  that  belief  in 
beings  arising  from  any  of  these  sources  would,  according 
to  the  peculiarities  of  the  children  and  the  circumstances 
of  their  lives,  first  gain  ascendency. 

4.  When  several  gods  existed  side  by  side,  fusion  and 
confusion  of  their  characteristics  could  hardly  be  avoided  : 
to  a  deified  ancestor  may  have  been  ascribed  the  attributes 
of  a  creator,  and  to  a  creator  the  role  of  an  ancestor ;  a 
non-moral  nature-divinity  may  have  been  raised  above  the 
natural  phenomenon  to  which  it  owed  its  origin  and  be- 
come, as  among  the  old  Aryans,  creator  and  governor  of 
the  world.  An  interaction  of  god-ideas  of  different  ori- 
gin—  and  therefore  of  different  nature  —  is  one  of  the 
fundamental  facts  to  be  taken  into  account  by  the  student 
of  the  origin  of  religion. 

It  is  for  the  anthropologist  and  the  historian  to  discover 
what  in  any  particular  case  has  actually  happened  in  these 
four  respects,  and  to  determine  the  origin  or  origins  of  any 
particular  god.  They  will  have  to  say,  for  instance,  why 
Shintoism  is  a  cult  addressed  exclusively  to  ancestral 
spirits,  to  family  and  national  ancestors,  while  the  other 
god-ideas  have  remained  unknown  to  the  Japanese,  or 
have  been  suppressed  under  the  influence  of  circumstances 
favorable  to  the  worship  of  ancestors.  It  was  otherwise 
with  the  Aryans.  Their  imagination  was  captured  by 
ideas  of  nature-gods,  sun,  fire,  storms,  etc.  The  richness 
and  versatility  of  the  Greek  mind  provided  that  wonderful 
race  with  a  pantheon  composed  of  ancestor-gods,  creator- 
gods,  and  nature-gods.  Why  these  differences.-'  As  to 
the  psychologist,  he  may  regard  his  task  as  completed 
when  he  has  pointed  out  the  several  possible  origins  of  the 
god-ideas,  the  characteristics  of  each,  and  the  nature  of  the 
general  causes  which  determine  the  dominance  of  partic- 
ular gods. 


lOO        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

I  close  this  chapter  with  an  illustration  of  the  usefulness 
of  the  principles  I  have  just  set  forth  in  solving  a  difficult 
problem  in  the  history  of  early  religion.^ 

It  is  an  old  opinion  that  even  the  lowest  savage  enter- 
tains a  belief  in  a  Supreme  Being,  however  dimly  con- 
ceived and  little  reverenced.  This  view  was  originally 
based  quite  as  much  on  the  propensity  of  Christians  to  dis- 
cover at  the  beginning  of  society  beliefs  in  agreement  with 
their  traditions,  as  on  actual  facts  concerning  these  peoples. 
Although  this  opinion  suffered  temporary  discredit  from 
the  discovery  that  in  several  instances  the  alleged  mono- 
theistic beliefs  really  proceeded  from  the  teaching  of  mis- 
sionaries, recent  anthropological  researches  furnish  suffi- 
cient evidence  to  warrant  a  return  to  this  view.  It  seems 
"^  now  established  that  in  every  part  of  Australia,  except 
perhaps  among  the  Arunta,  a  tribe  of  the  central  regions, 
there  is  a  belief  in  an  All-Father,  who  is  perhaps  always 
regarded  as  creator.  He  is  variously  named  in  the  differ- 
ent tribes :  Baiame,  Duramulum,  Mungamongana,  Nureli, 
etc. ;  that  is,  our  father,  father  of  the  whole  people,  father 
of  all  the  tribes  who  observe  the  law,  great  master,  and 
the  like. 

In  Africa  there  also  exists,  it  seems,  a  general  beUef  in 
a  great  God  conceived  as  creator.  Miss  Mary  Kingsley 
says  that :  "  The  god  in  the  sense  we  use  the  word,  is  in  es- 
sence the  same  in  all  of  the  Bantu  tribes  I  have  met  with 
on  the  coast ;  a  non-interfering  and  therefore  a  negligible 
quantity.  He  varies  his  name ;  Anzambi,  .  .  .  Nyambi, 
Ukuku,  Suku,  and  Nzam,  but  a  better  investigation  shows 
that  Nzam  of  the  Fans  is  practically  identical  with  Suku 
of  the  Congo.  .  .  .  They  regard  their  god  as  the  creator  of 
man,  plants,  animals,  and  the  earth,  and  they  hold  that, 

1  Another  illustration  will  be  found  in  the  chapter  on  the  relation  of  the- 
ology to  psychology. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS    loi 

having  made  them,  he  takes  no  further  interest  in  the  af- 
fair. But  not  so  the  crowd  of  spirits  with  which  the  uni- 
verse is  peopled  ;  they  take  only  too  much  interest,  and  the 
Bantu  wishes  they  would  not,  and  is  perpetually  saying  so 
in  his  prayers,  a  large  percentage  whereof  amounts  to  :  '  Go 
away,  we  don't  want  you.  Come  not  into  this  house,  this 
village,  or  its  plantations  ! '  "  ^  Mgr.  Le  Roy  reports  the 
presence  among  the  Pigmies  of  Equatorial  Africa  of  a  belief 
in  a  High  God  distinct  from  the  spirits  whom  they  wor- 
ship. He  is  a  creator  and  preserver,  but  receives  no  wor- 
ship. On  the  rare  occasions  when  they  address  him,  it  is 
to  ask  him  to  leave  them  alone.^ 

Concerning  the  natives  of  central  Australia, — the  most 
primitive  of  that  continent  —  Spencer  and  Gillen  write : 
"  In  all  of  the  tribes  there  is  a  belief  in  the  existence  of 
alcJicringia  (or  its  equivalent),  ancestors,  who  made  the 
country  and  left  behind  numberless  spirit  individuals." 

From  Melanesia  the  evidence  is  equally  interesting. 
Codrington  mentions  two  superhuman  beings  who  "  at  any 
rate  were  never  human  .  .  .  yet  were  in  some  ways  origi- 
nators of  the  human  race,  both  were  female,  both  were 
subjects  of  stories,  not  objects  of  worship."  A  little  farther 
on  he  expresses  some  surprise  at  the  existence  in  the  New 
Hebrides  and  Banks  Islands  of  spirit-beings  of  two  orders. 
He  writes  of  Qat,  "The  place  of  Qat  in  the  popular  behefs 
of  the  Banks  Islands  was  so  high  and  so  conspicuous  that 
when  the  people  first  became  known  to  Europeans  it  was 
supposed  that  he  was  their  god,  the  supreme  creator  of  men 
and  pigs  and  food.  It  is  certain  that  he  was  believed  to 
have  made  things  in  another  sense  from  that  in  which  men 
could  be  said  to  make  them  .  .  .  the  regular  course  of  the 

1  Kingsley,  Mary  H.,  Travels  in  West  Africa,  London,  Macmillan  (1897), 
p.  442.     See  also  Mrs.  E.  L.  Parker,  The  Euahlayi  Tribe,  pp.  4-10. 

2  Mgr.  Le  Roy,  La  Religion  des  Primitifs,  Paris,  Beauchesne,  1909. 


I02        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

seasons  is  ascribed  to  him,  the  calm  months  from  September 
to  December  when  the  un  Palola  sea-worm  comes,  the 
yearly  blow,  at  the  high  tide  in  the  month  of  wotgore.  .  .  . 
With  all  this  it  is  impossible  to  take  Qat  seriously  or  to 
allow  him  divine  rank.  He  is  certainly  not  the  lord  of 
spirits."^  Let  us  note  that  these  creators  are  not  worshipped, 
although  they  occupy  a  higher  station  than  any  of  the 
worshipped  gods. 

Although  the  general  existence  of  the  belief  in  High 
Gods  is  now  accepted  by  most  anthropologists,  there  is  no 
unanimity  of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  origin  of  the  belief. 
Supporters  of  the  traditional  Christian  religion  have  tried 
to  make  capital  out  of  this  so-called  original  monotheism. 
They  have  referred  it  to  a  revelation.^ 

Andrew  Lang,  approaching  the  same  facts  in  a  different 
spirit,  has  drawn  from  them  conclusions  which  contain 
certainly  a  valuable  element  of  truth.  He  revives  the  dis- 
credited view  of  the  existence,  at  the  origin  of  human 
society,  of  a  relatively  noble  religious  belief,  and  of  its  sub- 
sequent degeneration  into  rites  of  propitiation  and  concili- 
ation addressed  to  beings  greatly  inferior  in  power  and  in 
worth  to  the  original  High  God,  and  he  claims  that  his 
theory,  "  rightly  or  wrongly,  accounts  for  the  phenomena,  the 
combination  of  the  highest  divine  and  the  lowest  animal  qual- 
ities in  the  same  being.  But  I  have  yet  to  learn  how,  if  the 
lowest  myths  are  the  earliest,  the  highest  attributes  came 
in  time  to  be  conferred  on  the  hero  of  the  lowest  myth."  ^ 

1  Codrington,  R.  H.,  The  Melanesians,  pp.  150,  155. 

2  See  Father  Wilhelm  Schmidt  in  L'origine  de  Pidee  de  Dieu,  Anthropos, 
III  (1908),  IV  (1909).  These  papers  are  researches  at  second  hand  from  a 
well-informed  person  who  is  evidently  before  all  else  a  priest  of  the  Roman 
Catholic  Church  and  an  apologist  of  the  traditional  Christian  system. 

^  Lang,  Andrew,  The  Making  of  Religion,  2d  ed.,  Preface,  p.  xvi.  As  to 
the  origin  of  the  belief  in  a  kind  of  Germinal  Supreme  Being,  he  makes  in  the 
preface  to  the  second  edition  the  following  suggestion  :  "  As  soon  as  man  had 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF   UNSEEN  BEINGS    103 

In  my  opinion,  the  priority  of  the  High  Gods  is  not  the 
important  point  in  the  interpretation  of  the  facts  I  have 
just  cited.  And,  further,  it  would  not  necessarily  follow 
from  priority  that  the  lower  beings  are  degraded  High 
Gods.  The  truth  of  the  matter  as  I  see  it  is  that  the  High 
Gods  proceeded  from  an  independent  and  specific  source ; 
they  are,  or  were  originally,  the  Makers.  The  essential 
elements  of  my  theory  are  that  man  comes  to  the  idea 
of  superhuman  beings  along  several  routes,  that  the  char- 
acteristics of  these  beings  depend  upon  their  origin,  and 
that  one  —  or  one  class — of  these  beings,  the  one  arising 
from  curiosity  about  the  making  of  things,  is  necessarily  a 
relatively  lofty  conception,  awe-inspiring,  and  suggestive  of 
power  and  benevolence.  Gods  arising  from  the  belief  in 
ghosts,  or  from  the  personification  of  portentous  natural  phe- 
nomena might  have  appeared  first,  without  at  all  hinder- 
ing the  coming  into  existence  of  a  Creator-god.  And, 
whenever  that  conception  appeared,  the  god  would  have 
possessed  the  comparatively  high  and  noble  endowment 
naturally  belonging  in  the  mind  of  even  the  lowest  savage 
to  the  Creator  of  man  and  things.  The  question  of  the  or- 
der in  which  these  notions  found  their  way  into  the  human 
mind  is  thus  of  subordinate  importance. 

This  theory  is  quite  consistent  with  our  present  anthro- 
pological knowledge  ;  namely,  that  there  exists  among  the 
most  primitive  people  now  living  the  notion  of  a  Great  God 
high  above  all  others,  to  whom  is  usually  assigned  the  func- 
tion of  creator,  that  these  same  people  also  believe  in  a 

the  idea  of  making  things,  he  might  conjecture  as  to  a  Maker  of  things.  .  .  . 
He  would  regard  that  unknown  Maker  as  a  magnified  non-natural  man." 

What  is  still  happening  to  William  James  on  account  of  his  Varieties  of  Re- 
ligiozis  Experience  happened  to  Andrew  Lang.  The  authority  of  his  name 
was  claimed  in  support  of  the  Christian  revelation.  In  the  preface  to  the  second 
edition  of  The  Making  of  Religion,  he  declares  that  he  never  intended  to 
countenance  the  belief  in  an  original  revelation. 


I04        A   PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF   RELIGION 

crowd  of  spirits  and  ghosts,  and  that  ivithin  the  limits  of 
definite  Jdstorical  periods  "  sacrifice  and  prayer  become 
more  and  more  numerous  and  more  artificial  in  proportion 
as  the  idea  of  a  Supreme  Being  grows  dim."  ^ 

The  following  considerations  will,  I  hope,  convince  the 
reader  that  these  facts  do  not  necessarily  support  the 
corollary  drawn  by  Lang,  as  well  as  by  the  defenders  of  an 
original  revelation,  that  our  most  primitive  tribes  mark  a 
deterioration  from  the  earliest  condition  of  humanity,  but 
rather  that  the  facts  are  consistent  with  a  natural  develop- 
ment and  indicate  the  presence  of  no  factor  not  operative 
in  modern  progressive  societies. 

The  idea  of  a  Maker  I  suppose  to  have  originally  pre- 
sented itself  to  the  race  very  much  as  it  does  to  a  five-  or 
six-year-old  child  who  is  suddenly  struck  with  the  idea  that 
some  one  must  have  made  the  world.  It  did  not,  therefore, 
involve  such  notions  as  eternity,  omniscience,  omnipresence, 
omnipotence.  The  concept  of  a  Great  Maker  is,  of  course, 
awe-inspiring,  because  of  the  power  it  implies  and  of  the 
mystery  surrounding  the  operations  of  such  a  being.  Some 
degree  of  interest  and  benevolence  towards  that  which  he 
has  made  is  also,  it  seems,  unavoidably  associated  with 
even  the  simplest  idea  of  a  Maker.  Such  a  being  must 
thus  have  been  relatively  exalted. 

What  modifications  would  this  idea  undergo  when  it 
passed  beyond  the  gifted  individuals  who  had  conceived  it 
and  became  the  property  of  every  tribesman,  however 
brutish  and  ignoble  .-'  Undoubtedly  there  would  occur  the 
kind  of  modifications  that  history  records  in  the  case  of 
more  recent  gods :  they  are  transformed  into  beings  more 
nearly  like  the  worshippers  themselves.  But  this  process 
does  not  necessarily  imply  the  deterioration  of  the  people. 

^  Father  Schmidt,  Anthropos,  III,  p.  604.  This  statement  is  probably  much 
too  sweeping. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS    105 

The  gods  have  been  debased,  but  the  people  themselves 
have  been  raised  to  a  higher  level  by  the  lofty  notions  they 
have  corrupted.  This  degrading  process  is  the  natural 
unavoidable  method  by  which  the  masses  gradually  rise 
towards  the  level  of  those  who  have  set  for  them  unattain- 
able ideals.  Thus  it  is  that  the  return  to  origins  is  fre- 
quently a  progress.  In  the  case  before  us,  special  factors 
probably  made  the  degrading  process  speedier  and  more 
irresistible.  The  exalted  Maker  found  himself,  in  the  mind 
of  the  people,  in  company  with  other  superhuman  beings 
of  much  humbler  extraction.  Even  though  one  should  dis- 
regard the  possibility  of  the  personification  of  natural 
events,  one  must  in  any  case  reckon  with  the  belief  in 
beings  suggested  by  visions,  temporary  loss  of  conscious- 
ness, and  other  similar  occurrences.  Since  these  beings  are 
human  doubles,  they  may  possess  all  the  meanness  and 
cruelty  of  the  lowest  of  men.  Their  power,  though  not 
definitely  known,  is  sufficient  to  excite  fear,  but  not  in  most 
cases  great  enough  to  inspire  awe.  When  associated  with 
the  ever-present,  troublesome  doubles,  and  the  many  petty 
spirits  conceived  in  the  same  way  as  ghosts,  the  Maker 
could  hardly  preserve  his  identity  and  his  high  attributes. 
A  confusion  must  have  taken  place,  and  as  the  common  is 
more  easily  understood  and  retained  than  the  unusual,  the 
lofty  attributes  of  the  High  God  conceived  by  the  primitive 
philosophers  became  obscured,  and  to  him  were  attributed 
meaner  traits  originally  belonging  to  lower  gods.  One 
may  thus  admit  that  even  in  the  absence  of  any  real  de- 
generation of  a  community  the  oldest  conception  of  the 
Maker  was  the  noblest,  provided  a  limited  and  specific 
historical  period  is  considered.  When  this  period  of  ab- 
sorption and  incubation  is  past,  philosophers  and  seers 
again  appear,  who  enlarge  the  reigning  conceptions,  charge 
them  with  higher  worth,  and  return  them  to  the  people, 


io6       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

who    degrade    them    anew   in   the   travail   of    their   own 
elevation. 

The  fact  that  to  many  has  seemed  unaccountable,  namely, 
that  the  Maker  and  All-Father  is  not  among  early  people 
an  object  of  worship,  while  lower  beings  are  prayed  to 
and  propitiated,  seemed  to  me  just  what  would  be 
expected  of  human  nature.  It  is  true  that  a  Maker  seems 
the  being  best  qualified  to  become  a  God,  since  he  possesses 
the  necessary  power  and  greatness  and  must  be,  on  the 
whole,  benevolently  inclined  towards  those  whom  he  has 
created,  and  since  man  can  hardly  fail  to  feel  his  depend- 
ence upon  a  being  from  whom  he  proceeds.  Under  these 
circumstances,  the  speedy  appearance  of  religious  practices 
addressed  to  the  High  God  would  seem  unavoidable.  Why 
then  is  he  not  sooner  worshipped  ?  Because  his  very  great- 
ness and  remoteness  stand  as  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of 
practical  relations,  while  ordinary  spirits  and  great  ancestors, 
more  familiar  and  closer  to  man  than  a  Maker,  call  forth 
more  readily  those  methods  of  propitiation  and  of  worship 
constituting  the  lowest  religious  expression. 

The  kind  of  attitude  to  be  expected  of  an  uncivilized  man  towards 
the  Over-God  is  well  illustrated,  in  at  least  one  of  its  aspects,  in  the 
following  report  concerning  the  noble  tribes  of  the  Bight  of  Panavia. 
"  At  each  new  moon,  the  chief  of  a  village  goes  out  and  stands  in  the 
open  and  talks  to  Anyambie.  He  does  not  praise  Anyambie  ;  he  does 
not  request  him  to  interfere  in  human  affairs  ;  he,  the  chief,  feels  compe- 
tent to  deal  with  them,  but  he  does  want  Anyambie  to  attend  to  those 
spirits  which  he,  the  god,  can  control  better  than  a  man,  and  he  always 
opens  the  address  to  the  great  god  with  a  catalogue  of  his,  the  chief's, 
virtues,  saying :  '  I  am  the  father  of  my  people ;  I  am  a  just  man ;  I 
deal  well  with  all  men,  etc'  ...  At  first  hearing  these  catalogues  of 
the  chiei's  virtues  used  to  strike  me  as  comic,  and  I  once  said  :  '  Why 
don't  you  get  some  one  else  to  say  that  for  you ;  praising  yourself  in 
that  barefaced  way  must  be  very  trying  to  you.'  'Oh  no,'  said  the 
chief,  '  and  besides  no  man  knows  how  good  he  is  except  himself,' 
which  is  a  common  West  Coast  proverb.     But  by  and  by  —  when  I  had 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS    107 

been  the  silent  spectator  of  several  of  these  talks  with  the  great  God,  — 
the  thing  struck  me  as  really  very  grand.  There  was  the  great  man 
standing  up  alone,  conscious  of  the  weight  of  responsibility  on  him  of 
the  lives  and  happiness  of  his  people,  talking  calmly,  proudly,  respect- 
fully, to  the  great  God  who,  he  knew,  rules  the  spirit  world.  It  was 
like  a  great  diplomat  talking  to  another  great  diplomat.  .  .  .  There 
was  no  whining  or  begging  in  it  .  .  .  the  grandeur  of  the  thing  charmed 
me."  ^  This  is  of  course  neither  worship  nor  propitiation  ;  Anyambie 
is  apparently  too  high  a  personage  to  concern  himself  with  the  details 
of  human  life,  or  to  care  for  such  offerings  as  would  please  a  tribal 
chief.  And  yet  he  is  not  great  or  good  enough  to  elicit  awe,  admira- 
tion, and  reverence.  Miss  Kingsley's  oft-repeated  question,  "  Is  he 
good?"  was  always  answered  negatively,  except  by  natives  who  had 
been  under  the  influence  of  missionaries.  "  '  No,'  they  say  firmly,  '  he 
is  not  what  you  call  good  ;  he  lets  things  go  too  much,  he  cares  about 
himself  only.'  And  I  have  heard  him  called  'lazy  too  much,  bad  per- 
son for  business,'  and  a  dozen  things  of  that  sort." 

Now,  if  Anyambie's  character  were  loftier,  the  chief  might  not  so 
readily  enter  into  relation  with  him.  And,  further,  supposing  this  god 
to  have  been  originally  the  Creator,  is  it  altogether  improbable  that  as 
men  began  to  realize  the  imperfections  of  his  works,  he  should  have 
lost  prestige  and  rank  ?  Anyambie's  deterioration,  if  it  occurred  in  this 
manner,  would  in  no  wise  imply  the  deterioration  of  his  people. 

In  the  Christian  religion,  the  difficulty  of  entering  into 
formal  relation  with  the  Maker  is  overcome,  or  rather 
avoided,  by  the  introduction  of  intermediaries.  The  sup- 
plications and  offerings  of  Roman  Catholics  are  ad- 
dressed much  more  to  the  Virgin  Mary  and  to  the  Saints 
than  to  God  the  Creator,  ^  and  Christ  usually  takes  the 
place  of  God  the  Father.  It  is  quite  probable  that  religious 
rites  first  appeared  in  connection  with  the  behef  in  spirits 
very  near  to  man ;  the  closer  to  him,  the  more  readily 
would  he  enter  into  practical  relations  with  them,  as  he 

1  Kingsley,  Mary  H.,  The  Forms  of  Apparitions  in  West  Africa,  Proc.  of 
Soc.  for  Psychical  Research,  Vol.  XIV,  1898,  pp.  334-335. 

2  Hoffding  quotes  a  Copenhagen  preacher  as  saying  in  a  funeral  discourse, 
"  God  cannot  help  us  in  our  great  sorrow  because  He  is  so  infinitely  far  away; 
we  must  therefore  look  to  Jesus."     (  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  90.) 


io8       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

would  with  a  great  and  powerful  man.  The  practices  of 
placing  food  in  the  graves,  of  making  a  fire  near  them, 
of  placing  hunting  or  fighting  implements  in  them,  not  in 
the  expectation  of  profit,  but  simply  out  of  humane  feeling, 
are  probably  prototypes  of  the  earlier  religious  offerings 
and  sacrifices.  To  this  topic  I  shall  devote  a  special 
chapter.  Meanwhile  I  offer  these  instructive  instances  of 
the  worship  of  living  men. 

In  the  Marquesas  or  Washington  Islands,  "  the  god  was 
a  very  old  man  who  lived  in  a  large  house  within  an 
enclosure.  In  the  house  was  a  kind  of  altar,  and  on  the  beams 
of  the  house  and  on  the  trees  round  it  were  hung  human 
skeletons,  head  down.  No  one  entered  the  enclosure  except 
the  persons  dedicated  to  the  service  of  the  god.  .  .  .  This 
human  god  received  more  sacrifices  than  all  the  other  gods; 
often  he  would  sit  on  a  sort  of  scaffold  in  front  of  his  house 
and  call  for  two  or  three  human  victims  at  a  time.  .  .  .  He 
was  invoked  all  over  the  island,  and  offerings  were  sent 
to  him  from  every  side." 

"  The  kings  of  Egypt  were  deified  in  their  lifetime,  sacri- 
fices were  offered  to  them,  and  their  worship  was  celebrated 
in  special  temples  and  by  special  priests.  Indeed,  the  wor- 
ship of  the  kings  sometimes  cast  that  of  the  gods  into  the 
shade.  .  .  .  He  claimed  authority  not  only  over  Egypt, 
but  over  '  all  lands  and  nations.'  "  ^ 

The  Maker,  though  not  worshipped  and  propitiated  so 
early  as  the  lower  gods,  nevertheless  exercises  from  the  first 
an  influence  at  times  profound  and  often  the  most  ennobling 
known  to  the  primitive  mind.  In  this  connection  one 
should  remember  Howitt's  statement  concerning  the  All- 
Father  of  the  South-Eastern  Australians.  He  is,  we  are 
told,  "  imagined  as  the  ideal  of  those  qualities  which  are, 
according  to  their  standard,  virtues  worthy  of  being  imitated. 

^Frazer,  J.  G.,  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  pp.  387,  418. 


ORIGINS  OF  THE  IDEAS  OF  UNSEEN  BEINGS    109 

Such  would  be  a  man  who  is  skilful  in  the  use  of  weapons 
of  offence  and  defence,  all  powerful  in  magic,  but  generous 
and  liberal  to  his  people,  who  does  no  injury  or  violence  to 
any  one,  yet  treats  with  severity  any  breaches  of  custom 
or  morality."  ^  The  reader  will  remember  that  religion  as 
defined  in  a  preceding  chapter  includes,  under  the  name 
Passive  Religiosity,  affective  relations  of  this  sort. 

Hovvitt,  Hartland,  and  others  have  been  unwilling  to  take  the  High 
Gods  as  Creators  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word.  They  have  held  them 
to  be  primarily  ancestors  and,  in  particular,  great  chiefs  deified.  They 
have  had  no  difficulty  in  showing  that  the  All-Father  of  the  Australians 
is  often  spoken  of  as  chief  of  the  other  world.  G.  M'Call  Theal  says 
that  the  more  reliable  traditions  mention  Umkulunkulu,  the  Great  Great 
One  of  the  South  African  natives,  as  the  most  powerful  of  their  ancient 
chiefs,  and  therefore  he  is  unwilling  to  describe  him  as  a  Creator.  Be 
this  as  it  may  with  regard  to  Umkulunkulu,  it  remains  established  that 
the  High  God  is  usually  spoken  of  as  a  Creator.  To  say,  as  Hartland 
does,  that  the  concept  of  creation  as  we  understand  it  is  a  notion  foreign 
to  the  savage  is  beside  the  point,  and,  moreover,  it  is  true  only  if  "we" 
means  the  highly  cultured  few.  The  savage  thinks  of  a  Maker  as 
children  and  even  many  civilized  adults  do.  What  is  more  likely  than 
that  this  Maker  of  man  and  things  should  come  to  be  spoken  of  as 
Great  Chief,  Ruler  of  the  Sky  Country,  or  First  Ancestor? 

The  appHcation  of  the  term  "  monotheism  "  to  the  be- 
lief in  the  High  God  of  the  uncivilized  is  to  be  deprecated ; 
for  monotheism,  in  the  current  acceptance  of  the  term, 
means  more  than  a  belief  in  a  Maker ;  it  means  also  that 
there  exists  no  other  god  but  him.  This  is  obviously  not 
implied  in  the  conception  of  the  High  God.  The  Maker 
is  the  highest  god,  but  there  exists  side  by  side  with  him 
other  powerful  gods.  One  should  not  expect  the  relation 
of  the  Maker  to  the  other  gods  to  be  clearly  and  consistently 
defined.     After  all,   the    monotheism  of   our   uneducated 

1  Howitt,  A.  W.,  The  Native  Tribes  of  Soutk-East  Australia,  London, 
Macmillan  (1904),  pp.  506-507. 


no       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

Christian  population  is  of  a  similar  sort.     Pure  monotheism 
belongs  to  the  few ;  the  masses  are  rather  henotheists.^ 

Summary.  —  The  observation  of  a  variety  of  phenom- 
ena suggests  to  the  primitive  mind  the  existence  of  unseen 
agents  of  different  sorts:  (i)  dreams,  trances,  and  allied 
phenomena  generate  the  belief  in  ghosts  and  spirits  of 
human  form  and  attributes ;  (2)  the  personification  of 
natural  objects  leads  to  the  belief  in  nature-beings  con- 
ceived frequently  as  animals;  (3)  the  problem  of  creation 
gives  rise  to  the  belief  in  a  Maker  or  Makers  in  the  form 
of  man. 

These  beliefs  are  neither  manifestations  of  a  diseased 
mind  nor  the  outcome  of  a  revelation ;  they  arise  from 
perfectly  normal  mental  processes.  There  are  few  men 
living  to-day,  barring  the  mentally  defective,  who,  if  de- 
prived of  the  inheritance  of  civilization,  would  not  people 
an  unseen  world  with  these  unreal  creatures. 

But  ghosts,  spirits,  and  makers  are  not  in  themselves 
gods.  Only  a  few  of  them  possess  from  the  first  or  acquire 
later  on  the  attributes  necessary  to  the  establishment  of 
the  system  of  relations  called  religion,  and  are  thus  trans 
formed  into  gods.  This  transformation  will  be  the  subject 
of  the  next  chapter. 

^  For  discussions  regarding  High  Gods,  see  the  following  :  Andrew  Lang, 
The  Making  of  Religion,  1898,  new  ed.,  1900;  E.  Sydney  Hartland,  The 
High  Gods  of  Australia,  Folk-lore,  1898,  Vol.  IX,  pp.  290-319  (a  critical  re- 
view of  "The  Making  of  Religion");  Lang,  Australian  Coa'i,  Folk-lore, 
1899,  Vol.  X,  pp.  1-46  (a  reply  to  Hartland)  ;  Hartland,  Australian  Gods  : 
a  Rejoinder,  ibid.,  pp.  46-57  ;  Hartland,  The  Native  Tribes  of  South- East  Aus- 
tralia, by  A.  W.  Howitt,  Folk-lore,  Vol.  XVI,  1905,  pp.  101-109  ;  Lang,  All- 
Fathers  in  Australia,  ibid.,  pp.  222-224;  A-  W.  Howitt,  The  Native  Tribes 
of  South-East  Australia,  Folk-lore,  Vol.  XVII,  1906,  pp.  174-189;  Father 
Schmidt,  Anthropos,  III,  pp.  819-833 ;  A.  Van  Gennep,  Mythes  et  Legendes 
d\4ustralie,  Paris,  1905. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   MAKING  OF   GODS   AND   THE   ESSENTIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS   OF  A  DIVINITY 

The  mere  knowledge  that  the  world  is  peopled  with 
invisible  beings  does  not  of  itself  lead  to  the  establishment 
of  a  religion.  It  is  only  when  the  unseen  beings  become 
important  factors  in  the  struggle  for  life  that  they  acquire 
the  significance  of  real  gods.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  how- 
ever, a  "  mere  knowledge  "  of  unseen  agents  completely 
unrelated  to  the  daily  life  is  a  fiction.  Creators,  nature- 
beings,  spirits,  and  ghosts  are  all  connected  in  some  degree 
with  the  practical  life  of  the  tribe.  This  is  inevitable,  be- 
cause these  beings  owe  their  very  existence  in  the  mind  of 
man  to  fundamental  human  needs.  If,  for  instance,  strik- 
ing cases  of  fertility  gave  rise  to  the  idea  of  nature-beings, 
their  leading  attribute  would  be  the  power  to  render  fertile. 
If  a  belief  in  spirits  arose  from  the  observation  of  dreams 
and  trances,  these  spirits  would  possess  the  kinds  of  power 
that  belong  to  man. 

But  some  of  these  beings  lose  their  significance  after  a 
time,  while  others  enter  more  and  more  into  the  life  of  the 
community ;  they  become  objects  of  special  attention  and 
thus  centres  of  observances  and  practices,  i.e.  they  become 
gods.  The  reason  for  this  growth  on  the  part  of  certain 
of  the  unseen  beings  is  obvious.  How  could  man,  consti- 
tuted as  he  is,  believe  in  the  existence  of  powerful  beings 
and  not  try  to  conciliate  them  when  he  thought  them 
dangerous,  or  to  seek  favors  from  them  when  he  thought 
them  benevolent?     The  general  fact  of  man's  entering  into 

III 


112        A   PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

relations  with  certain  hyperhuman  agents  needs  no  other 
explanation  than  is  afforded  by  the  lust  for  life.  But  the 
many  problems  regarding  the  particular  attributes  as- 
cribed to  certain  gods  require  detailed  historical  and  anthro- 
pological knowledge.  As  I  am  only  a  psychologist,  I 
shall  have  to  content  myself  with  the  following  remarks 
about  circumstances  and  conditions  under  which  certain 
attributes  are  conferred  upon  unseen  beings. 

It  would  evidently  be  advantageous  to  man  if  he  could 
think  of  the  unseen  beings  as  possessing  every  power  of 
which  he  stands  in  need.  Now  it  happens  that  one  of  the 
most  useful  propensities  of  man  is  to  ascribe  to  unseen 
beings,  without  strict  regard  to  their  original  nature,  the 
ability  to  supply  all  the  wants  of  the  tribe  and  the  indi- 
vidual. Therefore,  the  powers  with  which  the  gods  are 
invested  are  as  many  and  as  varied  as  human  needs.  It  is 
truly  a  remarkable  habit,  —  that  of  imagining  in  other 
beings  coveted  powers  and  virtues,  and  of  turning  these 
powers,  by  supplications  and  offerings,  to  one's  own  bene- 
fit, or  of  enriching  oneself  with  these  virtues  by  means  of 
sympathetic  communion.  This  method  characterizes  not 
only  the  relations  of  men  with  gods,  but  also  those  of  men 
with  men.  We  see  in  others  the  perfections  which  we 
lack  :  the  numberless  little  human  gods  and  goddesses  who 
keep  the  flame  of  love  and  hope  burning  in  the  hearts  of 
their  votaries  perform  services  similar  to  those  of  the 
heavenly  gods. 

One  would  not  expect  a  tribe  to  develop  a  cult  touching 
that  which  is  unimportant  to  its  members,  or  that  which  is 
easily  available  in  a  more  direct  way.  The  things  essential 
to  life  and  at  the  same  time  hardest  to  secure  are  those 
with  which  the  gods  will  be  mainly  connected  in  the  mind 
of  man.  If  a  community  depends  for  its  subsistence  upon 
the  sea,  its  gods  will  be  endowed  with  the  powers  necessary 


ESSENTIAL  dL^JL-VCTERISTICS  OF  A   DIVINITY 


"3 


to  make  fishing  safe  and  productive ;  if  it  subsists  upon 
grains  and  fruits,  its  religious  and  its  magical  dealings  will 
be  chiefly  with  gods  of  vegetation.  In  dry  regions,  where 
happiness  and  often  life  depend  upon  the  fall  of  rain,  the 
whole  ritual  centres  about  the  production  of  rain,  and  the 
rain-maker  takes  precedence  even  of  the  chief.  Therefore 
the  early  gods  will  not  only  be  parts  of  the  social  order, 
but  they  will  be  related  to  economic  factors  of  the  first 
importance. 

When  the  conception  of  a  universe  governed  by  physical 
laws  has  become  established,  the  gods  lose  their  impor- 
tance as  controllers  of  natural  events,  but  they  gain  new 
functions  which  qualify  them  to  continue  in  the  service  of 
man.  They  become  comforters  in  time  of  sorrow,  lovers 
of  justice  and  mercy,  gods  of  righteousness  ;  i.e.  they  are  con- 
cerned chiefly  with  ethical  and  emotional  struggles.  The 
God  of  the  advanced  Christian  nations,  for  instance,  no 
longer  a  god  of  fertility,  although  still  to  a  certain  degree 
a  god  of  battle,  is  essentially  a  god  of  the  conscience  and 
the  heart. 

The  qualifications  which  a  being  must  possess  in  order 
to  be  available  as  a  god  are  the  following  :  — 

1.  He  must  be  a  psychic,  a  spiritual  agent.  —  By  these 
terms  I  mean  simply  the  quality  which  the  savage  attrib- 
utes to  agents  that  are  influenced  by  volition,  thought, 
and  feeling,  as  distinguished  from  those  that  are  not. 
This  rough  differentiation  expresses  sufficiently  well  the 
essential  difference,  as  understood  both  by  primitive  and  by 
civilized  man,  between  what  is  called  the  material  and  the 
spiritual  world. 

2.  As  \.o  personality,  I  shall  say  here  merely  that  from 
the  beginning  up  to  the  present  time  the  gods  of  all  the 
historical  religions  have  been  personal  beings,  imagined 


114       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

under  the  form  of  men,  or  of  animals,  or,  in  the  higher 
religions,  independent  of  form.  When  inanimate  objects 
such  as  the  sun  have  been  spoken  of  as  gods,  it  is  because 
they  were  regarded  as  symbols,  or  as  inhabited  by  a  god, 
or  possibly  because  they  were  classed  vaguely  with  animals. 

It  may  have  to  be  granted  that  there  are  now  religions 
in  process  of  formation  free  from  the  belief  in  a  personal 
god.  The  trend  of  religious  life  in  civilized  countries  is 
not  only  away  from  anthropomorphism,  but  even  away 
from  a  definitely  personal  god.  This  matter  I  shall  take 
up  in  a  chapter  on  the  future  of  religion. 

I  do  not  think  it  necessary  at  this  point  to  define  the  term 
"personal "  any  further  than  by  saying  that  it  involves  what 
is  implicitly  contained  in  the  idea  of  man  as  it  exists  in  the 
mind  of  the  savage,  —  the  idea  of  an  acting,  feeling,  and 
thinking  agent. 

3.  The  personal  Power  must  be  hyperhuman^  i.e.  he 
must  transcend  in  some  direction  ordinary  human  ca- 
pabilities ;  otherwise  he  could  not  gain  the  ascendency 
which  invariably  belongs  to  the  god-ideas.  He  need  not 
be  superhuman,  in  the  sense  of  belonging  to  another  than 
the  human  or  animal  order.  It  is  well  known  that  most  of 
the  earliest  gods  were  held  to  belong  to  the  race  of  men. 
But  human  relationship  is  a  limitation  that  the  gods  of 
the  higher  religions  have  transcended.  Neither  need  the 
personal  Power  be  omnipotent,  omnipresent,  nor  omniscient. 
It  is  only  among  highly  developed  races  that  these  qualities 
become  attributes  of  the  one  and  only  God.  A  god  is 
sufficiently  endowed  when  he  possesses  the  powers  neces- 
sary to  fulfil  the  expectations  of  his  worshippers.  Even 
the  high  God,  to  whom  is  addressed  the  prayer,  "Thy 
kingdom  come.  Thy  will  be  done  on  earth  as  it  is  in  heaven, 
give  us  this  day  our  daily  bread,"  need  not  be  conceived 
as  omnipotent  and  infinite. 


ESSENTIAL   CHARACTERISTICS  OF  A  DIVINITY    115 

4.  The  Jiyperhuman  pozver  must  be  a  part  of  the  essefice 
of  the  god,  not  merely  an  external  possession  separable 
from  him  in  definite  quantities,  either  by  the  exertion  of  his 
own  will,  or  by  magical  ceremonies  performed  by  other 
beings  in  order  to  coerce  him  into  manifesting  this  power. 

One  finds  that  the  wild  man  very  early  speaks  of  and 
deals  with  certain  beings  as  if  their  wonderful  power  were 
separable  from  themselves,  while  with  regard  to  others  he 
behaves  and  speaks  as  if  the  power  were  of  their  very  sub- 
stance. Ghosts  are  often  worshipped  because  of  the  wonder- 
ful non-personal  Force  at  their  disposal.  Among  the  Melane- 
sians,  for  instance,  "  The  ghost  who  is  to  be  worshipped  is 
the  spirit  of  a  man  who  in  his  lifetime  had  niana  in  him ; 
the  souls  of  common  men  are  the  common  herd  of  ghosts, 
nobodies,  alike  before  and  after  death."  "  On  the  death 
of  a  distinguished  man,  his  ghost  retains  the  power  that 
belonged  to  him  in  life,  in  greater  activity  and  with  greater 
force  ;  his  ghost  therefore  is  powerful  and  worshipful,  and 
so  long  as  he  is  remembered  the  aid  of  his  powers  is 
sought,  and  worship  is  offered  to  him ;  he  is  the  tindalo  of 
Florida,  the  Ho' a  of  Saa."  ^  Now  between  beings  that  are 
worshipped  or  coerced  because  of  an  impersonal,  detach- 
able power  in  their  possession,  and  beings  whose  very  nature 
transcends  that  of  man,  and  enables  them  to  perform 
wonderful  deeds,  there  is  a  dissimilarity  too  important  to 
be  disregarded.  The  objects  or  persons  in  which  is  incor- 
porated anonpersonal  Potency  become,  it  is  true,  mysterious 
and  sacred,  and  therefore  special  objects  of  attention  ;  but, 
nevertheless,  the  attitude  and  the  feeling  of  the  worshipper 
cannot  be  identical  in  the  two  cases. 

It  appears  to  me  advisable  to  reserve  the  use  of  the  term 
"  god  "  for  unseen  beings  who  are  superhumanly  powerful 

1  Codrington,  R.  H.,  The  Melanesians,  their  Anthropology  and  Folk-Lore, 
Clarendon  Press,  1891,  pp.  125,  253-254. 


ii6        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

in  their  very  nature.  The  significance  of  this  distinction 
will  appear  more  clearly  as  we  examine,  a  few  pages  below, 
the  facts  upon  which  rests  the  opinion  of  some  anthropolo- 
gists that  certain  gods  arose  from  the  deification  of  magicians. 

5.  Another  requisite  of  a  god  is  invisibility. —  The  reason 
for  this  requirement  has  been  stated.  A  god,  however, 
may  appear  occasionally  without  jeopardizing  his  divine 
character.  But  gods  manifest  themselves  in  their  own  shape 
only  in  the  lower  religions.  In  the  higher  religions,  when 
they  wish  to  come  to  earth,  they  assume  temporarily  a 
human  or  an  animal  shape.  The  higher  the  god,  the  less 
frequent  are  his  appearances. 

The  worship  of  animals  would  furnish  a  contradiction  of 
the  preceding  statement  if  these  animals  could  ever  be  re- 
garded as  gods  in  the  full  sense  of  the  term.  I  find  no 
data  to  prove  that  they  are  so  regarded.  Animals,  Hke 
men,  may  be  receptacles  of  non-personal  power  which  they 
may  be  induced  to  use  in  behalf  of  worshippers.  Again, 
like  men,  they  may  be  the  forms  in  which  spirits  or  gods 
incarnate  themselves.  In  these  two  ways  —  as  receptacles 
of  magical  power  and  as  incarnations  of  powerful  spirits  — 
animals  play  a  very  considerable  role  in  the  life  of  peoples 
of  primitive  culture.  Any  animal,  it  seems,  may,  because 
of  its  association  with  something  striking  or  important, 
assume  one  or  the  other  of  these  roles.  They  are  more 
commonly  ascribed,  however,  to  animals  that  attract  atten- 
tion by  peculiarities  of  shape,  color,  or  behavior.  "  Living 
sacred  objects  in  the  Solomon  Islands  are  chiefly  sharks, 
alhgators,  snakes,  bonitos,  and  frigate-birds.  Snakes  which 
haunt  a  sacred  place  are  themselves  sacred,  as  belonging  to 
or  serving  as  an  embodiment  of  the  ghost ;  there  was  one  in 
Savo,  to  look  upon  which  caused  death.  In  San  Cristo- 
val  there  is  a  special  reverence  for  snakes  as  representatives 
of  the  spirit-snake  Kahausibware.     Sharks  are  in  all  these 


ESSENTIAL  CEL\RACTERISTICS  OF  A  DIVINITY     117 

islands  very  often  thought  to  be  the  abode  of  ghosts,  as 
men  will  before  their  death  announce  that  they  will  appear 
as  sharks,  and  afterward  any  shark  remarkable  for  size  or 
color  which  is  observed  to  haunt  a  certain  shore  or  rock  is 
taken  to  be  some  one's  ghost,  and  the  name  of  the  deceased 
is  given  to  it."  "The  sacred  character  of  the  frigate-bird 
is  certain ;  the  figure  of  it,  however  conventional,  is  the 
most  common  ornament  employed  in  the  Solomon  Islands, 
and  it  is  even  cut  upon  the  hands  of  the  Bugoto  people."  ^ 
Although  animals  can  be  looked  upon  as  magic-gods  and 
gods-incarnate,  they  can  hardly  figure  as  magicians ;  for 
the  sounds  and  movements  they  make  can  rarely  be  re- 
garded in  the  same  light  as  the  magical  practices  of  the 
medicine-man  or  the  rain-maker.  It  is  still  more  difficult 
to  conceive  of  them  as  gods,  in  the  full  meaning  I  have 
given  to  that  term. 

6.  The  perso7ial  Power  must  be  accessible  (not  through 
coercitive  measures,  but  through  anthropopathic  action); 
otherwise  he  could  never  be  the  objectof  a  cult.  He  would 
at  most  be  "  a  regulative  idea  "  in  the  manner  of  the  "  ab- 
solute "  in  idealistic  philosophy,  or  of  the  god  of  Deism. 

7.  Benevolence  tozvard  men  must  enter  into  his  com- 
position. —  As  this  point  will  be  taken  up  again  when  we 
deal  with  the  original  religious  emotions,  I  need  say  no 
more  about  it  here. 

Mystcriousjtess,  azufulness,  and  frequently  sacredness 
have  been  thought  to  be  the  differentiating  characteristics 
of  the  gods.  A  being  who  is  usually  invisible,  who  wields 
great  power  for  good  or  evil,  and  whose  behavior  is  not 
predictable  is  evidently  a  mysterious  and  awful  being ; 
mysteriousness  and  awfulness,  therefore,  always  belong  to 

1  Codrington,  R.  H.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  178-179,  180.  Comp.  Irving  King,  The 
Development  of  Religion,  pp.  230-234. 


ii8        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

gods,  and  man's  relations  with  gods  will  be  more  or  less 
deeply  colored  by  awe.  But  in  awe  there  is  nothing  dis- 
tinctive of  religious  life,  for  this  emotional  experience  occurs 
outside  of  religion  as  well.  Any  spectacle  suggestive  of 
great  power  and  at  the  same  time  of  danger  may  inspire  awe. 
Moreover,  mysteriousness  and  awf ulness  are  not  coordinate 
with  the  preceding  list  of  characteristics  ;  for  awf  ulness  and 
mysteriousness  are  derived  from  power,  invisibility,  etc. 

It  has  also  been  urged  that  whatever  is  sacred  is  reli- 
gious and  whatever  is  religious  is  sacred ;  moreover,  that 
the  presence  of  this  quality  constitutes  a  chasm  between 
the  religious  and  the  non-religious.  I  have  already  had 
occasion  to  argue  that  this  view  is  tenable  only  when  the 
sense  of  the  term  "  religion  "  is  so  extended  as  to  lose  its 
historical  meaning  and  to  become  coextensive  with  what- 
ever is  of  great  importance  to  man.  The  word  "  sacredness  " 
points  not  to  a  simple  emotion,  but  to  a  highly  complex 
affective  experience,  of  which  awe  and  reverence  are  dom- 
inant components.  This  emotional  state  is  undoubtedly 
experienced  outside  of  religious  life.  It  belongs,  for  in- 
stance, to  the  mysterious  Mana  of  the  Melanesians,  as  well 
as  to  gods.  Now  Mana  itself  is  sacred  because  of  the 
good  and  evil  things  it  can  do ;  so  that  sacredness  has  its 
origin  in  the  values  which  life  places  upon  food,  fertility, 
sickness,  birth,  death,  etc.  Certain  objects  and  places  are 
sacred  because  Mana  is  to  be  found  in  them,  or  because 
powerful  ghosts  inhabit  them.  And  ghosts  are  sacred  for 
the  very  reason  that  a  non-personal  Power  is  sacred,  — 
they  have  dominion  over  sunshine  and  rain,  plenty  and 
famine,  birth  and  death.^ 

^  Sacred  objects  or  places  are  those  possessing  y'f/awa  or  serving  as  dwelling- 
places  of  ghosts  of  power.  "These  places  are  sometimes  in  the  village,  in 
which  case  they  are  fenced  round  lest  they  should  be  rashly  tread  upon, 
sometimes  in  the  garden  ground,  sometimes  in  the  bush.     A  vunuha  is  sacred 


ESSENTIAL   CIL\R.\CTERISTICS  OF  A   DIVINITY     119 

Men,  magicians,  and  gods. — In  TJie  Golden  Bough} 
J.  G.  Frazer,  after  giving  many  illustrations  of  magicians 
that  developed  into  chiefs  and  kings,  shows  that  certain 
kings  and  magicians  have  been  deified.  From  this  ad- 
mirable store  of  information,  I  draw  the  following  pas- 
sages :  — 

"  Now  in  central  Australia,  where  the  desert  nature  of  the  country 
and  the  almost  complete  isolation  from  foreign  influences  have  retarded 
progress  and  preserved  the  natives  on  the  whole  in  their  most  primitive 
state,  the  headmen  of  the  various  totem  clans  are  charged  with  the  im- 
portant task  of  performing  magical  ceremonies  for  the  multiplication  of 
the  totems,  and  as  the  great  majority  of  the  totems  are  edible  animals 
or  plants,  it  follows  that  these  men  are  commonly  expected  to  provide 
the  people  with  food  by  means  of  magic.  Others  have  to  make  the 
rain  to  fall  or  to  render  other  services  to  the  community.  In  short, 
among  the  tribes  of  Central  Australia  the  headmen  are  public  magicians. 
Further,  their  most  important  function  is  to  take  charge  of  the  sacred 
storehouse,  usually  a  cleft  in  the  rocks  or  a  hole  in  the  ground,  where 
are  kept  the  holy  stones  and  sticks  {c/turinga)  with  which  the  souls  of 
all  the  people,  both  living  and  dead,  are  apparently  supposed  to  be  in 
a  manner  bound  up.  Thus  while  the  headmen  have  certainly  to  per" 
form  what  we  should  call  civil  duties,  such  as  to  inflict  punishment  for 
breaches  of  tribal  custom,  their  principal  functions  are  sacred  or  mag- 
ical." Similarly,  in  southeastern  Australia,  "  In  the  Yerkla-mining 
tribe,"  for  instance,  "  the  medicine-men  are  the  headmen ;  they  are 
called  Afobung-bai,  from  mobung,  '  magic'  They  decide  disputes,  ar- 
range marriages,  conduct  the  ceremonies  of  initiation,  and  in  certain 

to  a  tindalo,  ghost  of  power,  and  sacrifices  are  offered  to  the  tindalo  in  it.  In 
some  cases  the  vtinuha  is  the  burial-place  of  the  man  who  has  become  a 
tindalo,  in  others  his  relics  have  been  transplanted  there  ;  in  some  places 
there  is  a  shrine,  and  in  some  an  image.  There  are  generally,  if  not  always, 
stones  in  such  a  sacred  place  ;  some  stone  lying  naturally  there  has  struck 
the  fancy  of  the  man  who  began  the  cultus  of  the  tindalo  ;  he  thinks  that  it 
is  a  likely  place  for  a  ghost  to  haunt,  and  other  smaller  stones  and  shells 
called  peopeo  are  added.  When  a  vunuha  has  been  established,  everything 
within  it  is  sacred,  tambu,  and  belongs  to  the  tindalo."  (Codrington,  op.  cit., 
pp.  175-176-) 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  335,  336,  338,  341, 
342,  345.  350.  353.  375.  387.  392. 


I20        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

circumstances  settle  the  formalities  to  be  observed  in  ordeals  of  battle. 
'  In  fact,  they  wield  authority  in  the  tribe,  and  give  orders  where  others 
only  make  requests.'  "  In  New  Guinea  and  in  Melanesia  the  magician 
occupies  a  similar  position.  "  According  to  a  native  Melanesian  ac- 
count, the  origin  of  the  power  of  chiefs  lies  entirely  in  the  belief  that 
they  have  communication  with  mighty  ghosts  (Jindalo),  and  wield  that 
supernatural  power  {tnana)  whereby  they  can  bring  the  influence  of  the 
ghosts  to  bear."  "The  real  gods  at  Tana  may  be  said  to  be  the  disease- 
makers.  It  is  surprising  how  these  men  are  dreaded,  and  how  firm  the 
behef  is  that  they  have  in  their  hands  the  power  of  life  and  death." 
These  sorcerers  are  thought  by  Dr.  Turner,  from  whom  Frazer  draws 
the  last  quotation,  to  be  on  the  highroad  to  divinity. 

In  Africa  "the  evidence  for  the  evolution  of  the  chief  out  of  the  m.a- 
gician,  and  especially  out  of  the  rain-maker,  is  comparatively  plentiful." 
"  Tradition  always  places  the  power  of  making  rain  as  the  fundamental 
glory  of  ancient  chiefs  and  heroes,  and  it  seems  probable  that  it  may 
have  been  the  origin  of  chieftainship."  P.  Kollman  states  that  the 
people  of  the  neighborhood  of  Victoria  Nyanza  "  hold  that  rulers  must 
have  power  over  Nature  and  her  phenomena."  The  Malays  firmly  be- 
lieve to  this  day  that  their  king  possesses  such  a  power.  In  Upper 
Egypt  also  "  most  of  the  chiefs  .  .  .  are  rain-makers,  and  enjoy  a  popu- 
larity in  proportion  to  their  powers  to  give  rain  to  their  people  at  the 
proper  season."  The  belief  in  the  magical  power  of  kings  has  lasted 
until  modern  times.  Queen  Elizabeth  often  exercised  the  miraculous 
gift  of  healing  scrofula  by  touch. 

Now  it  is  a  common  saying  that  the  savage  does  not  draw  a  sharp 
distinction  between  a  '■'  god  "  and  a  powerful  sorcerer.  "  His  gods,  as 
we  have  seen,  are  often  merely  invisible  magicians  who  behind  the  veil 
of  nature  work  the  same  sort  of  charms  and  incantations  which  the 
human  magician  works  in  a  visible  and  bodily  form  among  his  fellows. 
And  as  the  gods  are  commonly  believed  to  exhibit  themselves  to  their 
worshippers  in  the  likeness  of  men,  it  is  easy  for  the  magician,  with  his 
supposed  miraculous  powers,  to  acquire  the  reputation  of  being  an  incar- 
nate deity.  Thus,  beginning  as  little  more  than  a  simple  conjurer,  the 
medicine-man  or  magician  tends  to  blossom  out  into  a  full-blown  god 
and  king  in  one."  And  history  provides  us  with  quite  a  number  of 
instances  of  human  beings  which  have  been  treated  as  gods.  In  the 
Marquesas  or  Washington  Islands  there  was  a  class  of  men  deified  in 
their  life-time.  "  A  missionary  has  described  one  of  these  human  gods 
from  personal  observation.  The  god  was  a  very  old  man  who  lived  in 
a  large  house  within  an  enclosure.     In  the  house  was  a  kind  of  altar, 


ESSENTIAL  CHARACTERISTICS  OF  A  DIVINITY    121 

and  on  the  beams  of  the  house  and  on  the  trees  round  it  were  hung 
human  skeletons,  head  down.  No  one  entered  the  enclosure  except 
the  persons  dedicated  to  the  service  of  the  god ;  only  on  days  when 
human  victims  were  sacrificed  might  ordinary  people  penetrate  into  the 
precinct.  This  human  god  received  more  sacrifices  than  all  the  other 
gods ;  often  he  would  sit  on  a  sort  of  scaffold  in  front  of  his  house  and  call 
for  two  or  three  human  victims  at  a  time.  They  were  always  brought, 
for  the  terror  he  inspired  was  e.xtreme.  He  was  invoked  all  over  the 
island,  and  offerings  were  sent  to  him  from  every  side.  Again,  of  the 
South  Sea  Islands  in  general,  we  are  told  that  each  island  had  a  man 
who  represented  or  personified  the  divinity.  Such  men  were  called 
gods,  and  their  substance  was  confounded  with  that  of  the  deity.  The 
man-god  was  sometimes  the  king  himself;  oftener  he  was  a  priest  or 
subordinate  chief."  Similar  men-gods  are  found  in  semicivilized  com- 
munities ;  they  were  common  in  ancient  Egypt,  for  instance,  and  are 
found  even  to-day  in  India,  especially  among  the  Buddhist  Tartars. 

These  facts  point  to  the  following  distinctions  and  com- 
ments. Certain  of  the  so-called  human  gods  are  regarded 
as  incarnations  of  powerful  spirits.  If  the  spirits  are  true 
divinities,  their  incarnations  may  properly  be  spoken  of  as 
gods-incarnate.^  But  the  majority  of  men-gods  are  merely 
men  who  own  a  large  portion  of  the  non-personal  power. 
They  are  like  the  famous  English  ruler  of  the  Dyaks  of 
Sarawak  —  Rajah  Brooke  —  endowed  with  magical  virtue. 
"  Hence,  when  he  visited  the  tribe,  they  used  to  bring  him 
the  seed  that  they  intended  to  sow  next  year,  and  he  fer- 
tilized it  by  shaking  over  it  the  women's  necklaces  which 
had  been  previously  dipped  in  a  special    mixture.     And 

1  Frazer  makes  this  distinction,  and  no  other :  "  As  a  result  of  the  foregoing 
discussion,  the  two  types  of  human  gods  may  conveniently  be  distinguished 
as  the  religious  and  the  magical  man-gods  respectively.  In  the  former,  a 
being  of  an  order  different  from  and  superior  to  man  is  supposed  to  become 
incarnate,  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time,  in  a  human  body,  manifesting  his 
superior  power  and  knowledge  by  miracles  wrought  and  prophecies  uttered 
through  the  medium  of  a  fleshly  tabernacle  in  which  he  has  deigned  to  take 
up  his  abode.  This  may  also  appropriately  be  called  the  inspired  or  incarnate 
type  of  man- god."     (  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  244.) 


122        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

when  he  entered  a  village,  the  women  would  wash  and 
bathe  his  feet  first  with  water,  and  then  with  the  milk  of  a 
young  cocoanut,  and  lastly  with  water  again,  and  all  this 
water  which  had  touched  his  person  they  preserved  for 
the  purpose  of  distributing  it  on  their  farms,  believing  that 
it  insured  an  abundant  harvest.  Tribes  which  were  too 
far  off  for  him  to  visit  used  to  send  him  a  small  piece  of 
white  cloth  and  a  little  gold  and  silver,  and  when  these 
things  had  been  impregnated  by  his  generative  virtue,  they 
buried  them  in  their  fields,  and  confidently  expected  a 
heavy  crop."  ^  Such  men,  even  though  they  receive  adora- 
tion and  sacrifice,  are  magicians  rather  than  true  gods. 
For  it  is  to  the  man  and  not  to  the  mysterious  Power  that 
the  prayers  and  offerings  are  made.  The  non-personal 
Power  itself  cannot  be  reached  by  anthropopathic  methods, 
although  the  man  who  controls  this  Power  is  accessible  by 
this  means ;  therefore  the  man  is  given  homage  and  gifts 
in  the  expectation  that  he  will  use  it  in  behalf  of  the 
worshipper. 

Between  the  ordinary  magician  and  the  man-god  there 
is  an  important  point  of  difference.  The  former  does  not 
possess  the  Power  in  his  own  right,  but  must  abstract  it 
from  the  air  or  from  particular  objects ;  whereas  the  man- 
god  is  himself  a  reservoir  of  Mana,  and  can  supply  it 
whenever  he  chooses. 

There  are  thus  four  classes  of  wonderful  beings  known 
to  the  savage  :  — 

{a)  The  man  who  knows  ways  by  which  a  mysterious 
Potency  outside  himself  can  be  directed  to  certain  definite 
purposes.     He  is  a  simple  7nagician. 

(J?)  The  man  who  himself  possesses  the  magical  power, 
and  therefore  needs  no  magical  art  to  obtain  it.  But  the 
power  is  in  him  ;  it  is  not  a  part  of  his  very  nature.     He 

1  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  361. 


ESSENTIAL  CIL\R.\CTERISTICS  OF  A   DIVINITY     123 

may  be  called  a  magic-god,  and  may  be  regarded  as  a  con- 
necting link  between  magicians  and  true  gods. 

(f)  The  man  in  whom  a  god  has  taken  up  his  abode. 
Let  him  be  Xi2SC\Q.^  god-hicartiatc. 

{d)  The  being  in  whom  the  dualism  of  person  and  power 
is  transcended.  His  wonderful  deeds  do  not  proceed  from 
his  use  of  a  magical  force,  distinct  from  his  essence  ;  they 
are  the  expression  of  his  very  nature.     He  is  a  true  god. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  savage  does  not  possess 
clear  ideas  of  these  four  classes  of  beings,  and  that  he  may 
deal  with  the  same  man  at  one  time  as  if  he  were  a  simple 
magician,  and  at  another  time  as  if  he  possessed  Matia 
in  his  own  right.  The  magic-god  may  descend  to  the 
level  of  a  mere  magician  and  perform  magical  ceremonies 
or  be  the  object  of  magical  coercion  on  the  part  of 
others.  Much  confusion  of  this  kind  naturally  exists.  But 
I  believe  that  soon  the  savage  comes  to  "  feel  "  more  or  less 
vaguely  these  differences,  and  that  his  behavior  is  in  some 
degree  affected  by  them. 

Is  it  possible  for  a  magic-god  to  become  a  true  god  while 
yet  alive .''  I  know  of  no  facts  that  would  compel  an 
affirmative  answer.  In  a  living  being,  personal  defects 
and  limitations  are,  I  suppose,  too  obvious  to  allow  real 
deification.  A  man,  even  if  physically  and  morally  im- 
perfect, might  be  master  of  wonderful  forces,  but  could 
hardly  be  regarded  as  a  god.  His  physical  form,  his  petty 
physical  needs,  his  behavior,  work  against  his  deification  : 
he  is  too  evidently  a  man.  And  so  he  is  accepted  simply 
as  what  I  have  called  a  magician  or  a  magic-god.  After 
his  death,  however,  when  he  is  disencumbered  of  the  in- 
firmities of  the  flesh,  he  may  perhaps  assume  in  the  minds 
of  those  who  knew  him  the  magnitude  of  a  god.^ 

^  Is  one  justified  in  saying  that  Mrs.  Mary  Baker  Eddy,  from  a  simple 
magician,  healing  body  and  soul  by  a  power  "not  herself,"  which  she  knew 


124        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  predominance  of  the  social  form  of  consciousness 
at  the  beginning  of  civilization  must  give  a  peculiar  cast  to 
the  relation  of  the  individual  w^ith  gods.  To  primitive  man, 
life  is  not  so  commonly  and  clearly  as  it  is  to  the  man  of 
modern  civilized  society  a  struggle  to  realize  himself ;  it  ap- 
pears to  him  more  frequently  as  the  struggle  of  the  social 
group  to  which  he  belongs. 

And,  in  so  far  as  the  gods  hold  a  blood  relationship  to 
the  social  group,  the  primitive  religious  relations  may  take 
on  an  intimate  character,  something  similar,  —  though  on  a 
lower  plane,  — to  the  consciousness  of  the  Christian  mystic 
who  feels  himself  to  be  a  part  of  the  divine  substance. 
But  the  expression  of  communion  or  union  with  gods  is  a 
small  part  of  the  religious  behavior  of  the  savage.  Ordi- 
narily the  god  stands  over  against  the  tribe,  and  so  relations 
with  him  maybe  called  "external,"  in  opposition  to  the 
inner  relations  of  the  mystical  type.  The  overemphasis  of 
the  mystical  mood,  to  which  many  are  prone  when  describ- 
ing religious  consciousness,  is  the  outcome  of  a  natural  ten- 
dency to  exalt  that  which  appears  rare  and  exquisite  in 
human  nature.  It  is  as  if  one  mistook  the  hors-d' oeiivre  of 
the  meal  for  the  substance.  I  hold  that  in  the  absence  of 
the  mystical  form  of  consciousness  religion  might  still  ex- 
ist and  find  embodiment  in  most  of  the  religious  institu- 
tions with  which  we  are  familiar. 

The  conception  of  the  source  of  psychic  energy,  without 
belief  in  which  no  religion  can  exist,  has  undergone  very 
interesting  transformations  in  the  course  of  historical  devel- 
opment. The  human  or  animal  form  ascribed  to  the  gods 
in  the  earlier  religions  became  less  and  less  definite,  and  at 

how  to  coerce,  developed  into  a  magic  goddess?  That  such  may  be  the 
destiny  of  the  founder  of  Christian  Science  seems  almost  possible  in  the  light 
of  the  history  of  religious  sects. 


ESSENTIAL   CHAPL^CTERISTICS   OF  A  DIVINITY    125 

the  same  time  the  number  of  gods  decreased.  The  culmi- 
nation of  this  double  process  was  Monotheism,  in  which  the 
One,  Eternal  Creator,  and  Sustainer  of  life  had  no  longer 
necessarily  the  shape  of  man  or  beast :  though  still  anthro- 
popathic,  he  might  be  formless.  Love  and  righteousness 
were  his  chief  attributes.  In  a  second  phase,  this  formless 
but  personal  God  was  gradually  shorn  of  all  the  qualities 
which  make  for  individuality.  He  became  the  passionless 
Absolute  in  which  all  things  move  and  have  their  being. 
Thus  the  personifying  work  of  centuries  is  undone,  and 
humanity,  after  having,  as  it  were,  lived  throughout  its  in- 
fancy and  youth  under  the  controlling  eye  and  the  active 
guidance  of  personal  divinities,  finds  itself,  on  reaching 
maturity,  bereft  of  these  sources  of  life.  The  present  re- 
ligious crisis  marks  the  difficulty  in  the  way  of  an  adap- 
tation to  the  new  situation.  As  belief  in  a  personal  God 
seems  no  longer  possible,  man  seeks  an  impersonal,  effi- 
cient substitute,  belief  in  which  will  not  mean  disloyalty  to 
science.  For  man  will  have  life,  and  have  it  abundantly, 
and  he  has  learned  from  experience  that  its  sources  are  not 
only  in  meat  and  drink,  but  also  in  "  spiritual  faith."  It  is 
this  problem  which  the  Comtists,  the  Immanentists,  the 
Ethical  Culturists,  the  Mental  Scientists,  are  trying  to  solve. 
Any  solution  that  provides  for  the  preservation  and  per- 
fection of  life  by  means  of  faith  in  a  hyperhuman,  psychic 
power  will  have  the  right  to  the  name  religion. 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE^ 

I.   The  Emotions  in  Primitive  Religion 

It  is  held  by  many  that  religion  had  its  origin  in  the 
emotional  life,  in  "  loving  reverence,"  or  in  fear,  or  in  awe; 
and  many,  as  we  have  seen,  make  some  particular  emotion 
the  distinguishing  mark  of  religion.  Since  religion  is  a 
part  of  the  struggle  for  the  preservation  and  perfection  of 
life,  it  involves  from  the  very  beginning  emotional  states. 
But  to  speak  of  religion  as  originating  in  emotions  is  to 
proceed  upon  a  conception  of  religion  which,  at  this  stage 
of  our  study,  I  hope  will  seem  utterly  inacceptable.  If 
any  sentiment  or  emotion,  such  as  reverence  or  fear  or 
awe,  is  found  at  the  dawn  of  religion,  it  exists  as  part  of  a 
response,  in  a  particular  situation,  to  a  sense  of  the  pres- 
ence of  an  invisible  Being,  upon  whom  one  depends  and 
with  whom  one  desires  to  hold  satisfactory  relations.  The 
emotion  belongs  to  an  experience  involving  the  whole 
man  ;  that  is,  man  as  a  feeling,  thinking,  willing  being. 

The  question  that  I  desire  to  raise  in  the  first  part  of 
this  chapter,  then,  is  not  "  In  what  emotion  does  religion 
originate  ? "  but  "  What  is  the  dominant  emotion  at  the 
beginning  of   rehgious  life  .■' "     Let  us  first  consider  the 

^  In  this  chapter  I  have  used  freely,  and  often  verbally,  a  paper  on  Fear, 
Awe,  and  the  Sublime  in  Religion,  published  in  the  Amer.  Jr.  of  Religious 
Psychulogy  and  Education,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1-23,  and  also  a  brief  chapter  of  my 
booklet  on  the  Psychological  Origin  and  the  Nature  of  Religion. 

126 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  127 

question  a  priori,  on  the  basis  of  what  we  have  learned 
regarding  the  nature  of  religion.  What  are  the  emotions 
which  even  the  most  primitive  savage  is  likely  to  experi- 
ence as  he  feels  the  invisible  presence  of  his  great  tribal 
ancestors,  of  mighty  nature-beings,  of  creators  ?  Fear 
them  he  most  certainly  does.  If  he  believes  himself  able 
by  magic  to  coerce  any  of  them,  his  attitude  towards  that 
one  is  self-assertion,  self-reliance,  and  pride,  perhaps  even 
arrogance,  mitigated  no  doubt  by  a  lurking  fear  that  his 
magic  may  fail.  But  such  a  relation  to  a  spirit  or  god  does 
not  constitute  religion ;  it  is,  as  we  know,  magic.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  he  finds  himself  in  a  personal,  anthropo- 
pathic  relation  with  one  of  these  unseen  beings,  and,  realiz- 
ing his  need,  seeks  to  win  the  god's  favor  with  presents, 
or  by  bowing  before  him  in  an  attitude  of  fear,  respect,  and 
hope,  we  have  an  altogether  different  emotional  attitude. 
The  man  is  no  longer  self-assertive  and  proud.  A  sense  of 
subjection  is  present,  together  with  fear,  either  as  pure  fear 
or  as  that  higher  emotion  derived  from  fear  and  curiosity, 
—  awe.  There  may  be,  in  addition,  something  belonging 
to  the  opposite  end  of  the  emotional  gamut,  —  something 
approaching  the  tender  emotion. 

If  this  should  appear  to  some  to  endow  primitive  man 
with  feelings  beyond  him,  I  would  answer  that  we  owe  to 
our  animal  ancestry  not  only  the  instincts  and  emotions  of 
fear,  of  self-assertiveness  and  its  opposite,  but  also  those 
simpler  forms  of  the  tender  emotion  which  appear  in  the 
parental  relations  of  the  higher  animals  and  in  the  attach- 
ment of  certain  of  our  domestic  animals  to  their  masters. 
Why  then  should  one  be  unwilling  to  attribute  to  the  most 
primitive  savage  a  degree  of  tender  regard  for  his  Great 
Ancestor  or  for  his  Creator.''  I  do  not  imagine  the  first 
group  of  human  beings  to  have  been  necessarily  either 
bloodthirsty  brutes,  incapable  of  anything  but  violence  and 


128        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

cruelty,  or  abject,  timorous  creatures,  familiar  only  with 
fear.  The  lowest  men  we  know  do  not  at  all  answer  to 
either  description.  There  is  among  them  —  and  I  shall 
have  occasion  to  say  more  on  this  point  —  kindness,  mutual 
consideration,  and  even  real  affection.  This  is  what  one 
would  expect  of  primitive  man,  if  he  should  have  inherited 
the  best  in  his  animal  ancestry. 

Shall  we  add  gratitude  to  the  list  of  original  religious 
emotions .''  Young  children  have  the  reputation  of  being 
thankless,  and  savages  show  the  same  trait.  Gratitude 
is  not  a  simple  primary  emotion  as  are  fear,  self-assertion, 
self-subjection,  and  the  tender  emotion.  Nevertheless, 
I  do  not  see  why  some  degree  of  gratitude  should  not, 
even  at  the  beginning,  mix  with  the  other  emotions.  If 
some  of  the  gods  are  regarded  as  benevolent,  then  one  has 
a  right  to  expect  expressions  of  gratitude  towards  them 
when  they  have  fulfilled  the  desires  of  their  dependents. 

The  oldest  and  probably  most  widely  accepted  opinion 
is  that  fear  led  to  reUgion.  Hume's  conclusion  that  "the 
first  ideas  of  religion  arose  .  .  .  from  a  concern  with  re- 
gard to  the  events  of  life  and  fears  which  actuate  the 
human  mind  "  is  maintained  by  most  of  our  contempora- 
ries. Among  psychologists,  Ribot,  for  instance,  affirms 
that  "  the  religious  sentiment  is  composed  .  .  .  first  of  all 
of  the  emotion  of  fear  in  its  different  degrees,  from  pro- 
found terror  to  vague  uneasiness,  due  to  faith  in  an  un- 
known, mysterious,  impalpable  Power." ^ 

The  sway  of  fear  at  the  dawn  of  human  existence  is  a 
well-established  fact.  It  is  probable  that  evil  spirits  were 
the  first  to  receive  particular  attention.  "  Among  the 
Bongos  of  central  Africa  good  spirits  are  quite  unrecog- 
nized, and,  according  to  the  general  negro  idea,  no  bene- 

1  Ribot,  Th.,  The  Psychology  of  the  Emotions,  p.  309. 


THE   EMOTIONS  IN   RELIGIOUS   LIFE  129 

fit  can  ever  come  from  a  spirit."  ^  In  other  tribes  good 
spirits  are  known,  but  the  savage  always  "  pays  more  at- 
tention to  deprecating  the  wrath  of  the  evil  than  securing 
the  favor  of  the  good  beings."  The  tendency  is  to  let 
alone  the  good  spirits,  because  they  will  do  us  good  of 
themselves. 

But  though  fear  is  the  most  conspicuous  emotion  of 
primitive  religious  life,  it  is  not  the  only  one  present,  and 
there  is  no  quality  in  fear  that  fits  it  to  be  the  so-called 
original  religious  emotion.^  The  making  of  religion  re- 
quires nothing  found  in  fear  that  is  not  present  also  in  the 
other  emotions.  If  tender  emotions  are  not  prominent  at 
the  dawn  of  religion,  it  is  only  because  fear  is  the  first  of 
the  well-organized  emotional  reactions,  and  biologically  at 
first  the  most  valuable.  It  antedates  the  human  species  and 
to-day  appears  first  in  the  infant  as  well  as  in  the  young  ani- 
mal. In  early  human  existence  it  was  kept  in  the  fore- 
ground by  the  circumstances  of  existence.  It  is  true,  how- 
ever, that  before  the  protective  fear  reaction  could  be 
established,  the  lust  of  life  had  begun  to  express  itself  in 
aggressive  habits ;  for  instance,  the  habit  of  securing  food. 
But  these  desires  did  not,  as  early  as  in  the  case  of  fear, 

^  Avebury,  Lord  (Sir  John  Lubbock),  The  Origin  of  Civilization,  5th  ed., 
1892,  p.  225. 

■■^  R.  R.  Marett,  in  an  essay  entitled  Pre-Animistic  Religion,  gives  expres- 
sion to  an  interesting  view  of  the  original  religious  emotion.  '■  Before,  or  at 
any  rate  apart  from,  Animism,  was  any  man  subject  to  any  experience,  whether 
in  the  form  of  feeling,  or  of  thought,  or  of  both  combined,  that  might  be 
termed  specifically  'religious'?"  His  answer  is  affirmative;  the  emotion 
arising  in  the  presence  of  the  mysterious  —  awe  —  is  the  original  religious 
emotion.  "  Of  all  English  words  Awe  is,  I  think,  the  one  that  expresses  the 
fundamental  religious  feeling  most  nearly.  Awe  is  not  the  same  thing  as 
'pure  funk.'  'Primus  in  orbe  deos  fecit  timor'  is  only  true  if  we  admit 
Wonder,  Admiration,  Interest,  Respect,  even  Love,  perhaps,  to  be  no  less  than 
Fear,  essential  constituents  of  this  elemental  mood."  (^The  Threshold  of  Re- 
ligion, Methuen  and  Co.,  1909,  pp.  8,  13.) 
K 


130        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

give  rise  to  any  emotional  reaction  as  constant,  definite, 
and  poignant  as  fear.  The  place  of  fear  in  primitive 
religion  is,  then,  due  not  to  its  intrinsic  qualities,  but  simply 
to  the  circumstances  which  made  it  appear  first  as  a  well- 
organized  emotion,  vitally  connected  with  the  maintenance 
of  life.  It  is  for  exactly  the  same  reason  that  the  domi- 
nant emotion  in  the  relations  of  uncivilized  men  and  of 
animals  with  strangers  is  usually  fear. 

I  wish  to  add,  however,  that  there  does  not  seem  to  me 
anything  preposterous  in  the  supposition  that  groups  of 
primitive  men  found  themselves  in  circumstances  so  favor- 
able to  peace  and  safety  that  fear  did  not  occupy  the  fore- 
most place.  Neither  wild  men  nor  wild  animals  need  have 
found  themselves  so  situated  as  to  be  in  a  constant  state  of 
fright.  If  the  African  antelope  runs  for  its  life  twice  a 
day,  on  an  average,  as  Sir  Galton  supposes,  the  wild  horse 
on  the  South  American  plains,  before  the  hunter  appeared 
in  his  pastures,  ran  chiefly  for  pleasure.  Travellers  bear 
testimony  to  the  absence  of  fear  in  birds  and  animals 
inhabiting  certain  regions.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  would 
religion  have  come  into  existence  under  these  peaceful 
conditions  ?  A  life  of  ease,  comfort,  and  security  is  not 
conducive  to  the  establishment  of  practical  relations  with 
gods.  Why  should  happy,  self-sufficient  men  look  to  un- 
seen, mysterious  beings  for  assistance  .-'  History  teaches  us 
that  in  times  of  prosperity  men  forget  their  gods.  Under 
such  circumstances  the  unmixed  type  of  fear-religion  would 
never  have  come  into  existence.  Religion  would  have  ap- 
peared late  and,  from  the  first,  in  a  nobler  form.  It  would 
have  been  characterized  by  a  feeling  of  dependence  upon 
Creators  and  All-Fathers  regarded  as  benevolent  gods,  and 
would  have  elicited  primarily  awe  and  reverence. 

W.  Robertson  Smith  denies  that  the  attempt  to  appease 
evil  beings  is  the  foundation  of  religion.     "  From  the  earli- 


THE  EMOTIONS    IN   RELIGIOUS  LIFE 


131 


est  times  religion,  as  distinct  from  magic  or  sorcery,  ad- 
dresses itself  to  kindred  and  friendly  beings,  who  may 
indeed  be  angry  with  their  people  for  a  time,  but  are 
always  placable  except  to  the  enemies  of  their  worshippers 
or  to  renegade  members  of  the  community.  It  is  not  with 
a  vague  fear  of  unknown  powers,  but  with  a  loving  rever- 
ence for  known  gods  who  are  knit  to  their  worshippers  by 
strong  bonds  of  kinship,  that  religion,  in  the  only  sense  of 
the  word,  begins."  ^  In  this  passage  Robertson  Smith 
does  not  deny  that  certain  practices  intended  to  avert  the 
action  of  evil  spirits  preceded  the  establishment  of  affec- 
tionate relations  with  benevolent  powers  ;  he  declares  only 
that  the  attempt  to  propitiate  dreaded  evil  spirits  is  not 
religion. 

Can  this  limitation  of  the  meaning  of  religion  be  ac- 
cepted ?  When  a  person  seeks  to  conciliate  an  evil  being, 
his  feelings  and  his  behavior  are  undoubtedly  very  different 
from  his  experience  when  he  communes  with  a  benevolent 
being.  Yet  in  both  cases  an  anthropopathic  relation  with 
a  personal  being  is  established.  In  this  respect,  both 
stand  opposed  to  magical  behavior.  This  common  an- 
thropopathic element  is  so  fundamental  that  it  seems 
advisable  to  give  both  types  of  relation  the  name  rehgion. 
But  since  they  differ  in  important  respects,  the  terms 
Negative  Religion  may  be  used  for  man's  anthropopathic 
dealings  with  essentially  bad  spirits,  and  Positive  Religion 
for  his  relations  with  benevolent  gods. 

But  not  even  Positive  Religion  is  at  first  free  from  fear. 
The  benevolent  gods  are  quick  to  anger,  and  cruelly  avenge 
their  broken  laws.  This  is  one  more  reason  for  not  com- 
pletely dissociating  the  propitiation  of  evil  spirits  from  the 
worship  of  kindly  gods. 

1  Smith,  W.  Robertson,  The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  p.  55. 


132        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

2,   The  Emotions  in  the  Course  of  the  Development  of 

Religion 

Origins  are  interesting  chiefly  because  of  the  light  they 
shed  upon  the  present  and  the  future.  In  order  to  give 
that  light  its  fullest  illuminating  power,  the  beginnings 
should  be  connected  with  the  present  by  a  knowledge  of 
the  intervening  developments.  I  have  not  undertaken  in 
this  book  to  treat  systematically  the  development  of  the 
several  aspects  of  religion,  yet  I  think  this  section  will  not 
be  out  of  place.  It  is  a  topic  of  social  psychology  inter- 
esting from  more  than  one  point  of  view. 

One  of  the  most  significant  facts  revealed  by  a  compari- 
son between  the  earlier  and  later  forms  of  religion  is  an 
emotional  progression.  It  begins  with  the  yielding  of  fear 
to  its  relative,  awe,  which  in  its  turn  is  displaced  by  other 
emotions  in  which  fear  is  not  merely  held  in  control,  as  in 
awe,  but  is  completely  overcome.  They  are  reverence,  ad- 
miration, gratitude,  a  sense  of  the  sublime,  and  the  tender 
emotion.  In  the  highest  civilization  of  to-day,  fear,  awe, 
and,  to  a  considerable  degree,  even  reverence,  have  been 
displaced  by  the  tender  emotion,  which  rules  supreme. 
Fear  expresses  itself  in  rejecting  or  breaking  away  from 
its  object;  the  tender  emotion  in  embracing  or  accepting 
its  object.  The  progression  of  the  dominant  emotional 
tone  from  fear  to  the  tender  emotion,  passing  through  awe, 
reverence,  and  sublimity,  means,  then,  gradually  substitut- 
ing acceptance,  agreement,  and  union  for  rejection,  disa- 
greement, and  separation.  The  importance  of  this  fact 
will  appear  in  what  follows. 

This  advance  from  a  negative  to  a  positive  reaction  is, 
of  course,  not  the  result  of  religion.  To  take  it  so  would 
be  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse.  Rehgion  is  the  in- 
strument, not  the  creator,  of  human  impulses  and  desires. 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS   LIFE  133 

Whatever  the  development  through  which  it  passes,  that 
which  takes  place  in  it  is  no  more  than  the  manifestation  in 
one  realm  of  life  —  the  religious  —  of  what  takes  place  in 
life  generally. 

The  obviousness  of  the  transformation  I  have  indicated 
makes  a  long  demonstration  unnecessary.  A  few  illustra- 
tive facts  may,  however,  be  in  place.  Neither  Christ, 
nor  Gautama,  nor  even  Mohammed  were  actuated 
by  fear.  They  were,  it  seems,  of  all  men,  fearless.  But 
they  were  in  advance  of  their  times.  After  their  death, 
their  religions,  founded  upon  a  plane  far  above  the  lives 
of  their  contemporaries,  were  degraded  to  the  level  of  the 
period,  —  a  level  so  low  that  even  in  the  Christian  era  fear 
is  found  intrenched  as  the  predominant  religious  force. 
For  those  acquainted  with  history,  the  mention  of  the 
Dark  Ages,  when  cruelty  and  dread  sounded  the  leading 
notes  in  the  tumultuous  dramas  in  which  the  Church  of 
Rome  played  frequently  a  chief  part,  will  be  a  sufficient 
reminder  of  the  potency  of  fear  in  those  times.  After  the 
great  Protestant  schism,  fear  remained  for  another  long 
period  the  preponderant  emotion  in  the  life  of  most  Chris- 
tian bodies.  Predestination,  together  with  the  belief  in 
hell,  was  made  an  instrument  of  terror.  Nowhere  was 
the  dread  avvfulness  of  God  more  seriously  realized  than 
among  the  Jansenists  of  Port  Royal.  Le  Maitre,  de  Saci, 
Pascal,  three  of  their  great  leaders,  were  brought  to  God 
chiefly  through  fear.^  What  Fontaine  says  of  de  Saci,  in 
the  Menioires,  quoted  by  Sainte-Beuve,  could  have  been  as- 
serted with  equal  truth,  perhaps,  of  all  the  noble  men  who 
directed  the  movement.  "  Those  who  have  said  after  his 
death  that  the  fear  of  the  Lord  had  filled  him,  have  made 
a  true  portrait  of  him."     "  The  chaste  fear  of  God  and  re- 

1  Sainte-Beuve,  Port  Royal,  Vol.  I,  pp.    378-380,  Til)  \  Vol.  II,  pp.  328, 
502  ff.     Comp.  Histoire  de  M.  M.  Alacoque,  loth  ed.,  pp.  124-125. 


134        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

spect  for  his  infinite  grandeur  so  possessed  him  that  he 
was  in  His  presence  as  in  a  continual  tremor  of  fear." 
The  great  movement  started  by  John  Wesley  was  also  fed 
by  fear,  as  is  sufficiently  attested  by  the  terrifying  elo- 
quence of  its  most  distinguished  disciples.  Even  the  soci- 
ety that  took  the  peaceful  name  of  "  Friends  "  was  not  at 
the  beginning  free  from  fear. 

The  change  that  has  come  over  the  Christian  world  with 
regard  to  fear  is  reflected  in  the  altered  emotional  tone  of 
religious  revivals.  In  all  revivals  earlier  than  the  present 
generation,  one  of  the  chief  instruments  was  fear :  fear  of 
God's  wrath,  fear  of  wretchedness  in  this  life,  fear  of  tor- 
ments hereafter.  It  was  common  for  people  "  under  con- 
viction of  sin  "  to  be  so  frightened  that  they  would  "throw 
themselves  on  the  ground  and  roar  with  anguish."  The 
terrifying  method  was  carried  so  far  that  a  few  ministers 
made  an  effort  to  soften  the  preaching.  Jonathan  Edwards, 
however,  thought  that  "  speaking  terror  to  them  that  are 
already  under  great  terrors,  instead  of  comforting  them," 
is  to  be  commended  if  done  with  the  intention  of  bringing 
more  light.  He  complains  of  the  weakness  of  those  who 
shrink  from  throwing  children  into  ecstasies  of  fear  with 
talk  of  hell-fire  and  eternal  damnation.  "  But  if  those  who 
complain  so  loudly  of  this,"  he  remarks,  "  really  believe 
what  is  the  general  profession  of  the  country,  viz.,  that  all 
are  by  nature  the  children  of  wrath  and  heirs  of  hell ;  and 
that  every  one  that  has  not  been  born  again,  whether  he 
be  young  or  old,  is  exposed,  every  moment,  to  eternal  de- 
struction, under  the  wrath  of  Almighty  God  ;  I  say,  if  they 
really  believe  this,  then  such  a  complaint  and  cry  as  this 
betrays  a  great  deal  of  weakness  and  inconsideration.  As 
innocent  as  children  seem  to  be  to  us,  yet,  if  they  are  out 
of  Christ,  they  are  not  so  in  God's  sight,  but  are  young 
vipers  and  are  infinitely  more  hateful  than  vipers  and  are 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  135 

in  a  most  miserable  condition,  as  well  as  grown  persons."  ^ 
This  appeal  to  fear  of  a  hundred  years  ago  is  rare  to-day. 
The  great  evangeUst  Moody  ^  had  little  to  say  about  hell 
and  the  wrath  of  God,  and  a  great  deal  about  heaven  and 
the  love  of  Christ.  In  the  latest  of  great  revivals,  the 
Welsh  revival,  the  meetings  were  pitched  in  the  key  of  the 

1  Edwards,  Jonathan,  Thoughts  on  the  Revival  of  Religion  (1832),  p.  203. 
The  terrifying  nature  of  Edwards's  sermons  is  indicated  by  such  titles  as  The 
Eternity  of  Hell  Torments,  The  ftistice  of  God  in  the  Damnation  of  Sinners, 
Sinners  in  the  Hands  of  an  Angry  God.  In  the  last  is  found  the  following 
famous  passage  :  "The  God  that  holds  you  over  the  pit  of  Hell,  much  as  we 
hold  a  spider  or  some  loathsome  insect  over  the  fire,  abhors  you,  and  is  dread- 
fully provoked.  His  wrath  toward  you  burns  like  fire.  He  looks  upon  you 
as  worthy  of  nothing  else  but  to  be  cast  into  the  fire.  He  is  of  purer  eyes 
than  to  bear  to  have  you  in  his  sight.  You  are  ten  thousand  times  so  abomi- 
nable in  his  eyes  as  the  most  hateful  and  venomous  serpent  is  in  ours.  .  .  . 
There  is  no  other  reason  to  be  given  why  you  have  not  dropped  into  Hell 
since  you  arose  this  morning,  but  that  God's  hand  has  held  you  up.  There 
is  no  other  reason  to  be  given  why  you  have  not  gone  to  Hell  since  you  sat 
here  in  the  house  of  God,  provoking  his  pure  eyes  by  your  sinful,  wicked 
manner  of  attending  to  his  solemn  worship." 

Finney  was  of  Edwards's  mind.  "  Without  pity  or  abatement  he  appealed 
to  the  selfish  emotion  of  fear.  He  held  that  whoever  comforts  the  sinner  does 
him  an  injury  '  as  cruel  as  the  grave,  as  cruel  as  hell,'  for  it  is  calculated  to 
send  him  headlong  to  the  abyss  of  everlasting  fire."  (Davenport  F.  M.,  op. 
cit..,  p.  193.) 

"  Impassioned  appeals  to  terror  were  uncommon  with  Wesley,"  yet  he 
believed  in  everlasting  torment  for  the  wicked,  and  at  times  made  fearful 
pictures  of  what  awaited  unrepentant  sinners,  {/did.,  p.  166.)  "If  Wesley 
did  not  go  so  far  as  Edwards  in  '  preaching  terror,'  some  of  his  followers  did. 
No  community  ever  saw  more  terrible  scenes  of  mental  and  nervous  disorder 
than  are  described  in  the  fournal  as  having  occurred  under  the  preaching  of 
one  Berridge  and  one  Hicks  in  the  vicinity  of  Everton,  almost  under  the 
shadow  of  the  University  of  Cambridge."      {Ibid.,  p.  1 7 1.) 

2  "  With  Moody,  religious  evangelism  was  emancipated  from  the  horrid 
spectres  of  irrational  fear.  I  do  not  mean  that  he  was  blind  to  the  natural 
law  of  retribution.  .  .  .  There  was  no  thoughtless  optimism  about  his  preach- 
ing of  divine  justice.  But  the  old  emphasis  was  completely  changed.  Moody's 
favorite  theme  was  the  love  of  the  Heavenly  Father.  He  believed  that  the 
lash  of  terror  is  for  slaves  and  not  for  the  freeborn  of  Almighty  God."  (Dav- 
enport, F.  M.  op.  cit.,  p.  171.) 


136        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

tender  emotions.  "  The  burden  of  Evan  Roberts's  teach- 
ing is  love  and  gratitude,  obedience  and  personal  service 
and  joy."  ^  The  practices  of  the  Salvation  Army  show- 
that  even  in  the  lower  strata  of  society  fear  has  fallen  into 
disuse  as  a  religious  tool.  If  this  is  true  of  the  unedu- 
cated part  of  our  population,  it  is  even  more  marked  among 
the  cultured  classes.  God  is  best  known  to  our  prosperous 
church-goers  as  a  compassionate  Son  of  Man,  healing  the 
sick  and  comforting  the  wayward.  The  hissing  of  threats 
and  maledictions  has  given  place  to  the  singing  of  the 
Son's  redeeming  love,  and  of  the  dehghts  of  Beulah  Land. 
One  must,  however,  make  two  reservations  to  this  state- 
ment. On  the  one  hand,  the  spirit  of  Christ  has,  at  all 
times,  been  represented  here  and  there  in  all  its  gentleness. 
There  have  always  been  rare  men  like  Francis  of  Assisi 
and  Fenelon  to  bear  witness  to  the  struggle  between  the 
spirit  of  fear  and  the  spirit  of  love.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  cruder  attitude  is  still  met  with  occasionally,  chiefly 
among  the  less  intelligent.  This  is,  for  instance,  how  a 
French  priest,  Curate  of  Notre-Dame-du-Mont,  lately  man- 
aged part  of  the  religious  instruction  by  which  children 
are  prepared  for  confirmation  and  for  their  first  commun- 
ion. On  the  last  day  of  a  "  retreat  "  he  locked  the  doors 
of  the  church  in  which  the  children  were  assembled  and 
forbade  even  the  sexton  to  walk  about.  The  church  was 
then  darkened.  A  pall,  stretched  out  before  the  sanctu- 
ary, bore  a  crucifix  and  two  holy  candles.  In  this  artfully 
prepared  place  he  preached  an  hour's  discourse  on  Christ's 
Passion,  describing  minutely  every  detail  of  the  crucifixion, 
—  the  thorns  penetrating  into  the  flesh,  the  blood  trickling 
down  the  face,  the  moral  anguish  of  the  loving  Saviour. 

1  Fryer,  A.  "^.t  Psychological  Aspects  of  the  Welsh  Revival,  1^04-^,  Proceed- 
ings of  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research,  Vol.  XIX,  1905,  p.  92.  Evan 
Roberts  was  the  chief  leader  of  the  revival. 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  137 

Before  he  was  halfway  through,  sobs  broke  out  among 
the  terrified  children.  In  this  state  they  were  sent  to 
confession. 

A  few  years  ago  I  circulated  a  qiiestiomiaire  on  several 
phases  of  religion,  especially  upon  its  impulses  and  motives. 
The  three  hundred  answers  received  were  in  many  cases 
supplemented  by  personal  correspondence.  Inadequate  as 
these  answers  are  for  statistical  purposes,  they  are  valuable 
as  "  qualitative  "  information  concerning  the  religious  atti- 
tude of  our  contemporaries.  They  reflect  strikingly  the 
new  temper.  Fear  is  of  so  little  significance  in  their 
religious  life  that  its  removal  would  make  practically  no 
difference,  except  in  the  case  of  two  of  them,  an  elderly 
French  clergyman  and  a  young  law  student.  The  first 
writes  as  follows :  "  I  feel  very  much  that  my  letter  will 
disappoint  you.  The  feeling  of  Divine  justice  and  of  its 
exigencies  has  much  weakened  in  pious  persons.  In  me 
it  has  continually  grown  stronger.  The  principles  are 
neglected,  and  sentimentality  is  put  in  their  place.  More- 
over, I  have  suffered  dreadfully,  physically  and  morally ; 
the  history  of  Job  is  constantly  present  to  my  mind.  I 
have  seen  the  evil  spirits  at  work  trying  to  injure  me.  I 
have  seen  Satan  displaying  his  utmost  ingenuity  to  make 
me  suffer  the  inexpressible.  You  will  therefore  readily 
understand  that  my  usual  mood  is  not  one  of  superficial 
lightheartedness,  that  I  cannot  be  an  optimist  in  the  com- 
mon acceptation  of  the  word.  I  believe  that  the  just  man 
will  be  saved,  —  without  that  certitude  there  can  be  but 
despair  and  death,  — but  he  is  to  be  saved  painfully,  as  by 
fire.  ...  I  am  moved  to  religious  practices  by  a  feeling  of 
duty  and  to  appease  the  wrath  of  God  which  rises  against 
sinful  humanity.  .  .  .  For  many  people  the  most  charac- 
teristic religious  experience  is  the  feeling  of  God's  love,  of 
his  goodness,  compassion,  and  readiness  to  succor  those 


138        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

who  call  upon  Him.  I  would  not  say  that  this  is  false, 
but  its  one-sidedness  brings  it  near  to  being  false.  .  .  .  My 
experience  is  that  man  being  sinful  must  suffer,  suffer 
much,  drink  also  of  the  bitter  cup  of  Jesus  Christ.  In  my 
religious  exercises,  I  always  experience  fear  towards  the 
Holy  God,  who  must  inexorably  avenge  His  broken  law 
and  His  majesty  outraged  by  sin.  "  ^ 

The  law  student  (age  23)  admits  that  the  circumstances 
which  of  tenest  affect  him  religiously  are  those  which  frighten 
him  or  make  him  nervous.  Fear  is  with  him  an  emotion 
easily  aroused.  Several  of  his  religious  practices  are  kept 
up  chiefly  because  of  a  vague  fear  that  harm  will  befall  him 
if  he  discontinues.  This  is  true,  for  instance,  of  his  attend- 
ance on  Y.  M.  C.  A.  meetings,  although  he  "  shrinks  "  from 
them.  There  is  "  little  pleasure  and  some  annoyance  in 
them."  He  used  to  read  the  Bible  morning  and  evening. 
Lately  he  has  left  off  the  evening  chapter  because  "it 
wearies  him  so."  "  But,"  he  says,  "  it  was  a  great  effort, 
and  I  felt  the  fear  for  a  day  or  two." 

In  these  two  cases  of  fear-ridden  religion  —  the  sole  in- 
stances that  have  come  to  my  notice  through  the  question- 
naire —  fear  is  constitutional.  Both  men  are  mild  phobiacs, 
and  their  natural  disposition  makes  use  of  obsolete  Chris- 
tian doctrines.  The  young  man  knows  that  he  is  very  ner- 
vous, and  he  suspects  that  his  fears  are  abnormal.  "  It 
[the  fear]  makes  me  very  unhappy  even  when  I  am  anx- 
ious, or  at  least  willing,  to  do  the  very  thing  it  prompts  me 
to  do.  It  may  be  a  disease ;  for  I  remember  that  as  a  mere 
child  it  led  me  into  the  most  absurd  habits  or  tricks.  I 
would  feel  it  my  duty  to  pick  up  all  the  loose  pieces  of' 
glass  and  china  in  our  home-yard  lest  some  poor  barefoot 
be  injured."     He  knows  now,  even  at  the  moment  the  fear 

^  Reprinted  from  The  Contents  of  Religious  Consciousness,  Monist,  Vol.  XI, 
I90i,pp.  563-564. 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  139 

is  felt,  that  it  is  "admittedly  groundless,  unreasonable,  and 
inconsistent." 

In  most  cases,  my  correspondents  have  their  attention 
so  habitually  turned  in  other  directions  that  when  they 
write  upon  the  impulses  and  motives  of  rehgious  Hfe  they 
either  forget  fear  or  have  actually  nothing  to  say  about  it. 
When  they  do  mention  fear,  it  is  as  a  rule  in  general  terms  ; 
for  instance,  "  fear  of  danger."  A  few  are  more  definite. 
One  writes  that  she  would  not  begin  the  day  without  prayer 
for  fear  that  things  in  general  would  go  wrong.  Another 
would  not  dare  undertake  a  railway  journey  without  first 
securing  God's  protection.  A  few  mention  the  fear  of  death 
itself,  without  reference  to  the  beyond,  while  still  others 
seem  not  to  dread  the  great  crisis  so  much  as  the  other 
world.^  The  "  fear  of  God  "  appears  more  frequently  than 
any  other  fear.  Some  describe  it  as  a  "  reverential  fear  " 
or  as  a  "feeling  of  dependence."  In  others  it  bears  a  more 
mercenary  stamp.  I  find  only  five  who  seem  to  have  been 
disturbed  at  any  time  by  the  thought  of  the  hereafter,  and 
of  these  five,  four  declare  that  they  have  outgrown  that 
youthful  stage.2  In  childhood  and  adolescence  it  is  not  un- 
usual for  fear  to  be  the  principal  incentive  to  religious  Hfe. 
Before  reaching  the  point  where  we  fear  sin  and  remorse 
extremely,  but  punishment  not  at  all,  —  a  height  which 
Harriet  Martineau  attained  at  the  early  age  of  twenty,^ — 
there  is  usually  a  period  during  which  our  religion  is  prompted 

1  In  his  study  of  conversion,  Starbuck  found  that  in  14  per  cent  of  his 
cases  fear  of  death  and  hell  played  a  considerable  part.  His  were  chiefly  ad- 
olescent conversions.  {The  Psychology  of  Religion,  Ch^rlts  Scribner's  Sons, 
New  York,  1899,  p.  52.) 

2  Stanley  Hall,  in  A  Study  of  Fears,  reports  that  only  1 1  out  of  299  persons 
who  answered  his  questionnaire  mention  specific  fear  of  hell.  (Amer.  Jr.  of 
Psychology,  Vol.  VIII,  1906-1907,  p.  223. )  Scott  finds  in  an  inquiry  on  Old  Age 
and  Death  that  90  per  cent  of  his  correspondents  do  not  mention  hell  at  all. 
(Amer.  Jr.  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VIII,  1906-1907,  p.  104.) 

2  Martineau,  Harriet,  Autobiography,  Vol.  I,  p.  31.  • 


I40        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

by  fear  of  physical  suffering  and  punishment.  St.  The- 
resa confesses  that  it  was  base  fear  more  than  love  that 
prompted  her  to  enter  the  religious  life.  Mrs.  X.,  of  whom 
I  have  written  elsewhere,^  had  "  no  use  "  for  God  in  her  child- 
hood, except  when  she  was  frightened.  "  I  do  not  think 
that  I  bothered  with  God  when  I  was  a  child,  except  when 
frightened.  Usually  I  did  not  care  a  button  for  him.  I 
would  say  my  prayers  as  directed,  but  automatically.  Only 
if  I  got  into  a  plight  I  would  cling  with  the  completest  faith 
to  what  I  had  been  taught  about  God's  power  and  his 
readiness  to  answer  our  prayers."  ^ 

In  the  reHgious  experience  of  my  correspondents,  fear 
plays,  on  the  whole,  a  role  exceedingly  insignificant.  Our 
contemporaries  have  the  positive  attitude.  Their  virtues 
and  their  defects  are  those  of  an  aggressive,  optimistic,  and 
democratic  age. 

I  do  not  claim,  however,  that  the  results  of  my  investi- 
gation show  the  exact  degree  to  which  fear  is  still  present 
in  the  Christian  religious  consciousness.  Among  Roman 
Catholics,  fear  is  probably  much  more  influential  than 
among  the  people  represented  by  the  answers  to  my 
questionnaire. 

Let  us  turn  now  from  the  facts  to  their  interpretation. 
Three  causes  for  the  decline  of  fear  are  discernible. 

(i)  At  present  in  civiHzed  society  the  occasions  for  fear 
have  become  few.  The  pressing  dangers  to  which  men 
were  formerly  exposed  have  almost  ceased  to  exist.  Wild 
beasts,  human  enemies,  and  the  horrors  of  war  are  for  most 
of  us  only  imaginary  experiences.     It  was  not  so  in  New 

^  Leuba,  J.  H.,  The  Personifying  Passion  in  Youth,  with  Remarks  upon 
the  Sex  and  Gender  Problem,  Monist,  Vol.  X,  1900,  p.  547. 

See  also  Th.  Flournoy's  Observations  de  Psychologie  Religieuse,  Archives  de 
Psychologic,  Vol.  II,  1903,  Observation  II,  p.  331. 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  141 

England  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century.  Then 
the  conditions  of  life  were  favorable  for  the  spread  of  the 
harsh  Calvinistic  beliefs.  Conflicts  with  unsubdued  nature 
and  with  savage  Indians  kept  the  fear  reaction  uppermost. 
The  tender  emotions  could  hardly  thrive  where  one  went  to 
church  with  a  gun  on  the  shoulder  and  divided  one's  atten- 
tion between  worship  and  the  expectation  of  warwhoops. 
Speaking  of  the  Edwardian  revivals,  Davenport  says:  "I 
think  it  may  be  said  that  no  such  effects  as  are  there  visible 
could  have  been  produced  even  with  the  aid  of  the  shock- 
ing appeals  to  terror  employed  by  the  preachers  of  that 
period  if  there  had  not  been  in  the  population  a  tremen- 
dous amount  of  latent  fear." 

The  causes  of  fear  which  have  not  been  removed  by 
civilization  —  the  celestial  bodies,  the  thunder,  the  light- 
ning —  have  lost  much  of  their  terrifying  power ;  for  they 
are  now  understood  and  partly  mastered.  At  any  rate, 
eclipses,  comets,  tornadoes,  and  electric  storms  are  all 
physical  phenomena  to  us.  In  a  study  of  fear  among 
children,  I  find  the  following  :  "  The  director  of  the  school 
and  his  assistants,  after  having  considered  the  question, 
agreed  in  saying  that  they  had  never  discovered  in  the 
children  the  least  sign  of  fear.  Another  teacher  made  the 
same  declaration,  in  words  that  deserve  to  be  repeated  :  *  I 
have  never  noticed  fear  in  my  pupils.  What  should  they 
fear }  Their  master  }  We  are  not  in  that  age.  Their 
school  ?  That  is  made  as  pleasant  as  possible.  Their 
work  }  They  are  amused  while  being  taught.  Their  pun- 
ishments .''  They  are  so  light  and  so  infrequent !  No, 
rightly  or  wrongly,  the  children  of  to-day  fear  nothing ;  at 
least  the  feeling  of  fear  has  no  occasion  to  manifest  itself 
during  school-time.' "  ^ 

1  Binet,  A.,  La  Peur  chez  lez  Enfants,  Annee  Psychologique,  Vol.  II,  1895, 
pp.  224-225. 


142        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

(2)  The  fear  reaction  is  falling  into  disuse,  not  only  be- 
cause of  a  lack  of  proper  stimuli,  but  also  because  modern 
intellectual  and  moral  education  produces  an  increased 
capacity  for  converting  emotional  stimuli  into  controlled 
reactions.  Reflection  and  attention  are  natural  enemies  of 
emotional  reactions.  They  engender  a  habit  of  self-pos- 
session :  the  more  reflective  and  attentive,  the  less  emo- 
tional, 

(3)  The  fundamental  cause  of  the  decline  of  fear  is, 
however,  neither  knowledge  of  the  physical  world,  nor 
mental  training,  but  the  recognition  of  the  inadequacy  of 
fear  as  a  method  of  meeting  danger.  Without  entering 
into  a  detailed  examination  of  the  defects  of  the  hereditary 
fear-reaction,  we  may  note  that  it  meets  each  and  every 
danger  in  the  same  manner.  It  is  an  instinctive  ten- 
dency to  run  away  from  the  source  of  danger,  a  tendency 
which,  it  must  be  observed,  is  accompanied  by  a  scattering 
of  the  wits.  When  violent  it  brings  about  a  momentary 
paralysis  ;  it  interferes  with  respiration  ;  it  produces  spas- 
modic constriction  of  the  blood  vessels,  shiverings,  violent 
spasms  of  the  heart,  resulting  in  pallor  and  peripheral 
anaemia.  These  physiological  constituents  of  the  reaction 
are  not  altogether  without  direct  or  indirect  value ;  the 
immobility  which  they  enforce  would,  for  instance,  often 
be  the  wisest  behavior  for  the  threatened  man  or  animal. 
Yet  this  animal  fear-reaction  is  not  the  only  way,  nor 
usually  the  best  way,  in  which  an  intelligent  being,  living 
in  highly  complex  relations,  may  meet  every  dangerous 
situation. 

The  origin  of  the  fear-reaction  accounts  for  its  inade- 
quacy. It  arose  at  a  low  level  of  animal  life  through  the 
natural  selection  of  those  chance  variations  (assisted  proba- 
bly by  adaptive  habits)  which  gave  an  animal  an  advan- 
tage over  its  fellows.     Now,  the  struggle  for  life  does  not 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE 


143 


create  improvements  ;  it  simply  preserves  the  fittest  among 
the  variations  blindly  produced  by  nature.  The  "  fittest " 
is  anything,  however  wretched,  which  is  superior,  for  the 
purpose  of  animal  life,  to  that  which  existed  previously. 
Natural  selection  can  do  no  more  than  preserve  the  less 
deficient.  The  selected  improvements  have  been  trans- 
mitted to  man  through  generation  after  generation  of  ani- 
mals, in  the  face  of  rapidly  changing  circumstances.  As 
a  result,  man,  with  powers  of  observation  and  foresight 
immeasurably  superior  to  those  of  the  animals  in  which 
this  way  of  meeting  danger  was  established,  still  retains 
the  instinct  to  act  in  this  primitive,  inadequate  fashion. 
The  typical  fear-reaction  is  a  survival  of  a  by-gone  age. 
"  The  dominant  impression  left  by  such  a  study  "  [a  study  of 
fears  in  children  and  adolescents],  writes  Stanley  Hall,  "  is 
that  of  the  degrading  and  belittling  effects  of  excessive 
fears."  1 

This  insufficiency  of  the  fear-reaction  leads  civilized 
man  to  struggle  against  its  manifestation.  Our  instinctive 
legacy  for  meeting  danger  is  so  evidently  deficient  that  a 
man  in  peril  struggles  as  frequently  against  fear  as  against 
its  object.  In  other  words,  that  which  was  meant  to  be  a 
means  of  safety  —  the  fear-reaction  —  is  itself  looked  upon 
as  a  source  of  danger,  A  most  interesting  phase  of  the 
powerful  mind-cure  movement  is  the  war  it  wages  against 
fear.  "  Fear,"  says  Horace  Fletcher,  "  is  to  be  placed  in 
the  category  of  harmful,  unnecessary,  and  therefore  not 
respectable  things."  ^  For  these  people  fear  is  the  Great 
Sin ;  it  is  Satan's  new  name.  Physicians  are  ready  to 
agree  with  the  more  moderate  of  the  Christian  Scientists 

1  Hall,  G.  Stanley,  A  Study  of  Fears,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psychology,  Vol.  VIII, 
p.  238. 

2  Fletcher,  Horace,  Happiness  as  found  in  Fore-thought  minus  Fear-thought, 
Menticulture,  Series  II. 


144        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

in  their  impeachment  of  fear.  One  physician  writes : 
"  When  all  is  said  that  can  be  said  about  the  uses  of  fear, 
we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  on  the  whole  the  sense  of 
danger  is  a  nuisance.  Fear  is  out  of  date,  an  anachronism, 
a  vestige,  a  superannuated  and  silly  servant  that  has  seen 
better  days.  .  .  .  We  cannot  begin  to  know  the  mean- 
ing of  freedom  in  spiritual  Hfe  until  we  have  done  with  it. 
Until  men  and  women  learn  that  there  is  nothing  about 
which  it  is  worth  while  to  be  anxious,  until  they  put  fear 
aside  and  look  forth  upon  the  world  with  equanimity  and 
confidence,  they  cannot  exercise  a  free  judgment  nor  exert 
a  free  will."  "Generally  speaking,  the  capacity  for  fear 
in  the  human  mind  is  absurdly  in  excess  of  its  utility."  ^ 

Civilized  man,  however,  does  not  strive  to  be  rid  of  the 
awareness  of  danger.  What  he  wants  is  to  be  independent 
of  the  single,  blind,  inherited  way  of  meeting  every  emer- 
gency, and  to  remain  in  possession  of  his  intellectual  and 
muscular  powers,  so  as  to  use  them  judiciously.  The  goal 
towards  which  we  are  moving  is  a  fearless  alertness  to 
physical  and  moral  dangers. 

It  may  seem  to  some  that  we  have  uselessly  complicated 
a  simple  problem.  They  might  say  that  if  the  influence  of 
fear  in  religion  is  waning,  it  is  because  we  have  ceased  to 
believe  in  terrifying  doctrines.  When  the  belief  in  the 
judgment,  hell,  the  devil,  and  an  angry  God  gives  way, 
fear  is  dethroned.  This  account  would  be  satisfactory  if 
the  discredit  into  which  these  doctrines  have  fallen  were 
not  as  much  the  outcome  of  the  progressive  changes  I 
have  mentioned  as  of  the  activity  of  reason  exercised 
directly  upon  religious  ideas.  If  we  no  longer  believe  in 
hell,  it  is  as  much  because,  being  tuned  to  another  key,  we 

1  Wilson,  George  R.,  The  Sense  of  Danger  and  the  Fear  of  Death,  Monist, 
Vol.  XIII,  1903,  pp.  367,  366. 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE  145 

are  not  easily  frightened,  as  because  we  have  come  to  ad- 
mit the  insufficiency  of  the  proofs  for  the  existence  of  hell. 
In  the  two  cases  cited  above,  in  which  fear  held  its  old 
sway,  the  beliefs  were  supported  by  a  temperament  in 
accord  with  them.  Without  this  temperamental  disposi- 
tion, they  would  probably  not  have  believed  in  the  torments 
of  hell.  In  the  early  days  of  New  England,  the  conditions 
of  life  kept  fear  in  the  foreground,  hence  its  dominance  in 
religion.  Love  agrees  better  with  the  contemporary  popu- 
lar temper,  and  so  our  judgment  is  biased  in  favor  of  the 
doctrines  which  exhibit  the  love  of  God.  In  regard  to 
these  doctrines  we  are  as  easily  satisfied  intellectually  as 
others  used  to  be  regarding  the  fearful  doctrines. 

The  decline  of  fear  in  religion  is  to  be  ascribed  primarily 
neither  to  religious  influences  nor  to  critical  doctrinal 
studies.  Its  more  profound  causes  are,  as  I  have  said, 
increased  knowledge  of  the  physical  universe ;  intellectual 
and  moral  training ;  and,  above  all,  the  realization  of  the 
defects  of  the  fear  inheritance.  The  nature  of  these 
causes  indicates  that  the  passing  of  fear  observed  in  the 
Christian  religion  must  take  place  in  the  religions  of  all 
progressive  peoples,  despite  their  theologies  and  creeds. 
As  human  nature  changes,  so  do  gods  and  religions  change. 
The  effort  to  readjust  our  primitive  instincts  and  impulses 
to  the  present  altered  circumstances  is  what  is  meant  by 
the  expression  "  the  struggle  of  the  spiritual  against  the 
natural  man." 

Fear  gradually  yields  the  place  of  dominance  to  awe.^ 
In  the  ancient  Greek  mysteries ;  in  the  old  Druidic  rites  1 
celebrated  amid  the  sombre  majesty  of  forests  ;  in  the  mod- 
ern elaborate  ceremonies  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 

^  See  on  awe,  W.  McDougall's  Social  Psychology,  pp.  129-132;  on  the  sub- 
lime, Th.  Ribot's  Psychology  of  the  Emotions,  pp.  270,  348-350. 


146        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

as  well  as  in  the  plainer  forms  of  worship  where  simplicity 
and  silence  take  the  place  of  ornamentation  and  music,  — 
awe  constitutes  an  essential  part  of  the  whole  emotional 
impression.  Judged  by  the  efforts  made  to  affect  the 
worshippers  with  awe,  this  emotional  reaction  must  pos- 
sess a  high  rehgious  value.  Of  what  use,  then,  is  awe  in 
religion  .-'  One  of  the  services  that  awe  and  a  sense  of 
the  subUme  render  religion  is  to  bestow  upon  it  a  dignity 
impossible  to  fear.  Fear  is  not  an  experience  of  which 
we  may  be  proud ;  it  is  a  narrowly  utilitarian  and  unintel- 
ligent reaction.  In  so  far  as  it  expresses  essential  egotism, 
it  can  only  discredit  religion  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  have 
awakened  to  the  nobility  of  disinterestedness. 

Awe  and  the  sublime  differ  from  fear  in  that  they  do 
not  openly  refer  to  personal  needs,  neither  do  they  bla- 
tantly announce  weakness  and  incapacity.  They  have  no 
apparently  selfish  purpose  ;  they  have,  indeed,  no  obvious 
purpose  at  all.  The  shudder  that  creeps  over  one  at  the 
sight  of  the  leaping  waters  of  a  cataract  is  neither  egoistic 
nor  altruistic ;  it  is  disinterested.  It  is  true,  however,  that 
the  awe-producing  aspects  of  nature  have  all  lurking  about 
them  the  threat  of  potential  danger. 

The  value  of  awe  to  religion  is  not  only  its  disinterested- 
ness—  a  purely  negative  virtue;  it  has  a  direct  ennobling 
effect.  To  be  impressed  by  the  great,  the  powerful,  the 
mysterious,  and  still  to  be  unafraid,  is  to  evince  one's 
partial  kinship  with  these  forces.  Fear  reveals  antago- 
nism, enmity,  isolation;  awe,  involving  as  it  does  the 
recognition  of  greatness  without  actual  fear,  gives  the 
first  sense  of  a  not  unfriendly  relation  with  the  cosmos. 
To  feel  the  power  of  a  thing  and  at  the  same  time  to 
admire  it,  as  we  do  in  awe,  is  not  only  to  begin  to  under- 
stand, but  also  to  be  attracted.  The  sympathetic  vibra- 
tions of  awe  are  the  first  organic  sign  of  a  friendship  with 


THE  EMOTIONS  IN   RELIGIOUS  LIFE  147 

the  cosmic  forces,  the  first  step  towards  that  ultimate  union 
with  the  Great  Whole,  achieved  in  certain  forms  of  prac- 
tical mysticism.  The  thrills  of  awe  are  thus  enlarging, 
vitalizing,  ennobling. 

It  should  be  observed  further  that  there  is  but  a  single 
easy  step  from  awe  and  sublimity  to  admiration  and  rever- 
ence. Now  in  passing  from  fear  through  awe  to  admira- 
tion and  reverence,  man  progresses  from  the  position  of 
a  beggar  for  protection  to  that  of  a  bestower  of  praises. 
Since  man  is  bent  upon  self-respect  and  self -exaltation,  it  is 
not  surprising  that,  among  the  egoistic  utilitarianism  of  the 
fear-religion,  he  should  have  seized  upon  awe  and  the 
sublime  as  redeemers  of  his  religious  nature. 

However  important  to  religion  disinterestedness  and  the 
sense  of  kinship  with  greatness  may  be,  awe  and  the  sub- 
lime render  religion  a  still  greater  service  by  bringing  to 
the  mind  ideas  of  superhuman  agents,  of  gods,  or  of  God. 
Majestic  greatness  favors  a  religious  rather  than  a  scien- 
tific solution  to  the  question  of  origins ;  for  it  suggests  an 
explanation  by  reference  to  unseen,  personal  agents.  In 
reflective,  non-emotional  moments,  one  might  refer  natural 
phenomena  to  physical  forces,  while  when  under  the  in- 
fluence of  instinctive,  emotional  reactions,  one  might  in- 
terpret the  same  events  in  the  traditional  anthropopathic 
manner  necessary  to  the  historical  forms  of  religion. 
Emotions  absorb  attention,  arrest  the  stream  of  thought, 
and  thus  for  the  moment  limit  the  intellectual  range. 
Even  those  who  have  formed  in  youth  the  habit  of  look- 
ing upon  nature  as  a  mechanism  may,  when  awed  or 
frightened,  relapse  into  an  animistic  conception.  There 
are  persons  who  in  a  forest  or  in  a  tempest  "  feel  the 
divine "  within  them ;  "  something  in  the  stars  of  the 
night  reaches  out"  to  them.  In  this  way  the  ever  present 
animistic  tendency  crops  out  and  bids  us  dispense  with 


148        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

rational  proofs  of  the  existence  of  God.^  Any  experience 
awakening  a  strong  emotion  is  likely  to  shake  off  the  un- 
stable accretions  of  rational  intelligence,  to  throw  us  back 
\  upon  primitive  tendencies,  and  thus  to  resuscitate  ghosts, 
spirits,  and  gods.  This  discrepancy  between  the  godward 
tendency  of  our  thoughts  in  certain  emotional  seizures  and 
their  direction  when  under  the  guidance  of  experience  in- 
dicates on  the  one  hand  the  progress  made  by  the  individ- 
ual since  he  discarded  animism,  and  on  the  other  hand  the 
tenacity  of  the  mental  habits  rooted  in  a  distant  past. 

When  questioned  concerning  the  emotions  most  condu- 
cive to  religion,  our  Protestant  contemporaries  rarely  forget 
to  mention  awe  and  the  sublime.  For  one  who  names  fear, 
there  are  hundreds  who  single  out  awe,  the  sublime,  and 
the  beautiful  as  potent  sources  of  religious  moods  and 
activities.^  The  following  selections  will  illustrate  this 
influence. 

"  Mid-ocean,  lightning,  and  thunder  inspire  me  with  awe 
and  the  sense  of  dependence,  and  turn  my  feelings  toward 
God."     (No.  8.) 

"  I  can  never  look  up  at  the  stars  at  night  but  adoring 
love  and  worship  fills  my  soul.     The  same  at  early  dawn 

^  Comp.  William  James  on  the  sense  of  presence,  in  Varieties  of  Religious 
Experience,  pp.  58  fF. 

2  Who  sank  thy  sunless  pillars  deep  in  Earth  ? 
********* 
Who  made  you  glorious  as  the  Gates  of  Heaven 
Beneath  the  keen  full  moon  ? 

God  !     Let  the  torrents,  like  a  shout  of  nations. 

Answer !  and  let  the  ice-plains  echo,  God  ! 

God,  sing  ye  meadow-streams  with  gladsome  voice ! 

And  they  too  have  a  voice,  yon  piles  of  snow, 
And  in  their  perilous  fall  shall  thunder,  God ! 
—  (Coleridge,  Hymn  before  Sunrise,  in  the  Vale  of  Chamouni.) 


THE   EMOTIONS  IN  RELIGIOUS  LIFE 


149 


when  the  beautiful  new  day  comes  straight  from  the  hand 
of  God."     (No.  39.) 

"  Places  in  which  the  sense  of  the  sublime  is  appealed 
to  always  call  forth  religious  emotions.  I  have  felt  this 
in  grand  old  cathedrals.  The  last  time  I  noticed  the  feel- 
ing was  at  the  sight  of  Niagara  Falls  about  two  years 
ago."     (No.  121.) 

No.  51,  who  is  frequently  moved  to  awe  by  nature  and 
also  by  the  works  of  man,  writes  :  "  The  same  [religious] 
feeling  I  experience  when  meditating  upon  the  massiveness 
of  the  Brooklyn  bridge,  and  again  when  I  behold  such 
steamships  as  the  Sf.  Paul,  Tojirrainc,  etc." 

"  I  prefer  a  religious  service  of  much  formalism.  I 
have  no  religious  feelings  in  public  except  as  I  am  sur- 
rounded by  the  noble  in  architecture,  in  colored  glass,  in 
the  pageantry  of  the  Church.  I  have  knelt  at  some 
shrine  in  walking  through  the  country  abroad,  with 
religious  feelings,  and  I  have  done  likewise  in  some  altar 
in  a  cathedral.  I  prefer  the  Romish  worship  to  any  other 
on  this  account,  but  I  refrain  from  having  anything  to  do 
with  it  because  I  think  it  dangerous  to  liberty."    (No.  37.) 

Even  those  who  declare  themselves  without  religion  often 
call  awe  a  religious  emotion.  (For  instance,  Nos.  51  and 
37  quoted  above.)  Why  should  any  one  call  awe  a  rehgious 
emotion  unless  it  be  that  it  brings  to  the  mind  discarded 
ideas  of  a  Power,  which,  if  believed  in,  would  be  a  God. 

If  the  data  I  have  collected  show  clearly  that  in  Protes- 
tant religion  men  have,  as  a  whole,  set  their  faces  away 
from  the  dreadful  and  towards  the  desirable,  they  indi- 
cate further  that  the  stage  of  culture  at  which  awe 
can  be  the  dominant  religious  emotion  is  also  past. 
I  imagine  that  the  worshippers  of  Odin  and  of  Thor 
were   swayed    more  by  awe  than  by  any  other  emotion. 


I50        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  Christianity  of  past  centuries  knew  no  better  ally, 
after  fear,  than  awe.  But  now  the  awful,  as  well  as  the 
fearful,  is  losing  its  power.  To  be  sure,  these  emotions 
still  retain  much  of  their  original  power  in  large  portions 
of  the  Christian  world.  The  Roman  Church,  for  instance, 
is  not  ready  to  dismiss  so  efficient  an  agent.  Vast  cathe- 
drals, majestic  music,  mysterious  rites,  gorgeous  pageantry, 
still  entrance  the  faithful,  impress  the  thoughtless,  and 
draw  to  its  spectacles  even  those  indifferent  to  religion. 
The  terrible  they  have  for  the  most  part  outgrown ;  the 
awful  they  have  not  passed  ;  and  the  sublime  they  are 
using  as  effectively  as  possible.  In  Protestant  worship, 
and  especially  in  the  United  States,  it  is  somewhat  different. 
Yahve,  who  was  wont  to  thunder  on  the  summit  of  Mount 
Sinai,  in  the  presence  of  whom  Moses  himself  could  hardly 
I  live,  is  being  displaced  by  the  God  of  love,  before  whom 
I  not  even  prodigal  sons  need  tremble.  The  "  new  "  revela- 
tion is  a  gospel  of  love :  "  Children,  flowers,  fruit  trees,  — 
everything  is  full  of  God's  love."  (No.  39.)  In  church 
architecture,  the  comfortable  is  put  before  the  majestic  ; 
in  doctrine,  the  serviceable  is  preferred  to  the  mysterious  ; 
and  in  the  conception  of  God,  the  loving  is  not  to  be  over- 
shadowed by  the  awful. 

The  tendency  to  banish  awe  as  well  as  fear  is  evident 
not  only  in  religion,  but  in  secular  life  also.  The  rod  is 
proscribed  in  the  home  and  in  the  school ;  the  child  is  no 
longer  to  sit  at  the  feet  of  the  master,  but  pupil  and  teacher 
are  to  work  arm  in  arm  as  becomes  good  friends ;  sin  is  either 
weakness  or  disease,  and  should  be  met  with  sympathetic 
tenderness.  Nothing  is  worth  while  except  sympathy, 
charity,  love,  and  their  companions,  trust,  hope,  courage, 
fortitude.  The  positive  reactions  are  being  selected  because 
of  their  superior  efficiency  for  the  conditions  of  civilized 
life. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   ORIGIN  OF  MAGICAL  AND   OF  RELIGIOUS 

PRACTICES 

When  the  ideas  of  powers  suitable  for  magic  and  religion 
have  been  accounted  for,  and  the  impulse  to  enter  into 
practical  relations  with  these  powers  has  been  admitted, 
the  origin  of  magic  and  of  religion  is  not  yet  completely 
understood.  There  remains  yet  to  discover  the  origin  of 
the  relations  themselves ;  that  is,  the  origin  of  the  magical 
and  the  religious  rites  and  ceremonies.  That  done,  we 
shall  have  completed  the  part  of  the  book  dealing  with 
origins. 

I.   Magic  :  its  Varieties  and  Classification 

The  term  "  magic  "  I  would  restrict  to  those  practices  in- 
tended to  secure  some  definite  gain  by  coercitive  action,  in 
essential  disregard,  (i)  of  the  quantitative  relations  implied 
in  the  ordinary  and  in  the  scientific  dealings  with  the 
physical  world;  (2)  of  the  anthropopathic  relations  obtain- 
ing among  persons. 

Although  magic  never  makes  an  anthropopathic  appeal, 
it  frequently  brings  to  bear  its  peculiar  coercitive  virtue 
upon  feeling-beings.  It  aims,  then,  at  compelling  souls, 
spirits,  or  gods  to  do  the  operator's  will,  or  at  preventing 
them  from  doing  their  own.  In  necromancy,  spirits  are 
summoned  by  means  of  spells  and  incantations.  In  ancient 
Egypt  the  art  of  deaHng  coercitively  with  spirits  and  gods 
reached   a   high   development.     Maspero,  speaking   of   a 


152        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

curious  belief  regarding  names,  says,  "  When  the  god  in  a 
moment  of  forgetfuhiess  or  of  kindness  had  taught  them 
what  they  wanted  [the  sacred  names],  there  was  nothing 
left  for  him  but  to  obey  them."  ^  At  Eleusis,  it  was  not 
the  name  but  the  intonation  of  the  voice  of  the  magician 
which  produced  the  mysterious  results.^ 

But  how  should  be  classed  the  behavior  of  a  suppliant 
who  attempts  by  requests,  offerings,  adoration,  or  other 
anthropopathic  means  to  induce  a  ghost,  spirit,  or  god  to 
give  him  magical  power  ?  The  Dieri  of  Central  Australia 
in  dry  spells  "  call  upon  the  spirits  of  their  remote  an- 
cestors, whom  they  call  Mura,  Mura,  to  grant  them 
power  to  make  a  heavy  rainfall."  ^  This  behavior  belongs 
clearly  to  the  religious  type;  but  that  which  follows  —  the 
suppliant's  use  of  the  magical  power  secured  from  the 
spirit — -is  magic.  A  spirit  may  be  asked  to  use  his 
magical  power  himself.  In  that  case  the  suppliant  uses  the 
anthropopathic  method  of  bringing  about  a  magical  action.* 

To  one  who  approaches  the  subject  for  the  first  time, 
the  possibility  of  bringing  order  into  the  chaos  of  magical 

1  Maspero,  G.  C,  Eludes  de  niythologie  et  d^archeologie  igypiiennes,  Paris, 
1903,  Bibliotheque  Egyptologique,  Vol.  II,  p.  298. 

-  Foucart,  Paul,  Recherches  siir  la  Nature  des  Myst'eres  d^ Eleusis,  Memoires 
de  I'Institut,  Vol.  XXXV,  2d  Part,  pp.  31-32.     Comp.  Maspero,  op.  cit.,  p.  303. 

A  surprising  revival  of  the  belief  in  the  magical  power  of  names  came  to 
my  notice  a  fevi'  years  ago.  At  a  camp-meeting  of  Seventh  Day  Adventists  in 
Massachusetts,  I  heard  an  ex-cowboy  evangelist  deliver  an  impassioned 
address  on  the  power  of  the  "  Word."  He  showed  by  many  citations  from 
the  Hebrew  and  Christian  Scriptures  that  the  Book  did  not  teach  the  direct 
action  of  God  and  Christ,  but  that  whatever  they  did  was  accomplished 
through  the  power  of  the  Word.  It  was  by  the  Word,  not  by  God,  that  the 
vt'orld  was  created,  and  it  was  by  believing  in  the  Word  that  men  were  saved. 

■^  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  86. 

*  Jevons's  view  differs  from  this  in  that  for  him  the  magical  power  always 
belongs  to  a  conscious  agent.  "  Magic  is  the  mysterious  power  of  a  person 
or  conscious  agent  to  cause  injury  —  or,  secondarily,  it  may  be,  benefit  —  to 
another  person  who  may  be  at  a  distance  ;   a  power  which  when  exerted  is 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      153 

customs  seems  remote.  Before  taking  up  the  origins  of 
magic,  we  would  better  gain  some  knowledge  of  its  many 
forms.  This  may  be  done  conveniently  by  making  a 
critical  examination  of  a  widely  used  classification  of  these 
forms,  in  the  course  of  which  study  it  will  appear  that 
several  important  varieties  of  magic  fall  outside  of  this 
classification. 

The  classification  referred  to  is  that  of  Frazcr :  "  If  we 
analyze  the  principles  of  thought  on  which  magic  is  based, 
they  will  probably  be  found  to  resolve  themselves  into  two  : 
first,  that  like  produces  like,  or  that  an  effect  resembles  its 
cause  ;  and,  second,  that  things  that  have  once  been  in  con- 
tact with  each  other  continue  to  act  on  each  other  at  a  dis- 
tance after  the  physical  contact  has  been  severed.  The 
former  principle  may  be  called  the  Law  of  Similarity,  the 
latter  the  Law  of  Contact  or  Contagion.  From  the  first  of 
these  principles,  namely,  the  Law  of  Similarity,  the  ma- 
gician infers  that  he  can  produce  any  effect  he  desires 
merely  by  imitating  it ;  from  the  second  he  infers  that 
whatever  he  does  to  a  material  object  will  affect  equally 
the  person  with  whom  the  object  was  once  in  contact, 
whether  it  forms  part  of  its  body  or  not.  Charms  based 
on  the  Law  of  Similarity  may  be  called  Homoeopathic  or 
Imitative  Magic.  Charms  based  on  the  Law  of  Contact 
or  Contagion  may  be  called  Contagious  Magic."  ^ 

accompanied  by,  or  ascribed  to,  an  exclamation,  a  gesture,  or  an  action  indi- 
cating and  effecting  what  is  willed.  To  us  the  exclamation  or  gesture  indicates 
only  what  is  willed.  In  the  opinion  of  the  savage,  who  fails  to  discriminate 
between  the  categories  of  likeness  and  identity,  the  action  he  performs  not 
merely  resembles,  but  is  the  action  which  he  wills."  (F.  B.  Jevons,  Magic, 
Proceedings  Third  International  Congress  of  the  History  of  Religions,  pp. 
71-78.) 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  52.  See  also  Frazer,  Lectures  on 
the  Early  History  of  the  Kingship,  Macmillan,  1905,  p.  54  ;  and  A.  van  Gen- 
nep's  review  of  that  book  in  the  Revue  de  VHistoire  des  Religions,  Vol.  LI  II, 
1906,  pp.  396-401. 


154        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

This  classification  clearly  embraces  the  larger  number  of 
magical  practices,  especially  the  injuring  of  images  in 
order  to  injure  enemies,  the  simulation  of  birth  to  produce 
child-bearing,  the  numerous  cases  of  homoeopathic  magic 
both  in  medicine  and  outside  of  it ;  the  contagious  magic 
of  navel  string  and  placenta,  of  wounds  and  blood,  of  gar- 
ments, of  footprints,  and  the  like.^  Yet  several  types  of 
magic  remain  outside  this  classification,  or  are  brought 
within  it  only  by  extremely  far-fetched  explanations. 
"  The  Bushmen  despise  an  arrow  that  has  once  failed  of 
its  mark;  and,  on  the  contrary,  consider  one  that  has  hit 
as  of  double  value.  They  will,  therefore,  rather  make 
new  arrows,  how  much  time  and  trouble  soever  it  may  cost 
them,  than  collect  those  that  have  missed  and  use  them 
again."  ^  Similarly,  other  tribes  attach  a  special  value  to  a 
hook  that  has  caught  a  big  fish.  One  might  bring  the 
mental  process  involved  here  back  to  Frazer's  second 
principle.  Contagious  Magic :  "  Things  that  have  once 
been  in  contact  with  each  other  continue  to  act  on 
each  other  at  a  distance  after  physical  contact  has  been 
severed."  But  it  is  possible  to  make  a  simpler  explana- 
tion than  the  ascription  to  the  hook  of  a  specific  power 
acting  telepathically  upon  fish.  Nothing  need  be  involved 
here,  it  seems  to  me,  but  the  conviction  that  something  that 
has  happened  once  is  likely  to  happen  again.  No  prin- 
ciple is  simpler  and  more  firmly  established  than  this;  it  is 
an  imperfect  form  of  this  corollary  of  the  Principle  of 
Identity :  something  that  has  happened  once  will  happen 
again  under  identical  circumstances.  The  savage  goes 
wrong  because,  instead  of  taking  into  account  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, he  thinks  merely  of  the  hook.    But  if  he  prizes 

1  See  for  illustrations,  The  Golden  Bough,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  55-214. 

2  Lichtenstein,  M.  H.  K.,  Travels  in  South  Africa,  Vol.  II,  p.  271,  quoted 
by  Lord  Avebury,  Origin  of  Civilization,  6th  ed.,  p.  34. 


VARIETIES  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC     155 

the  hook,  not  simply  because  it  has  already  caught  fish, 
but  because  he  thinks  of  the  hook  as  possessing  an  attrac- 
tive power  over  fish,  the  mental  process  at  the  root  of  his 
action  is  another  and  a  more  complex  one  :  he  now  believes 
in  action  at  a  distance.  Considered  psychologically,  the 
behavior  of  the  savage  when  he  prefers  the  successful 
hook  may  thus  be  of  two  quite  distinct  kinds.  The  magic 
based  upon  the  simple  conviction  that  what  has  happened 
once  is  Hkely  to  happen  again,  finds  no  place  in  Frazer's 
system ;  for  the  two  branches  of  magic  that  he  recognizes 
"  may  conveniently  be  comprehended  under  the  general 
name  of  Sympathetic  Magic,  since  both  assume  that  things 
act  on  each  other  at  a  distance  through  a  secret  sympathy, 
the  impulse  being  transmitted  from  one  to  the  other  by 
means  of  what  we  may  conceive  a  kind  of  invisible  ether."  ^ 
There  remains  the  question  of  fact.  Does  the  savage  act 
on  these  two  principles,  or  only  on  the  one  mentioned  by 
Frazer  ?  Facts  and  arguments  will  be  offered  below  in 
support  of  the  former  alternative. 

Frazer's  classification  may  again  prove  inadequate  in  re- 
gard to  certain  dances  performed  by  the  women  when  the 
men  are  engaged  in  war.  "  In  the  Kafir  district  of  the 
Hindoo  Koosh,  while  the  men  are  out  raiding,  the  women 
leave  their  work  in  the  fields  and  assemble  in  the  villages 
to  dance  day  and  night.  The  dances  are  kept  up  most  of 
each  day  and  the  whole  of  each  night.  .  .  .  The  dances 
of  these  Kafirs  are  said  to  be  performed  in  honor  of  certain 
of  the  national  gods,  but  when  we  consider  the  custom  in 
connection  with  the  others  which  have  just  been  passed  in 
review,  we  may  reasonably  surmise  that  it  is  or  was  origi- 
nally in  its  essence  a  sympathetic  charm  intended  to  keep 
the  absent  warriors  wakeful,  lest  they  should  be  surprised 
in  their  sleep  by  the  enemy."  ^     According  to  the  author  of 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cii.,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  54. 
^Ii>id.,^p.  133-134. 


156        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

TJie  Golden  Bough,  this  practice  would  thus  fall  under  the 
Law  of  Similarity,  to  which  he  gives,  as  we  have  seen,  a 
double  form.  It  is  the  first  alternative  which  applies  in 
this  case,  "  like  produces  like  "  :  the  keeping  awake  of  the 
women  causes  the  men  to  keep  awake.  This  is  a  possible 
explanation.  But  it  is  noteworthy  in  the  other  instances 
given  by  Frazer  ^  that  the  stay-at-homes  are  not  simply 
trying  to  keep  awake,  but  that  they  are  doing  many  other 
things,  not  all  of  which  can  be  interpreted  as  mimetic  magic 
(like  produces  like). 

It  seems  very  likely  that  the  primary  cause  of  the  danc- 
ing is  not  the  belief  that  keeping  awake  will  make  the 
warriors  wakeful,  but  the  excitement  and  anxiety  under 
which  the  women  would  naturally  labor  while  their  husbands 
are  fighting.  Now,  a  state  of  high  tension  may  be  expected  to 
work  itself  off,  not  only  according  to  a  law  of  "  like  produces 
like,"  that  is,  of  contagion,  but  in  all  sorts  of  spontaneous 
activities.  The  facts  appear  to  agree  with  this  theory. 
The  dance  is  not  kept  up  night  and  day  in  every  tribe,  and 
in  most  of  them,  as  far  as  my  information  goes,  there  does 
not  appear  to  be  any  deliberate  purpose  of  resisting  sleep. 
Nor  do  these  women  use  dancing  alone ;  in  some  tribes 
they  refrain  from  sexual  intercourse,  believing  that  if  they  do 
not,  their  husbands  will  either  be  killed  or  wounded.  In  cer- 
tain islands  the  women  and  children  are  forbidden  to  re- 
main inside  the  houses,  or  to  twine  thread  or  weave.  If 
one  turns  to  the  savages'  own  explanation  of  their  actions, 
one  finds  great  variation.  I  do  not  discover  in  Frazer  that 
any  tribe  gives  the  interpretation  that  he  suggests  ;  but  he 
reports  that  the  Yuki  Indians  say  that  if  they  dance  all  the 
time,  "  their  husbands  will  not  grow  tired."  In  Madagascar 
the  women  say  that  by  dancing  they  impart  strength,  cour- 
age, and  good  fortune  to  their  husbands.     Why  bring  these 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit,,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  131-134. 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      157 

various  ceremonies  back  to  an  intention  of  keeping  the 
warriors  awake  ?  Some  of  the  actions  may  be  inspired  by 
that  purpose,  but  why  all  of  them  ?  Let  us  say  rather  that 
the  anxiety  of  the  women  tends  to  work  itself  off  in  spon- 
taneous movements,  some  of  them  having,  in  the  beginning 
at  least,  no  mimetic  or  telepathic  connection  with  the  fight- 
ing of  the  husbands.  They  simply  dance  or  jump  up  and 
down  for  relief,  and  the  relief  felt  leads  to  the  repetition  of 
the  movement.     Thus  the  dancing  habit  is  formed. 

Now  if  the  women  dance  while  they  are  filled  with  a 
desire  for  the  success  of  the  men  in  war,  does  not  our 
knowledge  of  psychology  lead  us  to  expect  the  formation 
of  a  causal  connection  between  dancing  and  the  success 
of  the  warriors .'  At  first  this  connection  will  probably 
be  regarded  as  general,  and  not  as  a  specific  relation  be- 
tween depriving  oneself  of  sleep  and  keeping  awake  the 
warriors.  The  dancing,  at  this  stage,  will  be  a  magical 
ceremony  of  the  simplest  sort.  But  certain  mental  tenden- 
cies readily  lead  to  modifications  of  the  primitive  dancing. 
The  minds  of  the  dancers  will  at  times  be  filled  with  im- 
ages of  the  fighting,  and  these  images  will  tend  to  shape 
the  movements.  In  this  way  mimicry  of  fighting  may 
take  the  place  of  the  original  dancing.  Among  the 
Tshi-speaking  peoples  of  the  Gold  Coast,  for  instance,  "  the 
wives  of  the  men  who  are  away  with  the  army  paint  them- 
selves white,  and  adorn  their  persons  with  beads  and 
charms.  On  the  day  when  a  battle  is  expected  to  take 
place,  they  run  about  armed  with  guns,  or  sticks  carved  to 
look  like  guns,  and  taking  green  paw-paws  (fruits  shaped 
somewhat  like  a  melon),  they  hack  them  with  knives,  as  if 
they  were  chopping  off  the  heads  of  the  foe."^  In  the 
Queen  Charlotte  Islands,  "when  the  men  had  gone  to  war, 

'^  Ibid.,  p.  132.  On  dancing  and  its  relation  to  primitive  religion,  see 
I.  King,  op.  cU.,  pp.  108-I12. 


158        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  women  at  home  would  get  up  very  early  in  the  morn- 
ing and  pretend  to  make  war  by  falling  upon  their  children 
and  feigning  to  take  them  for  slaves."  Certain  tribes  went 
as  far  as  to  scourge  severely  two  lads,  by  way  of  helping 
the  warriors. 

If  any  of  these  dancers  accounted  for  the  practice  by 
saying  that  keeping  awake  helped  warriors  to  remain 
watchful,  I  should  look  upon  this  statement  as  an  after- 
thought. The  idea  of  the  danger  of  surprise  to  the  sleep- 
ing men  would  readily  enough  connect  itself  with  the 
dancers'  loss  of  sleep,  a  loss  arising  from  the  dancing, 
which  is  itself  an  expression  of  anxiety. 

Perhaps  the  largest  and  most  important  class  of  magic 
not  provided  for  in  the  classification  we  are  considering  is 
Will-Magic.  Here  is  one  instance  taken  from  ancient  In- 
dia. In  order  to  protect  his  belongings  from  destruction, 
the  Buddhist  monk  is  directed  to  make  a  "  firm  resolve," 
saying,  "  For  the  space  of  seven  days  let  not  this  and  that 
article  be  burnt  by  fire,  borne  away  by  a  flood,  blown  to 
pieces  by  the  wind,  carried  off  by  robbers,  or  eaten  by  rats 
and  the  like.  .  .  .  Then  for  the  space  of  seven  days  no 
harm  will  touch  them."  ^  This  is  not  a  request  addressed  to  a 
spirit,  but  a  "  firm  resolve  "  that  the  wish  expressed  shall 
be  reaHzed.  In  the  Kei  Islands,  when  a  battle  is  in  prog- 
ress, the  women  wave  fans  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy  and 
sing  :  "  O  golden  fans  !  Let  our  bullets  hit,  and  those  of  the 
enemy  miss."^  The  essence  of  Will-Magic  is  the  belief 
that  an  exertion  of  the  will  takes  effect  at  a  distance. 
This  kind  of  magic  may  or  may  not  be  complicated  by  the 
addition  of  magical  elements  of  another  type. 

Can  Will-Magic  be  classed  under  Frazer's  Law  of  Simi- 

^  Pali   Texts,    Visuddhi-Magga,  Chap.  XXIII,  taken  from  Buddhism  in 
Translation,  Henry  C.  Warren,  Harvard  University  Press,  1896,  p.  385. 
"^  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  2^. 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      159 

larity?  This  law  is  expressed  in  a  double  form:  "Like 
produces  like"  and  "  An  effect  resembles  its  cause."  From 
this  law,  we  are  told,  "  the  magician  infers  that  he  can 
produce  any  effect  he  desires  merely  by  imitating  it." 
But  imitation  is  not  in  the  least  a  requirement  of  Will- 
Magic,  although  it  may  be  superadded.  The  formula 
"  like  produces  hke  "  means,  if  it  means  anything,  that  be- 
cause two  things  have  elements  in  common,  —  shape,  color, 
etc.,  what  happens  to  one  will  happen  to  the  other  also. 
Nothing  of  this  is  necessarily  involved  in  Will-Magic.  The 
other  form  of  the  law,  "  an  effect  resembles  its  cause," 
applies  no  better.  It  means  that  if  you  want,  for  instance, 
a  tumor  to  dry  up,  you  can  succeed  by  causing  something 
else  to  dry  up ;  or  if  you  want  jaundice  to  disappear,  you 
can  succeed  by  making  the  yellow  color  of  some  object,  a 
flower,  for  instance,  vanish.  In  this  case  the  effect  you 
have  produced  becomes  the  cause  of  a  similar  effect. 

I  must  observe  here  that  these  two  formulas  represent 
each  a  different  mental  process,  and  that  if  the  savage  is 
aware  of  this  difference,  the  two  mental  processes  should 
not  be  included  under  one  principle.  To  do  so  seems  to 
me  to  obliterate  distinctions,  rather  than  to  bring  order  by 
means  of  a  helpful  generalization.  If  primitive  man  does 
not  discriminate,  then  the  distinction  has  no  application  to 
the  mental  processes  involved  in  savage  magic. 

Although  I  feel  confident  in  affirming  that  Frazer's 
classification  needs  completion,  I  do  not  claim  that  the 
following  one  is  adequate. 

1.  Principle  of  Repetition. —  Something  that  has  hap- 
pened once  is  likely  to  happen  again.  A  successful  arrow 
will  meet  with  further  success,  and  one  that  has  failed  with 
further  failure.     No  telepathic  power  is  involved  here. 

2.  Principle  of  the  Transmission  of  an  Effect  from  one 
Object  to  Another.  —  Sympathetic  Magic.     An  action  tak- 


i6o        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ing  place  upon  an  object  will  take  place  upon  another 
object  when  the  two  objects  are  connected  with  each  other 
in  the  mind  of  the  magician.  The  connections  may  be  of 
several  kinds.  I  mention  three  of  these,  (a)  The  objects 
bear  a  likeness  to  each  other  (association  by  similarity) :  in- 
juring the  likeness  of  a  thing  injures  the  thing  itself,  {b) 
The  objects  have  been  or  are  in  contact  (association  by 
contiguity):  whatever  is  done  to  a  tooth  once  belonging  to 
a  person  will  happen  to  the  person  himself.  A  variation 
of  this  form  of  magic  is  seen  in  the  custom  of  rubbing 
oneself  with  a  part  of  a  powerful  and  courageous  animal 
in  order  to  acquire  these  traits,  {c)  The  objects  have  been 
in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect :  cooling  the  arrow 
which  has  inflicted  a  wound  will  prevent  the  inflammation 
of  the  wound. 

In  this  class  of  magic  an  attraction  or  a  telepathic  influ- 
ence is  exerted  between  objects. 

3.  Principle  of  Efficiency  of  Will-Effort.  —  Other  sys- 
tems of  classification  are  of  course  possible.  A  classifica- 
tion according  to  the  nature  of  the  Power  involved  in 
the  magical  operation,  and  the  relation  of  this  Power  to 
the  magician  appears  to  me  to  have  considerable  merit,  so 
I  add  it  here. 

Class  I.  —  Practices  in  which  there  is  no  idea  of  a  Power 
belonging  to  the  operator  or  his  instrument,  and  passing 
thence  to  the  object  of  the  magical  art.  To  this  class 
belong  many  instances  of  so-called  Sympathetic  Magic  ;  ^ 
many  of  the  taboo  customs  ;  most  modern  superstitions,  — 
those,  for  instance,  regarding  Friday,  the  number  thirteen, 

1  Hang  a  root  of  vervain  around  the  neck  in  order  to  cause  a  tumor  to 
disappear :  as  the  plant  dries  up,  so  will  the  tumor.  If  the  fish  do  not  appear 
in  due  season,  make  one  of  wood  and  put  it  into  the  water.  Keep  the  arrow 
that  has  wounded  a  friend  in  a  cool  place,  so  that  the  wound  may  not  become 
inflamed. 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      i6i 

horse-shoes,  planting  when  the  tide  is  coming  in.  In  these 
instances  the  effect  is  thought  to  follow  upon  the  cause 
without  the  mediation  of  a  force  passing,  let  us  say,  from 
the  magician  to  the  wooden  fish  placed  in  the  stream  and 
thence  to  the  living  fish.  An  illustration  of  this  class  of 
magic  has  already  been  given  in  the  old  lady's  belief  that 
good  luck  would  come  to  a  household  as  the  result  of  spar- 
rows having  fallen  down  the  chimney.  The  gambler  who 
believes  in  his  "  luck  "  does  not  usually  conceive  of  it  as  a 
Power  in  any  true  sense  of  the  word.  Several  facts  drawn 
from  child  life,  which  point  to  this  same  conclusion,  will  be 
noted  presently. 

Divination  by  casting  lots  or  otherwise,  when  a  spirit  or 
god  is  not  supposed  to  guide  the  cast,  may  be  included 
here  as  a  subdivision.  The  aim  of  divination  is  to  secure 
an  item  of  knowledge  for  the  magician,  while  the  other 
practices  of  this  class  are  calculated  to  produce  effects  of 
some  other  kind.  But  in  neither  case  does  there  exist  the 
idea  of  a  Power  mediating  between  the  thing  sought  and 
its  antecedent. 

Class  II.  —  Non-personal  Powers  are  believed  to  belong 
to  the  magician  himself,  or  to  particular  objects,  such  as 
the  magician's  instruments,  and  to  pass  from  these  into 
other  objects,  or  to  act  upon  them  so  as  to  produce  certain 
effects.  If  the  magician  himself  possesses  this  force,  he 
does  not  think  of  it  as  identical  with  his  "will,"  or  even  as 
intimately  connected  with  it. 

Howitt  relates  that  some  native  Australians  begged  him 
not  to  carry  in  a  bag  containing  quartz  crystals  a  tooth  ex- 
tracted at  an  initiation  ceremony.  They  thought  that  the 
evil  power  of  the  crystals  would  enter  the  tooth  and  so 
injure  the  body  to  which  it  had  belonged.^     Many  charms 

1  Journal  of  the  Anthropological  Institute,  Vol.  XIII,  1884,  p.  456,  quoted 
by  Frazer. 

M 


1 62        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

have  a  potency  of  this  nature,  while  others  have  an  animis- 
tic significance,  that  is,  they  involve  the  action  of  spirits, 
and  so  do  not  belong  here.  Eating  the  fat  of  a  brave  and 
strong  man  or  animal,  or  rubbing  oneself  with  it  in  order 
to  gain  courage  and  power  is  an  act  belonging  to  this 
second  class,  as  are  also  most  cases  of  Contagious  Magic. 

There  seems  to  be  among  all  peoples  a  stage  of  develop- 
ment at  which  a  Power  hke  that  described  above  is  con- 
ceived clearly  enough  to  be  given  a  name ;  Wakanda 
in  North  America,  Majia  in  Melanesia.  This  variously 
named  non-personal  Potency  is  the  efficient  cause  of  by 
far  the  greater  part  of  the  magical  practices. 

Class  III.  —  Will-Magic.  This  includes  the  cases  in 
which  the  magician  feels  that  his  will-effort  is  an  efficient 
factor.  Under  this  head  usually  fall  spells,  incantations, 
and  solemn  curses.  A  man  who  says  to  the  magic  spear, 
"  Go  straight  and  kill  him,"  feels  no  doubt  that  by  these 
words,  in  which  quivers  his  whole  soul,  he  directs  the  spear 
on  its  errand  of  death. 

When  discussing  the  origin  of  non-personal  Powers,  we 
saw  how  early  man's  attention  is  directed  to  his  will-efforts, 
and  how  very  soon  he  attempts  to  turn  his  "  will "  to 
account  in  the  magical  way.  Among  the  North  American 
Indians,  sending  forth  one's  thought  and  will  is  a  common 
practice.  Miss  Fletcher  tells  us  that,  "When  a  race  is 
taking  place,  a  man  may  bend  his  thoughts  and  his  will 
upon  one  of  the  contestants  ...  in  the  belief  that  this 
act,  this  '  sending  of  his  mind,'  will  help  his  friend  to  win."  ^ 
In  this  and  other  similar  cases,  the  will-power  itself  seems 
to  perform  the  magical  deed  ;  while  more  commonly,  per- 
haps, the  spell  or  incantation  "  carries  "  one's  will  to  another 

1  Fletcher,  Alice  C,  Notes  on  Certain  Beliefs  concerning  Will  Power 
among  the  Sioux  Tribes,  Science  (New  York),  N.  S.,  Vol.  V,  1897,  pp.  331, 
334.  ' 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      163 

person,  who  is  then  compelled  to  act  according  to  the  desire 
of  the  magician. 

The  importance  of  this  class  of  magic  is  so  great  that 
Marett  has  raised  the  question  as  to  whether  an  accom- 
panying spell  is  not  an  indispensable  part  of  "  perfect " 
magic.  ^  F.  B.  Jevons  also  connects  magical  power  in 
general  with  the  sense  of  one's  own  energy.^  In  my 
opinion,  this  exercise  of  the  will  is  the  characteristic  of 
only  one  class  of  magic.  In  magic  as  well  as  in  religion, 
we  must,  it  seems  to  me,  admit  several  independent 
origins.  What  follows  will,  I  hope,  be  conclusive  on  this 
point. 

In  this  attempt  at  classification,  I  would  not  give  the 
impression  that  the  conceptions  of  the  savage  are  clear 
and  definite.  On  the  contrary,  I  hold  them  to  be  hazy 
and  fluid.  What  appears  to  him  impersonal  at  one  mo- 
ment may  suddenly  assume  the  characteristics  of  a  spirit. 
Mana,  for  instance,  although  usually  an  impersonal  force 
stored  in  plants,  stones,  animals,  or  men,  takes  on  at  times 
truly  personal  traits.  One  should  not  be  surprised  to  meet 
with  cases  that  belong  to  several  classes.  The  following 
is  a  good  instance  of  the  mingling  of  will-magic  with 
other  types:  "The  ancient  Hindoos  performed  an  elabo- 
rate ceremony,  based  on  homoeopathic  magic,  for  the  cure 
of  jaundice.  Its  main  drift  was  to  banish  the  yellow  color 
to  yellow  creatures  and  yellow  things,  such  as  the  sun,  to 
which  it  properly  belongs,  and  to  procure  for  the  patient  a 
healthy  red  color  from  a  living,  vigorous  source,  namely,  a 
red  bull.  With  this  intention,  a  priest  recited  the  following 
spell:  *Up  to  the  sun  shall  go  thy  heart-ache  and  thy  jaun- 

1  Marett,  R.  R.,  The  Threshold  of  Religion,  pp.  52  ei  seq. 

2  See  footnote  on  page  152.  In  the  chapter  on  the  origin  of  the  idea  of 
non-personal  Power,  I  have  already  argued  against  the  view  that  Will-Magic 
is  the  primary  form  of  magic. 


164        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

dice  :  in  the  colour  of  the  red  bull  do  we  envelop  thee ! 
We  envelop  thee  in  red  tints,  unto  long  life.  May  this 
person  go  unscathed  and  be  free  of  yellow  colour !  .  .  , 
Into  the  parrots,  into  the  thrush,  do  we  put  thy  jaundice, 
and  furthermore,  into  the  yellow  wagtail  do  we  put  thy 
jaundice.'  While  he  uttered  these  words,  the  priest,  in  or- 
der to  infuse  the  rosy  hue  of  health  into  the  sallow  patient, 
gave  him  water  to  sip  which  was  mixed  with  the  hair  of  a 
red  bull;  he  poured  water  over  the  animal's  back  and 
made  the  sick  man  drink  it ;  he  seated  him  on  the  skin  of 
a  red  bull  and  tied  a  piece  of  the  skin  to  him.  Then  in  or- 
der to  improve  his  colour  by  thoroughly  eradicating  the 
yellow  taint,  he  proceeded  thus.  He  first  daubed  him 
from  head  to  foot  with  a  yellow  porridge  made  of  turmeric 
or  crucums  (a  yellow  plant),  set  him  on  a  bed,  tied  three 
yellow  birds,  to  wit  a  parrot,  a  thrush,  and  a  yellow  wag- 
tail, by  means  of  a  yellow  string  to  the  foot  of  the  bed ; 
then  pouring  water  over  the  patient,  he  washed  off  the 
yellow  porridge,  and  with  it  no  doubt  the  jaundice,  from 
him  to  the  birds.  After  that,  by  way  of  giving  a  final 
bloom  to  his  complexion,  he  took  some  hairs  of  a  red  bull, 
wrapt  them  in  gold  leaf,  and  glued  them  to  the  patient's 
skin."i 

2.   The  Origins  of  Magical  Behavior 

The  idea  of  non-personal  Powers  is  no  more  synonymous 
with  magic  than  the  idea  of  great,  unseen,  personal  beings 
is  synonymous  with  religion.  If  there  is  to  be  a  magical 
art,  ways  and  means  of  using  the  Power  must  be  produced. 
How  did  the  apparently  endless  variety  of  magical  practices 
come  to  be  .■'  Most  of  them  will  be  accounted  for  by  the 
following  principles  of  explanation.  These  are  of  unequal 
importance,  but  each  accounts,  it  seems  to  me,  for  a  certain 
class  of  magic. 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op,  cii.,  3d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  79. 


\'ARIETIES  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      165 

(a)  Children  often  amuse  themselves  by  making  prohi- 
bitions and  backing  them  up  with  threats  of  punishment. 
"  If  you  do  t/izs,"  they  say,  "  t/iat  will  happen  to  you." 
The  "  f/it's  "  and  the  "t/iai  "  have  usually  no  logical  connec- 
tion, nor  does  the  child  have  any  thought  of  a  particular 
power  or  agent  meting  out  the  punishment. 

It  is  important  to  remember  in  this  connection  that  what 
is  done  in  the  make-believe  spirit  by  one  person  is  often 
taken  seriously  by  another,  independently  of  any  empirical 
verification.  A  little  girl,  seven  years  old,  was  told  that 
killing  a  snail  would  cause  rain.  She  immediately  ac- 
cepted the  statement,  and  rational  arguments  did  not  take 
the  idea  out  of  her  head.  How  many  of  the  senseless 
superstitions  of  the  savage  arose  in  this  way  we  shall 
never  know.  It  seems  probable,  however,  that  many  of 
the  commands,  precautions,  and  prescriptions  in  the  life  of 
the  savage  have  had  this  origin ;  for  there  is  frequently  no 
logical  connection  between  the  deed  forbidden  or  pre- 
scribed and  the  thing  to  be  secured.  I  have  in  mind  cer- 
tain taboo  customs,  parts  of  initiation  ceremonies  of  the 
Australians,^  regulations  governing  hunting  and  the  like. 
A  good  instance  of  the  last  is  found  among  the  Central 
Esquimaux :  certain  kinds  of  game  must  not  be  eaten 
on  the  same  day ;  none  of  the  deer's  bones  must  be 
broken  during  skinning ;  and  bits  of  the  animal  must  be 
buried  in  the  ground  or  placed  under  stones.  In  many 
cases  a  fuller  knowledge  would  undoubtedly  disclose  rea- 
sons of  utility,  real  or  imaginary,  for  these  magical  prac- 
tices ;  but  that  this  would  be  true  in  every  instance  seems 
an  unjustifiable  assumption.  The  fact  that  the  savage  is 
usually  ready  with  reasons  for  his  behavior  is  no  proof  that 
these  reasons  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  practices.  The  expla- 
nations may  be  after-thoughts. 

1  spencer  and  Gillen,  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,  London,  Mac- 
millan,  1899,  Chaps.  VII-IX. 


1 66       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

{b)  It  seems  good  psychology  to  hold  that  certain  magical 
practices  originated  in  threats  of  untoward  happenings 
made  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  things  vital  to  the  life 
and  prosperity  of  the  tribe,  —  for  instance,  the  authority  of 
the  chief,  and  the  sanctity  of  the  marriage  relation.  The 
magical  beliefs  which  enforce  continence  on  the  part  of 
the  wives  of  men  engaged  in  war  appear  to  have  had  this 
origin.  The  punishment  may  be  anything  which  is  re- 
garded as  efficacious.  In  Madagascar  conjugal  fidelity  is 
enforced  by  the  threat  that  the  betrayed  husband  will  be 
killed  or  wounded  in  the  war;  among  the  indigenous  tribes 
of  Sarawack,  the  belief  is  that  the  camphor  obtained  by 
the  men  in  the  jungle  will  evaporate  if  the  women  are 
unfaithful ;  while  in  East  Africa,  the  husband  will,  in  the 
same  eventuality,  be  killed  or  hurt  by  the  elephant  he  is 
hunting. 1  The  high  sanction  which  the  requirements  of 
social  life  give  to  beliefs  of  this  kind  is  readily  understood. 

The  mental  attitude  out  of  which  these  beliefs  arose  need 
not  be  regarded  as  a  deliberate  intention  to  deceive  the 
women.  One  should  bear  in  mind  the  half  make-believe, 
half  serious  attitude  of  children  in  their  intercourse  with 
one  another.  Yet  I  do  not  think  it  impossible  that  beliefs 
of  this  sort  have  originated  in  purposive  deception. 
Spencer  and  Gillen^  relate  of  the  most  primitive  people 
known  to  us,  the  Arunta  of  Central  AustraHa,  that  the 
adult  males  rule  the  women  and  children  by  means  of  a 
bogle  called  Twanyirika. 

(c)  The  motive  which  leads  civilized  people  to  make  vows 
may  account  for  certain  magical  practices.  One  of  the 
original  impulses  of  human  nature  seems  to  be  to  try  to 
avoid  a  catastrophe  or  to  secure  advantages  by  promising 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cii.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  29-31. 

2  Spencer  and  Gillen,  op.  cii.,  p.  246,  note  I.  See  also  The  Northern  Tribes 
of  Central  Australia,  pp.  491-492. 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      167 

to  do  something  which  would  gratify  the  person  who  has 
control  over  the  event.  This  motive  in  its  cruder  form  is 
a  desire  to  do  something  meritorious  in  order  to  deserve 
immunity  from  danger.  Customs  of  continence  may  have 
had  the  origin  mentioned  above,  or  they  may  have  arisen 
from  the  women's  efforts  to  do  something  praiseworthy,  so 
that  the  life  of  their  husbands  might  be  preserved  and  their 
success  insured. 

{d)  Other  types  of  magical  behavior  have  their  origin  in 
the  spontaneous  response  of  the  organism  to  specific 
situations.  In  states  of  excitement  the  liberated  energy 
must  find  an  outlet  in  movements.  To  restrain  every 
external  sign  of  intense  emotion  is  unendurable.  By  the 
bedside  of  a  sick  person  one  loves,  one  must  do  something 
for  him.  The  "  expression "  of  the  excitement  is  not 
altogether  at  random.  It  takes  place  according  to  certain 
principles.^  For  instance,  it  is  a  common  fact  that  even 
men  of  culture  when  under  stress  of  emotion  act  in  the 
absence  of  the  object  of  their  passion  as  if  it  were  present. 
A  man  grinds  his  teeth,  shakes  his  fist,  growls  at  the  absent 
enemy ;  a  mother  talks  fondly  to  her  departed  babe  and 
presses  it  to  her  breast.     The  less  a  person  is  under  the 

1  Comp.  Irving  King:  "In  innumerable  cases  they  (magical  and  re- 
ligious acts)  can  be  shown  to  be  primarily  the  natural  reaction  of  the  psycho- 
physical organism,  almost  its  mechanical  reflex,  in  situations  of  strain  and 
relaxation,  or  to  such  conditions  as  require  practical  adjustments  of  some  sort." 
Op.  cit.,  pp.  179-188. 

In  attempting  to  explain  the  bodily  movements  which  accompany  emotions, 
Darwin  set  down  three  principles,  two  of  which  should  be  taken  into  account 
in  the  consideration  of  the  origin  of  magical  behavior  :  the  principle  of  actions 
due  to  the  constitution  of  the  nervous  system,  and  the  principle  of  serviceable 
or  associated  habit.  (Q\^z.x\q%  Tizx^'wi,  Expression  of  the  Emotions  in  Man 
and  Animals,  pp.  28  fif.)  These  principles  become,  in  Wundt's  treatment  of 
the  matter,  the  principle  of  the  direct  modification  of  innervation,  the 
principle  of  the  association  of  related  feelings,  and  the  principle  of  the 
relation  of  the  movements  to  sense-representations.  (W.  Wundt,  Physiolo- 
giscke  Psychologie,  5th  ed.,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  286-296.) 


1 68        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

control  of  reason,  the  more  likely  is  he  to  yield  to  such 
promptings. 

If  a  happy  coincidence  were  to  lead  to  a  connection  be- 
tween such  behavior  and  success  in  war,  these  spontaneous 
actions  would  become  magical,  that  is,  actions  performed  in 
the  belief  that  they  are  of  assistance  to  the  warriors.  But 
coinciding  fortunate  events  are  not  necessary  to  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  connection  in  question.  It  is  psycholog- 
ically probable  that  the  desire  in  the  mind  of  the  person 
during  the  spontaneous  activities  will  lead  to  a  connection 
between  these  and  the  realization  of  the  desire.  It  is  worth 
while  to  dwell  a  moment  longer  upon  this  possibility. 

A  few  pages  above  I  had  occasion  to  discuss  certain 
dancing  ceremonies.  I  attempted  there  to  account  for  the 
magical  dances  of  the  women  while  the  men  are  at  war  as 
due  in  their  original  form  to  a  spontaneous  expression  of 
restlessness  and  excitement.  Duration  and  repetition  of 
the  excitement  would  favor  its  expression  in  coordinated, 
inteUigible  movements,  —  mimicry  of  fighting,  for  instance. 
If  now  there  appears  a  sense  of  necessary  connection  be- 
tween mimic  fighting  and  success  in  war,  what  was  a  mere 
spontaneous  expression  of  excitement  becomes  a  magical 
practice.  This  step  is  not  impossible,  for  if,  while  the  danc- 
ing goes  on,  the  wish  for  the  success  of  the  warriors  is  up- 
permost in  the  minds  of  the  women,  the  dancing  will  prob- 
ably come  to  be  regarded  as  a  condition  of  success.  This 
last  step  would  be  no  more  than  an  expression  of  the  well- 
known  law  of  association  :  two  things  that  have  been  to- 
gether in  the  mind  tend  to  recall  each  other.  Thus  forms 
of  behavior  arising  as  a  release  from  emotional  tensions 
gradually  assume  definiteness  and  become  means  of  exer- 
cising magical  influence,  quite  independently  of  any  experi- 
mental proof.-^ 

1  If  any  one  finds  it  difficult  to  admit  that  the  savage  can  so  easily  be  de- 
ceived, I  would  call  his  attention  to  the  well-known  instances  of  children's 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      169 

Several  of  the  numerous  varieties  of  so-called  Sympa- 
thetic Magic,  particularly  the  widespread  practice  of  doing 
to  an  effigy  that  which  one  would  like  to  do  to  the  original, 
can  be  accounted  for  by  the  addition  to  the  former  prin- 
ciples of  the  following  law  of  mental  action.  Objects  re- 
sembling each  other  become  associated  in  the  mind,  so  that 
the  mind  tends  to  pass  from  one  to  the  other.  Like  objects 
may  become  to  some  extent  equivalents  in  mental  opera- 
tions. The  fact  that  the  satisfaction  to  the  person  laboring 
under  the  excitement  of  anger  or  any  other  emotion  in- 
creases with  the  similarity  of  the  object  upon  which  he 
wreaks  his  vengeance  to  the  person  really  intended,  was 
probably  discovered  by  chance  and  led  to  the  making  of 
images  and  effigies  for  magical  purposes. 

(e)  In  the  preceding  modes  of  origin,  movements  and 
behaviors  first  appear  independently  of  any  magical  inten- 
tion, and  afterwards  acquire  a  magical  significance.  But 
the  magical  principles  soon  became  disengaged  from  mag- 
ical practice.  At  this  point  a  new  chapter  opened  in  the 
history  of  the  magical  art.  Magic  no  longer  arose  only 
by  chance,  but  new  forms  were  created  deliberately. 
From  this  moment  there  must  have  been  a  tendency  to 
treat  according  to  more  or  less  definite  magical  principles 
every  difficult  situation. 

Here  belong  most  of  the  numerous  practices  that  may 
be  classed  under  the  heading  "  like  produces  hke."  That 
"like  produces  like"  is  a  law  of  nature  expressed  every- 
where about  us.     Cold,  for  instance,  produces  cold,  and 

beliefs  and  self-deceptions  regarding  dolls,  for  example.  Most  of  them  be- 
have, at  a  certain  age,  as  if  their  dolls  were  alive,  and  at  some  moments  they 
seem  really  to  believe  this.  What  they  think  at  other  moments  is  another 
matter.  We  need  not  suppose  that  the  savage  cannot  take,  at  times,  a  crit- 
ical attitude  and  perhaps  undeceive  himself.  It  is  sufficient  that  at  other 
moments,  when  under  the  pressure  of  need  or  in  the  excitement  of  important 
ceremonies,  he  should  be  able  to  assume  the  attitude  of  the  believer. 


1 70        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

fire  engenders  fire.  The  frequent  spreading  of  dreadful 
infectious  diseases  among  vegetables,  animals,  and  men 
seems  quite  sufficient  to  suggest  this  belief.  The  attention 
of  the  savage  would  naturally  be  drawn  very  early  to  that 
relation,  because  of  the  many  striking  and  dangerous  forms 
it  takes.  Now  as  he  is  quite  unable  to  distinguish  among 
the  different  agencies  involved  in  the  various  experiences 
of  this  sort,  he  cannot  draw  the  line  between  the  "  likes  " 
that  really  produce  "like"  and  those  that  do  not;  hence 
his  very  strange  expectations.  And  as  it  is  often  impos- 
sible to  obtain  or  manipulate  the  objects  possessing  the 
quality  desired,  the  whole  comes  to  be  replaced  by  a  part, 
or  even  by  a  symbol,  which  is  treated  as  if  it  contained  the 
power  of  the  whole.  For  example,  eating  or  wearing  a 
part  of  a  courageous  or  powerful  animal  makes  one  bold 
or  strong,  or  protects  from  danger;  rubbing  the  chin  of  a 
young  man  with  a  rat's  totem  makes  the  hair  grow,  etc. 

Another  origin  of  the  same  class  is  suggested  by  an  in- 
teresting observation  made  by  Sully.^  A  little  girl  thought 
that  making  her  hair  tidy  would  stop  the  blowing  of  the 
wind.  The  wind  disheveled  her ;  conversely  putting  her 
hair  in  order  would  make  the  wind  cease.  Similarly  some 
children  imagine  that  since  the  wind  produces  whistling 
sounds,  whistling  will  produce  wind.  The  second  of  two 
successive  events  is  thought  able  to  reproduce  the  first. 

In  attempting  to  demonstrate  the  priority  of  magic  to  religion,  Frazer 
writes  :  "  Magic  is  nothing  but  a  mistaken  application  of  the  very  sim- 
plest and  most  elementary  process  of  the  mind,  namely,  the  association 
of  ideas  by  virtue  of  resemblance  or  contiguity,  while  religion  assumes 
the  operation  of  conscious  or  personal  agents,  superior  to  man,  behind 
the  visible  screen  of  nature.  Obviously  the  concept  of  personal  agent 
is  more  complex  than  a  simple  recognition  of  the  similarity  or  contigu- 
ity of  ideas.  .  .  .  The  very  beasts  associate  the  ideas  of  things  that 
are  like  each  other  or  that  have  been  found  together  in  their  experience. 

1  Sully,  J.,  Studies  of  Childhood,  1896,  p.  80. 


VARIETIES  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      171 

.  .  .  But  who  attributes  to  the  animals  a  belief  that  the  phenomena 
are  worked  by  a  multitude  of  invisible  animals  or  by  one  enormous  and 
prodigiously  strong  animal  behind  the  scenes  ?  "  ^  It  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  the  mind  of  man  tends  to  pass  from  one  object  to  others  similar  or 
present  at  the  same  time ;  but  this  psychological  fact  does  not  in  itself 
account  for  magic.  The  mind  of  animals  is  regulated  in  like  manner. 
In  the  spring  the  sight  of  a  feather  makes  the  bird  "  think  "  of  nest-build- 
ing, and  the  smell  and  sight  of  the  master's  coat  probably  brings  the  master 
to  the  dog's  mind.  Yet  animals  do  not  practice  the  magical  art.  This 
fact  shows  the  insufficiency  of  "a  simple  (mistaken)  recognition  of  the 
similarity  and  contiguity  of  ideas  "  as  an  explanation  of  the  origin  of 
magic.  If  an  animal  had  had  his  attention  drawn  to  the  color  of  carrots 
and  of  jaundice,  he  might  connect  them  by  their  color  likeness ;  and 
also  "  coat "  and  "  master  "  might  follow  each  other  in  a  dog's  mind. 
But  in  order  to  treat  the  coat  as  he  would  the  master,  or  to  eat  carrots 
for  the  cure  of  jaundice,  the  dog  must  have,  in  addition  to  the  associa- 
tion, the  belief  that  whatever  is  done  to  the  coat  will  be  suffered  by  the 
master,  and  that  the  eating  of  carrots  will  cure  the  disease.  The  ex- 
istence of  these  ideas,  together  with  their  motor  and  affective  values, 
makes  magic  possible.  Frazer  seems  to  have  overlooked  this  funda- 
mental difference  between  mere  association  of  ideas  and  the  essential 
mental  processes  involved  in  magic.  This  difference  may  be  further  il- 
lustrated by  the  instance  of  a  dog  biting  in  rage  the  stick  with  which  he 
is  being  beaten.  He  is  indeed  doing  to  the  stick  what  he  would  like  to 
do  to  the  man  ;  but  in  attacking  the  stick  he  does  not  think  that  he  is 
injuring  the  man.  His  action  is  blindly  impulsive,  while  the  form  of 
magic  in  question  involves  the  purpose  of  inflicting  injury  on  something 
else  than  the  stick,  and  the  belief  that  the  injury  is  actually  done.'- 

If  magical  actions  cannot  be  deduced  simply  from  the  principles  of 
association,  they  can  at  least  be  classified  according  to  the  kind  of  as- 
sociation they  illustrate.  For  although  the  various  ideas  brought  to- 
gether in  magic,  in  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  are  frequently  said  to 
have  come  together  by  "  chance,"  some  of  the  conditions  under  which 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  70.  Oldenburg  {Die  Religion  des 
Veiia,  Berlin,  1894)  was  first,  I  believe,  in  holding  to  a  pre-religious  magica- 
stage  of  culture.  But  it  is  Frazer  who  first  made  a  clear  separation,  not  only 
between  magic  and  religion,  but  also  between  magic  and  the  belief  in  spirit- 
agents. 

2  Comp.  R.  R.  Marett,  From  Spell  io  Prayer,  Folk-lore,  Vol.  XV,  1904, 
pp.  136-141,  reprinted  in  The  Threshold  of  Religion,  pp.  44-48. 


172        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

they  have  in  fact  become  connected  are  expressible  in  the  universal  laws 
of  association ;  namely,  association  by  similarity  or  contrast,  by  conti- 
guity or  spatial  opposition,  and  by  emotional  congruity  or  disparity. 
Whenever  magical  acts  have  been  classified,  it  has  been  mainly  with 
reference  to  the  kinds  of  association  involved  in  the  mental  processes. 
But  every  kind  of  activity  involving  mental  operations  falls  in  some  of 
its  relations  under  the  laws  of  association,  hence  these  classifications 
are  relatively  unfruitful.  I  have  attempted,  therefore,  to  group  magical 
practices  according  to  a  factor  of  greater  significance,  namely,  the  na- 
ture of  the  power  involved. 

3.   The  Origins  of  Religious  Practices 

The  main  sources  of  religious  ceremonies  and  rites  are 
so  obvious  that  little  time  need  be  spent  in  stating  and 
illustrating  them. 

First  of  all,  certain  magical  practices  may  perhaps  be 
turned  to  religious  account.  "  It  will  not  surprise  us,"  says 
Jevons,  "if  we  find  that  the  ceremonies  which  were  used 
for  the  purpose  of  rain-making  before  rain  was  recognized 
as  the  gift  of  the  gods,  continue  for  a  time  to  be  practised 
as  the  proper  rites  with  which  to  approach  the  god  of 
the  community,  or  the  rain  god  in  particular."  ^  This 
would,  of  course,  be  religion,  in  our  sense  of  the  term, 
only  if  the  ceremony  were  thought  of  as  acting  anthropo- 
pathically  upon  the  god.  If,  instead,  its  action  were  co- 
ercitive,  it  would  still  be  a  magical  rite  brought  to  bear 
this  time  upon  a  personal  Power.  This  source  of  rehgious 
practices  can  be  of  only  slight  consequence,  since  it  is 
rarely  possible  for  coercitive  methods  to  be  adaptable  to 
religious  action. 

Most  of  the  forms  of  religious  behavior  arise,  no  doubt, 
from  transferring  practices  useful  in  human  intercourse 
to  man's  relations  with  gods.  Because  of  the  origin  and 
nature  of  the  gods,  human   relations  are   the   prototypes 

^Jevons,  F.  B.,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Comparative  Religion,  pp. 
91-92. 


VARIETIES  AND   CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      173 

of  intercourse  with  gods.  A  god  who  is  a  Great  Ancestor 
and  chief  of  a  tribe  will  naturally  be  approached  in  a  way 
similar  to  that  customary  with  living  chiefs.  If  the  "god  " 
is  still  living,  that  is,  if  he  is  a  medicine-man  or  a  chief 
deified,  he  will  evidently  be  dealt  with  according  to  the 
customs  of  men.  We  have  already  seen  how  widespread 
is  the  worship  of  men  supposed  to  possess  marvellous 
powers. 

Certain  religious  practices  may  be  an  extension  of 
friendly  offices  or  other  natural  actions  towards  the  dead 
in  the  grave,  and  towards  ghosts  which  cannot  yet  be 
ranked  with  gods.  When  a  Jupagalk  in  great  pain  calls 
on  some  dead  friend  to  come  and  help  him,  —  that  is,  to 
visit  him  in  a  dream  and  teach  him  some  song  whereby  he 
may  avert  the  evil  magic  that  is  hurting  him,^  —  his  call- 
ing for  the  friendly  service  of  his  relative  is  certainly  of 
the  same  nature  as  a  religious  prayer. 

The  custom  of  placing  in  graves  objects  of  which  the 
deceased  may  have  need  is  widespread.  Howitt  reports 
this  custom  among  the  natives  of  southeast  Australia. 
A  trait  of  human  nature  well  worth  noticing  is  that  the 
Australians,  who  provide  water  and  food  for  the  dead,  also 
break  the  legs  of  the  corpse  "to  prevent  the  ghost  from 
wandering  at  night,"  ^  presumably  not  as  a  further  good 
office,  but  out  of  fear  that  he  may  cause  them  injury. 

In  regard  to  religious  practices,  the  following  quotations  referring 
to  the  Melanesians  are  instructive.  In  Melanesia  "a  man  is  buried 
with  money,  porpoise  teeth,  and  ornaments  belonging  to  him,  his 
bracelets  put  on  upside  down ;  and  these  things  are  often  afterwards 
secretly  dug  up  again.  .  .  .  When  they  hang  up  the  dead  man's  arms 
on  his  house,  they  make  great  lamentations;  all  remains  afterwards 
untouched,  the  house  goes  to  ruin,  mantled  as  time  goes  on  with  the 
vines  of  the  growing  yams,  a  picturesque  and  indeed  a  touching  sight ; 

1  Howitt,  A.  W.,  The  Native  Tribes  of  South- East  Australia,  p.  435. 

2  Howitt,  A.  W.,  op.  cii.,  p.  474. 


174       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

for  these  things  are  not  set  up  that  they  may  in  a  ghostly  manner 
accompany  their  former  owner,  they  are  set  up  there  as  a  memorial 
of  him  as  a  great  and  valued  man,  like  the  hatchment  of  old  times. 
With  the  same  feeling  they  cut  down  a  dead  man's  fruit  trees  as  a 
mark  of  respect  and  affection,  not  with  any  notion  of  these  things 
serving  him  in  the  world  of  ghosts ;  he  ate  of  them,  they  say,  when 
he  was  alive,  he  will  never  eat  again,  and  no  one  else  shall  have 
them.  .  .  .  The  series  of  funeral-feasts  or  death-meals,  the  'eating 
of  death,'  as  they  call  it,  follows  upon  the  funeral,  or  even  begins  be- 
fore it,  and  is  the  most  important  part  of  the  commemoration  of  the 
dead  ;  it  may  be  said,  indeed,  to  be  one  of  the  principal  institutions 
of  the  islands.  The  number  of  the  feasts  and  the  length  of  time  during 
which  they  are  repeated  vary  very  much  in  the  various  islands,  and 
depend  also  upon  the  consideration  in  which  the  deceased  is  held. 
The  meals  are  distinctly  commemorative,  but  are  not  altogether  devoid 
of  the  purpose  of  benefiting  the  dead  ;  it  is  thought  that  the  ghost 
is  gratified  by  the  remembrance  shown  of  him,  and  honored  by  the 
handsome  performance  of  the  duty  ;  the  living  also  solace  themselves 
in  their  grief,  and  satisfy  something  of  their  sense  of  loss  by  affection- 
ate commemoration."^ 

Social  customs  such  as  prostrating  oneself  before  power- 
ful men  and  chiefs,  and  making  offerings  that  may  incline 
them  to  be  favorable,  are  no  doubt  the  prototypes  of  adora- 
tion and  offering.  Rivers,  in  his  interesting  account  of  the 
Todas,  mentions  that  one  division  of  a  clan  makes  to  an- 
other division  an  offering  of  a  buffalo  as  an  atonement  for 
certain  offences.  He  expresses  the  opinion  that  we  have 
here  "  something  which  is  midway  between  a  social  regula- 
tion of  the  nature  of  punishment  and  a  definitely  religious 
rite  of  propitiation  of  higher  powers."  ^  This  is  probably 
true  of  the  feasts  of  the  Thompson  Indians,  as  well  as 
of  those  of  many  other  primitive  populations.  "  All  of 
them,"  says  Teit,  "apparently  held  uppermost  the  idea  of 
good  fellowship.  Many  were  simply  social  gatherings, 
called,  for  instance,  by  one  family  when  it  chanced  to  have 

^Codrington,  R.  H.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  254,  255,  271. 

2  Rivers,  W.  H.  R.,  The  Todas,  London,  Macmillan,  1906,  p.  311. 


VARIETIES  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  MAGIC      175 

a  large  supply  of  food,  that  it  might  show  its  liberality 
and  good-will.  Feasts  were  also  given  when  one  family 
visited  another.  There  were  also  social  gatherings  called 
potlaches,  at  which  there  was  a  general  distribution  of  pres- 
ents by  a  wealthy  individual  or  family.  All  these  customs 
were  so  definitely  fixed  that  their  observance  was  certainly 
a  phase  of  tribal  good  form,  if  not  of  tribal  moraUty  and  re- 
ligion. At  any  rate,  they  are  interesting  as  showing  a 
rudimentary  stage  in  the  development  of  real  religious 
feasts."  ^  If  feasts  such  as  these  are  held  within  a  non- 
reUgious  social  life,  it  is  easy  to  understand  how  readily 
they  may  become  part  of  the  religious  life  when  the  god- 
ideas  appear.  But  in  most  cases,  social  feasts  develop  in 
a  milieu  where  Great  Ancestors  have  had  from  the  begin- 
ning a  prominent  share  in  the  festivals. 

The  intimate  and  detailed  relations  existing  between  the 
religious  forms  of  a  people  and  the  social  life  have  long 
been  recognized.'^  Gods  and  religious  rites  reflect  the  oc- 
cupations, customs,  and  chief  interests  of  a  people.  Were 
this  not  so,  the  conception  of  rehgion  and  of  its  origin  pre- 
sented in  this  book  would  be  radically  wrong. 

1  King,  Irving,  op.  cit.,  p.  107. 

2  Among  recent  books,  seo  Karl  Budde,  The  Keligion  of  Israel  up  to  the 
Exile ;  George  Barton,  Semitic  Origins. 


CHAPTER   IX 

COROLLARIES  REGARDING  THE  RESPECTIVE  NATURE 
OF  MAGIC  AND  RELIGION  AND  THEIR  RELATIONS 
TO  EACH   OTHER 

Before  bringing  to  a  close  the  comparative  study  of 
these  two  forms  of  behavior,  I  propose  to  discuss  briefly 
the  following  corollaries,  which  may  be  drawn  from  the 
propositions  set  down  in  the  preceding  pages. 

1.  Magic  and  religion  have  had  independent  origins. 
Neither  of  them  need  be  regarded  as  a  development  from 
the  other. 

2.  Magic  contributed  very  little  directly  to  the  making 
of  religion. 

3.  The  simpler  forms  of  magic  probably  antedated 
;:eligion. 

4.  Because  they  are  different  ways  of  achieving  the 
9ame  ends,  magical  and  religious  practices  are  closely  as- 
sociated. 

5.  Rehgion  is  social  and  beneficial ;  magic  is  dominantly 
individual  and  often  evil. 

6.  Magic  is  of  shorter  duration  than  religion. 

7.  Science  is  closely  related  neither  to  magic  nor  to 
religion,  but  to  the  mechanical  type  of  behavior. 

I.   Religion  and  magic  have  had  independent  origins. — 

This  is  the  most  important  of  these  corollaries.  The  facts 
and  arguments  brought  forward  in  the  preceding  discus- 
sion of  the  origins  of  the  non-personal  Power,  of  the  god- 

176 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  177 

ideas,  and  of  magical  and  religious  practices  afford,  to  my 
mind,  conclusive  evidence  of  the  truth  of  this  proposition. 
Religion  cannot  be  said  to  be  an  outgrowth  of  magic  ;  and 
religion  in  no  way  leads  to  magic. 

2.  What  did  magic  contribute  to  the  making  of  religion?  — 

We  cannot  accept  the  answer  given  by  Frazer.  Since  he 
recognizes  not  only  a  fundamental  distinction,  but  even 
an  opposition  of  principle,  between  magic  and  religion,  he 
cannot  allow  the  former  a  positive  influence  in  the  establish- 
ment of  religion.  Yet,  he  traces  a  genetic  relation  between 
them  ;  it  is  the  recognition  of  t\\Q  failure  of  magic  that  is 
the  cause  of  the  worship  of  gods.  "  I  would  suggest," 
writes  Frazer,  "  that  a  tardy  recognition  of  the  inherent 
falsehood  and  barrenness  of  magic  set  the  more  thoughtful 
part  of  mankind  to  cast  about  for  a  truer  theory  of  nature 
and  a  more  fruitful  method  of  turning  her  resources  to 
account."  When  a  man  saw  that  his  magical  actions  were 
not  the  real  cause  of  the  activity  of  nature,  he  concluded 
that,  "  if  the  great  world  went  on  its  way  without  the 
help  of  him  or  his  fellows,  it  must  surely  be  because  there 
were  other  beings,  like  himself,  but  far  stronger,  who,  un- 
seen themselves,  directed  its  course  and  brought  about  all 
the  various  series  of  events  which  he  had  hitherto  believed 
to  be  dependent  on  his  own  magic.  ...  To  these  mighty 
beings,  whose  handiwork  he  traced  in  all  the  gorgeous  and 
varied  pageantry  of  nature,  man  now  addressed  himself, 
humbly  confessing  his  dependence  on  their  invisible  power, 
and  beseeching  them  of  their  mercy  to  furnish  him  with 
all  good  things.  ...  In  this,  or  some  such  way  as  this, 
the  deeper  minds  may  be  conceived  to  have  made  the 
transition  from  magic  to  religion."  ^  Concerning  this  view, 
I  would  say,  first,  that  Frazer  does  not  even  attempt  to 

^  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  2d  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  75-78. 


N 


178       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

disprove  the  effectiveness  of  the  sources  of  the  behef  in 
ghosts,  nature-beings,  and  creators  mentioned  in  preceding 
sections.  These  sources  are  sleep,  trances,  and  apparitions ; 
the  impulse  to  personify  great  and  starthng  natural  phenom- 
ena; the  idea  of  creation.  His  hypothesis  of  the  origin  of 
religion  is,  therefore,  superfluous,  unless  he  can  show  that  the 
transition  from  magic  to  religion  took  place  in  the  manner 
he  suggests  before  the  experiences  and  reflections  we  have 
named  had  given  rise  to  the  god-idea  and  to  intercourse 
with  gods.  If,  disregarding  this  objection,  we  consider  the 
assumption  on  which  Frazer's  hypothesis  rests,  namely, 
that  sagacious  men  of  wild  races  persuaded  themselves 
and  their  fellows  of  the  inefficiency  of  magic,  we  find  it 
clearly  contradicted  by  the  history  of  the  relation  of  magic 
to  religion,  and  also  by  the  psychology  of  credulity.  On 
the  latter  ground,  he  may  justly  be  accused  of  attributing 
insufficient  influence  both  to  the  will  to  believe  and  to  the 
support  the  will  to  believe  receives  from  the  many  appar- 
ent or  real  successes  of  magic.  These  successes,  with  the 
help  of  the  several  ways  of  accounting  for  failures  without 
giving  up  the  belief,^  were,  in  my  opinion,  sufficient  to 
support  a  belief  in  the  efficiency  of  magic  until  long  after 
the  birth  of  religion.  Must  we  not  draw  this  conclusion 
from  the  recent  spread  of  the  spiritualistic  movement,  not 
only  among  the  untutored,  but  even  among  people  of 
culture.^  The  recent  gains  of  spiritism  have  been  made 
in  spite  of  numberless  failures,  the  repeated  discovery  of 
deception,  and  the  satisfactory  scientific  explanation  of  a 
large  proportion  of  the  alleged  spiritistic  facts.  To  sup- 
pose that  before  ghosts,  nature-beings,  and  creators  had 

^  A  widespread  opinion  ascribes  the  failures  of  the  magician  to  a  rival  or  to 
the  counter-influence  of  some  evil  spirit.  "If  a  man  died  in  spite  of  the 
medicine-man,  they  [the  Chepara  of  South-East  Africa]  said  it  was  WuUe,  an 
evil  being,  that  killed  him."     (Hovvitt,  op.  cit.,  p.  385.) 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  179 

been  thought  of  as  exercising  a  practical  influence  upon 
men's  conduct,  there  existed  persons  so  keenly  observant, 
so  capable  of  scientific  generalization,  and  so  free  from  the 
obscuring  influences  of  passion  as  to  be  able  to  reject  the 
many  instances  of  apparent  success  of  magic,  is  to  posit 
a  miracle  where  a  satisfactory  natural  explanation  already 
exists.^ 

Although  the  hypothesis  that  gods  and  religion  are  the 
consequence  of  the  recognition  of  the  failure  of  magic 
must  be  rejected,  it  does  not  follow  that  two  modes  of  activ- 
ity with  a  common  purpose,  as  are  magic  and  early  reli- 
gion, do  not  react  upon  each  other  in  many  ways.  If  magic 
was  first  in  the  field,  we  may  believe  that  the  satisfac- 
tion its  results  gave  to  man  were  apparent  and  real,  and 
that  in  providing  him  with  a  means  of  expressing  and 
gratifying  his  desires,  it  tended  to  retard  the  establishment 
of  any  other  method  of  securing  the  same  ends.  The 
habit  of  doing  a  thing  in  a  particular  manner  always  stands 
more  or  less  in  the  way  of  the  discovery  of  other  ways  of 
doing  the  same  thing.  So  that,  in  these  respects,  magic 
was  a  hindrance  to  the  making  of  religion.  There  is, 
however,  a  grain  of  truth  in  Frazer's  hypothesis.  Had 
magic  completely  satisfied  man's  multifarious  desires,  he 

1  In  the  third  chapter  of  Magic  and  Religion,  Andrew  Lang  vigorously 
attacks  Frazer's  hypothesis.  A  part  of  his  argument,  based  on  generally 
accepted  historical  data,  is  summarized  in  this  passage:  "  If  we  find  that  the 
most  backward  race  known  to  us  believes  in  a  power,  yet  propitiates  him 
neither  by  prayer  nor  sacrifice,  and  if  we  find,  as  we  do,  that  in  many  more 
advanced  races  in  Africa  and  America,  it  is  precisely  the  highest  power  which 
is  left  unpropitiated,  then  we  really  cannot  argue  that  gods  were  first  invented 
as  powers  who  could  give  good  things,  on  receipt  of  other  good  things,  sacrifice 
and  prayer."  He  remarks,  in  addition,  that  although  one  would  not  expect 
people  who  had  recognized  the  uselessness  of  magic  and  had  turned  to  gods, 
to  continue  the  development  of  the  magical  art;  yet,  in  order  to  find  the 
highest  magic,  one  has  to  go  to  no  less  a  civilization  than  that  of  Japan,  where 
gods  are  numerous. 


i8o        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

would,  in  all  probability,  have  paid  but  scant  attention  to 
the  gods ;  for  it  is  mainly  in  times  of  trial  that  man  turns 
to  them.  It  was  thus  greatly  advantageous  to  the  develop- 
ment of  religion  that  the  inadequacy  of  magic  should  have 
been  felt.  Besides,  magic  exercised  a  considerable  in- 
fluence on  the  general  mental  growth  of  savage  popula- 
tions ;  in  this  sense  also  it  may  be  said  to  have  indirectly 
helped  religion. 

3.  The  simpler  forms  of  magic  probably  existed  prior  to 
religion.  —  A  proof  of  the  separate  origins  of  magic  and  of 
religion  leaves  the  question  of  priority  unsolved.  When 
one  questions  students  of  primitive  history,  they  say  unan- 
imously that,  in  the  lower  societies  of  which  we  have  accu- 
rate knowledge,  magic  is  always  in  evidence,  whereas 
religion  may  be  represented  by  mere  rudiments.  Thus 
they  convey  the  impression  that  magic  antedated  religion. 
But  the  historical  argument  is  open  to  serious  objections. 
The  so-called  "  primitive  "  populations  are  not  at  all  primi- 
tive, and  so  any  one,  without  contesting  the  correctness  of 
the  facts  reported  by  anthropologists,  may  refuse  to  admit 
that  these  facts  represent  the  condition  of  really  primitive 
societies,  and  may  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  originally 
there  was  no  magic,  but  only  a  simple  and  crude  reHgion, 
and  that  what  we  observe  to-day  is  a  state  of  degeneration. 
No  headway  can  be  made  towards  an  historical  solution  of 
the  problem  until  our  knowledge  has  been  increased  to  an 
extent  perhaps  impossible. 

There  remains,  fortunately,  another  line  of  argumenta- 
tion :  the  comparative  consideration  of  the  mental  processes 
required  for  the  establishment  of  magic  and  religion.  If 
certain  classes  of  magical  practices  can  be  shown  to  result 
from  observations  more  obvious  and  from  mental  processes 
more  elementary  than  those  involved  in  the  making  of  re- 


MAGIC  AND   RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  i8i 

ligion,  it  will  be  legitimate  to  conclude  that  those  classes  of 
magic  probably  came  into  existence  earlier  than  religion. 
That  this  conclusion  is  warranted  by  the  facts,  has,  I  be- 
lieve, been  made  clear  in  the  preceding  pages,  where  one 
class  of  magic  was  shown  to  be  independent  both  of  the 
notion  of  animism  and  of  dynamism,  and  where  the  idea  of 
a  non-personal  Power,  upon  which  most  kinds  of  magic 
depend,  was  found  to  be  in  all  probability  a  conception 
earlier  in  time  than  animism. 

The  priority  of  magic  does  not,  of  course,  mean  that  there 
has  been  no  overlapping  of  the  periods  during  which  the 
two  modes  of  behavior  came  into  existence :  but  only  that 
magic  probably  began  before  religion. 

The  problem  of  priority  would  be  of  great  importance 
were  magic  and  rehgion  genetically  related.  But,  as  this 
is  not  the  case,  the  question  possesses  little  real  significance. 

4.  Magic  and  religion  are  often  closely  associated.  — 
Certain  authors  have  affirmed  that  magic  and  religion,  in 
their  crudest  expression,  are  hardly  to  be  distinguished. 
This  is  an  error  impossible  to  one  who  has  accepted  the 
conceptions  offered  in  this  book.  It  is  true,  indeed,  that 
they  are  often  used  together  and  for  a  common  purpose, 
but  this  in  no  way  obliterates  their  difference. 

Perhaps  enough  has  been  said  already  about  the  nature 
of  the  magical  power  and  of  the  relation  to  it  of  the  per- 
sonality of  the  magician.  For  the  sake  of  pointing  out 
once  more  the  distinction  existing  between  magical  and  re- 
ligious behavior,  however,  I  will  venture  two  additional 
illustrations.  In  ancient  Peru,  when  a  war  expedition  was 
contemplated,  the  people  used  to  starve  some  black  sheep 
for  several  days  and  then  slay  them,  uttering  the  incantation, 
"  As  the  hearts  of  these  beasts  are  weakened,  so  let  our 
enemies  be  weakened."     If  this  utterance  is  to  be  regarded 


i82        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

as  an  attempt  to  project  the  operator's  "  will  "  upon  the 
enemies,  we  are  in  the  realm  of  pure  magic.  But  if  it  is  to 
be  understood  as  a  request  addressed  to  a  personal  being, 
it  is  a  prayer,  and  then  we  deal  probably  with  an  instance  of 
the  combination  of  magic  with  religion.  One  of  the  finest 
incantations  of  the  ancient  Egyptians  seeks  to  make 
"  the  father  of  light  "  enter  into  a  lamp.  "  *  Come  down 
into  this  flame,  inspire  with  thy  holy  spirit.  ...  O  Logos 
that  orderest  day  and  night.  .  .  .  Come,  show  thyself  to 
me,  O  God  of  gods ;  enter,  make  manifest  thyself  ...  in 
thy  ape  form  enter.'  This  must  have  been  an  invocation 
to  Thoth,  the  sacred  ape,  showing  that  one  of  the  greatest 
gods  was  invoked  to  manifest  himself  by  magic."  ^  Here 
a  request  is  made  of  a  god  to  enter  into  a  lamp.  So  far 
we  deal  with  a  religious  attitude  and  behavior.  But  what 
seems  to  be  expected  of  the  god  is,  in  part  at  least,  a  mag- 
ical activity,  i.  e.  the  use  of  a  mysterious  power  in  his 
possession. 

In  an  ingenious  essay,  already  mentioned,^  Marett,  argu- 
ing against  Frazer's  "oil  and  water"  theory  of  the 
relation  of  magic  to  religion,  attempts  to  show  that  a  pro- 
gressive personification  and  deification  of  the  magical 
instrument  often  takes  place,  and,  at  the  same  time,  "  the 
spell  evolves  into  a  prayer."  Magic,  he  urges,  is  not  in 
origin  a  mechanical  "  natural  science,"  capable  only  of 
yielding  to  religion  as  a  substitute  and  never  of  joining 
forces  with  it  as  ally  or  blood-relation.  "  Magic  proper  is 
all  along  an  occult  process,  and,  as  such,  part  and  parcel 
of  the  '  god-stuff '  out  of  which  religion  fashions  itself." 
And  he  provides  illustrations  which,  he  thinks,  "  show 
how  artificial  must  ever  be  the  distinction  we  draw,  purely 

1  Petrie,  Flinders,  Aspects  of  Egyptian  Redgion,  Transactions  of  the  Third  In- 
ternational Congress  of  the  History  of  Religions,  Vol.  I,  p.  192. 
■■^  Marett,  R.  R.,  Frotyi  Spell  to  Prayer,  pp.  76  ff. 


MAGIC  AND   RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  183 

for  our  own  classificatory  purposes,  between    magic   and 
religion." 

I  have  no  wish  whatsoever  to  deny  that  the  spell  often 
passes  into  prayer  and  that  the  magical  instrument  may 
be  deified ;  and  I  quite  agree  that  magic  and  religion  fre- 
quently join  forces.  But  the  term  "blood-relation  "  means 
a  closer  relation  than  that  obtaining  between  them,  and  the 
accusation  that  the  distinction  between  these  two  forms  of 
behavior  is  artificial  does  not  seem  to  me  warranted.  The 
feeling-attitude  of  magic  is  always  distinct  from  the 
feeling-attitude  properly  called  religion,  because  the  Powers 
to  which  magic  and  religion  respectively  address  themselves 
are  of  a  different  nature.  There  is  nothing  in  Marett's 
instances  that  would  give  one  the  right  to  gainsay  what  I 
have  insisted  regarding  the  definiteness  of  the  distinction. 
Magic  and  religion  are  frequently  allies  because  tJicy  often 
have  the  same  end,  but  an  alliance  prompted  by  a  common 
purpose  is  not  a  blood  relationship.  And  if  one  chooses 
to  speak  of  magic  as  "  evolving  "  into  religion,  one  should 
not  understand  by  that  expression  that,  because  of  an  essen- 
tial identity  of  nature,  the  one  becomes  the  other.  That 
which  happens  is  merely  that,  having  two  instruments  at 
his  service  for  producing  one  and  the  same  result,  the  sav- 
age uses  them  simultaneously  or  in  succession. 

Will-Magic  in  all  its  phases  belongs  to  magic  and  never 
to  religion.  For  the  Power  that  is  sent  forth  in  Will- 
Magic  is  indeed  despatched  by  a  person,  but  is  not  itself 
a  person  ;  it  is  a  non-personal  Power,  detachable  in  various 
quantities  from  a  person.  Between  a  person  dealing,  as  a 
person,  with  another,  and  a  person  using  upon  another  a 
coercitive  Power,  there  is  a  chasm,  —  a  chasm  equally  great 
whether  the  coercitive  Power  seems  to  proceed  from  the 
very  centre  of  the  personality,  as  in  Will-Magic,  or  whether 
it  is  entirely  external,  as  in  other  varieties  of  the  art.     Hav- 


1 84        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ing  said  so  much,  I  must  add  that,  although  Marett  regards 
magic  and  rehgion  as  "  overlapping,"  he  holds,  neverthe- 
less, that  these  terms  embody  "  a  distinction  of  first-rate 
importance."  He  merely  wishes  "to  mitigate  the  contrast 
by  proposing  what,  in  effect,  amounts  to  a  separation  in 
lieu  of  a  divorce."  ^ 

5.  Religion  is  social  and  beneficent;  magic  is  dominantly 
individual  and  often  evil.  —  The  individualistic,  private,  and 
evil  character  of  magic  has  been  emphasized  by  certain 
students  of  primitive  life  and  contrasted  with  the  social, 
public,  and  benevolent  character  of  religion.  That  these 
epithets  express  a  relative  difference  between  these  two 
forms  of  behavior  is  undeniable.  One  must  agree  in  the 
main  with  King,  when  he  writes  :  "  There  is,  we  believe, 
no  generalization  concerning  savage  practices  which  may 
be  made  with  greater  assurance  than  this,  that  magic  is 
relatively  individualistic  and  secret  in  its  methods  and  in- 
terests, and  is  thus  opposed  fundamentally  to  the  methods 
and  interests  of  religion,  which  are  social  and  public.  This 
individualistic  and  secret  character  of  magic  makes  it  easy 
for  it  to  become  the  instrument  of  secret  vengeance,  as  we 
have  seen  above.  There  is  no  primitive  society,  as  far  as 
our  accounts  have  gone,  which  does  not  dread  the  sor- 
cerer." ^  But  it  would  be  an  error  to  regard  these  dif- 
ferences as  essential  and  to  try  to  use  them  for  the 
differentiation  of  magic  from  religion.  There  is  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  magic  to  make  it  necessarily  personal,  se- 
cret, or  evil.  The  facts  speak  clearly.  On  the  one  hand, 
there  is  an  abundance  of  magic  performed  not  for  an  in- 
dividual only,  but  for  a  group,  or  for  the  whole  tribe,  —  a 
magic,  the  technique  of  which  is  public  and  the  intention 

1  Marett,  R.  R.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  31,  34. 
*  King,  Irving,  op.  cit.,  p.  195. 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  185 

benevolent.  One  need  only  refer  to  Egyptian  magic  in 
confirmation  of  this  statement.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  are  stages  in  the  later  life  of  nations,  during  which 
religion  is  predominantly  a  personal  matter.  Christian 
mysticism,  for  instance,  which  is  for  many  the  highest 
expression  of  Christianity,  is  eminently  individualistic. 

The  fact  that  religion  is  used  for  social  ends  more 
widely  than  is  magic  is  a  consequence  of  their  fundamental 
differences  in  origin  and  in  nature.  Since  early  gods  are  re- 
garded as  tribal  ancestors,  creators,  or  nature  beings,  they 
are  intimately  related,  not  with  isolated  individuals,  but 
tvith  the  social  group  as  a  whole.  The  natural  tendency 
would  therefore  be  for  the  tribe  as  a  whole  to  maintain 
relations  with  these  beings.  On  the  other  hand,  no  obvi- 
ous reason  exists  for  the  non-personal  magical  Power  to 
be  considered  as  belonging  to,  or  as  acting  for,  the  entire 
community.  It  is  at  the  service  of  any  individual  who 
chances  to  get  hold  of  it.  This  same  fundamental  dif- 
ference explains  why,  when  the  separation  between  the 
offices  of  magician  and  of  priest  has  taken  place,  the  ma- 
gician is  more  loosely  connected  with  the  tribe  than  is  the 
priest. 

The  frequently  evil  character  of  magic  is  also  readily 
explained.  The  blood-relationship  involved  between  gods 
and  the  tribe  in  the  conception  of  ancestral  and  creator 
gods  necessarily  implies  a  general  attitude  of  benevolence 
toward  the  tribe.  The  gods  are,  therefore,  in  theory  at 
least,  inaccessible  to  the  enemy  of  the  common  weal. 
The  worship,  by  a  community,  of  personal  powers  recog- 
nized as  evil,  would  lead  speedily  to  the  destruction  of  the 
community  ;  for  it  would  result  in  a  systematic  strength- 
ening of  antisocial  forces. 

Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  magic  is  much  used  for  the 
gratification  of  individual  and  evil  purposes.     But  to  say, 


1 86        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

as  King  does,  that  when  the  ends  of  magic  are  more  or 
less  socialized,  they  begin  to  partake  of  the  nature  of  re- 
ligion, while  "  when  religion  becomes  subservient  to  anti- 
social or  to  merely  private  ends,  it  is  scarcely  to  be 
distinguished  from  sorcery,"  ^  is  to  fail  in  the  recognition 
of  the  fundamental  difference  existing  between  these  two 
types  of  behavior. 

6.  Magic  is  of  shorter  duration  than  religion.  —  Opinions 
conflict  regarding  the  ultimate  fate  of  religion,  but  it  can- 
not be  denied  that  it  is  still  among  us,  widespread  and 
influential,  while  magic  has  long  since  fallen  into  disrepute 
and  is  probably  doomed  to  disappear  altogether.  Why 
this  difference  in  the  historical  course  of  these  two  modes 
of  behavior } 

If  the  reader  will  turn  to  the  first  chapter.  Religion  as 
a  Type  of  Rational  Behavior,  he  will  see  that  all  but  two 
of  the  reasons  assigned  there  for  the  continuance  of  re- 
ligion, even  though  gods  should  have  merely  a  subjective 
existence,  apply  also  to  magic.  The  two  exceptions  are 
these :  since  the  Power  with  which  magic  deals  is  not  per- 
sonal, it  cannot  provide  the  comfort  found  in  communion 
with  a  loving  All-Father,  and  it  cannot  serve  as  a  stay  and 
inspiration  of  the  moral  life.  Now,  it  is  because  religion 
admits  of  these  moral  relations  with  an  ideal  Being  that 
it  has  endured.  Were  it,  like  magic,  able  to  serve  men 
only  in  the  other  respects  listed  in  the  chapter  referred  to, 
it  would  certainly  have  long  since  lost  most  of  the  potency 
it  still  retains  ;  for  its  inefificiency  as  a  means  of  controlling 
physical  nature  has  by  this  time  become  evident. 

Another  circumstance  has  accelerated  the  fall  of  magic. 
Its  failure  to  "  make  good "  in  certain  directions  might 
have  been  sufficiently  overbalanced  by  successes  in  other 

1  King,  op,  cit.,  p.  195. 


MAGIC  AND  RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  187 

directions  which  would  have  delayed  longer  its  fall,  were  not 
the  fundamental  principles  of  science  directly  opposed  to  it. 
Science  is  built  on  the  principle  that  a  quantitative  relation 
exists  between  cause  and  effect.  As  soon  as  this  notion 
found  lodgement  in  the  human  mind,  magic  became  on  log- 
ical grounds  radically  inacceptable.  The  conflict  of  religion 
with  science  could  not  be  so  direct  and  deadly,  for  as  the 
alleged  effects  of  religious  practices  are  ascribed  to  per- 
sonal agents,  science  could  attack  religion  only  by  showing 
that  it  was  inefficient  or  by  proving  directly  that  the  gods 
were  merely  mental  creations.  Now,  the  inefficiency  of 
religion  in  matters  physical  can  be  proved  with  relative 
ease  ;  but  not  its  inefficiency  in  matters  spiritual.  And  as 
to  a  metaphysical  disproof  of  the  existence  of  gods,  the 
student  of  the  history  of  philosophy  knows  what  difficul- 
ties stand  in  its  way. 

7.  Magic  and  the  origin  of  science.  —  The  reader  will 
remember  that  after  having  discriminated  roughly,  in  the 
introduction,  three  modes  of  behavior  observable  in  man, 
I  added  that  while  the  anthropopathic  behavior  becomes 
reUgion  when  it  is  directed  to  gods,  the  mechanical  be- 
havior becomes  science  when  the  principle  of  quantitative 
proportion  implicit  in  that  behavior  is  definitively  recog- 
nized. The  common  opinion  is,  however,  that  magic  is 
the  precursor  of  science.  Frazer,  who  may  stand  as  the 
representative  of  that  theory,  writes,  for  instance:  "  Magic 
is  next  of  kin  to  science,  for  science  assumes  that  in  nature 
one  event  follows  another  necessarily  and  invariably  with- 
out the  intervention  of  any  special  spiritual  or  personal 
agency.  Thus  its  fundamental  conception  is  identical  with 
that  of  modern  science ;  underlying  the  whole  system  is  a 
faith,  implicit,  but  real  and  firm,  in  the  order  and  uniform- 
ity of  nature  .  .  .  his  power  [the  magician's],  great  as  he 


1 88        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

believes  it  to  be,  is  by  no  means  arbitrary  and  unlimited. 
He  can  wield  it  only  so  long  as  he  strictly  conforms  to  the 
rules  of  his  art,  or  to  what  may  be  called  the  laws  of  nature 
as  conceived  by  him.  .  .  .  Thus  the  analogy  between  the 
magical  and  the  scientific  conception  of  the  world  is  close. 
In  both  of  them  the  succession  of  events  is  perfectly  regu- 
lar and  certain,  being  determined  by  immutable  laws,  the 
operation  of  which  can  be  foreseen  and  calculated  pre- 
cisely." ^ 

Regarding  this  opinion,  I  observe  that  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  a  fixed  relation  between  actions  or  beliefs  and 
their  results  is  not  peculiar  to  magic ;  it  is  implied  also  to 
a  considerable  degree  in  religion  and,  more  perfectly,  in 
mechanical  behavior.  Salvation  is  by  the  right  practice, 
or  by  the  right  faith,  or  by  both.  The  gods  cannot  be 
approached  and  conciliated  in  any  way ;  worshipper,  no 
less  than  magician,  has  to  conform  to  a  definite  ritual. 
In  certain  communities  not  entirely  barbarous,  salvation 
is  held  to  depend  upon  a  belief  in  no  fewer  than  thirty- 
nine  articles  !  Frazer  finds  it  convenient  to  disregard  the 
considerable  share  of  the  personal,  i.e.  of  the  capricious,  the 
incalculable,  in  magic.  Yet  the  personality  of  the  magician 
introduces  an  indeterminable  factor,  one  particularly  con- 
siderable in  Will- Magic.  Nothing  could  be  more  directly 
antagonistic  to  the  scientific  attitude  than  the  influence 
accorded  to  the  personality  of  the  magician.  It  appears  to 
me  truer  to  the  facts  to  say  that  the  fundamental  concep- 
tion of  science,  far  from  being  identical  with  that  of  magic, 
is  absent  from  it.  For  the  essential  presupposition  of 
science  —  that  which  differentiates  it  alike  from  magic 
and   from   religion  —  is  the    acknowledgment   of   definite 

1  Frazer,  J.  G.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  61-62.  In  the  third  edition  (pp.  458-461)  a 
change  seems  to  have  taken  place  in  the  author's  opinion.  What  this  change 
amounts  to,  I  cannot  exactly  make  out. 


MAGIC  AND   RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  189 

and  constant  quantitative  relations  between  causes  and 
effects,  relations  which  completely  exclude  the  personal 
element. 

That  which  magic  shares  with  science  is  not  the  belief  in 
the  fundamental  principle  we  have  named,  but  the  desire 
to  gain  the  mastery  over  the  powers  of  nature,  and, 
perhaps,  the  practice  of  the  experimental  method.  The 
experimentation  of  magic  is,  however,  so  Hmited  and  so 
unconscious  that  it  can  hardly  be  assimilated  to  the  modern 
scientific  method. 

If  any  one  should  turn  to  history  for  an  argument  in 
support  of  Frazer's  thesis,  and  should  point  out  that 
the  alchemist  is  the  lineal  ancestor  of  the  scientist,  the 
sufficient  answer  would  be  as  follows:  (i)  Historical 
succession  does  not  imply  continuity  of  principle.  Al- 
though magic,  alchemy,  and  science  form  an  historical 
sequence,  the  fundamental  principle  of  the  last  is  not  to 
be  found  in  the  others.  (2)  The  clear  recognition  of  the 
principle  of  fixed  quantitative  relations  means,  whenever 
and  wherever  it  appears,  the  birth  of  science  and  the  death 
of  both  magic  and  alchemy.  This  last  fact  demonstrates 
clearly  the  fundamental  opposition  of  these  arts  to  scientific 
procedure. 

Magic  does  not,  any  more  than  religion,  encourage  the 
exact  observation  of  external  facts,  but  rather  promotes 
self-deception  with  regard  to  them.  So  the  discovery  of 
the  scientific  principle  was  probably  almost  as  much  hin- 
dered by  the  false  notions  and  the  pernicious  habits  of 
mind  encouraged  by  magic,  as  it  was  furthered  by  the  gain 
in  general  mental  activity  and  knowledge  which  it  brought 
about. 

If  the  quantitative  presupposition  of  science  is  absent 
from  magic  and  religion,  it  is  implicitly  present  in  mechani- 
cal behavior.     The  savage  is  nearer  the  scientific  spirit,  and 


190        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

its  methods  when  he  constructs  a  weapon  to  fit  a  particular 
purpose,  or  when  he  adjusts  his  bow  and  arrow  to  the 
direction  and  the  strength  of  the  wind,  than  when  he  exor- 
cises diseases,  burns  an  enemy  in  effigy,  or  abstains  from 
sexual  intercourse  to  promote  success  in  the  hunt. 

8.   Summary  of  the  forms  assumed  by  magic  and  religion. 

—  In  the  preceding  pages  I  have  taken  pains  to  discrimi- 
nate and  classify  to  an  extent  perhaps  wearisome,  but  he 
who  would  understand  human  nature  cannot  rest  satisfied 
with  the  loose  class-terms  that  are  current.  He  must 
strive  after  a  finer  differentiation  of  its  confusingly  rich 
expressions. 

Three  types  of  behavior  have  been  separated  as  charac- 
teristic of  the  life  of  man,  even  in  the  most  primitive  tribes 
now  extant :  the  mechanical,  the  coercitive,  and  the  an- 
thropopathic  types.  At  the  root  of  the  two  latter  types 
are  found  the  conceptions  of  an  indeterminate  Potency, 
of  visible  beings  (men  and  animals),  and  of  unseen, 
personal  agents  (ghosts,  spirits,  nature-beings,  gods). 

1.  Mechanical  behavior  is  the  ordinary,  commonplace 
behavior  of  men  when  dealing  with  inanimate  things. 
It  contains  the  germ  of  the  recognition  of  a  principle 
which,  when  explicitly  formulated,  becomes  the  corner- 
stone of  science :    the   principle  of   quantitative   relation. 

2.  Coercitive  behavior,  or  magic,  has  been  found  to 
fall  into  three  groups  :  (i)  no  idea  of  power  is  present; 
(2)  the  Power  does  not  belong  to  the  magician,  but  he 
secures  it  from  outside  himself ;  (3)  the  Power  is  regarded 
as  identical  with  the  will  of  the  operator.  Another  classi- 
fication brings  magic  back  to  three  principles :  Repetition, 
Transmission  of  effects,  and  Efficiency  of  will-effort. 

Three  classes  of  wonderful  men  exist  in  primitive 
societies.     I  have  called   them,  Magicians,    men   able   to 


MAGIC  AND   RELIGION:    COROLLARIES  191 

secure  and  make  use  of  the  non-personal  Potency ;  Magic- 
Gods,  men  possessing  in  their  own  right  the  wonderful 
Potency ;  Incarnate  Gods,  men  in  whom  a  god  has  taken 
his  abode. 

3.  The  anthropopathic  behavior  includes  the  willing 
and  feeling  relations  of  men  and  animals  with  one  an- 
other, and  those  of  men  with  unseen  beings.  It  includes, 
therefore,  religion.  I  have  called  Passive  Religiosity  the 
relations  maintained  by  most  primitive  tribes  with  the 
highest  god  in  whom  they  believe,  usually  a  creator-god, 
by  whom  they  are  influenced,  but  whom  they  cannot 
be  said  to  worship.  Passive,  unorganized  religiosity  must 
be,  it  seems,  the  necessary  precursor  of  organized  religion  ; 
it  is  its  larval  stage.  But  it  does  not  by  any  means  dis- 
appear from  society  when  a  system  of  definite  relations 
with  gods,  or  with  impersonal  sources  of  religious  inspira- 
tion has  been  developed.  In  all  societies  there  is  always 
a  large  number  of  people  who  live  in  the  limbo  of  organ- 
ized religion.  They  are  open  to  the  influence  of  religious 
agents,  in  whom  they  believe  more  or  less  cold-heartedly, 
without  ever  entering  into  definite  and  fixed  relations  with 
them.  The  belief  in  a  Supreme  Being  who  keeps  aloof 
from  the  universe  permits  only  Passive  Religiosity. 

If  one  wishes  to  single  out  the  peculiar  relations  into 
which  men  enter  with  evil  spirits,  one  may  speak  of  them 
as  constituting  a  Negative  Form  of  Active  Religion. 


PART    III 

RELIGION  IN  ITS  RELATION  TO  MO- 
RALITY, MYTHOLOGY,  METAPHYSICS, 
AND    PYSCHOLOGY 


CHAPTER   X 
1.    MORALITY   AND   RELIGION 

The  extent  of  the  literature  on  the  relation  of  morality 
to  religion  is  amazing.  Almost  every  conceivable  kind  of 
relation  has  been  attributed  to  them.  It  has  been  main- 
tained, for  instance,  that  morality  has  no  existence  out- 
side of  reHgion ;  that  it  is  one  of  the  fruits  of  reHgion  ; 
that  purified  religion  is  morality;  and  that  no  connection 
whatever  exists  between  morality  and  religion.  But  if  one 
accepts  the  conception  of  religion  offered  in  this  book,  the 
relation  to  religion  of  ethical  appreciations  and  needs  does 
not  present  a  particular  problem.  It  is  merely  a  part  of  the 
general  problem  of  the  relation  to  religion  of  the  human 
impulses,  tendencies,  and  cravings. 

There  can  be  no  agreement  as  to  the  relation  of  morality 
to  religion  until  there  is  agreement  regarding  the  origin  and 
the  nature  of  each.  In  so  far  as  the  opinion  that  the  social 
life  is  the  matrix  of  moral  sentiments  has  become  generally 
accepted,  progress  has  been  made  towards  unanimity. 
This  view  does  not  necessarily  imply  a  naturalistic  philoso- 
phy. One  may  posit  behind  the  phenomenal  world,  as  or- 
ganizer and  inspirer,  a  conscious  Power.  In  either  case, 
provided  one  admits  that  the  moral  life  issues  out  of  the 
ordinary  social  relations,  the  problem  remains  the  same  : 
when  the  moral  tendencies,  needs,  and  cravings  have  ap- 
peared, why  and  how  do  they  become  connected  with  the 
religious  life  ? 

195 


196        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  grounds  for  the  belief  in  the  social,  non-religious 
origin  of  morality  are  now  so  well  known  that  I  need  not 
attempt  an  exhaustive  presentation  of  them.  In  order  to 
keep  from  disintegration,  a  community,  however  low,  must 
enforce  rules  making  for  cohesion  and  efficiency.  These 
rules  are  learned  gradually  from  the  lessons  of  life.  Such 
things  as  treachery,  stealing,  and  murder,  among  members 
of  the  group,  will  necessarily  soon  fall  under  the  ban  of 
tribal  opinion.  Moreover,  the  value  of  kindness  and  love 
will  be  felt  in  the  family  relations,  and  will  extend  thence 
to  the  wider  tribal  connections.  Even  among  the  higher 
animals,  the  mother  cherishes  and  protects  the  young  ; 
for  the  satisfaction  of  the  maternal  instinct,  she  will 
undergo  privation  and  even  death. ^ 

The  existence  of  social  virtues  of  considerable  nobility, 
even  among  the  lowest  savages,  with  or  without  religion,  is 
one  of  the  facts  which  late  ethnological  discoveries  have 
placed  beyond  doubt.  The  following  quotations  show  in  a 
surprising  manner  the  independence  of  moral  ideas  from 
rehgious  beliefs.  "  Among  the  Central  Australian  natives 
there  is  never  any  idea  of  appealing  for  assistance  to  any 
one  of  these  Alcheringa  ancestors  in  any  way.  .  .  .  They 
have  not  the  vaguest  idea  of  a  personal  individual  other 
than  an  actual  living  member  of  the  tribe  who  approves  or 
disapproves  of  their  conduct,  so  far  as  anything  like  what 
we  call  morality  is  concerned.  ...  It  must  not,  however, 
be  imagined  that  the  Central  Australian  native  has  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  a  moral  code.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  has 
a  very  strict  one,  and  during  his  initiation  ceremonies  the 
youth  is  told  that  there  are  certain  things  which  he  must 

^  For  a  valuable,  detailed  account  of  the  origin  of  the  tender  emotion  from 
the  maternal  protective  impulse,  see  Alexandre  Sutherland's  Origin  and 
Growth  of  the  Moral  Instinct.  There  is  also  an  excellent  briefer  treatment  in 
William  McDougall's  Social  Psychology,  pp.  66-81. 


MOR.\LITY  AND  RELIGION  197 

do  and  certain  others  which  he  must  not  do,  but  he  quite 
understands  that  any  punishment  for  the  infringement  of 
these  rules  of  conduct  .  .  .  will  come  from  the  older  men 
and  not  at  all  from  any  supreme  being,  of  whom  he  hears 
nothing  whatever.  In  fact,  he  then  learns  that  the  spirit 
creature,  whom,  up  to  that  time,  as  a  boy,  he  has  regarded 
as  all-powerful,  is  merely  a  myth,  and  that  such  a  being 
does  not  really  exist,  and  is  only  an  invention  of  the  men 
to  frighten  the  women  and  children."  ^ 

A  similar  invention  of  bugbears  for  the  moral  edification  of 
the  youth  is  found  also  among  the  Ona  Indians  of  Tierra  del 
Fuego.  They  "  pretend  that  the  natural  features  of  their 
country,  such  as  the  woods  and  rocks,  the  white  mists  and 
running  waters,  are  haunted  by  spirits  of  various  sorts, 
'  bogies  in  which  they  themselves  do  not  believe,  but  which 
are  a  strong  moral  aid  in  dealing  with  refractory  wives  and 
wilful  children.'  "  In  order  to  estabhsh  the  belief,  men  dis- 
guise themselves  in  appropriate  costumes  and  frighten 
children  and  youth.  At  about  fourteen  they  are  initiated 
in  these  mysteries.  "  At  a  series  of  nocturnal  meetings 
they  then  learn  the  true  nature  of  the  '  moral  aid  '  by  which 
their  green  unknowing  youth  has  been  trained  in  the  way 
it  should  go,  .  .  .  Any  boy  or  man  who  betrays  the  se- 
cret is  quietly  put  to  death  ;  and  the  same  fate  overtakes 
any  woman  who  is  suspected  of  knowing  more  than  is  good 
for  her."  2 

The  morality  of  the  Australian  aborigines  —  the  most 
primitive  savages  of  which  we  have  accurate  knowledge  — 
does  not  fall  far  short  of  that  of  large  portions  of  our 
Christian  communities.     And  yet  many  of  their  tribes  have 

^  Spencer  and  Gillen,  N^ortherii  Tribes  of  Central  Australia,  Macmillan, 
London,  1904,  pp.  491-492.  See  also  The  Native  Tribes  of  Central  Australia, 
p.  246,  footnote. 

^Frazer,  J.  G.,  The  Golden  Bough,  1st  ed.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  166,  167. 


198        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

no  religion  at  all,  if  by  religion  one  means  offering  formal 
petitions  for  the  assistance  of  the  gods.  "  The  natives  of 
Queensland  were  said  to  be  generally  honest  in  their  deal- 
ings with  one  another.  ...  If  a  native  made  a  find  of  any 
kind,  as  a  honey  tree,  and  marked  it,  it  was  thereafter  safe 
for  him,  as  far  as  his  own  tribesmen  were  concerned,  no  mat- 
ter for  how  long  he  left  it. 

"  Under  the  influence  of  the  food  rule,  a  certain  gener- 
osity of  character  is  fostered.  He  was  accustomed  to  share 
his  food  and  possessions.  A  man  of  the  Kurnai  tribe  must 
give  a  certain  part  of  his  '  catch  '  of  game,  and  that  the  best 
part,  to  his  wife's  father.  Each  able-bodied  man  is  under 
definite  obligation  to  supply  certain  others  with  food.  .  .  . 
Howitt  says  of  these  food  rules  and  other  similar  customs 
that  they  give  us  an  entirely  different  and  more  favorable 
impression  of  the  aboriginal  character  than  that  usually 
held. 

"  Among  the  Central  Australians,  chastity  is  a  term  to  be 
applied  to  the  relation  of  one  group  to  another,  rather  than 
to  the  relation  of  individuals.  Men  of  one  group  have  more 
or  less  free  access  to  all  the  women  of  a  certain  other  group. 
Within  the  rules  prescribed  by  customs,  breaches  of  mari- 
tal relations  were  severely  punished.  Among  the  natives 
of  North  Central  Queensland,  the  camp  as  a  body  punished 
incest  and  promiscuity. 

"Much  affection  was  usually  shown  to  children,  and 
this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  abortion  and  infanticide 
were  practised  in  many  locahties.  Howitt  says,  '  .  .  . 
they  [the  mining  tribes]  are  very  fond  of  their  offspring 
and  very  indulgent  to  those  they  keep,  rarely  striking 
them.' 

"  Lumholtz  says  that  the  Queenslanders  were  very  con- 
siderate of  all  who  were  sick,  old,  or  infirm.  In  northern 
parts  of  Australia  there  were  many  blind,  and  they  were 


MORALITY   AND   RELIGION 


199 


always  well  cared  for  by  the  tribe,  being  often  the  best  fed 
and  nourished."^ 

The  morality  of  the  native  Australians  before  they  suf- 
fered from  contact  with  the  whites  was  sufficiently  high  to 
lead  Andrew  Lang  to  compare  their  "  commandments  " 
with  the  Decalogue.  The  following  rules  are  apparently 
taught  and  fairly  well  practised  among  them :  — 

"To  Hsten  to  old  people  and  to  obey  them. 

"To  share  everything  with  their  friends. 

"To  live  in  peace  with  their  friends. 

"  Not  to  have  relations  with  young  girls  and  with  mar- 
ried women."  ^ 

The  struggle  for  existence  imposes  upon  primitive  tribes 
two  different  codes;  one  regulating  the  behavior  of  the 
members  of  the  tribe  towards  one  another,  the  other  gov- 
erning their  relations  with  other  tribes.  Herbert  Spencer 
aptly  characterized  these  codes  when  he  named  them  the 
ethics  of  amity  and  the  ethics  of  enmity.  ^     Killing  a  brother 

^  King,  Irving,  The  Development  of  Religion,  Macmillan  and  Co.,  1910, 
Chap.  XI,  pp.  287-305,  freely  quoted  with  many  omissions.  King  draws 
his  information  from  the  most  reliable  sources. 

2  Here  are  two  baby  songs  reported  by  Mrs.  E.  Langloh  Parker,  The 
Euahlayi  Tribe;  A  Study  of  Aboriginal  Life  in  Australia,  London,  Archi- 
bald Constable  and  Co.  (1905),  pp.  52,  54.  If  they  do  not  conform  to  the 
best  pedagogical  principles,  they  mark,  at  any  rate,  an  earnest  ethical  purpose. 

"  Give  to  me.  Baby, 

Give  to  her.  Baby, 

Give  to  him,  Baby, 

Give  to  one.  Baby, 

Give  to  all,  Baby." 

«'  Kind  be. 
Do  not  steal, 

Do  not  touch  what  to  another  belongs, 
Leave  all  such  alone, 
Kind  be." 
'  Spencer,  Herbert,    The  Principles  of  Ethics,  Appleton  and  Co.,   1893, 
Vol.  I,  p.  316.      (See  the  whole  chapter,  pp.  307-324.) 


200       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

tribesman  is  a  crime ;  killing  a  member  of  a  hostile  tribe  is 
a  good  deed.  The  necessity  for  these  two  irreconcilable 
standards  is  evident ;  they  are  the  forms  in  which  the  pri- 
mordial impulses  of  survival  and  aggrandizement  manifest 
themselves.  As  these  two  codes  exist  simultaneously, 
there  are  developed  two  sets  of  ideas  and  sentiments. 

These  incongruous  codes  still  survive  among  Christian 
nations  :  the  god  of  love  (ethics  of  amity)  becomes  at  times 
a  fighting  god  (ethics  of  enmity),  supplicated  for  help,  and 
thanked  for  assistance  in  the  slaughter  of  enemies.  Chris- 
tian nations  have  not  yet  been  able  to  accept  as  universally 
valid  the  code  of  love,  which  was  the  only  one  admitted  by 
the  founder  of  their  religion. 

With  the  accumulation  of  experience,  national  and  indi- 
vidual, a  reflective  morality  is  born,  and  an  effort  is  made 
to  formulate  ethical  rules  for  an  ideal  social  order  from 
which  no  man  is  excluded.  But  both  in  the  imperfect  mo- 
rality of  barbarous  tribes  and  in  rules  aiming  at  the  ideal 
state  desired  by  the  developed  moral  conscience,  we  have 
the  natural  outcome  of  social  experience. 

Although  the  appearance  and  development  of  conscience 
is  by  no  means  necessarily  dependent  upon  religion,  re- 
ligion has  been  from  the  first  closely  connected  with  the 
maintenance  of  tribal  customs,  and  later  with  the  support 
of  the  principles  of  higher  ethics.  It  has  been,  therefore, 
an  important  factor  in  ethical  progress.  Where  the  earli- 
est gods  are  great  ancestors  or  tribal  heroes,  should  they 
not  naturally  be  expected  to  do  for  their  tribe  that  which 
the  living  chiefs  are  trying  to  do,  —  to  enforce  the  sacred 
customs .-'  These  gods  must,  it  seems  to  me,  come  to  be 
regarded  as  the  guardians  of  all  the  values  established 
within  the  tribal  life.  Nature-gods  or  creator-gods  need 
not  be  so  directly  interested  in  the  morality  of  the  tribe  as 
would  be  ancestor  or  hero-gods ;  yet  in  their  friendly  deal- 


MORALITY  AND  RELIGION  201 

ing  with  the  tribe  the  former  will,  on  the  whole,  "  stand 
for"  the  recognized  virtues,  even  though  they  should  not 
practise  them  themselves.  The  natural  tendency  will  be 
to  expect  them  to  behave  towards  men  according  to  the 
double  code  of  amity  and  enmity. 

A  new  phase  in  the  socio-reUgious  development  appears 
when  the  gods  not  only  assist  in  enforcing  the  customs 
and  regulations  which  the  tribe  has  come  to  regard  as 
essential,  but  also  maintain  moral  relations  with  the  indi- 
viduals. This  is  the  level  of  so-called  ethical  religions. 
The  individual  has  become  morally  self-conscious ;  a  sense 
of  personal  righteousness  has  developed ;  the  voice  of  con- 
science proclaims  the  moral  law  and  condemns  its  trans- 
gressions. Then,  in  the  stress  of  his  moral  need,  man 
learns  to  look  upon  his  god  as  the  personification  of  his 
ideal,  and  as  purveyor  of  moral  energy.  In  God  he  sees 
realized  that  after  which  he  yearns,  the  perfect,  which  is 
not  to  be  found  on  earth. 

The  history  of  the  development  of  gods  is  a  magnificent 
testimony  to  the  strength  of  man's  craving  for  power  and 
perfection,  and  to  his  ingenuity  in  gratifying  his  wants. 
He  has  endowed  his  gods  according  to  his  needs ;  and  he 
has  believed  in  them  and  communed  with  them,  because 
in  these  ways  he  has  been  brought  nearer  to  the  realiza- 
tion of  his  desires.  The  psychological  study  of  contem- 
porary religious  experience  makes  it  evident  that  the  God 
of  Christianity  continues  to  be  an  object  of  worship,  not 
because  his  existence  is  rationally  established,  but  because 
he  affords  ethical  support  and  affective  comfort. 

With  regard  to  their  function  in  the  moral  life,  gods  are 
either  unconscious  or  conscious  devices  for  the  speedier 
attainment  of  ideals  arising  in  the  social  life.  Therefore, 
although  religion  has  always  been  a  guardian  of  morality 
and  an  aid  to  moral  progress,  it  may  not  be  called  the 


202        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

original  source  of  moral  inspiration.  It  is  not  true  that 
"  the  beginnings  of  all  social  customs  and  legal  ordinances 
are  directly  derived  from  religious  notions,"  nor  that  "re- 
ligious motifs  lay  at  the  basis  of  morals  and  morality  from 
the  beginning  of  civilization."  Rather  must  we  say,  with 
Harold  Hoffding :  "Values  must  be  discovered  and  pro- 
duced in  a  world  of  experience  before  they  can  be  con- 
ceived or  assumed  to  exist  in  a  higher  world.  The  other 
world  must  always  be  derived  from  this  world ;  it  can 
never  be  a  primary  concept.  .  .  .  Discussion  is  always  led 
back  by  implacable  logic  to  the  conceptual  priority  of 
ethics  over  reHgion."  "  He  who  is  just  because  the  god  in 
whom  he  believes  is  just,  must  attribute  value  to  justice 
itself.  Here  religion  has  its  logical  premise  in  an  inde- 
pendent ethics,  whether  or  no  it  consciously  posits  it."  ^ 

Because  rehgion  exists  among  peoples  whose  customs 
do  not  all  agree  with  modern  Christian,  ideas  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  fulfils  there  its  essential  purpose,  —  that  is, 
assists  in  the  enforcement  of  these  customs,  —  it  has  been 
said  that  early  religions  are  opposed  to  morality.  But  this 
judgment  arises  from  a  misunderstanding  of  the  nature  of 
religion  and  its  relation  to  morality.  The  reHgion  of  these 
people  bears  to  their  life  exactly  the  same  relation  that  our 
rehgion  bears  to  our  Hfe :  it  supports  the  accepted  rules  or 
convictions,  be  they  moral  or  immoral.  There  is  no  dif- 
ference in  the  functions  discharged  by  the  religion  of 
these  primitive  people  and  by  our  rehgion ;  but  there  are 
differences  between  our  ideas  of  morality  and  theirs. 

The  question  of  the  relation  of  morality  to  religion  is, 
therefore,  merely  a  part  of  the  general  problem  of  the  re- 
lation to  it  of  man's  impulses,  cravings,  desires,  and  ideals. 
Morality  and  rehgion  do  not  need  each  other  in  order  to 

1  Hoffding,  Harold,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Macmillan,  1906,  pp.  330, 
329.     See  the  whole  section,  pp.  322-331. 


MYTHOLOGY  AND   RELIGION  203 

come  into  existence,  but,  when  they  have  appeared,  reli- 
gious beliefs  are  speedily  called  upon  for  the  gratification 
of  tnoral  needs. 

2.    MYTHOLOGY   AND    RELIGION 

In  his  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language,  Max  Muller 
complains  that  the  religion  and  the  mythology  of  the 
ancient  nations  are  usually  confounded,  and  he  attempts 
to  differentiate  them.  Mythology,  he  tells  us,  consists 
of  the  "fables"  about  the  gods;  while  religion  is  "trust 
in  an  all-wise,  all-powerful,  eternal  Being,  the  Ruler  of 
the  world,  whom  we  approach  in  prayer  and  meditation."  ^ 
He  would  consign  to  the  realm  of  mythology  all  the  ir- 
relevant, foolish,  and  immoral  stories  related  of  the  gods. 
This  distinction  is  accepted  by  Andrew  Lang :  "  Where 
relatively  high  moral  attributes  are  assigned  to  a  Being, 
I  have  called  the  result  '  Religion.'  Where  the  same 
Being  acts  like  Zeus  in  Greek  fables,  plays  silly  or  obscene 
tricks,  is  lustful  or  false,  I  have  spoken  of  *  Myths.'  "  "^ 

1  Muller,  Max,  Lectures  on  the  Science  of  Language,  Second  Series,  Scribner, 
1884,  p.  433. 

"  Mythology  has  encroached  on  ancient  religion,  it  has  at  some  times  well 
nigh  choked  its  very  life  ;  yet  through  the  rank  and  poisonous  vegetation 
of  mythic  phraseology  we  may  always  catch  a  glimpse  of  that  original  stem 
round  which  it  creeps  and  winds  itself,  and  without  which  it  could  not  enjoy 
even  that  parasitical  existence  which  has  been  mistaken  for  independent 
vitality."  {IhiJ.)    See  also  First  Series,  p.  21. 

2  Lang,  Andrew,  The  Making  of  Religion,  2d  ed.,  1900,  Preface,  p.  xiii. 
The   following   passage   from  W.  Robertson  Smith  is  of  interest  in  this 

connection :  — 

"  But  strictly  speaking,  this  mythology  was  no  essential  part  of  ancient 
religion,  for  it  had  no  sacre4  sanction  and  no  binding  force  on  the  worship- 
per. .  .  .  Belief  in  a  certain  series  of  myths  was  neither  obligatory  as  a 
part  of  true  religion,  nor  was  it  supposed  that,  by  believing,  a  man  acquired 
merit  and  conciliated  the  favor  of  the  gods.  What  was  obligatory  or  meri- 
torious was  the  exact  performance  of  certain  sacred  acts  prescribed  by  religious 
tradition.     This  being  so,  it  follows  that  mythology  ought  not  to  take  the 


204        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

This  seems  like  making  the  modern  Englishman's  notion 
of  what  is  moral  and  sensible  the  test  of  religion  in  con- 
tradistinction to  myth.  Morality  and  rationality,  however, 
can  hardly  be  regarded  as  essential  characteristics  of 
religion.  Lang  is  better  inspired  when  he  argues  that 
religion  and  mythology  arose  from  two  separate  human 
moods;  one  earnest  and  serious,  the  other  humorous  and 
fanciful.  "  The  humorous  savage  fancy  ran  away  with 
the  idea  of  Power,  and  attributed  to  a  potent  being  just 
such  tricks  as  a  waggish  and  libidinous  savage  would 
like  to  play  if  he  could." 

The  conception  of  the  nature  and  function  of  religion 
I  have  presented  leads  directly  to  the  following  differ- 
entiation. When  man  is  concerned  with  his  practical 
relation  to  psychic,  superhuman  powers,  any  ideas  —  im- 
moral or  otherwise  —  that  he  may  hold  regarding  these 
powers  belong  to  religion.  According  to  the  mood  we  are 
in,  the  same  name  may  designate  different  objects ;  what 
is  said  or  thought  of  gods  outside  the  temple  need  not  be 
just  what  is  said  or  thought  of  them  within.  To  the  child, 
the  word  "  doll "  means  at  one  time  a  living  person,  who  is 
capable  of  ideas  and  affection,  and  of  whom  she  takes 
tender  care ;  at  another  time,  it  signifies  merely  so  much 
rags  and  color,  and  is  treated  accordingly.  So  it  is  with 
man  and  the  invisible  personages  in  whom  he  believes. 
Their  nature  and  attributes  vary  with  his  moods.  If  the 
aesthetic  mood  is  upon  him,  he  may  find  delight  in  repre- 
senting these  beings  in  their  fairest  form  in  clay  or  marble  ; 
at  that  moment  he  is  an  artist.     If,  in  a  fanciful  mood,  he 

prominent  place  that  is  too  often  assigned  to  it  in  the  scientific  study  of 
ancient  faiths.  So  far  as  myths  consist  of  explanations  of  ritual,  their  value 
is  altogether  secondary  .  .  .  the  ritual  was  fixed  and  the  myth  was  variable, 
the  ritual  was  obligatory,  and  faith  in  the  myth  was  at  the  discretion  of  the 
worshipper."     (^The  Religion  of  the  Semites,  t^,  19.) 


MYTHOLOGY  AND  RELIGION  205 

lets  his  imagination  weave  stories  about  them,  not  seriously, 
but  playfully,  as  the  child  romances  about  her  doll,  he  then 
becomes  a  maker  of  myths.  If  at  another  time  he  is  dis- 
interestedly concerned  about  understanding  the  origin  and 
nature  of  these  beings,  he  regards  them  for  the  time  being 
as  objects  of  philosophic  thought.  But  if,  in  a  serious 
mood,  he  feels  himself  in  vital  relation  with  them,  they  are 
for  him  at  that  moment  religious  objects.  Zeus  may  thus 
be  in  turn  to  the  same  person  an  object  of  artistic,  mytho- 
poeic,  philosophic,  or  religious  activity.  Whatever  charac- 
teristics are  attached  to  Zeus  in  the  mind  of  the  worshipper 
either  when  he  actually  worships  or  when  he  thinks  of 
Zeus  as  an  object  of  worship,  and  only  these  characteristics, 
belong  to  Zeus  as  a  god. 

These  various  moods  may  of  course  overlap.  The 
creative  fancy,  for  instance,  may  combine  with  the  spirit 
of  inquiry.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  most  myths  betray  a 
wish  to  understand ;  they  are  both  mythological  and  phil- 
osophical. 

The  less  seriously  the  gods  are  taken,  the  more  luxuri- 
antly does  mythology  flourish.  A  race  like  the  Greeks, 
fonder  of  the  beautiful  than  of  the  awful,  of  pleasure  than 
of  righteousness,  yields  readily  to  the  promptings  of  the 
fancy.  If  there  is  little  mythology  in  the  Hebrew  scrip- 
tures, it  is  because  the  Hebrew  took  his  God  in  grim  earnest. 
Even  the  story  of  creation,  in  Genesis,  is  more  a  bit  of 
crude  nature  philosophy  than  a  myth.  There  is  hardly  a 
myth  connected  with  the  Christian  God  or  with  Christ. 
Whatever  in  Christianity  might  be  called  myth  clusters 
around  the  lesser  personages  of  the  pantheon,  — the  Virgin 
Mary,  the  disciples,  and  especially  the  saints.  The  essen- 
tial traits  of  the  Divine  Father  and  of  His  Incarnate  Son 
have  always  been  such  as  to  make  it  utterly  impossible  for 
one  to  assume  towards  them  the  detached,  playful  attitude 


2o6        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

out  of  which  myths  are  born.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Christian  God  and  Christ  have  given  rise  to  endless  philo- 
sophical disputations.  This  is  exactly  what  one  might 
expect ;  for  these  beings,  too  august  and  too  vitally  impor- 
tant to  the  believer  to  be  the  subjects  of  playful  romance, 
make  a  strong  appeal  to  the  understanding. 

3.    METAPHYSICS  AND  RELIGION 

As  this  topic  has  been  touched  upon  in  the  criticism  of 
intellectualistic  definitions,  and  is  to  be  taken  up  again  in 
the  next  chapter,  I  shall  simply  restate  here  the  partial 
conclusion  already  reached. 

The  search  for  explanations  and  the  wish  to  understand 
induce  a  frame  of  mind  and  a  behavior  very  different  from 
the  attitude  and  behavior  of  a  person  who  endeavors  to 
conform  his  life  to  an  accepted  solution,  or  to  make  use 
of  it  for  himself  or  his  fellows.  To  seek  an  answer  to  the 
question,  Does  God  exist,  and  what  is  he  ?  is  to  philoso- 
phize ;  to  seek  in  God  the  fulfilment  of  hopes  and  desires, 
is  to  be  religious.  In  his  philosophical  moments  man 
wants  to  know;  in  his  religious  moments  he  wants  to  be. 


CHAPTER   XI 
THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY 

I.  The  Situation ;  the  Propositions  of  Empirical  Theology ; 
the  Documental  Evidence 

"  Le  conflit  entre  le  christianisme  et  la  science  a  ^clat^  d'abord 
sur  le  terrain  cosmologique ;  la  lutte  s'est  transportde  ensuite 
sur  le  terrain  de  la  biologic ;  elle  se  trouve  mainteaant  sur 
celui  de  la  psychologie." 

Theodore  Flournoy,  unpublished  lecture. 

One  of  the  results  of  the  scientific  and  philosophical 
activity  of  the  past  century  has  been  to  convince  the  best 
informed  among  the  theologians  who  have  remained  Chris- 
tians in  the  traditional  sense  of  the  word,  that  science  and 
metaphysics  are  not  the  allies  but  the  enemies  of  their  be- 
Uefs.i  This  conviction  has  resulted  in  an  energetic  effort 
to  render  theology  independent  of  science  and  metaphysics. 
Should  this  endeavor  succeed,  it  would  be  a  matter  of  in- 
difference to  religion  that  historical  criticism  contests  the 
authenticity  of  portions  of  the  Bible,  that  physical  science 
denies  miracles,  and  that  psychology  explains  by  natural 
means  revelation  and  conversion. 

Ritschlianism,  the  only  recent  system  of  theology  that 

^  The  metaphysicians  have  themselves  compelled  this  recognition,  even 
those  of  the  English  school  of  Hegelians.  See  on  this  an  instructive  and  de- 
lightfully written  chapter  in  Schiller's  Studies  in  Humanism,  on  "  Absolutism 
and  Religion,"  especially  pages  283-288 ;  and  note  his  reference  to  McTag- 
gart's  Some  Dogmas  of  Religion. 

207 


2o8        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

has  given  evidence  of  vitality,  marks  the  culmination  of 
this  effort.  To  save  religion,  Ritschl  ^  took  the  bold  step 
of  claiming  a  radical  separation  between  Christian  theology 
and  what  he  called  "  theoretical  "  knowledge.  He  alleges 
in  justification  a  specific  difference  between  religious  and 
non-religious  knowledge. 

"  It  is  incompetent  for  it  [theology]  to  enter  upon  either  a  direct  or 
an  indirect  proof  of  the  Christian  Revelation  by  seeking  to  show  that 
it  agrees  with  some  philosophy  or  some  judicial  view  of  the  world ;  for  to 
such,  Christianity  simply  stands  opposed."  ^  This  is  the  opinion  of 
the  entire  Ritschlian  school.  W.  Herrmann  affirms,  for  example,  that 
"  Whether  philosophy  be  deistic,  pantheistic,  theistic,  or  whatever  it  is, 
is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  theologians.  ...  He  who  imagines  he 
will  solve  or  even  advance  the  problem  of  religion  with  the  assistance 
of  that  metaphysic  of  the  much-longed-for  theistic  philosophy,  either 
divests  himself  in  theology  of  his  Christianity,  or  is  directly  asking  for 
another  religion."^ 

An  English  disciple  makes  the  following  confession:  "  From  philos- 
ophy, the  efforts  of  which  have  resulted  in  disappointment,  it  cannot 
expect  any  effective  assistance  as  an  ally ;  from  science,  which  has  been 
made  confident  by  its  successes,  it  may  anticipate  serious  attack;  its 
own  capacity  for  independence  on  the  one  hand,  and  for  resistance  on 
the  other,  appears  greatly  lessened  by  the  activity  of  historical  criticism. 
It  must  depend  more  and  more  exclusively  on  the  inherent  vitality  and 
the  inexhaustible  vigour  of  religion."  * 

^  Albrecht  Ritschl.  His  chief  work  is  Die  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Recht- 
fertigung  und  Versoehnung,  3  vols.  (1870-1874).  A  third  edition,  revised 
and  modified  in  at  least  one  important  particular,  appeared  in  1888.  The 
first  volume  was  put  into  English  in  1872  and  the  third  in  1900,  under  the  title 
The  Christian  Doctrine  of  Justification  and  Reconciliation,  H.  R.  Mackin- 
tosh and  A.  B.  Macaulay  (T.  &  T.  Clark).  This  third  volume  contains 
Ritschl's  own  theological  system.  For  a  good  bibUography  of  Ritschlian 
literature,  with  comments,  see  Alfred  Garvie's  The  Ritschlian  Theology,  also 
pp.  27-30  and  32-38. 

2  A.  Ritschl,  Justification  and  Reconciliation,  p.  24. 

s  Quoted  by  O.  Pfleiderer,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  Vol.  II,  p.  190,  from  Die 
Metaphysik  in  der  Theologie  (1876). 

*  Garvie,  A.,  Ritschlian  Theology,  T.  &  T.  Clark,  Edinburgh,  1899,  p.  16. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  209 

Three  of  the  fundamental  propositions  of  the  theology 
of  Ritschl  are  as  follows  :  — 

1.  The  facts  on  which  theology  rests  are  to  be  found  in 
religious  consciousness,  and  nowhere  else.  They  form  a 
group  of  facts  apart. 

2.  Theology  is  independent  of  metaphysics.  It  cannot, 
for  example,  make  use  of  the  arguments  for  speculative 
theism. 

3.  Christian  dogmas  are  an  illegitimate  mixture  of  the- 
ology and  metaphysics.  They  must  be  purged  of  the 
metaphysical  elements. 

This  theology,  modified  in  diverse  fashions,  has  spread 
widely  and  has  influenced  many  who  do  not  accept  it  en- 
tirely. It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  neither  Ritschl 
nor  any  of  his  followers  has  been  able  to  hold  strictly  to 
these  principles,  so  that  this  theology  is  just  as  remarkable 
for  its  lack  of  consistency  as  for  its  radicalness.  Could  the 
Ritschlians  have  been  consistent,  they  would  have  gained 
independence  from  metaphysics,  but  at  the  cost  of  mak- 
ing of  theology  a  natural  science,  that  is,  a  branch  of 
psychology. 

It  should  not  be  imagined  that  in  separating  theology 
from  science  and  metaphysics  Ritschl  made  a  new  de- 
parture. The  German  movement  merely  makes  a  more 
thorough  and  systematic  use  of  an  old  conviction.  The 
opinion  that  what  is  deepest  or  most  essential  in  reHgion 
is  a  matter  of  revelation,  of  intuition,  of  heart,  and  not  a 
matter  of  reflection  or  of  philosophy,  is  as  old  as  the  ethical 
religions.  It  is  presupposed  in  the  saying  of  Tertullian, 
"  I  believe  because  it  is  irrational,"  as  well  as  in  that  of 
Anselm,  "  I  do  not  seek  to  understand  in  order  that  I  may 
believe,  but  I  beUeve  in  order  that  I  may  understand." 
Pascal  has  given  to  this  conviction  its  classic  form,  "The 
heart  has  reasons   which   reason  does   not  know."     Ac- 


2IO        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

cording  to  him,  upon  these  "  reasons  of  the  heart "  rests 
the  beUef  in  the  gods  of  rehgions.  He  says,  "  The  meta- 
physical proofs  of  God  are  so  remote  from  the  reasoning 
of  man  and  so  involved,  that  they  make  little  impression ; 
and  when  some  persons  find  them  sufficient,  it  is  only  dur- 
ing the  moment  they  actually  see  the  demonstration.  But 
an  hour  afterwards  they  believe  they  have  been  deceived,"  ^ 
Even  Pascal,  that  magnificent  intelligence,  convinced  him- 
self of  the  existence  of  God  much  more  by  what  passed  in 
his  heart  than  by  metaphysical  arguments.  At  the  time 
of  his  conversion  he  saw,  he  tells  us,  that  the  God  who 
saves  is  not  the  "  God  of  philosophers,"  but  the  "  God  of 
Abraham  and  of  Jacob." 

Pascal's  saying  is  commonly  taken  to  mean  that  the 
"  heart "  is  an  organ  of  knowledge  comparable  with  the 
senses  and  the  intellect ;  it  teaches  religious  truth  inacces- 
sible to  the  reason.  The  same  conviction  is  expressed  to- 
day by  the  Ritschlians,  as  well  as  by  others,  thus :  "There 
is  a  moral  insight  and  spiritual  discernment  of  supersensu- 
ous  eternal  reality,  which  is  as  certain  a  means  of  knowl- 
edge as  is  observation  or  experiment  with  regard  to  sensible 
objects.  .  .  .  The  point  most  to  be  insisted  upon  is  that 
in  religious  knowledge  there  is  a  perception  of  reality  as 
well  as  an  appreciation  of  worth."  ^ 

But  what,  according  to  this  teaching,  are  the  data 
upon  which  theology  is  to  build .-'  The  unanimous  re- 
sponse of  pious  souls  who  no  longer  have  illusions  as  to 
what  they  can  hope  from  science  and  metaphysics  is  that 
"religious  experience,"  "inner  experience,"  or  "spiritual 
experience"  —  three  expressions  used  synonymously  — 
manifests  the  truth  of  religion  and,  in  particular,  the  reality 

^  Pascal,  B.,  Pensees,  Sec.  IV,  p.  277,  ed.  by  Leon  Brunschvieg. 
2  Garvie,  A.,  Expositor,  Vol.   VIII,   1903,  p.    304.     Comp.  Max  Miiller's 
affirmations  in  Chap.  II  of  this  book. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  211 

of  the  God  in  whom  they  believe.  The  unanimity  of  opin- 
ion goes  no  further.  Some  affirm  that  in  this  experience 
God  is  directly  "  apprehended  "  or  "  perceived  "  ;  that  he 
reveals  himself  directly  in  consciousness.  This  is  the  mys- 
tic point  of  view.  Others  hold  that  spiritual  experiences 
are  only  the  data  from  which  the  action  of  God  is  inferred. 

The  belief  in  the  direct  revelation  of  God  in  conscious- 
ness signifies  necessarily,  it  seems,  that  religious  experi- 
ence ^  does  not  belong  entirely  to  the  realm  of  psychology, 
that  it  includes  something  superhumanly  determined.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  this  is  what  its  defenders  unceasingly 
maintain.  Psychology,  on  its  side,  claims  the  right  to 
submit  every  content  of  consciousness  to  scientific  study, 
whether  it  be  dubbed  "inner,"  "spiritual,"  or  otherwise; 
moreover,  it  has  begun  to  make  good  that  claim.  Thus 
the  conflict  between  religion  and  science,  which  broke  out 
first  in  the  field  of  cosmology,  then  of  biology  and  the  his- 
torical sciences,  is  now  carried  into  the  field  of  psychology. 
The  Roman  Catholics,  belated  in  matters  of  science,  remain 
almost  indifferent  to  this  new  phase  of  the  conflict.  They 
still  rely  upon  the  metaphysical  proofs  of  the  existence  of 
God  and  upon  bibhcal  evidence.  With  the  Protestants  the 
situation  is  different.  They  have  bowed  to  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  metaphysical  arguments  and  the  weakness  of 
the  historical  proofs.  This  is  why  they  depend  more  and 
more  exclusively  upon  religious  experience,  in  the  hope  of 
finding  there  a  direct,  unassailable  proof  of  the  divine 
nature  of  their  religion. 

The  pubHcations  of  Protestant  theological  schools  show 
unmistakably  that  Protestantism  is  struggling  against  the 
new  evidence  which  would  incorporate  the  entire  rehgious 

^  I  use  here  the  current  expression  religious  experience  in  the  sense  or- 
dinarily given  to  it,  i.e.  that  of  which  a  person  is  conscious  in  his  religious 
moments. 


-s 


212        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

life  within  the  natural  order.  The  danger  from  historical 
and  literary  criticism  is  forgotten  in  the  presence  of  psy- 
chological questions  :  Are  communion  with  God,  conver- 
sion, mystic  revelation,  etc.,  to  be  explained  entirely 
according  to  natural  psychological  laws  .-'  If  the  answer  be 
yes,  how  then  legitimatize  belief  in  a  personal  God  sup- 
posed to  produce  these  results  in  answer  to  petitions  or  to 
desires  .''  If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  remains  an  unex- 
plained residue  after  science  has  completed  its  work,  what 
is  the  nature  of  this,  and  what  can  be  drawn  therefrom  in 
behalf  of  faith  ? 

My  task  in  this  chapter  will  be  to  show  :  — 

1.  That  belief  in  the  gods  of  religion  and,  indirectly, 
certain  other  fundamental  doctrines,  rest,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  upon  inductions  drawn  from  the  "  inner  "  life. 

2.  That  religious  experience  ("inner  experience")  be- 
longs entirely  to  psychology — "entirely"  being  used  in 
the  same  sense  as  when  it  is  claimed  that  the  non-religious 
portions  of  conscious  life  belong  entirely  to  science. 

3.  That  since  the  gods  of  religion  are  empirical  gods 
they  belong  to  science. 

The  documental  evidence.  —  I  shall  let  representatives  of 
different  schools,  especially  ministers  of  religion  and  pro- 
fessors of  theology,  speak  for  themselves;  for  it  is  evi- 
dently they  whom  we  should  hear.  Even  if  some  of  the 
documents  submitted  are  very  crude,  they  express  the 
opinions  of  those  who  truly  represent  the  beliefs  with  which 
we  are  concerned.  What  we  must  avoid  is  mistaking  the 
opinions  of  philosophers  or  theologians  for  the  facts  of  re- 
ligious life.  The  number  and  length  of  the  quotations  may 
seem  excessive,  but  I  wish  to  avoid  the  defect  of  most  dis- 
cussions of  religion,  i.e.  an  exaggerated  reliance  upon  tra- 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  213 

ditional  opinion  and  a  priori  reasoning,  instead  of  upon  a 
painstaking  consideration  of  the  facts. 

Doaiment  i. — I  do  not  know  of  any  place  in  Christian 
writings  where  the  arguments  for  the  Christian  faith  are 
more  definitely  expressed  than  in  the  following  fragments 
of  a  sermon  by  a  distinguished  Buddhist  priest.  I  place 
them  first  in  order  to  emphasize  the  agreement  between 
contemporary  Buddhism  and  Christianity  regarding  the 
principles  upon  which  both  would  erect  an  unassailable 
theology.  The  substantiation  of  these  principles  would 
thus  prove  the  validity  of  the  two  religions.  But  do  not 
principles  which  establish  the  tenets  of  two  religions  prove 
too  much  .-• 

"  I  believe  that  that  which  makes  religion  what  it  is,  in 
contradistinction  to  philosophy  or  ethics,  consists  in  the 
truth  that  it  is  essentially  founded  on  facts  of  ones  own 
spiritual  experience,  which  is  beyond  intellectual  demonstra- 
bility,  and  which  opens  a  finite  mind  to  the  light  of  uni- 
versal effulgence.  In  short,  spiritual  enlightenment  is  indis- 
ipensable  in  religion,  while  philosophy  is  mere  intellection. 

"  By  spiritual  enUghtcnment,  I  mean  a  man's  becoming 
conscious  through  personal  experience  of  the  ultimate  na- 
ture of  his  inner  being.  This  insight  breaks,  as  it  were, 
the  wall  of  intellectual  limitation  and  brings  us  to  a  region 
which  has  hitherto  been  concealed  from  our  view.  The 
horizon  is  now  so  widened  as  to  enable  our  spiritual  visions 
to  survey  the  totality  of  existence.  So  long  as  we  groped 
in  the  darkness  of  ignorance,  we  could  not  go  beyond  the 
threshold  of  individuation. 

"  The  enlightenment  which  thus  constitutes  the  basis  of 
religious  life  is  altogether  spiritual  and  not  intellectual.  .  .  . 
Philosophy  and  science  have  done  a  great  deal  for  the 
advancement  of  our  knowledge  of  the  universe,  and  there 
is    a  fair   prospect    of   their   future  service    to   this  end. 


214        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

But  they  are  constitutionally  incapable  of  giving  rest,  bliss, 
Joy,  and  faith  to  a  troubled  spirit.  .  .  .  The  faculty  seems 
to  have  all  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  feeling.  It  is 
intuitive  and  does  not  analyze ;  it  is  direct  and  refuses  a 
medium  of  any  form.  It  allows  no  argument,  it  merely 
states,  and  its  statement  is  absolute.  When  it  says  'yes,' 
the  affirmation  has  such  a  convincing  force  that  it  removes 
all  doubts,  and  even  sceptically  disposed  intellectual  minds 
have  to  admit  it  as  a  fact  and  not  as  a  whim.  It  speaks  as 
one  with  authority.  True,  it  has  only  a  subjective  value, 
which,  however,  is  just  as  ultimate  and  actual  as  sense-per- 
ception. Since  it  is  immediate,  there  is  no  other  way  to 
test  its  validity  than  that  each  experiences  it  personally, 
individually,  and  inwardly.  The  inner  sense  which  I  have 
called  religious  faculty  makes  us  feel  the  inmost  life  that 
is  running  through  every  vein  and  artery  of  nature ;  and 
we  are  completely  free  from  scepticism,  unrest,  dissatisfac- 
tion, and  vexation  of  spirit. 

"  Mere  talking  about  or  mere  believing  in  the  existence 
of  God  and  his  intimate  love  is  nonsense  as  far  as  religion 
is  concerned.  Talking  and  arguing  belong  to  philosophy, 
and  believing,  in  its  ordinary  sense,  is  a  sort  of  hypothesis, 
not  necessarily  supported  by  facts.  Religion,  however^ 
wants  above  everything  else  solid  facts  and  actual  personal 
experience.  If  God  exists,  he  must  be  felt.  If  he  is  love,  it 
must  be  experienced.  .  .  .  Without  the  awakening  of  the 
rehgious  sense  or  faculty,  God  is  a  shadow.  ...  In  Bud- 
dhism this  faculty  is  known  as  Prajna.'' 

"  The  dictates  of  the  Prajna  are  final,  and  there  is  no 
higher  faculty  in  our  consciousness  to  annul  them.  Faith 
is  absolute  within  its  own  limits,  and  the  office  of  the  intel- 
lect is  to  explain  or  interpret  it  objectively.  .  .  .  But  as 
long  as  there  is  some  unutterable  yearning  in  the  human 
heart  for  something  more  real,  more  vital,  more  tangible, 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  215 

than  mere  abstraction,  mere  knowing  and  mere  '  proving,' 
we  must  conclude  that  our  consciousness,  however  frac- 
tional, is  capable  of  coming  in  touch  with  the  inmost  life  of 
things  in  another  way  than  intellection."  ^ 

That  which  this  writer  understands  by  spiritual  experience 
exceeding  the  possibility  of  an  intellectual  demonstration  is, 
on  his  own  statement,  merely  a  part  of  the  affective  life,  — 
the  peace,  happiness,  joy,  which  accompany  in  his  case  a 
certain  conception  of  the  universe.  His  God  proves  his 
objective  existence  and  his  attributes  by  action  on  the  soul : 
"If  God  exist.  He  must  be  felt";  "if  He  is  love,  it  must 
be  experienced."  The  metaphysical  arguments  concerning 
the  existence  of  the  object  of  religion  can,  according  to 
him,  enter  into  consideration  only  secondarily.  They  are,  in 
fact,  entirely  superfluous. 

Document  2.  —  Similar  convictions  are  voiced  in  the  fol- 
lowing passages  from  the  writings  of  a  former  president  of 
one  of  the  foremost  theological  schools  in  America :  — 

"  Many  times,  in  the  experiences  of  those  whose  senses 
are  trained  by  use  to  discern  good  and  evil,  the  still,  small 
Voice  sounds  in  the  soul's  ear  in  tones  of  mystery.  Inti- 
mations of  duty  assert  themselves  so  subtly  that  we  cannot 
put  them  into  words,  while  of  their  divine  authority  we 
have  no  doubt ;  warnings  against  courses  of  conduct  that 
to  our  prejudiced  minds  seem  expedient,  yet  upon  which 
the  unformulated  verdict  of  conscience  sets  its  prohibition. 
There  is  but  one  adequate  explanation  of  these  phenomena. 
They  are  the  Witness  of  God  in  the  Sotil." 

"  Through  the  subconscious  depths  of  our  being,  where 
our  life  and  Infinite  Life  become  one,  His  influence  finds 
entrance  to  all  the  avenues  of  consciousness.     His   very 

^  Sermons  of  a  Buddhist  Abbot,  Soyen  Shaqu,  Lord  Abbot  of  Engaku-ji  and 
Kencho-ji,  Kamakura,  Japan,  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.,  Chicago,  1906.  I 
have  italicized  in  this  and  the  other  documents  the  most  significant  statements. 


2i6        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

spirit,  life-making,  reasonable,  holy,  witnesses  with  our 
spirits  that  we  are  the  children  of  God.  From  this  source 
come  our  holy  desires,  appreciation  of  goodness,  recurrent 
advances  in  spiritual  knowledge,  vigorous  cotitrol  of  unruly 
instincts  and  passions,  moral  courage,  calmness  in  suffering, 
self-restraint  i?i  sorroiv.  " 

"  How  can  we  know  that  ajiything  spoken  in  Scripture  is 
truth  ?  By  the  witness  of  God  in  the  Soul  that  what  is 
spoken  is  the  thing  that  is.  .  .  .  This  is  the  simple  truth, 
verified  by  the  deepest  facts  in  the  realm  of  life,  to  which 
this  truth  refers.  Antiquity,  usage,  or  authority  migJit 
declare  against  this,  but  the  witness  of  God  in  the  soul  co?i- 
firms  tlie  sure  word  of  prophecy.  Again  a  Scripture  says 
concerning  prayer  :  '  In  everything  by  prayer  and  suppli- 
cation with  thanksgiving  let  your  request  be  known  unto 
God,  and  the  peace  of  God  which  passeth  all  understand- 
ing shall  keep  your  hearts  and  minds  through  Christ 
Jesus.'  How  do  I  know  that  this  is  true?  Not  from 
usage,  nor  antiquity ;  although  from  each  of  these  sources 
comes  a  powerful  corroboration.  But  I  know  it  for  truth 
by  the  Witness  of  God  in  my  soul  confirming  the  sure  word 
of  prophecy.  Confused  with  doubt,  beset  by  temptation, 
oppressed  with  grief,  'weary  of  earth  and  laden  with  sin,' 
I  approach  in  perfect  confidence  of  spirit  the  Divine  Ground 
and  Source  of  my  existence.  As  a  troubled  child  confiding 
in  a  trusted  Father,  I  pour  my  personal  confidences  into 
the  ear  of  that  Invisible  Being  with  whom  I  am  myste- 
riously connected  ;  and  from  the  depths  of  my  subconscious 
life  wells  up  into  consciousness  a  calmness  of  spirit,  a 
restored  equilibrium,  a  deliverance  from  oppression,  a 
peace  of  God  of  which  one  may  truly  affirm :  '  it  passeth 
understanding.'  "  ^ 

1  Hall,  Charles  Cuthbert,  The  Barrows  Lectures  for  igob-igoy,  Christ  and 
the  Eastern  Soul,  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1909,  pp.  88-S9  ;   93-94  ;    100. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        217 

Document  3.  —  A  professor  at  the  school  of  Protestant 
theology  in  Paris  writes :  "  God  is  not  a  phenomenon  that 
we  may  observe  apart  from  ourselves,  or  a  truth  demon- 
strable by  logical  reasoning.  He  who  does  not  feel  Him  in 
his  heart  will  never  feel  him,  from  without.  The  object  of 
religious  knowledge  reveals  itself  only  in  the  subject,  by  means 
of  the  religious  phenomena  themselves.  .  .  .  We  never  be- 
come conscious  of  our  piety  externally,  we  feel  religiously 
moved,  perceiving,  more  or  less  obscurely,  in  that  very  emo- 
tion the  object  and  the  cause  of  religion,  i.e.  God.  Observe 
the  natural  and  spontaneous  movement  of  piety  ;  a  soul 
feels  an  inner  peace  and  light ;  is  it  strong,  humble,  resigned, 
obedient  ^  It  immediately  attributes  its  strength,  its  faith, 
its  humility,  its  obedience,  to  the  action  of  the  divine  spirit 
within  itself,  Anne  Doubourg,  dying  at  the  stake,  prayed  : 
'  Oh,  God  do  not  abandon  me  lest  I  should  fall  off  from  thee  * 
.  .  .  to  feel  thus  in  our  personal  and  empirical  activity  the 
action  and  the  presence  of  the  spirit  of  God  within  our  own 
spirit,  is  a  ^nystcry,  as  it  is  also  the  source  of  religion." 

"  Truths  of  the  rehgious  and  of  the  moral  order  are  known 
by  subjective  action  of  what  Pascal  calls  the  heart.  Science 
can  know  nothing  about  them,  for  they  are  not  in  its  order."  ^ 

Document  4.  —  A  leader  of  the  liberal  movement  in  the 
United  States  expresses  similar  views.  "  God  is  not  an 
hypothesis  which  the  minister  has  invented  to  account  for 
the  phenomena  of  creation.  He  knows  that  there  is  a 
*  power  not  ourselves  that  makes  for  righteousness,'  because 
when  he  has  been  weak  that  power  has  strengthened  him, 
when  he  has  been  a  coward  that  power  has  made  htm  strong, 
when  he  has  been  in  sorrow  tJiat  power  has  comforted  him, 
when  he  has  been  in  perplexity  that  power  has  counselled 

1  Sabatier,  A.,  Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,  James  Pott  and  Co., 
New  York,  1902,  pp.  30S-309,  311. 


2i8        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

him,  and  he  has  walked  a  different  path  and  Hved  a  differ- 
ent Hfe  and  has  been  a  different  man  because  there  is  that 
power,  impalpable,  invisible,  unknown,  and  yet  best  and 
most  truly  known."  ^ 

Dociifnent  5. —  The  religious  belief  of  Digamma,  prob- 
ably a  fellow  in  a  College  of  Oxford  University,  rests  upon 
an  induction  made  from  a  special  class  of  fadts.  At  twenty- 
two  he  found  himself  involved  in  circumstances  that  seemed 
as  if  they  must  lead  to  the  ruin  of  his  career.  "  The  cir- 
cumstances of  which  I  have  spoken  tended  to  produce  ex- 
treme mental  depression.  A  cloud  had,  as  it  were,  descended 
on  my  life.  Bict  I  noticed  that  after  earliest  prayer  this  de- 
pression was  greatly  relieved,  and  at  times  completely  vanished. 
That  which  struck  me  most  in  the  phenomenon  was  its  ir- 
rationahty.  What  I  mean  is  that  the  relief  was  experienced 
again  and  again  without  any  consciousness  of  its  cause. 
I  could  not  attribute  it  to  a  feeling  of  satisfaction  at  having 
performed  a  religious  duty,  for  I  noticed  that  the  relief  came 
in  many  cases  when  no  such  feeling  of  satisfaction  was  or 
had  been  present  in  my  mind.  The  importance  of  the 
phenomenon  in  respect  to  one's  life  was  such  as  to  lead 
me  to  further  observation  of  it ;  and  this  process  of  induc- 
tion has  with  me  extended  over  a  period  of  more  than 
twenty  years.  ...  In  watching  this  phenomenon,  there- 
fore, I  have  carefully  checked  my  observation  and  have 
excluded  all  instances  in  which  some  intermediary  cause 
intervened  between  prayer  and  the  mental  happiness  re- 
sulting from  it.  In  the  thousands  of  instances  which  have 
come  under  my  observation,  for  the  phenomenon  is  at  least 
of  daily  occurrence,  I  have  never  observed  a7iy  case  ifi  which 
earnest  prayer  has  not  been  ^answered'  (to  use  the  ordinary 

1  Abbott,  Lyman,  Address  before  the  Alumni  of  Bangor  Theological  Semi- 
nary, The  Outlook,  June  25,  1898. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  219 

word)  hy  an  increase  of  mental  happiness.  I  have  spoken 
of  this  as  '  irrational '  because  it  does  not  arise  from  any 
physical  or  external  cause,  nor  indeed  from  any  of  those 
internal  causes  to  which  such  feeling  can  be  ascribed.  Its 
irrationality  consists  in  the  fact  that,  if  my  induction  be 
valid  and  correct,  it  is  connected  with  the  phenomenon  of 
earnest  prayer  by  a  chain  of  causation  which  may  be  ex- 
plicable by  conjecture,  but  is  not  determinable  by  reason. 

"  I  do  not  wish  it  to  be  supposed  that  my  observation  leads 
me  to  believe  that  a  high  level  of  mental  happiness  must 
always  result  from  prayer.  There  are  other  factors,  of 
course,  in  the  calculation,  and,  above  all,  the  factor  of  bodily 
condition.  Still  I  imagine,  though  I  cannot  say  that  I  have 
ever  reahzed,  that  this  factor  may  be  to  a  great  extent  elim- 
inated by  the  action  of  that  factor  which  we  call  prayer. 
'The  prayer  of  the  righteous  man  availeth  much'  is  after 
all  a  saying  which  must  be  true  if  the  power  of  prayer  is 
in  any  sense  admitted. 

"  But,  nevertheless,  even  to  one  who,  like  myself,  is  but 
ordinary  in  respect  to  righteousness,  the  conviction  has 
come  after  long  years  of  observation,  that  prayer  does  in- 
variably raise  the  level  of  mental  happiness. 

"  No  one  has  yet  succeeded  in  defining  any  universal 
cause  of  happiness,  but  I  take  it  that  many  would  admit 
that  we  can  best  attain  it  when  our  individual  natures  are 
acting  in  accord  with  the  great  world  of  nature  around  us. 
In  the  physical  world,  at  any  rate,  it  is  by  such  action  that 
we  seek  the  means  to  this  end.  I  take  it  that  the  case  is 
the  same  with  regard  to  the  spiritual  world.  We  are  con- 
scious that  we  are  environed  by  it,  and  the  more  we  adapt 
ourselves  to  that  environment,  the  happier  will  be  our  life. 
The  all-pervading  power  in  that  spiritual  world  is  what  we 
know  as  God.  .  .  .  Conseqiie^itly  my  faith  rests  upon  an 
empirical  basis.     But  time  forbids  my  speaking  of  the  de- 


220        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

ductions  from  this  major  premise.  This  at  any  rate  I  know, 
that  God  can  be  approached  along  those  paths  along  which 
I  was  led  in  childhood."  * 

Thus  in  the  case  of  Digamma  the  empirical  basis  of 
religious  belief  is  the  raising  of  the  affective  level  through 
prayer.  Is  not  his  argument  admirably  simple  .''  —  Prayer 
relieves  depression,  increases  happiness  ;  this  does  not  arise 
from  any  external  physical  cause,  nor  from  any  bodily 
cause ;  it  is  therefore  the  effect  of  getting  into  harmony 
with  the  all-pervading  power  of  the  spiritual  world,  — 
namely,  God. 

One  could  not  easily  find  a  more  striking  example  of  the 
offhand,  amateurish  manner  in  which  these  problems  are 
disposed  of.  In  matters  religious  every  one  assumes  the 
right  to  interpret  as  best  he  can  what  takes  place  in  his 
consciousness.  A  physical  phenomenon  would  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  physicist  or  a  chemist.  Why  not  submit  these 
psychological  facts  to  a  psychologist }  Digamma  might 
have  remembered,  it  seems,  that  other  means  besides  prayer 
produce  the  effects  he  has  observed.  And  does  he  not 
know  that  the  mere  idea  of  a  power  "that  we  call  God" 
may,  entirely  irrespective  of  its  objective  existence,  produce 
the  comforts  he  finds  in  prayer }  Is  the  sweet  and  benefi- 
cent emotion  of  one  who  believes  himself  loved  a  sufficient 
proof  that  he  is  loved .''  But  Diga^nma  was  probably  too 
desirous  of  preserving  at  any  cost  this  means  of  blessed- 
ness to  deserve  consideration  as  an  interpreter  of  his  own 
experiences,  even  supposing  him  to  have  had  the  required 
knowledge. 

Document  6.  — The  following  document  throws  some  light 
on  the  manner  in  which  these  questions  are   understood 

1  Digamma,  An  Aspect  of  Prayer,  an  address  before  a  "society  in  a  certain 
college  in  Oxford,"  Oxford,  B.  H.  Blackwell. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  221 

by  the  students  of  theology  in  Protestant  schools.  "  Our 
teachers  have  told  us  that  a  Christian  student  should  never 
forget  certain  positive  facts  verified  by  every  Christian 
during  his  life,  facts  that  have  revealed  to  him  the  existence 
of  a  supernatural  power ;  they  have  told  us  of  '  experi- 
ences '  having  an  absolute  value  and  giving  faith  an  un- 
shakable foundation." 

What  are  these  experiences  ?  "  In  conversion  more  than 
anywhere  else  we  can  say,  '  I  know,'  .  .  .  We  know  that 
this  transformation  has  not  come  about  of  itself ;  in  mo- 
ments of  inquiry,  of  troubles  of  conscience,  of  confused 
and  unhappy  aspirations,  we  were  already  experiencing  a 
mysterious  activity.  ...  It  is  a  definite  assurance  that  if 
we  should  cease  to  abandon  ourselves  to  the  all-powerful 
influence  creating  our  new  self,  the  work  already  com- 
menced would  be  undone.  These  are  the  revalations  of 
prayer,  that  profound  sentiment  that  a  Being  hears  us, 
that  he  himself  inspires  the  words  which  without  effort  of 
thought  spring  from  our  heart.  .  .  .  To  be  sure,  we  may 
be  forbidden  to  speak  of  '  experiencing  God '  ;  it  is  quite 
true  that  I  can  experience  only  myself  and  the  modifica- 
tions of  this  self.  But,  similarly,  if  I  cannot  say  that  I 
have  experienced  my  fellow-men,  still  there  are  certain 
states  of  consciousness  as  to  the  nature  and  the  significance 
of  which  I  am  not  deceived ;  I  know  when  I  have  the 
right  to  say  that  I  know  my  fellow-being,  I  know  when 
my  feelings  are  in  harmony  with  his,  when  our  hearts  are 
as  one, — and  I  also  know  when  my  soul  communes  with 
the  Father.  Likewise,  when  I  have  once  met  Christ,  I 
recognize  him  in  my  hours  of  pure  and  lofty  meditation. 
.  .  .  I  know  of  a  certainty  that  my  right  is  absolute  to  affirm 
before  all  —  for  myself  —  the  work  of  the  Spirit  in  me,  God 
intimately  known  to  my  heart,  Christ  always  the  same." 

Yet,  despite  appearances,  this  young  enthusiast  is  not 


222        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

without  some  information  on  suggestion,  subconsciousness, 
and  automatism.  He  has,  in  particular,  read  The  Varieties 
of  Religions  Experience.  So,  notwithstanding  the  lightness 
of  his  psychological  baggage,  he  feels  deeply,  at  times  at 
least,  the  force  of  certain  psychological  arguments.  "  The 
second  objection,"  he  tells  us,  "is  much  more  formidable, 
every  one  knows  it ;  in  a  word,  it  is  autosuggestion.  Yes 
or  no,  in  the  Hfe  of  piety,  in  prayer  particularly,  is  there 
only  illusion .''  "  His  answer  deserves  quoting,  for  it  ex- 
presses the  typical  attitude  of  most  intelligent  and  culti- 
vated Christians.  Their  intense  need  of  believing,  and 
their  insufficient  understanding  of  the  scientific  explanation 
of  psychic  automatism  permits  them  to  set  it  aside  when 
they  cannot  invalidate  it. 

"  After  long  reflection,  we  do  not  believe  it  possible  to 
remove  the  difficulty  by  reasoning.  Our  attitude  at  present 
is  this.  .  .  .  We  understand  perfectly  the  state  of  mind  of 
a  loyal  adversary  who  believes  that  he  can  explain  prayer 
by  a  sort  of  division  of  the  personality,  .  .  .  and  we 
also  understand  this  explanation  to  be  seducingly  simple. 
But  when  endeavoring  to  '  realize '  the  meaning  of  the 
contradiction  ...  it  becomes  evident  to  us  that  it  will 
be  very  difficult  to  bring  about  an  agreement  and  that 
the  objections  of  our  adversary  cannot  reach  us.  We 
stand  on  two  different  grounds,  and  so  we  doubt  if  he  will 
ever  understand  us,  but  he  ca?inot  shake  in  us  the  affirma- 
tions of  experience  ;  namely ,  that  we  feel  within  us  a  being 
that  is  not  ourselves  ;  we  see  born  within  us  new  ideas  and 
perceptions,  real  revelations  that  do  not  come  from  ourselves  ; 
we  verify  each  day,  and  for  years  have  been  able  to  verify  in 
our  life,  a  progressive  ajid  continuous  guidance  'which  permits 
us  to  assert  that  we  do  not  proceed  alone  along  life's  path- 
way, that  our  Christian  faith  is  not  an  illusion."  ^ 

1  Paradon,  Emile,  De  P Experience  Chretienne,  Thesis  presented  at  the 
School  of  Protestant  Theology  at  Montauban,  1902. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY 


223 


There  is  probably  not  a  religious  work,  whether  artless 
and  naive  like  Paradon's  or  subtle  like  Pascal's,  from  which 
one  could  not  take  similar  passages.  How  could  these 
writers  understand  and  appreciate  the  scientific  explana- 
tion, since  they  lack  the  psychological  knowledge  which 
alone  makes  such  an  explanation  compelling  ? 

Doacment  7.  —  Numberless  impassioned  souls  know 
from  experience  the  conviction  voiced  in  this  instance, 
thus :  **  I  say  to  you  that  I  have  known  God  within  me, 
and  it  was  not  a  dream,  an  hallucination ;  never  had  my 
reason  been  more  master  of  itself ;  and  I  say  to  you  that 
there  was  within  me,  speaking  to  me,  drawing  me  close, 
uniting  itself  to  me,  one  who  was  not  of  myself,  who 
proceeded  not  from  me,  who  had  penetrated  within  me 
and  who  filled  the  depths  of  my  being  with  I  do  not 
know  what  light  which  was  not  of  this  world,  causing  me 
to  tremble  with  I  know  not  what  emotion,  that  nothing 
human  will  ever  give  birth  to.  And  this  strange  and 
mysterious  guest  had  no  need  to  tell  me  His  name.  I  say 
to  you  that  I  recognized  Him  the  Invisible,  Him  the  Power, 
Him  Love,  Him  Health,  Him  the  Reason  of  all  being, 
Him  the  Supreme  Explanation,  Him  the  Alpha  and 
Omega,  the  First  and  the  Last,  the  Beginning  and  the 
End.  He  was  there,  making  His  abode  in  my  astonished 
and  trembling  soul,  and  causing  feelings  to  spring  up  in  it 
that  it  could  no  longer  recognize  for  its  own."  ^ 

I  cite  as  a  curiosity  the  following  passage  from  the 
Larger  Catechism  of  Luther.  He  is  commenting  on  the 
first  commandment.     "  What  is  it  to  have  a  God,  or  what 

*  Minault,  Paul,  Dhcours  Religieux,  La  Solitude,  p.  64.  Quoted  by  E.  Pon- 
soye  in  Experience  et  Acie  de  Foi,  Thesis,  Montauban,  1905,  p.  43, 


224        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

is  God  ?  A  God  denotes  that  something  by  means  of 
which  man  shall  be  aware  of  all  good  things  and  wherein 
he  shall  have  a  refuge  in  every  necessity.  Therefore  to 
have  a  God  is  nothing  other  than  to  trust  and  to  believe 
him  from  the  heart,  as  I  have  often  said  that  the  trust 
and  confidence  of  the  heart  alone  create  both  God  and 
idol" 

Document  8.  —  Of  recent  defences  of  the  belief  in  God 
and  his  action  in  the  soul,  probably  the  most  elaborate 
is  that  of  Henri  Bois,  professor  at  the  School  of  Theology 
at  Montauban.  I  may  perhaps  be  permitted  to  add  the 
substance  thereof  at  some  length,  even  though  it  is  ex- 
ceedingly involved  and  apparently  contradictory.  I  am 
not  writing  a  history  of  philosophical  thought,  but  am 
providing  illustrations  of  the  experiences  and  arguments 
upon  which  contemporary  Christianity  rests.  The  form 
these  take  for  one  who  is  intrusted  with  the  education 
of  future  clergymen  is  therefore  highly  pertinent  to  my 
purpose.  Professor  Bois  begins  by  admitting  that  re- 
ligious experience  falls  entirely  within  the  domain  of 
psychology,  even  of  psycho-physics.  The  difficulties  that 
confront  the  psychology  of  religion  are  enormous,  but 
"  it  is  the  business  of  savants  to  find  expedients,  and,  if 
I  may  say  it,  shifts  for  overcoming  obstacles."  He  regrets 
the  mystic  affirmation,  "  God  is  given  immediately  in  con- 
sciousness," and  he  holds,  on  the  contrary,  that  one  attains 
to  God  by  an  induction.  But,  let  us  give  heed,  there  is 
induction  and  induction.  The  kind  of  induction  he  means 
he  calls  "  metaphysical "  ;  "  it  is  an  induction  that  exceeds 
observable  phenomena,"  although  "based  on  experience," 
It  is  in  fact  an  induction  that  necessitates  faith  !  "  I  prefer 
to  say  that  the  true  religious  experience  in  the  proper 
sense,  just  as  scientific  experience,  makes  no  pretension 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  225 

to  an  absolute  objectivity,  that  it  too  furnishes  us  with 
facts  without  lending  them  other  significance  than  that 
of  phenomena  that  are  renewed  every  time  their  equally 
phenomenal  conditions  appear.  I  prefer  to  say  that  ob- 
jectivity, here  just  as  in  the  sciences,  is  nothing  else  than 
the  possibility  for  every  man  to  prove  in  himself  or  in 
others,  while  conforming  to  certain  conditions,  the  same 
connections  of  phenomena,  by  virtue  of  the  universality 
and  constancy  of  the  laws  of  the  spirit,  which  are  just  as 
constant  and  universal  as  those  of  nature.  Finally,  I 
prefer  to  say  that  unquestionably  if  the  religious  man 
claims  an  entirely  different  significance  for  his  religious 
experience,  it  is  not  experience  in  its  own  capacity  that 
raises  these  demands  in  him,  it  is  faith."  Metaphysical 
induction  is  then  an  act  of  faith  by  which  the  religious 
soul  is  assured  of  the  transcendent  reality  of  God.  He 
repeats  this  in  various  places :  "  Yes,  experience  attests 
for  us  the  strong  conviction  of  the  religious  soul  that  he 
is  in  communication  with  a  transcendent  being,  the  evi- 
dence of  whose  existence  cannot  be  proved.  For  if 
repentance,  or  love,  the  feehng  of  downfall,  or  moral 
resurrection  is  a  fact,  God  is  not  a  fact,  and  his  reality 
and  his  activity  cannot  be  considered  immediately  and 
surely  as  data  merely  because  of  the  feeling  that  we  have 
in  regard  to  them.  There  is  indeed  a  science  of  psy- 
chology that  quite  rightly  studies  religious  experiences, 
and  seeks  to  show  their  connections,  conditions,  and  laws, 
without  departing  from  the  order  of  observable  phenom- 
ena. But  this  psychology  does  not  suffice  the  religions 
man  who  wishes  to  be  and  to  remain  religions.  For  him 
it  is  necessary  to  transceyid  and  interpret  his  religions  ex- 
perience by  meajis  of  faith." 

A  little  farther  on  the  reader  is  surprised  to  find  that 
what  was  called  metaphysical  induction  has  now  become 

Q 


226        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

a  perception :  "  Besides  the  false  mysticism  and  its  ex- 
travagances, there  exists  among  a  great  number  of  men 
a  strong  feeling  of  union  with  God,  wJiicJi  is  calm,  health- 
ful, and  beneficent,  which  has  the  effect  of  creating  within 
the  soul  a  new  centre  of  activity  and  of  force,  of  their  in- 
troducing peace,  joy,  freedom,  love,  and  light.  .  .  .  When 
that  something  appears  more  responsive  the  more  one 
asks  of  it,  when  it  transcends  irreducibly  every  seizure 
that  one  attempts  upon  it,  when  it  is  a  source  that  we 
cannot  exhaust,  a  presence  that  we  cannot  avoid,  should 
it  not  be  adjudged  real  ? 

"  There  is  then  in  the  realm  of  religion,  a  perception  of 
a  reality  existing  independently  of  us,  a  reality  which  we 
do  not  create,  and  which  can  be  known  ahke  by  different 
consciousnesses.  There  is  a  perception  that  is  not  that 
of  the  senses,  of  which  the  senses  are  not  capable,  and  which 
is  given  not  to  the  intelligence,  as  the  ^intellectual  intuition^ 
of  the  philosopJiers,  but  to  the  affective  and  volitional  be- 
ing, the  spiritual  and  mo7'al  being.  .  .  .  By  such  a  per- 
ception we  know  directly  the  Being  which  truly  is,  in 
opposition  to  the  immediate  objects  of  our  sensible  per- 
ceptions that  are  but  appearances  and  symbols  behind 
which  we  have  to  place  a  true  reality  entirely  opposed  to 
them." 

The  terms  "metaphysical  intuition,"  "faith,"  "per- 
ception," are  used  here  in  a  confusing  manner.  We 
have  nevertheless  discovered  the  author's  fundamental 
argument  It  is  this:  the  experiences  which  he  men- 
tions, and  which,  in  accord  with  the  other  authors  we  have 
quoted,  he  considers  to  be  the  characteristic  experiences 
of  the  Christian  religious  life,  are  so  excellent  and  so  com- 
pletely inexplicable  by  natural  means  that  transcendence 
alone  accounts  for  them.  It  seems  to  him  that  if  all 
the  treasures   by   which  he  is  enriched   come   from   his 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        227 

subconsciousness,  they  must  have  been  placed  there  by 
God. 

Professor  Bois  tells  us  that  the  Christian  believes  because 
he  cannot  do  otherwise.  "The  Christian  feels  that  he 
believes.  Yes,  he  feels  it,  and  he  feels  also  that  whatever 
effort  he  may  attempt  to  the  contrary  he  will  not  succeed 
in  not  believing  it.  He  is  unable  not  to  believe  it.  .  .  . 
The  Christian  may  likewise  feel  authorized  to  say :  I  can- 
not prevent  myself  believing  in  the  intervention  of  God. 
The  irresistibility  of  niy_belie/  is  the  cxjterion  I  have  of  its 
trutJiT'^ 

From  end  to  end  of  the  Protestant  world  this  is  appar- 
ently the  only  argument  confidently  relied  upon  for  justi- 
fying the  belief  in  an  objective  God  in  direct  relation  with 
man:  There  are  experiences  of  another  order  than  those 
belonging  to  science.  In  them  God  reveals  himself.  The 
pious  soul  "perceives"  God  in  the  emotion  which  seizes 
it ;  it  "  feels  "  God  within  itself. 

The  entire  self-sufficiency  of  the  experiential  basis  of 
faith  in  God  has  nowhere  been  more  boldly  proclaimed 
than  among  the  society  of  Friends.  "The  fundamental 
significant  thing  which  stands  out  in  early  Quakerism  was 
the  conviction  which  these  founders  of  it  felt,  that  they  had 
actually  discovered  the  living  God  and  that  He  was  in  them. 
They  all  have  one  thing  to  say — *I  have  experienced 
God.'  " 

"  It  [Quakerism]  was  first  of  all  the  proclamation  of  an 
experience.  The  movement  came  to  birth,  and  received 
its  original  power,  through  persons  who  were  no  less  pro- 
foundly conscious  of  a  divine  presence  than  they  were  of  a 
world  in  space."  ^ 

1  Bois,  Henri,  La  Valeur  de  U Experience  Religieuse,  Emile  Nourry,  Paris, 
1908. 

2  Jones,  Rufus,  Social  Law  in  the  Spiritual  World,  p.  161. 


228        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

Document  g.  —  The  so-called  modern,  positive  movement 
in  German  theology  calls  for  a  short  exposition ;  ^  with  this 
I  shall  bring  to  a  close  the  presentation  of  data  regarding 
the  grounds  of  the  present  faith  in  Christianity.  This 
movement  may  be  regarded  as  an  adaptation  of  Ritschlian- 
ism  to  the  preservation  of  the  old  faith.  The  aim  of  Pro- 
fessor Reinhold  Seeberg,  one  of  the  leading  spirits  of  this 
movement,  like  that  of  Kaftan  and  Herrmann,  is  to  save 
the  old  faith  by  giving  it  a  new  theological  vestment.  By 
"old  faith"  they  mean  a  supernatural  revelation  and 
a  supernatural  redemption.  Their  theology  finds  the 
original  ground  for  faith  in  individual  experiences; 
in  which  is  also  found  the  necessary  justification  for 
accepting  as  historical  facts  the  records  of  redemption 
in  the  New  Testament.  These  records,  therefore,  be- 
come independent  of  literary  and  historical  criticism.  See- 
berg, for  instance,  relates  how  a  miracle  took  place  in  his 
own  life.  "I  came  into  the  presence  of  the  traditions  of 
the  church.  These  seemed  strange.  They  belonged  to  a 
past  age.  I  found  a  protest  arising  within  myself  at  the 
very  thought  of  believing  this  supernatural  account  of  things. 
Then  something  happened.  The  words  that  had  been 
said  to  me  were  transformed  into  living  power ;  their  com- 
plexity was  changed  to  simplicity.  I  did  not  bring  this 
about  myself,  and  no  man  was  the  cause  of  it.  The  will  of 
God  in  his  omnipotence  penetrated  into  my  heart.  The 
complexity  of  tradition  gained  power  and  unity  by  be- 
coming means  for  the  activity  of  God."^ 

^ For  an  account  of  this  movement,  see  Martin  Schian,  Zur  Beurtheilung 
der  modernen  positiven  Theologie,  Topelmann,  Giessen,  1907,  121  pages. 
See  also  Gerald  Boiney  Smith,  The  Modern  Positive  Movement  in  Theology, 
Amer.  Jr.  of  Theol.,  January,  1909,  pp.  92-99.  From  the  latter  I  draw  much 
of  my  information  on  this  movement. 

2  Seeberg,  Reinhold,  Zur  systematischen  Theologie,  Deichert,  Leipzig,  1909, 
p.  140.     See  also  by  the  same  author,  The  Fundamental  Truths  of  the  Chris- 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  229 

The  ground  of  his  faith  is  thus  the  peculiar  kind  of  ex- 
periences commonly  known  as  "  conversion."  Without 
taking  the  trouble  to  analyze  them  psychologically,  he 
declares  his  conviction  that  they  transcend  human  nature 
and  justify  him  in  accepting  the  Christian  interpretation. 

Principal  Forsythe,  a  vigorous  expositor,  in  English,  of 
the  German  movement,  adopts  the  main  positions  of  the 
conservative  Ritschlians.  In  his  Lyman  Beecher  Lecture, 
he  writes  :  "  The  man,  the  church  that  is  in  living  inter- 
course with  the  risen  Christ,  is  in  possession  of  a  fact  of 
experience  as  real  as  any  mere  historic  fact,  or  any  expe- 
rience or  reality,  that  the  critic  has  to  found  on  and  make 
a  standard.  And,  with  that  experience,  a  man  is  bound 
to  approach  the  critical  evidence  of  Christ's  resurrection 
in  a  different  frame  of  mind  from  the  merely  scientific 
man  who  has  no  such  experience."^ 

There  is  nothing  new  in  the  main  argument  offered  by 
these  most  recent  theologians.  The  reasons  of  the  Chris- 
tians for  their  belief  in  God  the  Father  and  Jesus  his  Son;* 
of  the  Mohammedans  for  belief  in  Allah  and  his  Prophet ;  \ 
of  the  Australians  for  belief  in  Baiami,  the  Creator  and 
Ruler, — are  in  substance  the  same.  Experiences  demand 
in  each  instance  the  existence  and  intervention  of  the  par- 
ticular God  in  question.  The  "irresistibility  "  of  religious 
belief  is  everywhere  the  criterion  of  its  truth. ^ 

No  facts  of  consciousness  have  seemed  so  conclusive  of 

tian  Religion,  Putnam,  New  York,  1908,  331  pages.     Comp.  W.  Herrmann, 
Ojffenbarimg  unci  JF?<«i/^r,  Topelmann,  Giessen,  1908,  71  pages. 

1  Forsythe,  P.  F.,  Positive  Preaching  and  the  Modern  Mind,  Armstrong, 
New  York.  1907,  p.  276. 

2  The  marvellous  Mana  of  the  Melanesians  is  often  found  in  stones.  "A 
man  comes  by  chance  upon  a  stone  which  takes  his  fancy  ;  its  shape  is  singu- 
lar, it  is  like  something,  it  is  certainly  not  a  common  stone,  there  must  be  mana 
in  it.  So  he  argues  with  himself,  and  he  puts  it  to  the  proof  ;  he  lays  it  at  the 
root  of  a  tree  to  the  fruit  of  which  it  has  a  certain  resemblance,  or  he  buries  it 


f 


230        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  intervention  of  an  external  personal  power  and  of  the 
consequent  independence  of  religion  from  science  as  the 
facts  of  conscience.  We  have  found  them  directly  men- 
tioned by  the  Rev.  C.  C.  Hall,  and  at  least  implied  in  all 
the  other  documents.  The  peculiar  characteristics  to  which 
these  phenomena  owe  their  place  in  apologetics  are  their 
obligatoriness  and  universality.  The  authority  with  which 
conscience  is  invested  is  one  that  man  feels  compelled  to 
admit  even  when  he  resists  it.  And  he  cannot  avoid 
ascribing  to  that  authority  a  transindividual  origin. 
"^  In  addition,  certain  effects  following  upon  a  particularly 
vivid  realization  of  the  moral  law  bear  what  seems  to  many 
the  unmistakable  mark  of  a  superhuman  origin.  During 
the  conversion  crisis,  for  instance,  certain  inferior  cravings 
which  have  formerly  gained  the  mastery  are  found  to  be 
displaced  by  new  desires,  presenting  themselves  as  having 
not  only  the  right  but  also  the  power  to  triumph.  The 
manner  in  which  the  triumph  of  previously  impotent  higher 
tendencies  is  achieved  usually  makes  the  person  feel  as  if 
he  had  been  little  more  than  a  spectator  in  the  struggle ; 
so  that  he  readily  accepts  the  belief  that  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  forces  of  his  inner  being  under  the  dominance 
of  impulses  of  supreme  value  is  the  work  of  the  Grace  of 
God. 

These  and  similar  experiences  point,  no  doubt,  to  an  ori- 
gin reaching  beyond  the  person ;  but  is  this  origin  neces- 
sarily superhuman;  that  is,  outside  of  sociological  causality  .-^ 
This  is  not  the  place  for  an  explanation  of  the  phenomena 
of  conscience,  but  I  shall  venture  the  statement  that  the 
objective  character  and  the  obligatoriness  of  moral  obliga- 
tion is  a  problem  that  falls  within  the  fields  of  social  and 

in  the  ground  when  he  plants  his  garden  ;  an  abundant  crop  on  the  tree  or 
in  the  garden  shows  that  he  is  right,  the  stone  is  niatia,  has  that  power  in  it." 
(Codrington,  R.  H.,  The  Melanesians,  pp.  1 18-120.) 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  231 

individual  psychology.     The  origin  of  these  experiences  is     ) 
superindividual,  but  not  superhuman.  -' 

Moreover,  if  divine  intervention  should  be  made  mani- 
fest in  man  only  by  the  sense  of  moral  obligation  and  its 
results,  it  would  follow  that  only  a  part  of  the  religious 
life  would  depend  upon  superhuman  influence  and  tran- 
scend science.  The  lower,  non-moral  religions  as  well  as 
much  of  the  religious  life  of  the  ethically  minded  would  be 
purely  human.  The  preceding  quotations  have  made  clear 
that  the  facts  of  conscience  constitute  only  one  of  the  classes 
of  experience  in  which  the  followers  of  Christianity  and  other 
religions  find  their  gods. 

I  must  finally  mention  the  peculiar  twist  given  to  the  argu- 
ment by  a  number  of  theologians,  who  are  apparently  not  sat- 
isfied with  the  strategic  position  gained  by  claiming  peace, 
joy,  moral  strength,  and  the  particular  circumstances  of  the 
appearance  of  these  experiences,  as  a  sufficient  proof  of  the 
divine  aflflatus.  They  set  it  down  that  a  certain  class  —  or 
classes  —  of  judgments  of  value  constitutes  religious  knowl- 
edge, and  that  these  judgments  are  the  products  of  a  function 
of  the  mind  radically  different  from  those  yielding  "  theo- 
retical," that  is,  scientific  or  metaphysical,  knowledge.  And 
they  affirm  of  these  two  kinds  of  knowledge,  that  even  when 
they  concern  the  same  object  they  nowhere  coincide.  For 
Ritschl,  who  may  be  regarded  as  a  representative  of  this 
trend  of  thought,  "  judgment  of  value  "  is  synonymous  with 
"  feeUng  experience  and  meaning."  The  specifically  reli- 
gious function  of  the  mind  is,  according  to  him,  the  forma- 
tion of  certain  judgments  or  "  perceptions  "  of  value.  These 
judgments  proceed  from  the  action  that  certain  ideas  have 
upon  man  when  he  accepts  them  as  true.  For  example, 
the  idea  of  Jesus  conceived  of  as  the  only  Son  of  God  pro- 
duces in  man  experiences  having  a  peculiar  affective  quality 


232        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

and  significance.  And  Garvie  interprets  W.  Herrmann  as 
saying :  "  For  science  and  philosophy  .  .  .  the  real  means 
the  explicable.  In  religious  knowledge  the  real  is  that 
which  can  be  enjoyed  by  self-consciousness,  that  which  can 
be  experienced  as  valuable  for  the  ends  of  self."  ^  This  is 
a  restatement  in  more  technical  terms  of  the  familiar  say- 
ing, "  The  heart  has  reasons  which  reason  does  not  know." 
The  knowledge  of  reason  becomes,  in  this  phraseology, 
"theoretical  knowledge,"  and  the  "reasons"  of  the  heart 
"judgments  of  value." 

I  think  that  no  one  —  certainly  no  psychologist  —  would 
contest  that  the  formation  of  judgments  of  value  is  a  par- 
ticular function.  But  that  religious  life  is  tJic  specific  ex- 
pression of  that  function,  orlthat  theology  deals  only  with 
a  certain  class  of  judgments  of  value,  is  a  statement  so 
obviously  false  that  it  should  not  need  consideration.  The 
preceding  chapters  should  have  convinced  us  that  no  par- 
ticular class  of  judgments  of  value  can  be  said  to  constitute 
religion  or  to  belong  exclusively  to  religion.  Judgments  of 
all  sorts  enter  into  it. 

But,  in  any  case,  the  psychologist  will  declare  without 
hesitation  that  judgments  of  value  are  part  of  the  data 
which  it  is  the  task  of  the  psychologist  to  describe,  analyze, 
compare,  and  classify,  and  of  which  he  must  determine 
the  conditions  and  the  consequences.  Judgments  of  value 
belong  to  psychology  as  much  as  any  other  fact  of  con- 
sciousness. With  regard  to  sensory  feelings,  science  dis- 
covers their  partial  dependence  upon  sensations  and  specific 
organs,  the  objective  conditions  of  their  appearance,  their 
effects  upon  voUtion,  etc.  A  similar  statement  is  true  of 
the  higher  feelings ;  they  also  are  dependent  upon  psycho- 
physiological factors ;  they  also  belong  to  a  vast  network 
of  causal  connections  which  it  is  the  task  of  science  to 

1  Garvie,  A.,  Expositor,  1903,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  148. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        233 

bring  to  light.  Identifying  religion  with  a  particular  class 
of  judgments  of  value  can,  therefore,  in  no  way  lead  to 
the  separation  of  religion  from  science. 

The  insufficiency  of  this  Ritschlian  theory  of  knowledge 
is  so  evident  that  some  have  believed  that  Ritschl  had  no 
intention  of  affirming  more  than  the  subjective  existence 
of  God.  Professor  Denney  says,  for  example,  that  for 
Ritschl,  "though  Jesus  Christ  has  for  the  religious  con- 
sciousness the  religious  value  of  God,  he  has  for  the  scien- 
tific consciousness  only  the  common  real  value  of  man."  ^ 

The  foregoing  documents  will  be  held  sufficient,  I  hope, 
to  bear  out  the  statement  with  which  I  began ;  namely, 
that  belief  in  the  Christian  God  rests  no  longer  upon  the 
wonders  of  the  physical  universe,  nor  upon  metaphysical 
arguments,  but  upon  certain  inner  experiences.  The  al- 
most complete  absence  of  reference  to  physical  miracles 
and  to  the  argument  from  design,  which  only  recently  were 
made  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  assaults  upon  revealed  re- 
ligion, is  indeed  striking,  and  physical  science  may  well 
regard  this  silence  as  a  flattering  recognition  of  its  tri- 
umph. 

It  should  also  have  become  clear  that  these  inner  expe- 
riences are  looked  upon  either  (i)  as  being  the  material  for 
what  is  called  an  "induction"  of  the  existence  of  a  divine 
power —  apparently  a  scientific  procedure  ;  or  (2)  as  bear- 
ing in  themselves  the  mark  of  transhuman  origin,  that  is 
they  are  taken  as  "  immediate  "  revelations  of  God.  This 
second  alternative  is  the  one  embraced  by  the  mystics.  I 
shall  call  it  the  mystical  claim. 

^  Quoted  by  Garvie,  Ritschlian  Theology,  p.  188. 


234        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

II.  Religious  Knowledge  as  immediately  given  in  Specific 

Experiences 

It  is  an  interesting  problem  to  determine  what  influences 
have  led  theologians  to  anchor  their  beliefs  upon  the  prop- 
osition that  religious  experience  differs  from  other  forms 
of  consciousness  in  that  it  gives  one  an  immediate  knowl- 
edge of  the  external  existence  of  certain  objects  of  be- 
lief, although  they  do  not  fall  under  the  senses,  and  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  truth  of  certain  historical 
facts. 

The  motive  for  this  astonishing  claim  is  the -desire  to 
make  rehgious  values  entirely  independent  of  any  factor 
which  might  threaten  them.  The  conviction  that  the 
separation  of  theology  from  science  and  from  metaphysics 
is  necessary  for  the  sake  of  religion  would,  of  course, 
strengthen  this  motive.  I  need  not  dwell  upon  the 
potency  of  desire  in  determining  conviction ;  recent  dis- 
cussions on  the  will,  and  on  the  right  to  believe  have 
called  attention  to  the  dependence  of  belief  upon  desire. 

The  acceptance  of  the  mystical  claim  has  been  made  easier 
by  ignorance  in  matters  psychological,  —  an  ignorance 
which  has  resulted,  among  other  things,  in  the  confusion 
of  truly  immediate  experience  with  immediate  experience 
interpreted. 

Ignorance  of  psychology  is  interestingly  displayed  by 
the  author  of  a  recent  thesis  offered  for  the  degree  of 
Doctor  of  Theology.  The  author  thinks  he  has  dis- 
covered in  conversion  operations  beyond  the  field  of 
psychology.  Is  he  thinking  of  some  metaphysical  prob- 
lems .''  By  no  means ;  for  he  says  that  he  hopes  to  obtain 
some  idea  of  their  solution  "by  a  more  subjective  and 
consequently  less  scientific  study  of  conversion,  —  a  study 
which  will  endeavor  to  fill,  by  as  faithful  as  possible  an 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  235 

analysis  of  inner  experience,  the  gaps  left  by  science."  ^ 
He  hopes  to  reach  beyond  psychology  "by  as  faithful 
as  possible  an  analysis  of  inner  experience,"  by  a  study 
more  subjective  and  consequently  less  scientific  !  What 
does  this  mean  ?  Simply  that  unwittingly  the  author  is 
about  to  try  to  do  the  work  of  the  psychologist. 

On  the  distinction  between  bare,  raw  experience  and 
its  objective  interpretation,  I  must  dwell  at  some  length. 
It  is  obviously  ignored  in  the  impatient  complaints  by 
which  religious  persons  endeavor  to  protect  themselves 
from  what  they  deem  an  unwarranted  encroachment  of 
science  and  of  philosophy.  What  have  we  to  do,  they 
say,  we  who  have  been  upheld  when  about  to  stumble, 
comforted  when  in  despair ;  who  have  experienced  the 
inexpressible  joy  of  communion  with  the  Divine ;  what 
have  we  to  do,  we  who  know  the  Lord,  with  the  psychol- 
ogist and  his  reference  to  nerve-cells,  brain  centres, 
automatism,  subconsciousness,  and  the  rest  of  it  ?  His 
discussions  and  conclusions  do  not  reach  us  at  all.  He 
deals  with  a  mechanical  world,  we  with  desires  and  pur- 
poses, joys  and  sorrows;  we  live,  he  analyzes  life.  We 
move  in  different  spheres ;  let  him  not  meddle  with  us. 
These  imaginary  but  typical  persons  might  continue  thus : 
The  inner  life  is  not  a  mass  of  ideas  and  of  feelings, 
of  emotions  and  volitions,  in  the  sense  in  which  the 
psychologist  looks  upon  them  when  he  considers  conscious 
experience  to  be  made  up  of  psychic  elements  connected 
in  some  way  with  an  organism.  The  reality  in  which 
we  move  is  a  world  of  action,  of  desire,  of  aversion,  of 
ends  and  purposes. 

Were  these  statements   intended   simply  to  affirm  that 

iBerguer,  Henri,  La  Notion   de    VaUur,   Geneve,   Georg  &   Co.,    1908, 
p.  228. 


236        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

one's  experiences  are  final  when  they  are  considered 
merely  as  facts  of  consciousness,  who  would  take  excep- 
tion to  them  ?  Surely  not  the  psychologist.  States  of 
rehgious  consciousness  are  what  they  are,  irrevocably. 
They  can  no  more  be  denied  or  explained  away  than  any 
other  state  of  consciousness,  —  than,  for  instance,  what 
passes  in  the  mind  of  a  merchant  or  poet.  They  have 
happened  ;  that  is  the  long  and  the  short  of  it.  Science  has 
never  attempted  to  deny  that  Saint  Francis  had  moments  of 
inexpressible  joy, — joy  which  he  held  infinitely^^uperior 
to  any  "earthly"  pleasure;  that  Bunyan  heard  voices 
which  he  thought  belonged  to  devils  or  to  God  ;  or  that 
George  Muller  prayed  for  help  and  was  "  lifted  up  with 
a  sense  of  the  presence  of  the  Almighty  within  him." 
Science  accepts  these  as  facts  of  consciousness,  and  so 
there  cannot  be  any  conflict  here  between  psychology 
and  theology. 

A  conflict  does  arise,  however,  when  these  persons 
imagine  their  experiences  to  involve  the  objective  or  the 
universal  validity  of  certain  of  their  ideas.  When  they 
say,  for  instance,  that  their  experiences  attest  the  present 
existence  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  or  that  the  belief  in 
certain  doctrines  is  a  necessary  condition  of  these  experi- 
ences. Isaac  Pennington,  for  example,  describes  thus 
what  happened  to  him  at  a  meeting  at  Swamington :  "  I 
felt  the  presence  and  power  of  the  Most  High.  .  .  .  Yea, 
I  did  not  only  feel  words  and  demonstrations  from  with- 
out, but  I  felt  the  dead  quickened,  the  seed  raised,  inso- 
much that  my  heart  said,  '  This  is  He,  there  is  no  other : 
this  is  He  whom  I  have  waited  for  and  sought  after  from 
my  childhood.'  .  .  .  I  have  met  with  my  God ;  I  have  met 
with  my  Saviour.  ...  I  have  met  with  the  true  knowl- 
edge, the  knowledge  of  life."^ 

^  Pennington,  Isaac,  Works,  1S61,  Vol.  I,  pp.  37,  38.  Quoted  by  R.  Jones 
in  Social  Law  in  the  Spiritual  World,  p.  162. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  237 

Such  claims  as  this  pass  out  of  the  incontrovertible, 
subjective  sphere  into  the  sphere  of  science  since  the 
affirmation  that  certain  ideas  mean  an  objective  existence 
or  are  universally  valid  raises  the  question  of  the  inter- 
pretation of  experience.  ^ 

The  validity  of  the  reli^ous  states  of  consciousness  is 
precisely  of  the  same  sort  as  that  of  any  other  state  of  con- 
sciousness ;  they  are  absolute,  undeniable,  only  so  long  as 
they  are  considered  merely  as  the  experience  of  a  subject, 
and  no  longer.  Before  the  theologians  who  claim  to  find 
in  inner  experience  the  data  of  theology,  and  on  that 
ground  to  remove  it  from  all  contact  with  science,  may  be 
looked  upon  as  intellectually  worthy  of  consideration,  they 
must  explain  how  they  secure  objective  and  universal 
knowledge.  The  mystical  claim  can  exist  only  because  of 
the  failure  to  separate  the  subjective  significance  of  con- 
sciousness from  the  transsubjective  meaning  which  is 
attributed  to  some  parts  of  it.  The  difficulty  in  the  way 
of  making  this  distinction  may  be  exemplified  from  the 
writings  of  William  James. 

In  The  Varieties  of  Religioiis  Experience,  William  James 
endeavors  to  show  that  mystic  states  —  these  states  in- 
clude for  him  drunkenness  and  not  merely  religious  states 
of  mysticism  —  unveil  at  times  realities  that  exceed  what 
ordinary  consciousness  is  able  to  apprehend.  "As  a  mat- 
ter of  psychological  fact,"  he  tells  us,  "mystical  states  of 
a  well-pronounced  and  emphatic  sort  are  usually  authori- 
tative over  those  who  have  them.  They  have  been  '  there ' 
and  know.  ...  It  mocks  our  utmost  efforts,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  and  in  point  of  logic  it  absolutely  escapes  our  ju- 
risdiction. Our  own  more  '  rational '  beliefs  are  based  on 
evidence  exactly  similar  in  nature  to  that  which  mystics 
quote  for  theirs.  Our  senses,  namely,  have  assured  us  of 
certain  states  of  fact;   but   mystical   experiences    are    as 


238        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

direct  perceptions  of  fact  for  those  who  have  them  as  any 
sensations  ever  were  for  us.  The  records  show  that  even 
though  the  five  senses  be  in  abeyance  in  them,  they  are 
absolutely  sensational  in  their  epistemological  quality,  — 
that  is,  they  are  face-to-face  presentations  of  what  seems 
immediately  to  exist.  The  mystic  is,  in  short,  invulner- 
able." 1 

"  They  have  been  *  there '  and  know  "  ;  "  mystical  expe- 
riences are  as  direct  perceptions  of  fact  for  those  who  have 
them  as  any  sensations  ever  were  for  us" ;  "the  mystic  is 
in  short  invulnerable,"  —  these  affirmations  involve  the 
confusion  we  have  just  considered,  unless  mystical  "intui- 
tions "  exclude  all  extra-subjective  references.  In  that  case 
the  mystic  "revelations"  would,  of  course,  be  unassailable. 
But  pious  souls  mean  more  than  that  when  they  speak  of 
the  validity  of  their  experiences.  They  claim  the  objective 
reality  of  the  religious  objects,  and  the  universal  validity  of 
the  dogmas  which  chance  to  be  regarded  by  them  as  a 
necessary  condition  of  their  experience.  And  it  is  also 
undoubtedly  more  than  the  bare  subjective  fact  for  which 
William  James  claims  invulnerability.  "They  [the  mys- 
tics] offer  us,"  he  writes,  "hypotheses,  hypotheses  which 
we  may  voluntarily  ignore,  but  which  as  thinkers  we  cannot 
possibly  upset."  Thus,  that  which  he  regards  as  invulner- 
able are  hypotheses,  i.e.  intellectual  constructions.  The 
great  American  psychologist  seems  to  have  been  blinded 
by  a  too  great  desire  to  discover  a  new  world. 

Should  one  of  the  great  mystics  be  asked  to  formulate 
his  "intuitions,"  he  would  mention  in  substance  those 
Christian  doctrines  in  which  his  mystic  experiences  are  set. 
He  would  say,  for  example,  that  he  has  "  felt "  the  infinite 
goodness  of  God,  has  become  aware  of  His  incarnation  in 

1  James,  William,  The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  Longmans,  Green 
and  Co.,  1904,  p.  423. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  239 

Jesus  Christ ;  perhaps  he  would  even  affirm  that  the  mys- 
tery of  the  Trinity  had  been  unveiled  to  him.  He  would, 
it  is  true,  hasten  to  add  that  words  are  insufficient  to 
express  these  unutterable  things.  William  James,  more 
cautious,  does  not  accept  all  these  "  revelations  "  as  invul- 
nerable hypotheses.  But  this  restraint  is  at  the  expense  of 
consistency.  Why  does  he  content  himself  with  the  fol- 
lowing meagre  characterization  of  the  "  invulnerable " 
essence  of  the  mystical  deliverances  ?  "  They  speak  to  us 
of  the  supremacy  of  the  Ideal ;  they  speak  to  us  of  union 
with  the  infinite,  of  security,  of  repose."^ 

In  a  very  sympathetic  account  of  the  pages  from  which 
I  have  quoted.  Professor  Boutroux  makes  use  of  the  follow- 
ing similar  phrases  to  express  the  essence  of  religious 
experience :  "  It  is  the  feeling  that  all  goes  well,  outside 
us  and  within  us.  .  ,  .  It  is  the  consciousness  of  partici- 
pating in  a  power  greater  than  our  own,  and  the  desire  of  co- 
operating with  that  power  in  works  of  love,  of  peace,  and 
of  joy.  It  is  on  the  whole  an  exaltation  of  life  as  creative 
force,  as  harmonization,  and  as  joy."  But  he  also  begins 
by  saying  that  this  feeling  "  cannot  be  described,"  that 
these  descriptions  are  good  only  so  far  "  as  one  can  sug- 
gest the  idea  with  words."  ^ 

William  James  does  not  say,  as  do  more  na'fve  persons, 
"  These  experiences  speak  to  us  of  union  with  God  or  with 
his  incarnate  Son,"  but  only,  "  They  speak  to  us  of  union 
with  the  infinite."  Even  this  truncated  formula,  however, 
implies  a  passage  from  the  subject  to  an  object  beyond. 
For  the  phrase  "  union  with  the  infinite  "  has  meaning  only 
in  so  far  as  the  terms  between  which  the  union  exists  are 
apprehended.     The  phraseology  of  James  and  Boutroux 

1  James,  op.  cii.,  pp.  428,  362. 

2  Boutroux,  Einile,  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale,  1908,  Vol.  XVI, 
P-5- 


240        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

indicates,  it  seems,  a  desire  to  reduce  as  much  as  possible 
the  alleged  transcendent  implications  of  mystical  experi- 
ences, without  altogether  giving  them  up.  Their  failure 
to  say  in  what  consists  the  objective  validity  of  the  mystical 
experience  confirms  the  opinion  that  the  only  invulnerable 
thing  in  "  union  with  the  infinite,"  whether  it  be  induced 
by  "  divine  love,"  by  wine,  or  by  the  contemplation  of  sub- 
lime nature,  is  the  affective  consciousness  —  a  conscious- 
ness that  does  not  reach  beyond  itself.  \ 

V 

The  manner  in  which  God  acts  in  the  soul.  —  This  should 
be  a  question  of  prime  interest  to  those  who  believe  in  the 
action  of  God  upon  man.  Yet  the  religious  person  is  usu- 
ally so  much  engrossed  in  results  and  pays  so  little  criti- 
cal attention  to  means  and  methods  that  he  has  little  of 
consequence  to  say  on  this  topic.  As  to  the  psychologist, 
he  cannot  be  expected  to  apply  himself  to  the  solution  of 
this  problem  until  the  alleged  intervention  has  been  sub- 
stantiated. I  shall,  however,  in  order  to  gratify  a  possible 
curiosity  on  the  part  of  some  readers,  report  two  sugges- 
tions that  have  been  made  as  to  the  manner  in  which  God 
works  upon  the  soul.  The  one  at  present  in  wider  favor 
is  derived  from  the  speculations  of  F.  W.  Meyers.  This 
is  the  view  to  which  William  James  has  given  currency  in 
the  conclusion  to  T/ie  Varieties  of  Religions  Experience. 
According  to  this  hypothesis,  God,  or  other  extra-human 
agents,  acts  upon  the  subliminal  consciousness,  —  a  very 
obscure  term  which  seems  to  have  captured  the  popular 
imagination.  It  has  also  won  the  approbation  of  a  goodly 
number  of  theologians.  The  most  ignorant  or  the  least 
prudent  among  those  who  make  use  of  this  hypothesis  even 
identify,  it  seems,  all  subconsciousness  with  the  divine.^     It 

^  "  I  feel  obliged,  nevertheless,  to  recognize  that  it  has  several  times  hap- 
pened that  my  lamented  friend  Frommel  and  M.  FuUiquet  [Professors  of  The- 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY 


241 


is  an  hypothesis  which  unfortunately  entices  even  men  of 
science  to  renounce  their  task,  —  the  investigation  of  phe- 
nomena,—  by  deceiving  them  into  thinking  that  reference 
to  the  subconscious  is  a  final  explanation.  That  which 
Kant  said  of  transcendental  hypotheses,  in  the  Discipline 
of  Pure  Reason,  is  true  of  the  subliminal  hypothesis:  they 
"  do  not  advance  reason,  but  rather  stop  it  in  its  progress ; 
.  .  .  they  render  fruitless  all  its  exertions  in  its  own  proper 
sphere,  which  is  that  of  experience.  For,  when  the  ex- 
planation of  natural  phenomena  happens  to  be  difficult,  we 
have  constantly  at  hand  a  transcendental  ground  of  ex- 
planation which  lifts  us  above  the  necessity  of  investigating 
nature." 

In  the  second  class  of  hypotheses,  God  is  conceived  of  I 
as  acting  directly  upon  consciousness  and  no  longer  in-  > 
directly  through  subconsciousness.  One  can  here  main- 
tain that  divine  action  is  exercised  upon  the  duration  and 
the  energy  of  the  attention  given  to  certain  objects.  For, 
in  order  to  transform  an  individual,  it  would  evidently  suf- 
fice to  be  able  to  prolong  in  him  the  duration  of  right  and 
noble  ideas.  It  is  true  that  if  divine  intervention  were 
limited  in  this  fashion  it  could  not  serve  as  an  explanation 
of  all  that  its  believers  love  to  attribute  to  it.  Besides, 
many  would  prefer  a  theory  that  leaves  a  greater  freedom 
to  the  Divinity;  for  example,  a  theory  conceiving  of  God 
as  acting  upon  the  feelings,  and  through  them  upon  all  the 
conscious  processes.  *'  God  can  excite  new  centres  of  asso- 
ciation of  ideas,  can  arrest  old  associations ;  all  intellectual 
activity  being  subservient  to  feeling,  He  can  produce  what- 
ever doctrines  and  ideas  He  wishes."^ 

ology  at  the  School  of  Theology  at  Geneva]  have  expressed  themselves  as  if 
they  identified  all  subconsciousness  with  God  or  with  the  result  or  the  seat  of 
divine  action."     (PI.  Bois,  Foi  et  Vie,  September  16,  1909,  p.  565.) 

^  Bois,  H.,  Inspiration  et  Revelation,  lemons  inedite,  1902-1903,  quoted  by 
E.  Ponsoye,  Experience  et  Acte  de  Foi,  Thesis,  Valence,  1905,  pp.  63-64. 
K 


242        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

Should  God  act  in  this  manner,  nothing  ought  to  be 
easier  for  the  psychologist  than  to  show  in  the  life  of  feel- 
ing and  of  thought  disturbances  not  depending  upon  known 
natural  causes.  The  student  of  reUgious  life  would  be  in 
the  position  of  the  astronomer  who  knows  that  certain 
stars  are  affected  by  forces  of  which  he  does  not  yet  under- 
stand the  source.  The  fact  is  that,  in  proportion  as  psy- 
chology advances,  the  apparent  anomalies  of  the  religious 
life  are  more  and  more  completely  explained  according  to 
known  laws. 

[  This  section  has  come  to  its  logical  conclusion  :  the  claim 
that  "  inner  experience  "  is  independent  of  psychological 
science  remains  unsubstantiated.  I  trust  it  has  become 
clear  that  the  hope  to  lift  a  theology  based  on  inner  ex- 
perience out  of  the  sphere  of  science  is  preposterous ; 
since  whatever  appears  in  consciousness  is  material  for 
psychology.  Religious  knowledge  may  be  said  to  be  im- 
mediate and  independent  of  science  only  in  the  sense  in 

(which  this  can  be  stated  of  any  experience.  Any  bit  of 
conscious  life  is  in  itself,  as  a  fact  of  consciousness,  unas- 
sailable. But  a  theology  that  should  remain  within  the 
domain  inaccessible  to  science  would  be  limited  to  a  mere 
description  of  man's  religious  consciousness,  and  would 
be  deprived  of  the  right  to  any  opinion  on  the  objective 
reality  of  its  objects  and  on  the  universal  validity  of  its 
propositions. 

If  superhuman  factors  are  at  work  within  human  experi- 
ence, there  are  no  ways  of  discovering  them  except  the 
ways  of  science. 

The  authority  of  Kant  has  not  infrequently  been  claimed  by  those 
holding  the  views  I  have  criticised.  Some,  in  their  eagerness  to  put 
him  on  their  side,  have  said,  in  effect,  "  Did  he  not  sharply  separate 
the  world  of  sense  from  the  'intelligible'  world,  the  empirical  realm 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  243 

from  the  realm  of  reason  ?  And  did  he  not  teach  that  beyond  science 
there  was  a  higher  world,  the  world  of  freedom  into  which  one  pene- 
trates only  by  faith  ?  After  all,  we  are  merely  restating,  in  our  own 
way,  one  of  the  fundamental  propositions  laid  down  by  the  illustrious 
author  of  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason^'' 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  ''  their  own  way  "  of  stating  Kant  de- 
nies his  most  fundamental  propositions.  No  support  whatsoever  can  be 
found  in  his  writings  for  attempting  to  establish  either  that  in  certain 
experiences  God  is  immediately  revealed  to  the  soul  (this  mystical 
claim  has  never  been  imputed  to  Kant  by  any  one  entitled  to  being 
heard),  or  that  certain  portions  of  "  experience  "  could  not  be  explained 
by  natural  means,  —  that  is,  according  to  the  causal  principle,  — just  as 
satisfactorily  as  any  other  psychic  experience. 

If  Kant  made  an  absolute  separation  between  the  "  sensible  "  and  the 
"  intelligible  "  world,  it  was  not  because  he  found  some  portions  of  sensi- 
ble experience  scientifically  explainable  and  others  showing  empirical 
evidence  of  a  transcendent  origin.  To  seek  empirical  ground  for  the 
action  of  God  in  man's  soul  is  to  place  oneself  completely  outside  of  the 
Kantian  philosophy.  Yet  this  is  precisely  what  the  contemporary  em- 
pirical theologians  do.  Kant's  belief  in  God,  Freedom,  and  Immortality 
is  a  corollary  of  the  Moral  Law  itself.  The  categorical  command  im- 
plies, in  Kanfs  mind,  the  possibility  of  the  realization  of  the  Moral  Law, 
which  is  not  satisfied  in  this  world  hence  we  must,  he  thinks,  have  a 
right  to  postulate  the  immortality  of  the  soul  and  the  existence  of  God, 
i.e.  a  transcendent  Moral  World  in  which  the  Moral  Law  is  com- 
pletely realized. 

Very  different  is  the  argumentation  of  the  theologians.  Digamma 
observes,  as  we  have  seen,  that  earnest  prayer  has  been  "  answered  " 
by  an  increase  of  mental  happiness  ;  therefore  he  believes  in  God. 
Bois,  similarly,  as  a  basis  of  his  faith  in  a  reality  existing  independently 
of  us,  points  to  a  "  strong  feeling  of  union  with  God,  calm  and  healthful, 
which  produces  peace,  joy,  and  strength."  Seeberg  tells  us  how,  when 
his  mind  was  protesting  against  the  belief  in  the  supernatural  account 
of  the  religious  life,  something  happened  within  him  :  an  inexplicable 
transformation,  a  miracle,  took  place ;  words  he  had  not  understood 
were  transformed  into  living  power,  and  he  found  himself  in  living  in- 
tercourse with  the  risen  Christ.  William  James  attempts  to  single  out 
within  the  phenomenal  life,  experiences  from  which  one  may  infer  the 
existence  of  a  transcendent  agent  in  dynamic  relation  to  man. 

On  the  other  hand,  "  religion  "  according  to  Kant's  statement  can  be 


244        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

neither  proved  nor  disproved  by  science,  though  dogma  (in  his  sense 
of  the  term)  can  be.  But  his  God  and  his  religion  are  not  the  God  and 
the  religion  the  theologians  are  defending.  Kant's  conception  of  God 
implies  a  denial  of  what  they  account  necessary  :  a  personal  God  in 
dynamic  relation  with  man,  either  directly  or  through  the  Son  of  Man 
and  the  Saints.  "  The  conception  of  a  supernatural  intervention  in  our 
often  defective  moral  faculty,  and  even  in  our  uncertain  or  weak  dis- 
position to  fulfil  our  whole  duty,  is  a  transcendental  conception  and  a 
mere  idea,  of  the  reality  of  which  no  experience  can  assure  us."  Prayer, 
the  instrument  par  excellence  of  Christian  life,  was  for  him  a  super- 
stitious delusion,  although  useful  and  respectable  under  certain  con- 
ditions.i 

The  facts  are  so  clear  that  common  fairness  and  a  little  knowledge 
should  suffice  completely  to  disconnect  the  name  of  Kant  from  the 
present  empirical  Christian  apologetics. 

There  remains  for  us  to  consider  the  opinion  that  re- 
ligious knowledge  is  the  product  of  an  induction.  Is  this 
conception  valid,  and  if  so  what  becomes  of  the  relation  of 
theology  to  science } 

III.   Theology  as  a  Body  of  Induced  Propositions 

Empirical  apologetics  occupies  a  curious  position ;  it 
stands  on  two  mutually  exclusive  propositions.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  would  protect  religion  against  metaphysics  by 
setting  up  inner  experiences  as  containing  the  proof  of  the 
existence  and  of  the  nature  of  the  Christian  God,  and  as 
the  only  source  of  religious  knowledge.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  would  defend  religion  against  science  by  invoking 
the  principle  of  transcendence  according  to  which  science 
is  incompetent  to  deal  with  religious  knowledge  and,  in 

1 "  Prayer,  considered  as  an  inner  formal  worship  of  God  and  therefore  re- 
garded as  a  means  of  grace,  is  a  superstitious  delusion  (a  fetichism)  ;  for  it  is 
merely  a  wish  expressed  to  a  being  who  requires  no  explanation  of  the  inner 
disposition  of  the  suppliant,  by  which  means  therefore  nothing  is  accomplished." 
(Kant,  Die  Religion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blosen  Vernun/i,  general 
remarks,  Hartenstein  edition,  Vol.  VI,  pp.  290-294.) 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  245 

particular,  with  the  question  of  God.     Let  us  begin  with 
the  consideration  of  the  second  of  these  propositions. 

I.    THE    EXCLUSION    OF    THE    TRANSCENDENT    FROM    THE 
SPHERE    OF   SCIENCE 

In  an  excellent  lecture  on  the  Principles  of  Religious 
Psychology,  Professor  Flournoy  defines  the  attitude  which 
he  thinks  the  psychologist  should  take  towards  religious 
beliefs.  "  Psychology  neither  rejects  nor  affirms  the  tran- 
scendent existence  of  the  religious  objects;  it  simply  ig- 
nores that  problem  as  being  outside  of  its  field."  He 
quotes  approvingly  Ribot,  "  The  religious  feeling  is  a  fact 
which  psychology  simply  analyzes  and  follows  in  its  trans- 
formations, but  it  is  incompetent  in  the  shatter  of  its 
objective  value,"  and  adds :  "  The  words  I  have  italicized 
express  exactly  what  I  mean  by  the  exclusion  of  the  tran- 
scendent. .  .  .  Religious  Psychology  can  be  estabUshed 
and  can  progress  only  by  resolutely  avoiding  and  referring 
to  philosophy  the  insidious  questions  in  which  she  stands 
in  danger  of  becoming  entangled  from  the  start."  ^  Im- 
agine the  relief  felt  by  those  who  have  watched  with  dread 
the  advance  of  psychology  in  the  sphere  of  religion,  when 
they  hear  an  eminent  psychologist  say:  "And  finally, 
never  be  afraid  of  science.  ...  In  particular  do  not  fear 
its  influence  upon  your  faith,  for  science  and  faith  are  not 
of  the  same  order.  Science  is  neutral,  silent,  'agnostic,' 
regarding  the  foundation  of  things  and  the  final  meaning 
of  life.  It  is  an  unfair  use  of  it  which  makes  it  proclaim 
any  dogma  whatsoever,  whether  materialistic  or  spiritualis- 
tic. And  so,  never  ask  of  it  arguments  favoring  your  con- 
victions ;  the  support  it  might  seem  to  lend  you  would  be 

^  Flournoy,  Th.,  Les  Principes  de  la  Psychologic  Religieuse,  Archives  de 
Psychologic,  Vol,  II,  1903,  pp.  37-41. 


246        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

but  a  reed  which,  should  you  lean  upon  it,  would  pierce 
your  hand.  But  be  equally  certain  that  it  does  not  speak 
in  favor  of  antagonistic  doctrines."  ^ 

Professor  Flournoy  is  right,  if  the  God  of  religion  is 
really  the  Metaphysical  God,  Absolute,  Infinite,  Imper- 
sonal. In  that  case  science  is  certainly  incompetent.  But 
if,  on  the  contrary,  the  object  necessary  to  the  religion  of 
Professor  Flournoy's  auditors,  and  to  religion  generally, 
manifests  himself  directly  to  human  consciousness,  if  he 
reveals  himself  in  inner  experiences,  and  if  faith  in  him  is 
based  upon  these  facts,  —  then  he  is  an  empirical  God  and 
belongs  to  science.  The  fundamental  problem  confronting 
us  is,  then,  whether  the  God  of  the  religions  is  the  Impas- 
sible Absolute,  whose  existence  is  established  by  metaphys- 
ical arguments,  or  whether  he  is  a  Being  whose  objective 
reality  is  demonstrated  by  the  production  of  peace,  joy, 
strength,  righteousness,  and  other  results  of  that  order,  in 
those  who  commune  with  him. 

One  of  the  chief  outcomes  of  the  preceding  chapters 
has  been  the  demonstration  of  the  empirical  origin  of  the 
gods  and  of  the  empirical  nature  of  the  grounds  for  the 
present  behef  in  them.  This  conclusion  will  receive  ad- 
ditional support  if  it  is  shown  that  when  the  exclusion  of 
science  from  the  transcendent  world  is  supposed  to  divorce 
science  from  the  fundamental  current  religious  beliefs,  it  is 
because  of  a  failure  to  keep  separate  two  God-ideas  that 
are  as  distinct  in  content  as  they  are  in  origin  :  a  metaphys- 
ical idea,  which  has  nought  to  do  with  religion ;  and  an 
empirical  idea,  which  belongs  to  religion.  Had  these  two 
God-ideas  been  kept  distinct,  much  of  the  muddle  in  which 
theology  and  the  philosophy  of  reHgion  are  now  flounder- 
ing would  have  been  avoided. 

1  Flournoy,  Th.,  Le  Genie  Religietix,  a  lecture  to  the  Swiss  Students' 
Christian  Association,  Sainte-Croix,  1904,  p.  34. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY       247 

Before  proceeding  further  we  must  consider  briefly  at 
least  one  of  the  metaphysical  arguments,  so  that  we  may 
compare  the  attributes  of  the  Being  to  which  it  would  lead 
with  the  attributes  demanded  of  the  God  of  the  historical 
religions.^  I  choose  the  "  cosmological  "  proof,  because  it 
has  enjoyed  preeminence  and  because  it  still  retains  a  little 
of  its  old  vitality.  It  arises  from  the  logical  necessity,  in 
order  to  understand  the  universe,  of  stopping  somewhere 
in  the  regression  by  which  science  passes  from  one  phe- 
nomenon to  another  one  regarded  as  its  cause :  an  effect 
has  a  cause ;  that  cause  is  itself  the  effect  of  another  cause, 
and  so  on.  But  if  there  were  no  limit  to  this  causal  chain, 
a  complete  explanation  of  any  term  of  the  series  could 
never  be  obtained.  In  other  words,  in  order  that  there 
may  be  causes  at  all,  there  must  be  a  First  Mover,  itself 
uncaused  or  its  own  cause.  The  criticism  destructive  of 
this  argument,  culminating  in  the  form  given  it  by  Kant, 
remains  unanswered.  We  are  not,  however,  concerned 
with  the  validity  of  the  proof,  but  only  with  the  nature  of 
the  Being  which  it  would  demonstrate. 

The  Being  of  the  cosmological  argument  proceeds  from 
the  need  of  a  causal  understanding  of  the  universe,  —  a 
need  quite  different  from  that  which  urges,  for  instance,  the 
Christian  mystics  to  a  belief  in  an  All-Father.  Now  a 
Being  can  legitimately  possess  only  the  attributes  required 
in  order  that  he  may  gratify  the  need  from  which  he  arose. 
Thus  the  Cosmological  Being  may  properly  be  spoken  of 
as  the  First  Cause,  the  Absolute,  the  "  eternally  complete 

1  For  a  recent  discussion  between  orthodox  Roman  Catholics  and  Roman 
Cathohc  Modernists  upon  the  metaphysical  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God, 
see  the  Revue  de  Alctapkysique  et  de  Morale,  Vol.  XV,  1907,  pp.  129-170  ; 
470-513;  ^ViA  Revue  de  /"/iiV.,  Vol.  XIII,  1908,  pp.  5-25,  123-142.  In  the 
former,  Le  Roy  offers  a  critical  review  of  the  classical  proofs  and  shows  in 
what  respects  they  are  insufficient.  In  the  latter,  Abbe  Gayraud  answers  him 
in  approved  scholastic  fashion. 


248        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

consciousness,"  or  even  as  "the  principle  of  unification," 
but  he  should  not  receive  names  denoting  personahty.  To 
conceive  of  the  First  Cause  as  personal  would  be  to  add 
elements  foreign  to  those  demanded  by  the  logical  necessity 
of  stopping  the  regression  of  secondary  causes,  so  that  to 
designate  it  by  symbols  drawn  from  relations  between  per- 
sons —  King,  Lord,  Father  —  is  to  make  an  illegitimate  use 
of  these  symbols.  Hence  the  Cosmological  God  cannot  be 
the  God  of  any  of  the  historical  religions.  An  Absolute 
God  manifesting  himself  through  immutable  secondary 
causes  would  leave  man  indifferent,  since  the  causes  with 
which  he  is  concerned  are  those  acting  upon  him  and  on 
which  he  can  react.^ 

Philosophers  with  rehgious  bent  have  felt  the  antagonism 
of  the  God  of  the  understanding  to  the  God  of  the  heart. 
But  that  they  have  not  always  clearly  reahzed  it,  and  that 
they  have  rarely  been  able  to  rid  their  minds  of  it,  is  abun- 
dantly indicated  in  their  writings.  St.  Augustine, — to 
speak  of  a  Christian  philosopher,  —  recognized  that  the 
expression  "  mercy  "  could  not  properly  be  applied  to  the 
Absolute  God,  since  the  word  implies  suffering  through 
the  suffering  of  others.     Nevertheless,  he  thought  himself 

1  In  the  article  "  Atheisme  et  Materialisme,"  in  the  Questions  de  philosophic 
morale  et  sociale,  Durand  de  Gros  denounces  "  the  mess  produced  by  the  de- 
testable mixing  of  two  orders  of  disparate  ideas,  which  have  been  put  together 
by  an  accident  into  a  hybrid,  monstrous  whole."  He  endeavors  to  show  that 
the  religious  question  must  be  clearly  separated  from  the  ontological  question. 

Comp.  G.  Belot  in  A  Note  on  the  Triple  Origin  of  the  Idea  of  God.  "  By 
what  right  do  we  give  the  same  name,  God,  to  an  abstract  principle,  a  simple 
affirmation  of  Unity,  the  Necessary,  the  Conclusion  or  the  basis  of  a  purely 
intellectual  dialectic,  and  to  the  object  of  a  social  cult  in  a  traditional  and 
popular  religion  ?"  (^Revue  de  Aletaphysiqtie  et  de  Morale,  Vol.  XVI,  1908, 
p.  718.)  See  also  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Studies  in  Humanism,  Macmillan  and 
Co.,  1907,  pp.  285;  285-289. 

The  reader  will  find  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  attributes  of  the  meta- 
physical gods  in  Chaps.  VI  and  VII  of  John  McTaggart's  Some  Dogmas  of 
Religion,  Edward  Arnold,  London,  1906. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        249 

justified  in  using  the  term  to  save  the  ignorant  from 
stumbling.^  The  ignorant !  And  he  himself,  the  learned 
doctor,  the  tender  and  compassionate  soul,  has  he  found  it 
possible  to  believe  only  in  the  impassible,  infinite  God  ? 
The  Confessions  show  that,  like  less  powerful  intellects, 
St.  Augustine  maintained  tender  sentimental  relations 
with  his  God,  relations  more  dignified,  to  be  sure,  but  of 
the  same  character  as  those  described  by  the  great  love-sick 
Spanish  mystic.  It  is  a  significant  chapter  of  philosophy 
where  the  scholastic  doctors  tax  their  ingenuity  to  adapt 
the  philosophical  conception  of  God  to  a  God  serviceable 
to  religion.  If  the  Christian  mystics  have  escaped  the 
difficulty,  they  owe  it  to  their  utter  disregard  of  logical 
relations.  Most  of  them  apparently  do  not  even  suspect 
the  flagrant  contradiction  that  exists  between  the  concep- 
tion of  a  being  of  whom  nothing  can  be  predicated,  one 
who  is  to  be  defined  only  by  negations,  and  a  God  with 
whom  it  is  possible  to  maintain  the  intimate  relations 
described  in  their  autobiographies.  They  come  into  the 
presence  of  their  God  and  he  vivifies  their  souls  ;  they 
address  him  and  his  answers  illuminate  their  intelligence  ; 
they  love  him  and  in  return  are  made  to  tremble  by  a  sense 
of  his  unutterable  love.  That  such  a  God  cannot  at  the 
same  time  be  Unity,  Perfect  Identity,  Nothing,  Infinite, 
never  appears  to  them  clearly  enough  to  disturb  their  men- 
tal quietude.  And  this  is,  in  truth,  the  condition  of  the 
great  majority  of  deeply  rehgious  souls,  in  no  matter  what 
environment,  who  rise  at  times  to  philosophical  meditation  : 
they  fail  to  see  the  contradiction,  thanks  to  that  admirable  il- 
logicalness  without  which  life  would  be,  after  all,  impossible. 

1  Augustinus,  De  Moribus  EccUsies  Caikolicce,  Chap.  XXVII,  quoted  by 
Hoffding,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  p.  78.  Schleiermacher  says  likewise, "  To 
attribute  mercy  to  God  were  more  appropriate  to  an  homiletic  or  poetic  man- 
ner of  speaking  than  to  the  dogmatic."     (^Der  Christliche  Glaube,  §  85.) 


250        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

In  the  course  of  several  investigations  I  have  collected  a 
number  of  biographies  that  show  in  a  striking  manner  these 
two  conceptions  of  God  alternating  or  existing  side  by  side 
in  the  same  person.     Several  examples  have  already  been 
given  in  the  chapters  on  the  origin  and  nature  of  gods. 
Here  are  three  others,  given  in  answer  to  the  question, 
"  Do  you  think  of  God  as  personal  or  impersonal  ?  "     The 
first  comes  from  a  high  school  teacher,  the  others  from 
college  students.     "When  I  am  in  the  states  of  mind  in 
which  I  need  a  personality  for  help,  or  for  response  to  an 
inner  tide  of  joy  or  enthusiasm,  then  God  is  for  me  a  per- 
sonality.    At  such  moments  He  seems  to  be  as  far  away 
as  heaven  and  yet  also  in  my  very  soul  at  the  same  mo- 
ment.    In  everyday  or  matter-of-fact  moods,  the  thought 
of  God  is  in  the  background  of  my  mind  as  an  Impersonal 
Idea  of  Force.  ...     In  more   intellectual   conditions    of 
mind,  the  Fatherhood  conception  of  God  is  in  the  back- 
ground as  one  I  believe  in  and  must  have,  while  in  the 
foreground  the  improbability  of  such  an  anthropomorphic 
conception  is  dominant.     I  seem  able  to  entertain  both  the 
personal  and  impersonal  conceptions  at  once  without  con- 
fusion and  with  real  comfort,  but  if  one  is  in  the  foreground 
the  other  is  withdrawn  to  the  back  somewhere." 

One  of  the  college  students  writes :  "  In  an  agitated  or 
excited  state  of  mind,  I  think  of  God  as  a  Personal  Father 
who  is  ready  to  reward  or  punish.  But  generally  I  think 
of  God  as  a  mass  of  forces  having  certain  effects  follow 
from  certain  causes ;  the  force  that  causes  us  to  do  good 
will  bring  with  it  its  own  reward  and  vice  versa." 

Another  student  says  :  "  I  think  of  God  sometimes  as  a 
personal  being  and  at  times  as  an  impersonal  one.  The 
conception  differs  according  to  the  state  of  my  feelings. 
For  instance,  when  I  am  perplexed  by  some  distressing 
occurrence  and  feel  the  need  of  some  kind  of  counsel,  my 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  251 

conception  of  God  and  my  appeal  to  Him  is  as  to  a  per- 
sonal being.  On  the  other  hand,  when  I  am  out  in  the 
woods  and  see  a  beautiful  landscape  or  an  unusual  sunset, 
my  conception  of  God  is  impersonal.  I  think  of  God  then 
as  a  great  power,  of  no  definite  shape  or  size,  with  none  of 
the  attributes  of  a  being." 

Cardinal  Newman,  when  about  thirty  years  of  age, 
wrote,  "  I  loved  to  act  as  feeling  myself  in  my  Bishop's 
sight,  as  if  it  were  the  sight  of  God."  ^  So  do  millions  of 
other  people.  Is  it  in  the  presence  of  the  One,  Unchange- 
able, Eternal  Being,  that  they  stand  "  as  in  the  presence 
of  their  Bishop  "  ? 

Although  the  Infinite  Being  of  the  metaphysician  should 
not  be  called  personal  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  word, 
philosophers  have  not  infrequently  used  that  term.  Lotze, 
for  instance,  understands  by  "  Perfect  Personality  "  an  in- 
finite being  possessing  the  following  metaphysical  attri- 
butes :  oneness,  unchangeableness,  omnipresence,  eternity. 
If  these  predicates  are  to  be  valid  for  the  Highest  Being, 
then  that  Being  must  have  in  addition,  he  claims,  perfect 
personal  existence.^  This  use  of  the  term  "personal"  is  the 
opposite  of  the  customary  one ;  it  is  therefore  to  be  used 
only  for  the  production  of  confusion.  Certain  of  our  con- 
temporaries have  unfortunately  followed  Lotzc's  example. 
Some  do  this  the  more  willingly  because  the  equivocation 
in  this  use  of  the  word  "  person  "  protects  them  from  the 
opprobrium  of  those  to  whom  the  denial  of  a  personal  God 
is  the  great  immorality. 

The  following  frank  remarks  of  Bradley  deserve  to  be 
quoted :  "  And  if  by  personality  we  are  to  understand  the 
highest  form  of  finite  spiritual  development,  then  certainly 

1  Apologia,  1888,  p.  50. 

2  Lotze,  H.,  Outlities  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  tr.  by  G.  T.  Ladd,  Ginn, 
Heath  and  Co.,  Boston,  1885,  Chaps.  Ill  and  IV. 


252        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

in  an  eminent  degree  the  Absolute  is  personal.  For  the 
higher  (we  may  repeat)  is  always  the  more  real."  But  he 
regrets  this  use  of  the  term  "personal"  mainly  "because  it 
is  misleading  and  directly  serves  the  cause  of  dishonesty." 
"  For  most  of  those  who  insist  on  what  they  call  '  the  per- 
sonality of  God '  are  intellectually  dishonest.  They  desire 
one  conclusion,  and,  to  reach  it,  they  argue  for  another.  .  .  . 
They  desire  a  person  in  the  sense  of  a  self,  amongst  and 
over  against  other  selves,  moved  by  personal  relations  and 
feelings  toward  these  others  —  feelings  and  relations  which 
are  altered  by  the  conduct  of  others.  And,  for  their  pur- 
pose, what  is  not  this,  is  really  nothing.  .  .  .  Of  course,  for 
us  to  ask  seriously,  if  the  Absolute  can  be  personal  in  such 
a  way,  would  be  quite  absurd.  And  my  business  for  the 
moment  is  not  with  truth,  but  with  intellectual  honesty."  ^ 
When  consciousness  is  attributed  to  the  Absolute,  as  in 
the  Hegelian  metaphysics,  it  should  be  added,  in  order 
to  preclude  deception,  that  the  Eternal  and  the  human 
consciousness  "cannot  be  comprehended  in  a  single  con- 
ception." ^  So  that  "consciousness"  in  the  Absolute 
and  "  consciousness  "  in  man  is  not  a  point  of  agreement, 
but  one  of  divergence  ;  for  the  term  is  used  in  two  differ- 
ent senses  according  as  it  is  applied  to  one  or  to  the  other. 

1  Bradley,  F.  H.,  Appearance  and  Reality,  Chap.  XXVII,  pp.  531-532. 

"^  Green,  T.  H.  Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  §  68. 

"  The  philosophical  theists  like  C.  H.  Weisse  and  H.  Lotze  affirm,  it  is  true, 
that  only  an  infinite  being  can  possess  personality,  and  that  a  limited  and  con- 
sequently dependent  being  is  not  worthy  of  this  title;  only  a  being  absolutely 
active  can  be  a  person.  But  in  speaking  thus,  it  is  admitted  that  the  word 
"  personality  "  can  be  taken  in  two  entirely  different  senses  according  as  it  is  ap- 
plied to  God  or  man.  Hence,  strictly  speaking,  these  philosophers  agree  in 
the  conclusion  at  which  Spinoza  and  Kant  have  arrived  :  after  having  elimi- 
nated everything  that  is  valid  of  finite  beings  only,  nothing  remains  of  our 
fundamental  psychological  concept  but  the  name."  (Hoffding,  H.,  op.  cit., 
p.  80  of  French  edition  ;   p.  86  of  English  edition.) 

Feuerbach   was  not    deceived    by  the  ambiguous  use  of  the  term  "per- 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  253 

The  conflict  arising  from  this  twofold  idea  of  God  has 
been  regarded  as  an  anomaly  of  the  religious  life.  Hoff- 
ding  calls  it  the  "religious  paradox."  The  reHgious  con- 
sciousness has  need  of  a  finite  object;  nevertheless,  he 
says,  "it  tends  to  conceive  of  its  object  as  quite  superior 
to  all  finite  relations.  But  in  yielding  without  reserve  to 
this  tendency,  it  defeats  its  purpose,  for  intimate  and  vital 
relations  between  it  and  its  object  become  thenceforth  im- 
possible. .  .  .  When  these  tendencies  are  present  in  their 
extreme  forms,  we  have  the  religious  paradox :  God  is  im- 
mutable, yet  changeable ;  he  is  eternal,  yet  becoming ;  he 
is  victor,  yet  vanquished  ;  blessed,  yet  suffering."  ^  The 
source  of  this  opposition  is  not  in  the  religious  life  itself ; 
for  it  is  philosophical  speculation,  not  the  religious  life,  that 
tends  to  conceive  of  its  object  as  infinite.  Since  men  havef 
been  able  neither  to  harmonize  the  several  ontological  con- 
ceptions nor  to  single  out  one  of  them  as  sufficient,  they 
have  had  to  get  along  as  best  they  could  with  several  God- 
ideas,  and  these  they  have  sadly  confused.  If  the  great  ' 
founders  of  religions,  like  Gautama  and  Jesus,  did  not  fall 
into  this  error,  it   is   because   they  ignored  metaphysical 

son,"  nor  was  he  willing  that  the  confusion  should  continue.  "  The  denial 
of  determinate,  positive  predicates  concerning  the  divine  nature  is  noth- 
ing else  than  a  denial  of  religion  with,  however,  an  appearance  of  re- 
ligion in  its  favor,  so  that  it  is  not  recognized  as  a  denial  ;  it  is  simply 
a  subtle,  disguised  atheism.  The  alleged  religious  horror  of  limiting  God 
by  positive  predicates  is  only  the  irreligious  wish  to  know  nothing  more 
of  God,  to  banish  God  from  the  mind.  Dread  of  limitation  is  dread  of  exist- 
ence. All  real  existence,  i.  e.  all  existence  which  is  truly  such,  is  qualitative,  de- 
terminative existence.  He  who  earnestly  believes  in  the  divine  existence  is  not 
shocked  at  the  attributing  of  gross,  sensuous  qualities  to  God.  He  who  .  .  . 
shrinks  from  the  grossness  of  a  positive  predicate,  may  as  well  renounce  exist- 
ence altogether.  .  .  .  An  existence  in  general,  an  existence  without  qualities  is 
an  insipidity,  an  absurdity."  (Ludwig  Feuerbach,  Werke,  Vol.  VH,  Chap.  2, 
Das  Wesen  des  Chrisienihums,  p.  42  ;    tr.  by  Marian  Evans,  p.  15.) 

1  Hoffding,  H.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  83-84  of  French  edition  ;  p.  91  of  English 
edition. 


2  54        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

arguments.  With  them  the  need  of  logical  understand- 
ing was  completely  subordinated  to  the  passion  for  con- 
crete living.  I  have  elsewhere  quoted  Gautama  on  this 
point. 

May  I  not  now  claim  to  have  unravelled  a  tangle  at  the 
root  of  empirical  apologetics  ?  On  one  side  it  would  de- 
fend religion  against  science  by  invoking  the  principle  of 
transcendence,  according  to  which  science  is  incompetent 
to  deal  with  the  question  of  God  and  with  religious  knowl- 
edge generally.  On  the  other,  it  would  protect  reHgion 
against  philosophy  by  insisting  on  inner  experience  as  the 
only  sufficient  proof  of  the  existence  and  nature  of  the 
Christian  God.  Now,  the  fact  is  that  it  is  only  the  God  of 
metaphysics  that  is  inaccessible  to  science,  a  Being  for 
whom  the  historical  religions  have  no  use  ;  whereas  the 
gods  of  the  religions  are  empirical  beings.  Their  exist- 
ence is  made  evident  in  consciousness ;  they  are  therefore 
within  the  sphere  of  science.  TJie  empirical  theologians 
employ  the  term  "  God''  in  two  different  setts es ;  hence  the 
confusion. 

I  have  had  occasion  to  remark  that  the  metaphysical 
proofs  have  fallen  into  disrepute.  The  dubious  way  in 
which  theologians  nowadays  bring  them  in  (when  they  do 
not  leave  them  out  entirely),  however  much  they  may  feel 
the  need  of  buttressing  their  faith,  should  not  be  ascribed 
altogether  to  the  recognition  of  the  logical  weakness  of 
these  proofs.  There  are  good  reasons  for  thinking  that 
this  change  is  due  to  some  dim  recognition  that  the  kind 
of  God  these  arguments  would  support  is  not  the  one  they 
ywant.  The  sooner  it  is  definitely  admitted  that,  "from  the 
point  of  view  of  practical  religion  the  metaphysical  monster 
which  they  [the  old  systems  of  dogmatic  theology]  offer 
to  our  worship  is  an  absolutely  worthless  invention  of  the 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  255 

scholarly  mind,"  ^  the  better  for  the  human  race.  If  popu- 
lar religions  are  to  continue  in  existence,  the  facts  upon 
which  they  are  to  stand  must  be  patent  to  every  believer. 
Voltaire  was  inspired  by  his  consummate  good  sense  when 
he  wrote :  "  It  always  seems  to  me  absurd  to  make  the  ex- 
istence of  God  depend  upon  a  plus  b  divided  by  z.  Where 
would  human  kind  be  if  it  was  necessary  to  study  dynamics 
and  astronomy  in  order  to  know  the  Supreme  Being  }  "  ^ 

The  real  controversy,  as  far  as  reUgions  of  the  present 
type  are  concerned,  hangs,  as  Principal  Lodge  well  says, 
upon  the  question :  "  Is  the  world  controlled  by  a  living 
Person,  accessible  to  prayer,  influenced  by  love,  able  and 
willing  to  foresee,  to  intervene,  to  guide,  and  wistfully  to 
lead  without  compulsion  spirits  in  some  sort  akin  to  Him- 
self .''...  The  whole  controversy  hinges,  in  one  sense,  on 
a  practical  pivot  —  the  efficacy  of  prayer." 

2.    THE    INDUCTIVE    METHOD    AND    EMPIRICAL    THEOLOGY 

The  gods  of  religion  being  in  reality  inductions  from 
observations  of  inner  phenomena,  it  follows  that  the  prop- 
ositions of  theology  regarding  them  are  to  be  justified  in 
the  same  way  as  science  justifies  its  hypotheses,  that  is  to 
say,  by  reference  to  experience.  We  have  seen  that  this 
is  just  what  religious  people  have  always  done.  They 
say,  "We  know  that  our  beliefs  are  true,  because  when 
put  to  the  proof  they  have  succeeded  for  us  "  ;  or,  "  Inner 
experience  furnished  us  with  the  undeniable  proof  that, 
after  all,  whatever  may  be  said  to  the  contrary,  God  exists, 
for  he  works  within  us."  We  have  seen  also  that  the- 
ologians have  embraced  as  a  last  recourse  this  popular  pro- 
cedure. Max  Reischle  speaks  for  the  Ritschlian  School 
when  he  declares  :     "  Although  theoretical  reason  cannot 

^  James,  o/>.  di.,  p.  447. 

2  Voltaire,  Letter  to  A.  M.  Koenig,  Frankfort,  June,  1753. 


256        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

prove  either  the  truth  or  the  falsehood  of  the  propositions 
of  faith,  yet  a  proof  of  their  truth  may  be  drawn  from  the 
practical  consideration  that  the  only  sufficient  help  in 
man's  moral  conflict  is  found  in  Christianity,  and  that  the 
faith  which  accepts  Christ  as  divine  revelation  finds  its 
own  justification." 

From  the  time  Jesus  bade  men  try  his  doctrine  to  the 
present  day,  the  popular  and  the  only  really  effective  proof 
of  the  truth  of  Christianity  has  been  its  success  in  provid- 
ing at  least  a  part  of  the  blessedness  it  promises.  The  ex- 
istence of  every  one  of  the  gods  in  whom  men  have  ever 
put  their  faith  has  been  held  to  be  proved  by  the  test  of 
experience.  Fetiches  are  trusted  because  their  efficiency 
has  been  proved.  Yahve  showed  himself  to  be  the  true 
God  by  helping  his  worshippers  to  defeat  the  hosts  of 
Chemosh.  The  Virgin  Mary  demonstrates  daily  her  powers 
of  intercession  by  serving  those  who  address  their  petitions 
to  her. 

Now  the  scientific  method  of  ascertaining  truth  is  obser- 
vation of  the  facts,  made,  whenever  possible,  under  definite, 
controllable  conditions,  i.e.  experimentation.  The  funda- 
mental epistemological  principle  of  empirical  theology  and 
the  popular  method  of  verifying  religious  propositions 
seem,  therefore,  in  essential  agreement  with  the  principle 
and  method  of  scientific  procedure.  Why  is  it,  then,  that 
theology  and  science  are  so  far  from  each  other  in  their 
conclusions  that  theology,  for  fear  of  destruction,  would 
divorce  itself  from  science  .■'  The  truth  is  that  empirical 
theologians  have  never  intended  \.o  adopt  scientific  methods  ; 
incredible  as  it  may  seem,  they  have  apparently  never  real- 
ized that  to  make  "  inner  experience  "  the  only  source  of 
religious  knowledge  means  a  surrender  to  psychological 
science.  Their  respect  for  experience  and  their  use  of  it 
is  of  a  kind  with  that  of  the  ignorant  empiric  in  medicine. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  257 

The  test  of  the  truth  of  a  belief  by  means  of  experience 
involves  a  procedure  incomparably  more  difficult  and  pains- 
taking than  religious  people  imagine.  Let  me  illustrate 
the  difficulty.  Some  one  on  observing  that  a  nail  in  water 
has  rusted  concludes  that  the  water  is  the  cause  of  the 
rust.  Another  person  noticing  that  a  bright  steel  blade 
rusts  in  air  decides  that  the  air  is  the  cause.  A  third  finds 
that  the  more  a  steel  object  is  handled,  the  more  it  rusts, 
and  forthwith  he  believes  that  the  hands  are  the  efficient 
agent.  Each  one  of  these  conclusions  is  in  a  fashion  veri- 
fied by  a  practical  test,  and  in  a  fashion  each  is  "true." 
But  the  deeper  truth  does  not  appear  until  the  chemist, 
having  observed  the  behavior  of  steel  under  different  con- 
ditions, and  having  studied  likewise  that  of  other  metals, 
is  led  by  the  method  of  elimination  to  the  conclusion  that 
oxygen  is  the  one  thing  necessary  for  the  formation  of  rust, 
and  that  moisture  assists  the  chemical  operation.  Having 
the  wider  knowledge,  the  chemist  finds  the  deeper  truth. 
Some  years  ago  the  most  divergent  opinions  existed  as  to 
the  manner  of  obtaining  hypnotic  sleep.  Those  who  said 
it  was  necessary  to  make  "  passes  "  based  this  opinion  on 
what  they  had  seen  "with  their  own  eyes."  Those  who 
thought  the  subject  must  fix  his  eyes  upon  something 
brilliant,  expressed  likewise  the  result  of  their  experi- 
ence. And  those  who  employed  verbal  suggestions  used 
again  an  empirical  argument.  All  had  success  as  proof, 
not  only  of  the  validity  of  their  method,  but  also,  as  they 
thought,  of  the  conclusions  they  drew  therefrom ;  for  in- 
stance, that  hypnotic  sleep  is  produced  by  the  magnetic 
fluid  projected  by  the  hands  making  the  passes.  And  so 
these  people  incorporated  in  the  experience  they  called 
immediate  and  unassailable,  inductions  open  to  scientific 
criticism  just  as  is  commonly  done  in  the  field  of  religious 
experience.     The  psychologist,  on  the  other  hand,  putting 


258        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

together  all  that  he  has  learned  about  hypnotism  and  simi- 
lar topics,  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  a  method  succeeds 
in  proportion  as  it  arrests  mental  activity  and  induces  the 
expectation  of  sleep. 

Not  only  have  theologians  failed  carefully  to  scrutinize 
their  facts  and  to  bring  them  into  comparative  relation  with 
similar  facts  either  in  other  religions  or  in  secular  life, 
according  to  the  way  of  science,  but  they  have  even 
declared,  as  we  know,  that  this  cannot  be  done.  Ritschl, 
for  instance,  states  that  "  the  Christian  religion  presents 
an  element  which  transcends  all  merely  secular  knowl- 
edge ;  namely,  the  end  and  the  means  of  the  blessedness 
of  man.  Whatever  content  may  have  been  ascribed  to 
this  word  'blessedness,'  it  expressly  denotes  a  goal,  the 
knowledge  of  which  is  unattainable  by  Philosophy  and  the 
realization  of  which  cannot  be  secured  by  the  natural  means 
at  the  command  of  men,  but  depends  upon  the  positive 
character  of  Christianity."  ^ 

In  justification  of  their  failure  to  make  exact,  comprehen- 
sive investigations,  they  have  alleged  that  religious  expe- 
rience is  something  sui  generis,  incomparable  with  the  rest 
of  life,  and  also  that  it  is  a  whole  and  therefore  not  subject 
to  analysis.^     "  It  is  not  a  further  development  of  the  nat- 

^  Ritschl,  K.,  Justification  and  Reconciliation,  p.  193, 

2  The  only  answer  to  make  to  the  dogmatic  assertion  that  religious  experi- 
ences are  unanalyzable  wholes  is  actually  to  analyze  them.  That  the  products 
of  a  psychological  analysis  are  not  identical  with  the  object  analyzed  is  just  as 
much  a  truism  in  psychology  as  in  the  physical  sciences.  No  compound  is 
identical  with  the  elements  of  which  it  is  composed.  Analyzing  a  substance 
means  breaking  it  up.  Is  that  an  argument  against  the  use  of  the  analytical 
method  in  chemistry  ?  Is  it  any  more  an  argument  against  the  analysis  of  psy- 
chic processes  ?  Are  not  the  recent  results  of  psychological  investigation  in 
the  fields  of  perception,  feeling,  imagination,  hallucination,  association,  speech, 
emotion,  aesthetics,  etc.,  sufficient  to  convert  sceptics  into  enthusiastic  support- 
ers of  the  scientific  study  of  psychic  experiences  ?  The  day  is  past  for  talking 
of  the  inscrutable,  incomparable,  unanalyzable,  religious  experiences. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  259 

ural  man,  but  a  new  departure ;  it  is  a  living  process,  com- 
ing to  us  as  a  whole."  ^  To  this  obscurantist  declaration, 
they  have  frequently  added  an  almost  neccessary  comple- 
ment, to  wit,  that  the  apprehension  of  religious  truth  requires 
a  special  "sense"  or  "faculty."  Garvie,  in  the  passage 
already  quoted,  expresses  this  opinion  in  its  common  form. 
Whoever  has  this  "sense  "  for  the  "  discernment  of  super- 
sensuous  eternal  reality,"  may  "confidently  reject  the  crit- 
icism of  the  objects  of  faith  which  is  offered  to  him  by  the 
irreligious  man  who  lacks  it."  "  Over  against  the  suspi- 
cions and  surmises  of  criticism,  we  can  put  the  certainties 
of  our  experience  of  Christ's  saving  power."  ^ 

In  similar  language  did  all  men  speak  of  practically 
every  phase  of  mental  life,  before  the  birth  of  modern 
psychological  science.  Attention,  memory,  imagination, 
reason,  etc.,  were  looked  upon  as  so  many  unanalyzable, 
distinct  "  faculties,"  each  somehow  independent  of  the 
others.  Theology  has  not  yet  learned  the  lesson  writ 
large  in  the  history  of  psychology.  It  continues  to  bear 
to  psychology  a  relation  similar  to  that  of  alchemy  to 
chemistry.  The  former  took  things  as  a  whole,  was  little 
concerned  with  observation,  analysis,  comparison.  It  pre- 
ferred to  gloat  over  the  wonderful  properties  of  this  or 
that  mysterious  substance.  Its  most  characteristic  trait 
was  a  splendid  faith  in  the  existence  of  some  miraculous 
matter  which  would  transmute  base  metal  into  gold.  At 
a  later  period,  it  held  to  an  equally  naive  conviction  that 
there  was  to  be  found  an  elixir  that  would  infallibly  re- 
store men  to  health.  The  science  of  chemistry  was  born 
when  the  childish  faith  in  the  existence  of  a  philosopher's 

1  See,  for  instance,  Eucken's  uncritical  philosophy  of  religion  in  Haupt- 
probleme  der  Religions-philosophie  der  Gegenwart  (three  lectures),  1907, 
Reuter  and  Reichard,  Berlin.  He  is,  apparently,  one  of  those  who  see  no 
escape  from  intellectualism  except  in  affectivism. 

2  Garvie,  A.,  op.  cii.  (1903),  VIII,  pp.  369,  370. 


26o        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

stone  or  in  the  elixir  of  life  was  renounced,  or,  at  least, 
when  it  was  admitted  that  the  only  way  to  find  these 
things  was  by  careful  observation  and  analysis,  aided  by 
the  experimental  method.  With  this  new  procedure, 
chemistry  has  discovered  a  hundred  different  substances 
capable  of  changing  the  color  of  base  metals,  and  has 
actually  learned  how  to  transform  charcoal  into  diamond. 

Simple  religious  souls,  as  well  as  most  theologians, 
continue,  alchemist-like,  to  believe  in  the  existence  of 
a  religious  panacea,  and,  therefore,  neglect,  nay,  often 
despise,  the  careful,  persistent,  scientific  study  of  man's 
spiritual  nature,  of  its  defects  and  remedies.  In  what 
practical  way,  for  instance,  is  the  present  soteriology  in 
advance  of  that  of  St.  Augustine  ?  What  has  Chris- 
tian theology  done  in  the  course  of  two  thousand  years 
to  increase  our  knowledge  of  "  sin,"  its  central  problem  ? 
What  has  been  gained  by  the  endless  discussions  of  the 
relation  of  evil  to  an  Omnipotent  and  Righteous  God, 
of  free  will,  of  the  respective  shares  of  man  and  of  the 
Divine  Grace  in  overcoming  evil .-'  Need  any  one  be  told 
to-day  that  the  question  of  predestination  is  chiefly  a  prob- 
lem of  heredity  and  breeding,  and  that  our  teachers  on 
this  subject  ought  to  be,  not  Christian  Fathers,  but  con- 
temporary scientists  and  educators  ?  The  eradication  of 
moral  evil  is  a  problem  demanding  for  its  solution  a 
knowledge  far  more  difficult  of  attainment  than  that 
which  has  already  enabled  us  to  master  many  bodily 
diseases :  nothing  will  suffice  short  of  an  exhaustive 
knowledge  of  general  psychology,  individual  and  social ; 
in  particular  a  knowledge  of  psychology  in  its  relation  to 
physiology. 

The  indifference  of  those  who  are  supposed  to  be  the 
custodians  of  religious  knowledge  to  the  only  ways  by 
which  knowledge  on  the  cardinal  problems   of   practical 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        261 

religion  can  be  increased,  excusable  a  hundred  years  ago, 
has  become  a  scandal  and  a  public  danger, — a  scandal 
and  a  danger  which  will  continue  as  long  as  the  Christian 
Church  seeks  its  information  on  sin  and  the  means  to 
righteousness  only  in  its  own  sacred  Scriptures  and  in 
unanalyzed  experience.^ 

3.    THE    ACT    OF    FAITH    AND    ITS    MOTIVES 

If  the  fundamental  truths  of  religion  are  either  imme- 
diately given  in  inner  experiences  or  induced  from  them, 
one  does  not  see  why  something  additional  called  "  faith  " 
should  be  a  necessary  condition  of  religious  belief.  Yet 
this  is  what  both  classes  of  empirical  theologians  maintain. 
What  does  this  mean  ?  If  God  manifests  himself  imme- 
diately and  clearly  in  consciousness,  as  the  mystical  em- 
piricists so  insistently  aver,  why  should  a  conscious  process 
additional  to  those  in  which  the  truths  of  religion  are  re- 

^  The  craven  advice  offered  by  one  of  Germany's  most  prominent  theolo- 
gians may  serve  in  estimating  the  difficulty  there  is  for  any  one  brought  up 
in  the  traditional  theological  schools  to  make  a  clean  departure  from  the 
old  ideas.  "  The  reconciliation  of  our  present  knowledge  of  nature  and 
history  with  the  religious  faith  handed  down  in  the  Church,  and  imparted 
to  us  in  our  education,  will  remain  in  the  future  the  perpetual  problem  of 
Theology.  It  is  evident  that  its  formulae,  from  the  very  fact  of  their  having 
this  practical  object,  cannot  claim  to  be  scientific  propositions,  valid  univer- 
sally for  all  times.  A  sound  tact  giving  prominence  to  what  is  for  us  re- 
ligiously essential,  and  putting  into  the  background  what  is  antiquated  will, 
perhaps,  be  better  able  to  solve  the  problem  than  a  rigorously  systematic 
method."  (O.  Pfleiderer,  The  Development  of  Theology  since  Kant,  p.  205.) 
When  men  of  the  highest  influence  affirm  that  theology  can  hardly  do  better 
than  perpetually  strive  to  reconcile  that  which  is  acknowledged  to  be  false, 
or  at  least  deficient  (the  religious  faith  handed  down  in  the  Church),  with 
our  present  knowledge,  and  that  "  sound  tact "  is  the  essential  quality  of 
a  successful  theologian,  we  must  hold  it  well  for  the  manhood  of  our  young 
men  that  they  should  prefer  to  that  sublime  vocation  almost  any  other  — 
even,  perhaps,  that  of  the  American  "practical"  politician,  whose  chief 
business  seems  to  be  the  reconciliation  of  the  irreconcilable :  dishonesty  and 
honestv. 


262        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

vealed  intervene,  and  what  may  be  the  function  of  this 
process  ?  To  say  that  it  is  by  faith  that  these  experiences 
are  laid  hold  of  and  accepted  seems  a  denial  of  the  quali- 
ties of  immediacy  and  unimpeachableness  claimed  for 
them. 

But  perhaps  "faith  "  is  intended  to  designate  the  particu- 
lar attitude,  i.e.  the  volitional  and  feeUng  setting  resulting 
from  the  immediate  revelation.  This  meaning  seems  to  me 
the  only  one  the  mystical  empiricists  can  logically  assign 
to  that  word.  Faith  would  then  be  a  will-attitude  accom- 
panied by  a  definite  mood  and  generated  by  religious  ex- 
periences. But  in  this  case  one  could  not  speak  of  believing 
by  faith  that  these  experiences  are  from  above,  since  the 
faith-state  would  not  be  a  cause,  but  a  consequence  of  be- 
lief. Usually,  however,  faith  is  spoken  of  as  producing 
belief  or  as  an  "organ"  of  knowledge. 

For  those  who  regard  religious  propositions  as  inferences 
from  inner  experiences,  and  who  admit,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  a  natural  explanation  of  them  is  possible,  the  word 
"  faith  "  is  susceptible  of  another  meaning.  These  people 
reject  a  logically  satisfactory  human  account  of  certain 
experiences  in  favor  of  a  superhuman  one ;  this  they  call 
making  an  act  of  faith.  But  why  should  an  act  of  faith 
be  made  in  favor  of  a  proposition  different  from  one  rec- 
ognized as  logically  valid  }  Because  of  the  conviction  that 
only  thus  can  certain  vital  advantages,  certain  essential 
values,  be  secured.  Practical  7ieeds  determine  the  act  of 
faith. 

This  second  meaning  is  clearly  the  one  impHed  in  the 
quotations  made  earlier  from  Professor  Bois.  It  appears 
also  plainly  in  the  following  passage  by  a  young  theolo- 
gian :  "  Even  when  he  theoretically  separates  these  from 
the  metaphysical  belief  that  conditions  it,  the  experience 
with  its  priceless  value  remains.  .  .  .     Relying  upon  this 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  263 

fact  which  gives  him  strength,  joy,  inner  unspeakable  ra- 
diance whenever  he  presents  himself  before  the  living  per- 
son of  Christ,  relying  furthermore  upon  rational,  historical, 
and  moral  motives,  he  freely  maintains  the  Christian  in- 
terpretation, and  keeps  by  an  act  of  faith  and  of  love  his 
living  assurance."  ^  We  find  this  meaning  of  faith  again 
in  Professor  Boutroux:  "The  essential  phenomenon  is  here 
the  act  of  faith  by  which,  experiencing  certain  emotions, 
consciousness  pronounces  that  these  emotions  come  to  it 
from  God.  Religious  experience  is  not  of  itself  objective. 
But  the  subject  gives  it  an  objective  significance  by  means 
of  the  belief  it  inserts  there."  ^ 

If  now  we  compare  these  two  meanings  of  faith,  we  find 
them  not  antagonistic.  In  the  second  meaning,/^?////  names 
the  will-act  by  which  an  interpretation  of  apparently  vital 
importance  is  embraced ;  in  the  first  meaning,  the  word 
denotes  the  particular  blessed  condition  of  mind  and  heart 
which  is  generated  by  the  whole-hearted  acceptance  of 
certain  propositions.  These  two  meanings  are  comple- 
mentary ;  taken  together  they  cover  the  will-act  and  its 
psychological  consequences. 

Understood  in  this  inclusive  sense,  faith  is  anything  but 
a  rare  phenomenon.     Its  sphere  is  not  limited  to  religious 

1  Ponsoye,  E.,  op.  cit.,  p.  8. 

2  Boutroux,  E.,  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale.,  1908,  Vol.  XVI,  p.  25, 
Elsewhere  he  has  said:  "And  thus  in  religious  experience,  considered  as 

such,  I  find  again  faith,  and  with  it,  confidence  and  submission  to  an  authority. 
It  is  because  by  faith  I  attribute  an  infinite  value  to  religious  phenomena,  that 
I  refuse  to  see  there  a  simple  case  of  natural  suggestion  or  autosuggestion. 
(^Esprit  et  Autoritc,  Revue  Chretienne,  August,  1904,  p.  102.)  Here  the  act 
of  faith  is  not  the  will  to  believe  moved  by  the  wish  to  retain  certain  precious 
"  realities,"  but  faith  is  now  something  by  which  an  "infinite  "  value  is  attrib- 
uted to  religious  phenomena.  Can  this  have  the  same  meaning  as  the  quota- 
tion in  the  text  ?  I  confess  that  I  do  not  see  how  it  can,  nor  yet  what  else  it 
could  mean. 


264        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

life.  Strange  it  is,  indeed,  that  all  the  praises  lavished 
upon  faith  should  have  been  prompted  by  its  r61e  in  reli- 
gion ;  for  it  is  met  with  in  every  phase  of  human  existence. 

The  pragmatists  have  recently  reminded  us  that  it  is  by 
faith  we  hve.  If  we  could  or  would  not  act  until  we  had 
obtained  the  kind  and  degree  of  certitude  we  require  in 
our  analytical  moments,  life  would  at  once  come  to  a  stop. 
Faith  is  as  essential  to  the  progress  of  commerce,  industry, 
science,  as  to  the  progress  of  religion ;  for  it  is  in  making 
faith-ventures  that  commerce  and  industry  are  established 
and  that  new  scientific  hypotheses  are  afforded  a  chance  to 
prove  themselves  true.  The  faith-act  is  a  commonplace  of 
life,  because  it  is  a  corollary  of  imperfect  knowledge,  and  a 
condition  of  the  acquisition  of  the  knowledge  necessary  to 
life.  It  is  only  when  faith  involves  tragic  issues,  or  when 
it  leads  to  convictions  regarded  as  preposterous  by  most 
people,  or  yet  when  it  involves  a  quasi-ecstatic  mood  that 
it  attracts  attention.  It  is  because  these  circumstances  are 
often  existent  in  religion,  that  religious  faith  has  always 
been  conspicuous.  But  it  should  be  frankly  acknowledged 
that  the  propositions  of  theology  and  of  science,  in  so  far 
as  they  are  faith-propositions,  are  marks  of  incomplete 
knowledge,  and  that,  therefore,  the  duty  of  theology  as  well 
as  of  science  is  to  press  forward  towards  fuller  light. 

Unfortunately,  faith,  which  is  normally  the  ally  of  science 
and  of  religion,  often  becomes  their  enemy.  This  happens 
whenever  particular  faith-propositions  become  so  firmly 
rooted  in  tradition  as  to  prevent  recognition  of  new  facts 
and  the  formulation  of  new  beliefs  from  which  better  re- 
sults would  be  secured.  Our  ofBcial  creeds  are  in  the 
main  stupendous  instances  of  such  deterrent  beliefs. 

The  motive  of  the  act  of  religious  faith  is  then  not  the 
need  of  explaining  causative ly  religions  experiences,  but  the 
**felt''  impossibility  of  otherwise  s "curing  certain  valuable 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  265 

ends.  The  numerous  quotations  placed  at  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter  have  made  clear  what  it  is  that  Christian  re- 
ligious faith  is  intent  upon  preserving  or  securing.  Peace, 
joy,  inner  radiance,  strength,  moral  energy, —  these  are  the 
words  with  which  we  have  become  familiar.  William 
James  uses  the  terms  "  reconciliation,"  "  union."  "  Mysti- 
cal states,"  he  says,  "tell  of  the  supremacy  of  the  ideal,  of 
vastness,  of  union,  of  safety,  and  of  rest."  The  only  im- 
provement Professor  Boutroux  would  make  upon  this  is, 
apparently,  to  prefix  the  megalomanic  adjective  "infinite" 
to  some  of  these  nouns.  All  would  probably  agree  upon 
this  formulation :  religious  faith  secures  things  to  which  is 
attached  high  value,  and,  if  one  had  in  mind  exalted  forms 
of  rehgion,  one  would  have  to  say  "  supreme  value."  ^ 

Whatever  vitality  remains  in  the  belief  in  the  Christian 
God  proceeds  from  the  gratification  it  provides  for  affective 
and  moral  needs.  There  are  millions  who  say,  "  It  seems 
to  me  undeniable  that  that  notion  [a  personal  God] ,  although 
altogether  too  human  to  be  properly  attributed  to  God,  has 
a  deep  meaning,  a  moral  significance,  a  religious  value,  that 
no  other  term  possesses"  ;  ^  and  consequently  they  choose 
to  think  of  God  as  a  person.     It  is  precisely  because  no 

1  It  should  be  observed  here  that  a  certain  argument  often  thought  to  sup- 
port the  Christian  religion  offers  in  reality  not  the  slightest  motive  for  belief 
in  the  Christian  God,  but  only  for  belief  in  a  moral  order,  in  a  spiritual  universe. 
In  this  argument  it  is  asserted  that  it  is  impossible  for  him  who  feels  moral  val- 
ues to  admit  that  they  are  only  an  accident  in  the  development  of  mankind. 
It  is  claimed  that  these  supreme  values  must  express  at  least  one  of  the  funda- 
mental characteristics  of  ultimate  reality. 

This  argument  falls  outside  our  discussion;  for  it  is  satisfied  with  the  ad- 
mission of  the  existence  of  a  moral  principle  belonging  to  the  essence  of  the 
universe.  The  philosophers  who  insist  most  strongly  upon  this  argument  are 
precisely  those  who  reject  the  Christian  conception  of  God  the  Father  and 
Comforter,  and  it  is  partly  in  order  to  supply  the  place  of  that  rejected  belief 
that  they  have  taken  pains  to  find  reasons  for  believing  in  a  moral  order. 

"^  Leo,  Albert,  Atude  Psychologique  sur  la  Friere,  Thesis,  Faculty  of  Theol- 
ogy, Montauban,  1905,  p.  43, 


266        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

other  form  of  available  belief  satisfies  so  easily  and  so  com- 
pletely certain  urgent  needs  of  the  human  heart  that  the 
idea  of  God  the  Father  remains  among  us. 

The  following  illustration  shows  again,  in  a  striking 
manner,  these  needs,  their  energy,  and  just  how  potent 
they  are  in  defeating  reason.  Thirty  years  ago,  a  woman 
a  little  over  forty  was  teacher  of  botany  in  one  of  our 
colleges.  One  Sunday  she  drifted  into  a  church  to  hear 
the  old  hymns  of  her  childhood,  and  then  continued  to 
attend  its  services,  although  she  was  fully  conscious  of  her 
dissent  from  the  faith  of  its  members.  Her  motives  are 
clearly  stated  :  "  The  quiet,  restful  place,  the  singing  of  the 
old  hymns,  and  the  friendly  greetings  which  assured  me  of 
my  welcome,  all  helped  to  attract  me  to  a  custom  to  which 
I  had  long  been  a  stranger."  The  young  clergyman  inter- 
ested and  attracted  her  also.  During  a  trying  moment  in 
her  career  she  took  him  into  her  confidence.  "  This  gave 
me  the  relief  that  comes  from  the  feeling  that  one  unpre- 
judiced knows  and  understands  our  case."  On  several 
occasions  when  the  gap  between  her  beliefs  and  those  of 
the  minister  and  his  congregation  was  made  evident,  she 
considered  breaking  her  informal  relations  with  the  church ; 
but  she  could  not  bring  herself  to  give  up  the  comfort  and 
strength  she  found  there.  Several  years  passed  in  this 
fashion,  the  bonds  connecting  her  with  the  pastor  and  the 
church  growing  stronger,  but  her  beliefs  remaining  unal- 
tered. The  death  of  a  dear  and  intimate  friend  with  whom 
she  had  been  associated  in  her  work  brought  her  to  a  crisis. 
"One  Sunday  morning  I  went  to  church  feeling  so  bur- 
dened and  troubled  that  it  seemed  to  me  I  could  no  longer 
endure  it.  Some  change  must  come ;  the  work  was  more 
than  I  could  carry  through  alone.  Almost  the  first  sen- 
tence of  the  sermon  was,  '  It  is  of  no  use,  we  cannot  get 
through  this  world  and  accomplish  what  we  are  placed 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  267 

here  to  do  unless  we  let  some  one  besides  ourselves  carry 
the  heavy  end  of  the  burden.'  The  whole  sermon  was 
after  this  strain,  and  how  I  blessed  God  for  sending  me 
that  comforting  message  which  I  needed  so  much  !  "  At 
the  close  of  the  service,  as  she  endeavored  to  slip  out  un- 
observed through  the  crowd,  a  lady  greeted  her  kindly 
with  the  words,  "  I  think  you  are  a  stranger  here." 
"  *  Stranger '  —  so  I  was  !  But  I  did  not  want  the  fact  to 
stare  me  in  the  face  just  then  !  I  was  trying  to  climb  into 
the  fold  in  some  other  way  than  through  the  open  door, 
and  my  theology  repudiated  my  need  of  a  fold  or  a  pastor  !  " 
She  decides  that  since  she  cannot  join  the  church  honestly, 
the  only  thing  to  do  is  to  sever  her  relations  with  it,  and 
she  sits  down  to  write  a  letter  to  the  pastor  in  explanation 
of  the  intended  step.  Almost  against  her  wish,  her  pen 
writes  :  "  I  must  confess  I  would  like  that  old  faith  that  you 
preach  and  that  I  have  so  long  rejected.  I  have  sought 
long  and  faithfully  for  something  to  take  its  place,  and  I 
have  never  yet  been  able  to  find  it."  This  confession 
made,  various  biblical  passages  fill  her  mind,  for  instance, 
"  Except  ye  become  as  little  children,  ye  can  in  no  wise 
enter  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven."  "  This  means  you  must 
be  willing  to  be  led ;  you  must  resign  entirely  all  thought 
or  wish  to  enter  the  Kingdom  by  any  other  means  than  the 
way  devised  by  God  himself ;  to  do  this,  you  must  lay 
aside  all  trust  in  your  own  intellectual  powers ;  you  never 
will  be  able  to  understand  before  you  come,  come  as  a  child 
comes,  with  loving  trust  in  the  hand  that  leads.  ...  To 
this  I  answered  silently,  but  firmly,  that  I  was  willing  to 
come  in  any  way ;  I  would  give  up  forever  my  plan  of 
understanding  first,  and  coming  afterward.  I  wanted  this 
faith  earnestly  enough  to  comply  with  the  conditions. 
Then  came  the  text,  '  Peace  which  passeth  understanding.' 
There  was  no  explanation  of   this  in  words,  but  simply 


268        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  presence  of  God's  Spirit.  .  .  .  God's  very  presence 
in  my  heart,  fiUing  it  with  a  peace  which  I  had  never  felt 
before.  ...  I  did  not  ask  or  wish  to  understand  it,  only 
to  experience  it  was  enough." 

She  accepted  her  experience  of  peace  and  joy  as  coming 
from  God  himself  for  two  reasons  :  "  first,  the  strong  sense 
of  God's  presence ;  secondly,  the  clearness  of  spiritual  vis- 
ion which  enabled  me  to  see  and  understand  how  different 
God's  way  for  me  to  come  into  the  Kingdom  was  from  the 
way  I  had  chosen  for  myself,"  —  namely,  intellectual  con- 
viction.^ 

IV.   The  Task  of  Psychology  in  the  Study  of  Religious 

Life 

If  we  are  right  in  holding  that  religion  consists,  in  its 
individual  aspect,  of  the  relations  maintained  by  man  with 
superhuman  powers  of  psychic  order,  and  if  these  relations, 
quite  like  those  of  a  subject  with  his  sovereign,  or  of  a 
lover  with  his  loved  one,  take  the  form  of  sensations,  im- 
ages, conceptions,  sentiments,  emotions,  etc.,  issuing  in 
action,  immediate  or  deferred,  overt  or  not,  —  if,  that  is  to 
say,  these  relations  assume  forms  common  to  the  whole  of 
psychic  life,  —  then  the  task  of  psychology  with  regard  to 
religion  is  of  the  same  character  as  its  task  in  other  parts 
of  conscious  life. 

It  is,  of  course,  theoretically  possible  for  one  to  affirm 
the  presence  in  religious  experience  of  special  psychic  ele- 
ments and  special  forms  of  consciousness.  But  I  am  not 
aware  that  any  competent  person  has  seriously  attempted 
this.  Neither  has  the  logic  built  upon  the  principles  of 
identity,  excluded  middle,  and  contradiction  been  replaced  by 
another  logic  valid  in  the  construction  of  religious  knowl- 

1  From  A  Scientist's  Confession  of  Faith,  Amer.  Baptist  Pub.  Soc,  Phila- 
delphia, 1898. 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  269 

edge.  Until  proof  of  the  contrary  is  produced,  we  may  set 
it  down  that  religious  experience  is  made  up  of  the  same 
elements  as  the  rest  of  conscious  life,  and  that  these  ele- 
ments are  connected  and  elaborated  according  to  laws  hold- 
ing for  mental  life  generally.  It  follows  that  religious  life 
is  a  province  of  science  just  as  is  any  other  portion  of  con- 
scious life. 

Expressed  in  general  terms,  the  task  of  psychology  in 
respect  to  the  group  of  facts  constituting  religious  Hfe  is 
to  observe,  compare,  analyze,  and  to  determine  the  conditions 
and  consequences  of  the  appearance  of  these  facts.  Its 
chief  problems,  outside  of  the  genetic  one,  may  be  classi- 
fied under  four  heads  :  (i)  the  impulses,  motives,  and  aims  ; 
(2)  the  means  employed  to  reach  the  ends — ceremonial, 
prayer,  communion,  etc.  ;  (3)  the  results  secured  ;  (4)  the 
means  and  the  results  considered  in  the  relation  of  cause 
and  effect.^ 

The  control,  for  man's  profit,  of  the  physical  forces  is 
the  ultimate  goal  of  physical  science.  The  control  of  the 
psychical  forces  is  the  practical  aim  of  psychology,  —  of  the 
psychology  of  religious  life  as  well  as  of  any  other  branch 
of  the  science. 

It  is  conceivable  that  in  accomplishing  this  task  the 
psychologist  may  encounter  phenomena  transcending  what 
he  can  explain  by  the  causes  already  known.  So-called 
premonitions,  clairvoyance,  telepathy,  sudden  moral  conver- 
sions, and  mystic  illuminations  might,  for  instance,  baffle 
his  efforts  at  explanation.  And  it  might  be  claimed  that 
the  course  of  historical  events  testifies  to  a  divine  action. 
Dr.  Reinhold  Seeberg,  Professor  of  Theology  at  the  Uni- 
versity of  Berlin,  maintains  that  certain  facts  of  history 
"certify  to  man  the  operative  presence  of  God";  "these 
facts  are  distinct  from  the  common  or  regular  connection 

1 1  hope  to  be  able  to  follow  this  outline  in  two  volumes  to  follow  this  one. 


t/ 


270        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

of  events.  They  are  in  themselves  characteristically  mar- 
vellous, or  they  are  so  constituted  that  man  is  through  them 
made  aware  of  the  presence  of  God,  and  in  them  feels  the 
power  of  God."  The  same  author  speaks  also  of  "the 
influence  of  God  upon  the  human  mind,  an  influence  ap- 
parent under  different  forms,  but  directed  to  arouse  recog- 
nition and  appreciation  of  God,  submission  to  His  will,  and 
a  desire  to  serve  Him.  This  cause  and  its  effects  are 
always  miraculous  in  their  nature."  ^ 

These  are  possibilities ;  but  let  this  be  clearly  seen  :  it  is 
for  science  to  show  that  any  one  of  these  possibilities  has 
become  at  a  particular  time  a  reality.  The  facts  must  first 
be  analyzed,  compared,  classified,  and  an  effort  made  to 
trace  them  back  to  familiar  causes.  Who  is  qualified  to 
\  attempt  this  work  ?  Who  has  a  right  to  make  the  distinc- 
li  tion  between  the  human  and  the  superhuman  ?  Is  any 
pious  person  who  has  passed  through  alleged  superhuman 
experiences  qualified  for  this.?  It  was  formerly  the  ten- 
dency to  see  the  work  of  God  or  of  devils  in  a  great  num- 
Sber  of  psychic  phenomena  to-day  "naturalized."  If  any 
one  has  the  right  to  attempt  this  discrimination,  it  is  the 
psychologist.  He  it  is  who  can  — if  any  one  can — mark 
the  points  at  which  unknown  factors  interfere  in  the  psy- 
cho-physiological system.  For  the  rest,  it  is  clear  that 
from  the  presence  of  inexplicable  perturbances  one  cannot 
posit  the  inadequacy  of  the  known  forces  unless  one  may 
claim  a  complete  knowledge  of  them. 

It  would  require  a  large  volume  to  present  fully  the 
recent  knowledge  concerning  the  phenomena  alleged  by 
reputable  religions  or  disreputable  "cults"  to  be  super- 
human. Only  a  few  general  remarks  upon  two  points  are 
called  for  here. 

^  Seeberg,  Reinhold,  Revelation  and  Inspiration,  Harper  Brothers,  1909, 
pp.  40,  51- 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY        271 

I.  What  does  psychology  think  of  those  phenomena, 
which,  although  they  may  not  exceed  what  we  know  to  be 
possible  to  man,  seem  to  many  to  demand  a  transcendent 
explanation  because  of  the  unusual  conditions  of  their  ap- 
pearance ?  I  refer  to  the  great  majority  of  visions  and  so- 
called  revelations;  to  the  imperative  feehng  of  obligation,; 
and  the  sense  of  passivity  which  often  accompany  thoughts; 
and  actions,  thus  giving  the  impression  that  some  one  other 
than  ourselves  thinks  or  acts  for  us.  Not  long  ago  science 
was  seriously  embarrassed  by  these  sensory  and  motor 
automatisms.  To-day  facts  of  this  kind  are  incorporated 
in  the  domain  of  nature. 

William  James,  whose  authority  has  been  used  illegiti- 
mately in  certain  circles,  has  not  separated  himself  from 
his  fellow-psychologists  on  this  point.  In  the  first  part  of 
The  Varieties  of  Religions  Experience,  he  explains  in  an 
orthodox  fashion  the  phenomena  he  studies ;  that  is,  with- 
out making  use  of  extra-human  causes.  If,  after  having 
made  that  demonstration,  he  declares  that  he  prefers  in 
certain  cases  another  explanation,  this  is  not  at  all  because 
the  natural  explanation  does  not  account  for  the  facts  in 
question  just  as  well  as  it  does  for  other  experiences ;  it  is 
for  reasons  of  another  order,  which  I  have  already  had 
occasion  to  mention. 

It  has  become  so  evident  that  a  natural  explanation  is 
just  as  adequate  to  these  remarkable  rehgious  experiences 
as  to  the  other  manifestations  of  psychic  life,  that  this 
view  has  forced  itself  even  upon  those  who  are  by  educa- 
tion and  temperament  least  disposed  to  accept  it.  We 
have  seen  several  examples  of  this.  Here  is  one  more, 
taken  from  a  recent  thesis  of  a  bachelor  in  theology  pre- 
sented at  the  theological  school  at  Montauban.  After  hav- 
ing compared  cures  accomplished  by  non-religious  means 
with  those  which,  according  to  him,  depend  upon  divine 


272        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

operation,  he  is  obliged  to  admit  that  there  is  no  difference 
in  the  manner  in  which  the  cure  takes  place.  "  For  us," 
he  says,  "  everything  takes  place  as  if  it  were  nothing  more 
than  a  natural  action.  This  does  not  prevent  its  being  a 
divine  action."  And  later  on  he  adds,  "  It  must  be  recog- 
nized with  good  grace  that  the  special  intervention  of  God 
is  never  susceptible  of  positive  proof."  ^  It  is  in  what  he 
calls  ultimate  personal  experience  that  he  finds  the  proof 
for  divine  healings.  We  have  seen  what  this  may  signify. 
2.  What  are  the  conclusions  of  psychology  concerning 
experiences  apparently  transcending  what  man  can  of  him- 
self do  or  know  ?  On  this  point  I  must  content  myself 
with  the  following  reflections.  If  there  were  extra-human 
sources  of  knowledge  and  superhuman  sources  of  human 
power,  their  existence  should,  it  seems,  have  become  in- 
creasingly evident.  Yet  the  converse  is  apparently  true  ; 
the  supernatural  world  of  the  savage  has  become  a  natural 
world  to  civilized  man ;  the  miraculous  of  yesterday  is  the 
explicable  of  to-day.  In  rehgious  lives  accessible  to  psy- 
chological investigation,  nothing  requiring  the  admission  of 
superhuman  influences  has  been  found.  There  is  nothing, 
for  example,  in  the  Hfe  of  the  great  Spanish  mystic  whose 
celebrity  is  being  renewed  by  contemporary  psychologists, 
—  not  a  desire,  not  a  feeling,  not  a  thought,  not  a  vision,  not 
an  illumination,  —  that  can  seriously  make  us  look  to  tran- 
scendent causes.^ 
>^  As  proof  of  this  I  might  give  the  failure  of  William  James 
to  find  in  rehgion  anything  not  amenable  to  natural  laws. 
Tke  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience  does  not  purport  to 

^  Lavaud,  Charles,  La  Guerison  par  la  Foi,  1906,  pp.  II0-118. 

2  See  on  this  subject  the  excellent  book  of  Henri  Delacroix,  Etudes  (fHis- 
toire  et  de  Psychologic  du  Mysticisme  :  Les  Grands  Mystiques  Chretiens,  Felix 
Alcan,  1908,  and  my  articles  on  the  same  subject  in  the  Revue  Philosophique, 
Vol.  LIV,  1902,  pp.  1-36,  441-487. 


THEOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  273 

be  a  systematic  study  of  religion.  It  owes  its  existence  to 
the  desire  of  finding  in  religious  life  facts  which  may  serve 
as  arguments  for  the  transcendent  hypothesis  developed  in 
the  conclusion  of  the  book.  What  has  the  author  discov- 
ered .-•  In  my  opinion,  nothing  that  can  serve  him ;  and  it 
is  difficult  to  believe  that  such  is  not  his  own  opinion.  Af- 
ter having  shown  that  instantaneous  conversions  can  be 
explained  by  the  theory  of  the  subliminal,  he  says :  "  But 
if  you,  being  orthodox  Christians,  ask  me  as  a  psychologist 
whether  the  reference  of  the  phenomenon  to  a  subliminal  self 
does  not  exclude  the  notion  of  the  direct  presence  of  Deity 
altogether,  I  have  to  say  frankly  that  as  a  psychologist  I 
do  not  see  why  it  necessarily  should.  The  lower  manifes- 
tations of  the  Subliminal,  indeed,  fall  within  the  resources 
of  the  personal  subject :  his  ordinary  sense  material,  in- 
attentively taken  in  and  subconsciously  remembered  and 
combined  will  account  for  all  his  usual  automatisms.  But 
just  as  our  primary  wide-awake  consciousness  throws  open 
our  senses  to  the  touch  of  things  material,  so  it  is  logically 
conceivable  that  if  there  be  higher  spiritual  agencies  that 
can  directly  touch  us,  the  psychological  condition  of  their 
doing  so  might  be  our  possession  of  a  subconscious  region 
which  alone  should  yield  access  to  them."  ^ 

Observe  that  the  author  assumes  in  this  passage  neither 
the  attitude  of  the  mystic  nor  that  of  the  metaphysician, 
but  that  of  the  scientist,  inasmuch  as  he  seeks  for  a 
factual  difference  (he  speaks  of  "lower"  and  "higher" 
manifestations)  which  may  justify  belief  in  superhuman 
causes.^     If  there  were  higher  experiences  that  could  not 

^  James,  op.  cit.,  p.  242.     The  italics  are  mine. 

^  William  James's  avowed  position  throughout  The  Varieties  of  Religious 
Experience  is  that  of  the  empiricist.  He  writes,  for  instance,  of  theology, 
"  She  must  abandon  metaphysics  and  deduction  for  criticism  and  induction." 
(Pages  455-456.)  If  he  relinquishes  this  standpoint  anywhere,  it  must  be 
due,  it  seems,  to  an  inadvertence. 
T 


274        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

be  satisfactorily  explained  by  natural  causes,  it  would  be 
scientific  procedure  to  try  other  hypotheses.  The  author's 
I  task  is  thus  clear  :  it  is  to  indicate  the  manifestations  which 
he  regards  as  having  a  superhuman  origin  and  to  state  the 
grounds  on  which  he  makes  the  differentiation. 

After  examining  those  phenomena  among  which  one 
might  expect  to  meet  superhuman  manifestations,  he  ar- 
rives at  the  conclusion  I  have  commented  upon,  —  that  the 
mystic  states  seem  to  point  towards  a  reconciliation,  a 
union ;  they  speak  of  the  supremacy  of  the  jdeal,  of  security, 
of  repose.  Now  I,  for  one,  am  somewhat  amazed  that  this 
should  have  seemed  to  William  James  sufificient  to  warrant 
the  making  of  so  pregnant  a  differentiation.  Because  cer- 
tain experiences  speak  of  reconciliation  and  of  union,  of 
security  and  of  repose,  we  are  asked  to  put  them  on  one  side 
of  the  line  separating  the  humanly  conditioned  from  the 
divinely  conditioned  !  Such  states  of  consciousness  should 
not  be  explicable  by  natural  means,  and  all  others  should! 
William  James's  effort  to  find  in  religious  experiences 
phenomena  warranting  the  hypothesis  of  divine  action  is  a 
fiasco  which,  despite  his  own  preference  announced  in  the 
conclusions,  should  be  felt  as  a  severe  blow  by  the  super- 
naturally  inclined. 

But  you  forget,  some  one  may  say,  the  phenomena  in 
which  the  Society  for  Psychical  Research  is  interested, 
phenomena  which  seem  to  indicate  the  action  of  extra-hu- 
man agents :  the  divining  rod,  premonitions,  clairvoyance, 
and  communications  of  spirits.  I  do  not  forget  them. 
But  one  has  a  right,  before  introducing  spiritistic  theories, 
to  wait  until  they  have  undergone  the  experimental  proof 
to  which  they  are  now  being  submitted. 

The  arguments  that  are  sometimes  used  to  invalidate  studies  of  re- 
ligion by  men  of  science  on  the  pretext  that  these  men  have  not  in 
themselves  known  the  experiences  they  are  studying,  deserve  perhaps  a 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  275 

moment's  attention.  It  is  contended  that  one  must  have  had  these  ex- 
periences in  order  to  comprehend  them,  just  as  one  must  see  in  order 
to  know  lio-ht.  The  analogy  frequently  used  between  the  absence  of 
visual  perceptions  and  the  absence  of  religious  experiences  is  defective  ; 
for  the  forms  of  consciousness  in  which  religious  experiences  are  cast, '. 
are  the  same  as  those  that  enter  into  the  composition  of  psychic  life  in 
general.  The  feelings  and  emotions  of  religion  are  peace,  confidence 
self-surrender,  hope,  faith,  love,  moral  obligation,  etc. ;  that  is,  states  the 
nature  of  which  is  known  by  all  people  who  live  in  the  moral  world.  If 
every  one  knows  from  personal  experience  the  forms  in  which  the  re- 
ligious life  manifests  itself,  it  follows  that  just  as  it  is  not  necessary  to 
be  a  soldier  in  order  to  understand  military  life,  nor  mad  in  order  to 
make  researches  in  mental  alienation,  nor  a  painter  in  order  to  be  an 
art  critic,  —  the  psychology  of  religious  life  may  be  understood  and  the 
quality  of  religious  life  appreciated  to  a  certain  extent  by  all. 

Devotion  to  a  religion  is  much  more  likely  to  make  one  hopelessly 
biassed  and  blind.  A  lover  would  not  be  asked  for  an  impartial  criticism 
of  the  one  he  loves.  The  ideal  condition  for  the  student  of  religion 
would  be  to  have  lived  naively  through  religious  experiences  and  then  to 
have  gained  freedom  from  traditional  convictions.  If  the  psychologist  has 
passed  through  the  experiences  he  discusses,  so  much  the  better  for  him. 
If  he  has  not,  he  is  no  more  disqualified  for  religious  studies  than  for 
the  psychological  analyses  of  non-religious  experiences  which  have 
never  been  his,  —  a  crime  of  passion,  the  mental  state  of  a  captain  of 
industry  struggling  with  his  rivals,  or  any  form  whatever  of  mental 
disorder. 1 

SUMMARY    AND    CONCLUSIONS 

Contemporary  Protestant  Christianity  grounds  its  beliefs 
solely  upon  so-called  "  inner  experience,"  which,  it  is 
claimed,  leads  directly  or  through  "faith"  to  a  knowledge 
of  God,  without  the  mediation  of  science  and  of  meta- 
physics. From  these  Protestant  Christianity  would  divorce 
itself,  for  the  metaphysical  arguments  no  longer  seem  reli- 

^  The  author  was  brought  up  in  a  religious  atmosphere.  During  adoles- 
cence and  several  subsequent  years,  he  was  deeply  stirred  by  religion 
and  passed  through  conversion.  And  although  now  he  finds  little  acceptable 
in  the  Roman  Catholic  and  the  Protestant  dogmas,  he  has  retained  a  sympa- 
thetic appreciation  and  understanding  of  religious  life. 


276        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

able,  and  science  undermines  rather   than   supports   the 
central  beliefs  of  the  historical  religions. 

But  to  say  that  reUgion  is  based  solely  upon  "inner," 
"  immediate  "  experience,  really  means  that  theology  is  a 
branch  of  psychological  science.  So  that  the  claim  that 
religious  experience  is  inaccessible  to  'science  rests  upon  a 
misunderstanding  and  a  confusion :  the  nature  of  religious 
experience  is  misunderstood,  and  the  God  of  metaphysics 
is  confused  with  the  God  of  the  religions. 

The  immediacy  of  religious  knoivledge  is  illusory.  The 
expression  "  immediate  experience  "  can  be  applied  only  to 
mere  sensation  (sensory  impressions  not  referred  to  an  ob- 
ject), and  to  mere  feeling.  Every  transsubjective  refer- 
ence falls  under  the  criticism  of  the  intellect. 

/      If  the  claim  that  certain  religious  experiences  are  condi- 
(  tioned  by  superhuman  action  can  be  established,  it  is  the 
psychologist  who  stands  the  best  chance  of  doing  this  suc- 
cessfully. 

The  insistent  affirmation  of  the  new  theology  that  it  finds 
its  warrant  in  "  inner  experience  "  turns  out  to  mean  some- 
thing quite  different  from  that  which  the  proposition  would 
mean  to  a  man  of  science.  The  final  grounding  of  the 
whole  religious  structure  upon  an  act  of  faith  is  sufficient 
to  correct  the  misunderstanding  into  which  he  might  fall. 
In  the  language  of  these  theologians,  dependence  upon 
experience  is  not  intended  to  mean  that  religious  knowledge 
is  to  proceed  from  an  analysis  of  a  certain  class  of  facts  of 
consciousness,  a  comparison  of  them  with  other  similar 
facts,  and  a  study  of  the  conditions  under  which  these  facts 
come  into  existence.  The  scientific  treatment  of  religious 
experiences  is  the  very  thing  that  empirical  theology  would 
preclude.     Indeed,  the  theologians  of  this  school  are  deter- 


THEOLOGY  AND   PSYCHOLOGY  277 

mined  to  face  no  longer  any  attempt  at  scientific  or  philo- 
sophical examination  of  the  truths  of  their  dogmas.  They 
have  turned  their  faces  resolutely  away  from  metaphysics 
and  from  psychology.  Henceforth,  the  only  question  they 
are  willing  to  acknowledge  as  relevant  is,  "  Does  this  or 
that  belief  produce  the  results  we  want  ?  "  If  it  does,  they 
think  themselves  justified  in  holding  to  it  by  an  act  of 
faith,  even  against  science  and  philosophy. 

The  superficial  way  in  which  the  new  theology  uses  the 
pragmatic  conception  of  truth  makes  that  conception  appear 
ridiculous.  A  theology  intelligently  pragmatic,  interested 
in  the  value  of  religion  to  humanity,  rather  than  in  the  pres- 
ervation of  a  particular  form  of  religion,  would  realize 
that  the  practical  problems  with  which  it  is  confronted  can- 
not be  solved  offhand,  by  an  appeal  to  the  immediacy  of 
religious  experience  or  by  acts  of  faith.  There  are  many  — 
and  they  deserve  serious  consideration  —  who  hold,  for  in- 
stance, that  a  balance  sheet  of  what  the  civilized  world 
would  lose  in  renouncing  the  ideal  of  a  God-Providence  and 
of  what  it  would  gain  by  fixing  its  attention  upon  human 
society  in  the  process  of  formation,  would  not  be  in  favor 
of  the  traditional  opinion. 

If  theology  is  ever  to  find  out  what  beliefs  work  best 
towards  self-realization  and  happiness,  it  will  have  to  deal 
with  inner  experience  according  to  the  best  scientific  meth- 
ods. Until  it  does  so,  it  cannot  make  any  claim  to  serious 
consideration.  And  when  it  does  so,  it  will  have  become 
a  branch  of  psychology. 


PART  IV 

THE  LATEST  FORMS  AND  THE  FU- 
TURE OF  RELIGION 


CHAPTER  XII 
THE  LATEST  FORMS   OF  RELIGION 

An  author  audacious  enough  to  write  on  the  future  of 
religion  —  as  I  shall  do  in  the  final  chapter  of  this  book  — 
is  perhaps  less  likely  to  be  ridiculous  if  as  a  preparation 
he  adds  to  an  investigation  of  the  origin  and  functions  of 
religion  a  study  of  the  trend  of  contemporary  religious  Hfe. 
In  the  past  and  present  may  be  read  a  prophecy  of  the 
future. 

The  present  time  abounds  in  religious  movements  pos- 
sessing the  value  of  experiments.  Let  us  learn  from  them 
what  we  can.  Perhaps  we  shall  discover  what  conceptions 
and  practices  the  average  man,  dissatisfied  with  traditional 
Christianity,  is  ready  to  accept,  and  what  may  be  their  value 
to  him.  As  we  take  up  the  new  doctrines,  let  us  keep  in 
mind  their  relation  both  to  the  generalizations  of  science 
and  to  the  belief  in  the  anthropopathic  Christian  God. 

I  shall  consider  successively  the  influence  of  pantheistic 
conceptions  upon  theistic  religion,  the  psychotherapic  cults, 
the  Religion  of  Humanity  of  Auguste  Comte,  and  the  Eth- 
ical Culture  Society.  But  first  I  shall  introduce  a  few 
pages  on  original  Buddhism,  because  this  earliest  attempt 
to  establish  a  religion  independent  of  supernatural  per- 
sonal powers  is  too  instructive  to  be  omitted. 

I.  Original  Buddhism.^  —  Buddhism,  unlike  the  more 
primitive  religions,  is  largely  the  creation  of  one  man,  the 

1  The  substance  of  these  pages  was  first  published  in  the  second  part  of 
Religion,   its   Impulses   and  Ends,   Bibliotheca    Sacra,  Vol.    LVIII,    1901, 

PP-  763-773- 

281 


282        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL   STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

Buddha  Gautama.  This  fact  simplifies  considerably  our 
task,  because  in  the  experiences  which  launched  the  founder 
upon  his  career,  and  in  the  doctrines  he  formulated,  can 
be  readily  discerned  the  motives  and  purposes  of  original 
Buddhism. 

Would  that  we  had  a  full  record  of  the  inner  life  of  the 
young  man  in  whom  the  new  rehgion  was  germinating. 
His  disgust  and  his  yearning,  his  disappointments  and  his 
hopes,  his  sorrows  and  his  loves,  would  make  a  precious 
contribution  to  the  psychology  of  religion.  Unfortunately 
history  offers  only  meagre  information  on  these  points. 
Yet  the  Httle  we  know  of  Gautama's  early  life,  taken  to- 
gether with  his  subsequent  activity,  and  particularly  his 
teaching,  is  sufficient  to  make  clear  his  motives.  At  the 
age  of  about  twenty-nine,  Siddharta,  the  son  of  an  Indian 
prince,  abandoned  his  father's  palace  and  his  own  family 
to  search  for  the  peace  of  Nirvana.  He  thought  to  find 
it  in  a  life  of  isolation  and  rigid  penance.  There  is  com- 
plete unanimity  of  opinion  as  to  the  cause  of  this  conduct : 
Siddharta  had  tasted  all  the  joys  of  life  and  had  found 
them  insufficient,  delusive,  or  loathsome. 

From  the  rapid  growth  of  Buddhism,  we  may  conjecture 
that  this  Indian  prince  was  not  alone  in  his  moral  nausea. 
The  views  of  human  life  entertained  by  the  more  serious 
Indians  of  the  period  were  extremely  gloomy.  Kern  writes : 
"What  strikes  us  most  is  the  emphatically  pronounced  dread 
of  the  miseries  of  life,  of  old  age  and  death ;  a  dread  inten- 
sified by  the  belief  in  perpetual  rebirth,  and  consequently 
of  repeated  misery.  All  sects  —  barring  the  Sadducees  of 
the  epoch  —  agree  in  the  persuasion  that  life  is  a  burden, 
and  unmixed  evil.  All  accordingly  strive  to  get  liberated 
from  worldly  existence,,  from   rebirth,   from   Samsara."  ^ 

1  Kern,  H.,  Manual  of  Indian  Buddhism,  Grundriss  der  Indo-Arischen 
Philologie  und  Altertumskunde,  ed.  by  G.  Buhler,  III  Band,  8  Heft,  p.  ii. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF   RELIGION  283 

When  the  famous  Brahman,  Kassapa  of  Urvela,  had  left 
all  to  join  the  new  Teacher,  and  the  astonished  people 
asked  him :  — 

"What  hast  thou  seen,  O  thou  of  Urvela, 
That  thou,  for  penances  so  far  renowned, 
Forsakest  thus  thy  sacrificial  fire  ? 
I  ask  thee,  Kassapa,  the  meaning  of  this  thing  : 
How  comes  it  that  thine  altar  lies  deserted? " 

he  answers :  — 

"  'Tis  of  such  things  as  sights,  and  sounds,  and  tastes, 
Of  women,  and  of  lusts,  the  ritual  speaks. 
When  these  I  saw  to  be  the  dregs  of  life, 
I  felt  no  charm  in  offerings  small  or  great."  ^ 

But  this  pessimism  was  not  all-embracing,  or  else  it 
would  not  have  given  birth  to  a  religion.  The  conviction 
that  life  is  not  worth  living,  deadening  by  itself,  leads 
to  irresistible  activity  when  associated  with  the  persuasion 
that  there  is  a  way  of  escape  leading  to  the  peace  that 
"  passeth  understanding,"  a  way  not  beyond  the  power 
of  man  to  discover.  This  hopeful  belief  was  shared  by 
the  seriously  minded  Indians  of  the  time.  Kern  writes 
of  the  general  state  of  religion  in  India  at  the  advent  of 
Gautama  :  "  All  [sects]  are  convinced  that  there  are  means 
to  escape  rebirth,  that  there  is  a  path  of  salvation,  a  path 
consisting  in  conquering  innate  ignorance  and  in  obtaining 
the  highest  truth." 

The  successive  steps  of  Gautama  in  the  search  for  the 
path  of  salvation  need  not  be  given  in  detail  here.  His 
departure  from  home,  his  seclusion,  his  penances  and 
fasting  (he  probably  went  through  the  technical  Yoga 
practices),  and,  finally,  the  attainment  of  the  Buddhahood, 

iThe  first  Kkandhaka,  Chap.  XXII,  5,  quoted  by  Rhys  Davids  in  his 
Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion,  Hibbert  Lectures  for  1881, 
p.  159. 


284        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

have  of  late  become  almost  as  well  known  to  the  reading 
public  as  the  chief  events  of  the  life  of  Christ. 

Our  inquiry  may  be  limited  to  an  examination  of  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "  Nirvana  "  and  of  the  means  used 
to  attain  that  blessed  state.  "  Nirvana  "  denotes  the  goal 
of  the  Buddhist's  religious  activity.  The  complete  con- 
notation of  the  word  is  open  to  discussion ;  but  it  is  now 
generally  granted  that  its  meaning  is  not  purely  negative, 
as  some  formerly  held ;  it  does  not  mean  simply  anni- 
hilation, suppression  of  life.  A  quotation  from  the  Bud- 
dJiist  Birth  Stories  will  bring  out  its  positive  side  :  "  When 
the  fire  of  lust  is  gone  out,  then  peace  is  gained ;  when 
the  fires  of  hatred  and  delusion  are  gone  out,  then  peace 
is  gained ;  when  the  troubles  of  mind,  arising  from  pride, 
credulity,  and  all  the  other  sins,  have  ceased,  then  peace 
is  gained !  Sweet  is  the  lesson  the  singer  makes  me  hear, 
for  the  Nirvana  of  Peace  is  that  which  I  have  been  trying 
to  find  out.  This  very  day  I  will  break  away  from  house- 
hold cares !  I  will  renounce  the  world !  I  will  follow 
only  after  Nirvana  itself."  ^  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
exact  belief  of  the  Buddhists  concerning  the  end  of  their 
religious  efforts,  this  at  least  may  be  regarded  as  estab- 
lished on  the  authority  of  Burnouf,  Oldenberg,  Barth, 
Kern,  La  Vallee  Poussin,  and  others:  Arahatship,  the 
hmnediate  Nirvana,  is  a  bliss  to  be  enjoyed  on  this  earth, 
free  from  the  disappointments  of  the  senses  and  of  the 
fear  of  death  itself ;  the  Absolute  Nirvana,  the  ultimate 
end,  which  can  only  be  reached  after  death,  is  a  "state" 
void  for  all  eternity  of  the  sufferings  of  the  flesh  and 
mind.  The  Absolute  Nirvana  implies  a  cessation  of  con- 
sciousness ;  the  doctrine  of  the  Skandhas  and  that  of 
Karma,  both   admitted  by  Gautama,  lead  unquestionably 

1  Davids,  Rhys,  Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion,  Hibbert 
Lectures  for  1881,  pp.  160,  161,  159. 


THE   LATEST   FORMS  OF   RELIGION  285 

to  annihilation  of  personality.^  But  the  Master  never 
expressed  himself  definitely  on  this  point.  He  is  reported 
to  have  said  that  it  is  one  of  the  questions  which  must 
be  set  aside  as  useless. 

Practically  Nirvana  means  for  the  believer  deliverance 
from  suffering,  —  salvation,  final  and  forever.  We  may 
well  believe  that  few  took  the  trouble  to  form  a  clear 
representation  of  the  condition  of  the  saved  individual. 
It  was  enough  for  life's  purpose  to  define  it  as  the  highest 
happiness.  Does  the  modern  Christian  have  a  more  dis- 
tinct idea  of  his  future  state .-' 

The  thoroughly  pragmatic  and  non-ritualistic  nature 
of  Buddhism  cannot  fail  to  be  noticed.  One  cannot  ap- 
proach the  religion  of  Gautama  from  the  point  of  view 
of  traditional  Christianity  without  being  struck  with  two 
characteristics :  the  absence  of  ritualism,  and  a  deeply 
grounded  aversion  to  speculation.  "  Buddha  does  not  deny 
the  existence  of  certain  beings  called  Indra,  Agni,  Varuna ; 
but  he  thinks  that  he  owes  nothing  to  them.  .  .  .  He 
does  not  busy  himself  with  the  origin  of  things  ;  he  takes 
them  just  as  they  are,  or  as  they  appear  to  him  to  be ; 
and  the  problem  to  which  he  incessantly  returns  in  his 
conversations  is  not  that  of  being  itself,  but  that  of  exist- 
ence. Still  more  than  in  the  Vedanta  of  the  Upanishads, 
his  doctrine  is  confined  to  the  doctrine  of  salvation."  ^  If 
the  disciple  must  learn  and  understand  the  real  nature 
of  man  and  the  conditions  of  his  existence,  it  is  only  in 
order  to  escape  from  the  "  fetter  of  delusion,"  and  to  be 
prepared  to  follow  the  path  of  salvation.  Knowledge  is 
the  revealer  of  the  path  ;  it  is  a  means,  not  an  end.  The 
exclusively  utilitarian  purpose    of   primitive  Buddhism  is 

^Kern,  H.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  46-54;  Poussin,  Louis  de  La  Vallee,  Etudes  et 
Materiaux,  pp.  43-46,  83-84. 

^Barth,  The  Religions  of  India  (tr.  by  the  Rev.  J.  Wood),  pp.  109-110, 


286        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

unquestionable  ;  the  way  leading  to  freedom  from  suffering 
was  Siddharta's  quest,  and  the  announcement  of  the 
"way"  constitutes  the  burden  of  his  preaching.  The 
Dhanitnacakkappavattana  formulates  the  gospel  of  the 
Hindu  sage  thus  :  — 

1.  "  Birth  is  sorrow  ;  clinging  to  earthly  things  is  sorrow. 

2.  "  Birth  and  rebirth,  the  chain  of  reincarnations, 
result  from  the  thirst  for  life  together  with  passion  and 
desire. 

3.  "  The  only  escape  from  this  thirst  is  in  the  annihila- 
tion of  desire. 

4.  "  The  only  way  of  escape  from  this  thirst  is  by  follow- 
ing the  eightfold  path  :  right  belief,  right  resolve,  right 
word,  right  act,  right  life,  right  effort,  right  thinking, 
right  meditation."  ^ 

That  Buddha  refused  to  enter  upon  metaphysical  discus- 
sions concerning  the  soul,  and  that  he  held  it  irrelevant  to 
reason  upon  the  origin,  nature,  and  existence  of  spiritual 
beings,  is  now  a  fact  recognized  by  every  authority.  It  is 
written  in  the  SiUtas  :  — 

"  It  is  by  his  consideration  of  those  things  which  ought 
not  to  be  considered  [the  gods  and  future  existence]  and 
by  his  non-consideration  of  those  things  which  ought  to  be 
considered,  that  wrong  leanings  of  the  mind  arise  within 
him  [the  disciple]. 

1  Dhammacakkappavattana,  Hopkins,  pp.  305-306. 

The  eight  fold  path  is  thus  interpreted  by  Rhys  Davids:  "  I.  Right  views; 
free  from  superstition  or  delusion.  2.  Right  aims ;  high,  and  worthy  of  the 
intelligent,  earnest  man.  3.  Right  speech;  kindly,  open,  truthful.  4.  Right 
conduct;  peaceful,  honest,  pure.  5.  Right  livelihood;  bringing  hurt  or  dan- 
ger to  no  living  thing.  6.  Right  effort;  in  self-training  and  in  self-control. 
7.  Right  mindfulness;  the  active,  watchful  mind.  8.  Right  contemplation; 
earnest  thought  on  the  deep  mysteries  of  life."  —  Davids,  Rhys,  Sacred  Books 
of  the  EffSi,  Vol.  XI,  p.  144,  introduction  to  Dhammacakkappavattana  Sutta, 


THE   LATEST  FORMS   OF   RELIGION  287 

"Unwisely  doth  he  consider  thus:  'Have  I  existed 
during  the  ages  that  are  past,  or  have  I  not  ?  What  was  I 
doing  during  the  ages  that  are  past  ?  How  was  I  dur- 
ing the  ages  that  are  past  ?  Having  been  what,  what 
did  I  become  in  the  ages  that  are  past?  Shall  I  ex- 
ist during  the  ages  of  the  future,  or  shall  I  not?  What 
shall  I  be  during  the  ages  of  the  future  ?  How  shall  I  be 
during  the  ages  of  the  future  ?  '.  .  .  Or  he  debates  within 
himself  as  to  the  present :  *  Do  I  after  all  exist,  or  am  I 
not  ?     How  am  I  ? ' 

"  In  him  thus  unwisely  considering,  there  springs  up  one 
or  other  of  the  six  absurd  notions  [all  of  which  are  about 
the  soul].  This,  brethren,  is  called  the  walking  in  delusion, 
the  jungle,  the  wilderness,  the  puppet-show,  the  writhing, 
the  fetter  of  delusion  !  "  ^ 

Another  peculiar  and  pregnant  fact  must  be  dwelt  on  an 
instant.  If  original  Buddhism  is  a  non-speculative  religion, 
if  it  has  no  theology,  it  is  because  its  salvation  is  to  be  se- 
cured by  the  individual's  efforts,  and  not  by  the  grace  of  any 
God.  Let  the  Brahman  discourse  upon  the  origin,  the  na- 
ture, and  the  attributes  of  the  gods,  let  him  bow  down  to 
them  in  adoration,  let  him  offer  them  sacrifices  in  the  hope 
of  securing  their  assistance ;  the  disciple  of  Buddha  is  to 
gain  salvation  for  himself  by  himself.  In  one  of  his 
last  conversations  with  Ananda,  his  beloved  disciple,  the 
Buddha,  speaking  of  the  future  of  the  Brotherhood  and  of 
Ananda's  desire  that  he  would  leave  instructions  touch- 
ing the  Order,  said:  "The  Tathagata  [Gautama]  thinks 
not  that  it  is  he  who  should  lead  the  brotherhood.  .  .  . 
Why  then  should  he  leave  instructions  in  any  matter  con- 
cerning the  order?"  He  then  adverts  to  his  approaching 
passing  away,  and  continues  : — 

^  Davids,  Rhys,  Lectures  on  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion,  p.  88.  For 
a  similar  passage,  see  Buddhism  in  Translations,  H.  C.  Warren,  pp.  11 7-1 28. 


288        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

"Therefore,  O  Ananda,  be  ye  lamps  unto  yourselves. 
Be  ye  a  refuge  to  yourselves.  Betake  yourselves  to  no 
external  refuge.  Hold  fast  to  the  truth  as  a  lamp.  Hold 
fast  as  a  refuge  to  the  truth.  Look  not  for  refuge  to  any 
one  besides  yourselves. 

"And  whosoever,  Ananda,  either  now  or  after  I  am 
dead,  shall  be  a  lamp  unto  themselves,  and  a  refuge  unto 
themselves,  .  .  .  and  holding  fast  to  the  truth  as  their 
lamp  .  .  .  shall  look  not  for  refuge  to  any  one  besides 
themselves,  it  is  they,  Ananda,  among  the  Blikkhus  (the 
members  of  my  society)  who  shall  reach  the  very  topmost 
height  [Nirvana  Arahatship] — but  they  must  be  willing 
to  learn."! 

This  proud  individualism  with  regard  to  the  means  of 
salvation  leaves  no  room  for  worship  in  original  Buddhism. 
The  Founder  is  merely  the  revealer  of  the  Truth ;  he  is 
the  Enlightener  ;  and  only  thus  is  he  the  Saviour.  That  is, 
the  orthodox  belief  authorizes  only  a  commemoration  of  the 
saints  and  of  the  symbols  of  their  mission.  If,  never- 
theless, one  finds  among  later  Buddhists  two  methods  by 
which  the  assistance  of  the  gods  is  sought,  —  the  Tantric 
and  the  Adoration  methods,^  —  they  should  be  ascribed  to 
the  transformations  of  Buddhism  which  followed  the  death 
of  Gautama. 

Shall  we  class  this  original  Buddhism  with  religion, 
or  shall  we  agree  with  Tiele  that  "  Primitive  Buddhism 
ignored  religion".''^     With  this  opinion  we  shall  have  to 

1  Davids,  Rhys,  op.  cit.,  pp.  182,  183. 

2  For  a  description  of  these  methods,  see  La  Vallee  Poussin,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
107,  108. 

3  Tiele,  C.  P.,  Outline  0/ a  History  of  Religion,  p.  137.  "Buddhism,  in 
fact,  rejected  .  .  .  the  whole  dogmatic  system  of  the  Brahmans,  their  worship, 
penance,  and  hierarchy,  and  simply  substituted  for  them  a  higher  moral 
teaching."     (^Ibid.,  p.  136.) 


THE  LATEST  FORJVIS  OF  RELIGION  289 

agree  unless  we  can  show  that  although  original  Buddhism 
disregarded  gods,  it  made  use,  in  its  efforts  to  escape  from 
the  chain  of  reincarnation,  of  a  psychic  power  transcend- 
ing man.  On  this  point  I  can  only  say  that  certain 
methods  adopted  by  Gautama  and  his  early  disciples  sug- 
gest that  they  objectified  Thought  and  Resolve  somewhat 
as  the  psychotherapist  objectifies  Thought  and  Love,  and 
the  magician  Will-Magic.  This  Power  stood  for  the  Bud- 
dhist as  the  deepest  reality,  the  very  essence  of  things. 
Little  opportunity  was  provided  for  developing  that  concep- 
tion or  the  means  of  entering  in  relation  with  that  Power, 
since  Buddhism  soon  took  unto  itself  much  of  what  its 
founder  had  rejected,  —  in  particular,  a  belief  in  personal 
divinities. 

In  the  Pali  Pitakas  and  in  certain  Suttas,  as  well  as  else- 
where, there  appears  a  belief  in  wonderful  powers  acquired 
by  performing  various  rites.  The  adept  may  expect,  for 
instance,  "to  hear  with  clear  and  heavenly  ear,  surpassing 
that  of  men,  sounds  both  human  and  celestial ;  to  compre- 
hend by  his  own  heart  the  hearts  of  other  beings  and  of 
men  [telepathy],  to  be  able  to  call  to  mind  his  various 
temporary  states  in  days  gone  by."  ^  But  here  we  are 
evidently  in  the  sphere  of  magic  and  not  of  religion. 

The  chief  lesson  that  primitive  Buddhism  teaches  the 
inquirer  into  the  future  of  religion  is  the  difficulty  for  men 
of  the  Hindu  temperament,  and  at  the  intellectual  level 
of  the  contemporaries  of  Gautama,  to  produce  a  religion 
based  upon  a  belief  in  a  non-personal  psychic  power. 

2.  Pantheism  and  immanence  in  theology.  —  Among  the 
most  significant  aspects  of  the  higher  religions  are  the 
persistency   with   which  pantheism  crops  out  in  theistic 

1  Sacred  Books  of  the  East,  edited  by  Max  Miiller,  Vol.  XI,  Akankheyya 
Sutta. 


290       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

religions,  and  the  ease  with  which  theism  keeps  in  check 
pantheistic  intrusions. 

Brahmanism  rests  upon  pantheism,  but  it  has  never  been 
free  from  theistic  doctrines.  Behind  the  all-including  imper- 
sonal One,  remained  the  pre-Brahmanic  gods,  Indra,  Agni, 
Vishnu,  etc.  Brahma  itself  soon  became  personified.  Sim- 
ilarly, Buddhism  began  as  a  godless  religion,  but  the  dis- 
ciples soon  turned  to  gods  for  assistance.^ 

If  pantheistic  religions  have  not  kept  themselves  free 
from  gods,  the  theistic  religions  have  failed  to  keep  them- 
selves free  from  pantheistic  conceptions.  The  rich  Hel- 
lenic Pantheon  had  its  pantheistic  background.  The 
Christian  religion,  also,  has  always  included  undercurrents 
of  a  pantheistic  nature.  The  powerful  mystical  trend  in 
the  Christian  Church  is  pantheistic  ;  and  the  recent  move- 
ments we  shall  presently  study  are  expressions  of  the  same 
tendency. 

The  vigor  with  which  pantheism  is  pushing  its  way  into 
modern  religious  life  is  not  surprising  ;  for  it  is  the  expres- 
sion in  religion  of  a  type  of  conception  which  has  triumphed 
in  philosophy  because  of  its  greater  logical  consistency. 
In  a  world  such  as  ours,  a  personal  God,  all-powerful  and 
all-good,  is  a  conception  bristling  with  contradictions.     The 

^  "  The  mystical  piety  of  India,  when  strictly  pantheistic,  knows  nothing  of 
the  gratitude  for  Divine  mercy  and  the  trust  in  Divine  righteousness  which 
characterize  evangelical  piety.  .  .  .  When  feelings  like  love,  gratitude, 
and  trust  are  expressed  in  the  hymns  and  prayers  of  Hindu  worship, 
it  is  in  consequence  of  a  virtual  denial  of  the  principle  of  pantheism.  .  .  . 
Hinduism  holds  it  to  be  a  fundamental  truth  that  the  absolute  Being  can 
have  no  personal  attributes,  and  yet  it  has  not  only  to  allow  but  to  en- 
courage its  adherents  to  invest  that  Being  with  these  attributes  in  order  that 
by  thus  temporarily  deluding  themselves  they  may  evoke  in  their  hearts  at 
least  a  feetle  and  transient  glow  of  devotion.  ...  It  is  the  personal  gods  of 
Hindu  polytheism,  and  not  the  impersonal  principle  of  Hindu  pantheism, 
that  the  Hindu  people  worship."  {Anti-tkeistic  Theories,  Robert  Flint, 
6th  ed.,  pp.  388-389.) 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF   RELIGION  291 

fact  that  the  development  of  modern  philosophy  has  been 
away  from  theism  is  shown  by  the  "  God  "  of  Spinoza  and 
that  of  Shelling,  the  "regulative  idea"  of  Kant,  the  "abso- 
lute ego"  of  Fichte,  the  "absolute  idea"  of  Hegel, 
and  the  various  forms  of  present-day  "  absolute  ideal- 
ism." The  surprising  thing  is  rather  the  tenacity  of 
religious  theism  in  the  face  of  its  rejection  by  philoso- 
phy. When,  however,  religion  is  understood  to  be  a 
pursuit  of  practical  ends,  it  is  clear  why  this  theory 
discarded  by  philosophy  has  lagged  behind  in  religion. 
For,  from  the  practical  point  of  view,  neither  of  these  two 
conceptions  is  entirely  satisfactory  ;  hence  there  is  a  ten- 
dency to  use  both,  without  much  regard  for  logical  consist- 
ency. 

The  failure  of  pantheism  entirely  to  displace  theism 
indicates  not  so  much  a  logical  weakness  of  the  former,  as 
its  insufficiency  for  the  gratification  of  certain  of  the  reli- 
gious needs  of  modern  society.  On  the  other  hand,  the  rela- 
tive success  of  Christian  theism  in  keeping  its  ground 
against  pantheism  is  not  a  sign  of  the  philosophical  ade- 
quacy of  theism,  but  rather  an  indication  of  its  success  in 
providing  some  of  the  things  that  man  seeks  in  religion. 

The  efforts  at  theological  restatement  now  going  on  un- 
der the  name  Immanence  disclose  with  striking  clearness 
the  need  of  religion  for  both  pantheism  and  theism,  and 
the  indifference  of  pious  souls  to  stringent  consistency, 
provided  the  coveted  values  are  secured. 

To  set  forth  the  leading  features  of  this  tendency,  I  can- 
not probably  do  better  than  draw  from  The  New  Theology, 
by  Rev.  R.  J.  Campbell.  It  is  regarded,  I  believe,  as  ex- 
pressing very  well  the  leading  principles  of  the  immanent 
movement  as  understood  by  the  clergy.  If  we  were  con- 
cerned with  a  history  of  contemporary  theology,  I  should 


292 


A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 


find  it  necessary  to  define  certain  terms  more  explicitly 
and  to  make  distinctions  that  are  quite  beside  the  purpose 
of  this  book.  I  shall  have  accomplished  my  purpose  if  I 
make  clear  how  deeply  the  Immanentists  feel  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  a  theism  that  does  not  make  possible  the  essen- 
tial oneness  of  man  and  God.  Whether  or  not  this  oneness 
is  consistent  with  Christian  theism  and  with  human  person- 
ality is  one  of  the  questions  by  which  they  refuse  to  be 
embarrassed. 

The  universe  is  God's  thought  about  Himself,  writes 
Campbell.^  God  is  the  power  which  is  finding  expression 
in  the  universe  and  which  is  present  in  every  tiniest  atom 
of  the  wondrous  whole.  This  power  is  the  one  reality  we 
cannot  get  away  from,  for  whatever  else  it  may  be,  it  is 
ourselves.  Campbell  affirms  the  essential  oneness  of  God 
and  man.  There  is  no  dividing  line  between  our  being 
and  God's  "except  from  our  side."  There  is  no  substance 
but  consciousness;  mankind  is  of  one  substance  with  the 
Father.  And  so,  when  our  finite  consciousness  ceases  to 
be  infinite,  there  will  be  no  distinction  whatever  between 
our  consciousness  and  God's.  The  distinction  between 
finite  and  infinite  is  not  eternal.  "  The  being  of  God  is  a 
complex  unity  containing  within  itself  and  harmonizing 
every  form  of  self-consciousness  that  can  possibly  exist." 
In  spite  of  these  statements,  he  maintains  the  distinctive- 
ness of  man's  personality,  perhaps  on  the  theory  that  the 
soul  and  the  spirit  are  sharply  separated:  the  soul  we 
make,  while  "the  spirit  we  can  neither  make  nor  mar,  for 
it  is  at  once  our  being  and  God's." 

He  rejects  the  accusation  that  his  doctrine  is  pantheistic 
in  the  sense  of  standing  for  a  blind  force,  "  a  fate-God, 

1  In  the  following  statements,  taken  from  The  New  Theology,  Macmillan, 
New  York,  1907,  I  have  preserved  as  far  as  practicable  the  words  of  the 
author. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  293 

...  a  God  Who  does  not  even  know  what  He  is  about." 
He  adds  :  "  My  God  is  my  deepest  Self  and  yours  too  ;  He 
is  the  Self  of  the  Universe  and  knows  all  about  it.  .  .  . 
With  Tennyson  you  can  call  this  doctrine  the  Higher  Pan- 
theism, if  you  like ;  but  it  is  the  very  antithesis  of  the 
Pantheism  which  has  played  such  a  part  in  the  history 
of  thought."  And  when  people  turn  upon  him,  saying, 
"  This  view  of  the  relationship  of  God  to  man,  which  you 
preach,  hails  not  from  Palestine  but  from  Oxford,"  he  does 
not  deny  its  kinship  to  the  Neo-Hegelianism  of  T.  H. 
Green,  but  remarks  that  it  is  much  older,  and  refers  the 
critics  to  the  mystic  gospel  of  John.  Whether  it  is  older 
or  not,  it  cannot  but  be  clear  to  any  one  able  to  assume  a 
critical  attitude  that  Absolute  IdeaUsm  is  not  consistent 
with  the  kind  of  personal  God  with  whom  one  can  main- 
tain the  social  relation  expressed  in  the  Christian  worship, 
both  Roman  Catholic  and  Protestant.^     Campbell  finds  it 

1  Campbell  has  recognized  only  one  logical  difficulty  as  standing  immov- 
ably in  his  way.  But  as  he  is  preeminently  a  mystical  moralist,  and  not  a 
philosopher,  he  does  not  allow  himself  to  be  swerved  from  his  course  by  this 
obstacle.  "  The  only  telling  criticism  that  can  be  directed  against  it  [his  con- 
ception] is  that  which  proceeds  from  the  side  of  scientific  Monism.  A  thor- 
oughgoing monist  might  reasonably  contend  that,  up  to  a  certain  point,  I  have 
been  arguing  for  a  monistic  view  of  the  world,  in  company  with  practically 
the  whole  of  the  scientific  world,  and  have  then  given  the  case  away  by  ad- 
mitting a  certain  amount  of  individual  freedom.  I  confess  it  looks  like  it  ;  I 
have  had  to  face  the  antinomy.  I  see  that  there  is  no  escape  from  the  asser- 
tion of  the  fundamental  unity  of  all  existence  ;  and  yet,  by  the  very  constitu- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  we  are  compelled  to  take  for  granted  a  certain  amount 
to  individual  initiative  and  self-direction."     (^The  Ntw  Theology,  p.  41.) 

On  the  "  true  notion  of  the  spiritual  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  God," 
T.  H.  Green  writes:  "He  is  not  merely  a  Being  who  has  made  us,  in  the 
sense  that  we  exist  as  objects  of  divine  consciousness  in  the  same  way  in 
which  we  suppose  the  system  of  nature  to  exist,  but  that  He  is  a  Being  in 
whom  we  exist  ;  with  whom  we  are  in  principle  one  ;  with  whom  the  human 
spirit  is  identical,  in  the  sense  that  He  is  all  which  the  human  spirit  is  cap- 
able of  becoming."     {^Prolegomena  to  Ethics.) 

Campbell  is  one  of  the  theologians  who  have  used  the  writings  of  William 


294        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

possible,  nevertheless,  to  deal  with  his  pantheistic  God  like 
a  loyal  Christian  theist,  and  thus  he  reaps  the  advantages  of 
both  pantheism  and  theism.  This  is  no  more  than  the 
Christian  Mystics  have  always  done. 

Many  of  the  writings  of  the  Society  of  Friends  show 
the  same  combination  of  pantheism  and  theism  that  is 
typical  of  modern  immanence  theology.  They  set  forth 
God  as  an  external  Power,  which  can  filter  into  the  human 
soul,  and  also  as  a  Being  who  is  the  human  spirit.  One 
of  the  leaders  of  the  progressive  Friends  writes,  for  in- 
stance, "  We  have  ...  a  God  '  in  whom  we  live  and  move 
and  are,'  whose  Being  opens  into  ours  and  ours  into  His, 
Who  is  the  very  Life  of  our  lives,  the  matrix  of  our  per- 
sonality ;  and  there  is  no  separation  between  us  unless  we 
make  it  ourselves."  ^  He  insists  upon  the  "unity  of  con- 
sciousness": "Even  the  budding  personahty  betrays  an 
infinite  background  and  suggests  an  infinite  foreground. 
What  we  really  have,  when  the  person  appears,  is  the 
self-consciousness  of  the  world,  manifest  at  a  focus  point 
—  a  nnique  expression  of  the  eternal  self —  set  free  to 
make  Ids  individual  contribution  to  the  world  of  spiritual 
Being:"^ 

A  clean-cut  theism,  making  what  seems  an  impassable 
gulf  between  God  and  man,  is  intolerable  to  such  men  as 
these;  they  would  have  both  oneness  of  God  and  man, 

James  to  bolster  up  their  theology.  In  order  to  explain  the  oneness  of  God 
and  man  he  has  recourse  to  the  "  subconscious  mind  "  and  draws  from  it  the 
following  propositions  :  i.  We  have  a  higher  self  and  our  limited  conscious- 
ness does  not  involve  a  separate  individuality.  2.  The  whole  human  race  is 
fundamentally  one  —  "  Ultimately  your  being  and  mine  are  one  and  we  shall 
come  to  know  it."  3.  The  highest  of  ourselves,  the  ultimate  Self  of  the  Uni- 
verse, is  God. 

1  Jones,  Rufus,  Tke  Double  Search,  John  C.  Winston  Co.,  Philadelphia, 
p.  100. 

2  Jones,  Rufus,  Social  Law  in  the  Spiritual  World,  John  C.  Winston  Co., 
Philadelphia,  p.  85. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS   OF   RELIGION  295 

and  the  independent  reality  of  each.  "  The  true  view,  the 
proper  formulation  must  hold  that  God  is  the  inward  prin- 
ciple and  ground  of  the  personal  Hfe  —  the  indwelling  life 
and  light  of  the  soul,  permeating  all  its  activities."  "The 
Inner  Light,  the  true  Seed,  is  no  foreign  substance  added 
to  an  undivine  human  life.  It  is  neither  human  nor  divine. 
It  is  the  actual  inner  self  formed  by  the  union  of  a  divine 
and  a  human  element  in  a  single  undivided  life."  ^  This 
doctrine  is  in  substance  that  set  forth  by  Sabatier,^  and,  in 
fact,  by  the  majority  of  those  who  to-day  take  a  share  in 
attempting  to  reform  religious  doctrines  "from  the  in- 
side." ^ 

3.  Psychotherapic  Cults  :  Christian  Science  ;  Mind-Cure; 
New  Thought.  —  The  most  noteworthy  religious  event  since 
the  Reformation  is  perhaps  the  appearance  in  the  United 
States  of  a  number  of  religious  movements  which  may  be 
grouped  together  under  the  designation  of  psychotherapic 
cults.  The  foremost  of  them  is  "  Christian  Science," 
founded  by  Mrs.  Mary  Baker  Eddy. 

I  hasten  to  add  that  the  value  of  these  cults  does  not, 
in  my  mind,  belong  to  their  "  metaphysics,"  considered  as 
a  philosophical  system.  It  is  the  product  of  ignorant  and 
ill-trained  minds.  Much  of  it  defies  logic  and  offends  com- 
mon sense.  But  the  defects  which  in  the  eyes  of  many 
wholly  damn  these  movements  might  conceivably  be  re- 

1  Jones,  Rufus,  op.  cii.,  p.  1 76.     The  italics  are  mine. 

2  Sabatier,  A.,  Religions  of  Authority,  p.  307, 

2  Oliver  Lodge,  a  recognized  scientist,  writes  in  the  same  spirit :  — 
"  We  are  rising  to  the  conviction  that  we  are  a  part  of  nature,  and  so  a 
part  of  God  ;  that  the  whole  creation  —  the  One  and  the  Many  and  All-One 
—  is  travailing  together  toward  some  great  end  ;  and  that  now,  after  ages  of 
development,  we  have  at  length  become  conscious  portions  of  the  great 
scheme,  and  can  cooperate  in  it  with  knowledge  and  joy."  {Suggestions  to- 
ward the  Re-interpretation  of  Christian  Doctrine,  The  Hibbert  Journal,  April, 
1904,  Vol.  II,  p.  475.) 


296        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

moved,  and  there  would  remain  important  elements  of  a 
new  religious  faith  acceptable  to  the  modern  world. 

In  this  chapter  I  shall  try  to  show  that  the  psychother- 
apic  movements  in  their  essential  teaching  are  popularized 
and  distorted  formulations,  on  the  one  hand,  of  important 
truths  regarding  the  "  power  of  thought  "  over  body  to 
which  psychology  has  recently  given  added  significance, 
and,  on  the  other,  of  a  non-theistic  philosophy  alUed  to 
the  absolute  idealism  of  modern  metaphysics.  Although 
they  distort  contemporary  thought,  they  do  not  intend  to 
oppose  it.     They  wish  rather  to  build  upon  it. 

These  new  cults  are  forcible  reminders  of  the  fact  that 
belief  in  a  Saving  Power  is  a  condition  of  the  existence  of 
religion,  and  also  that  the  desire  for  deliverance  from  moral 
and  physical  miseries  and  for  the  realization  of  ideals  con- 
tinues to  be  the  motive  of  rehgious  life,  just  as  it  was  in  the 
days  of  Gautama,  the  Enlightener,  and  of  Jesus,  the  Healer. 

The  mind-cure  books  announce  "the  discovery  of  the 
might  of  Truth  in  the  treatment  of  disease  as  well  as  of 
sin,"^  "the  vital  law  of  true  life,  true  greatness,  power,  and 
happiness."  They  claim  to  be  "  systems  of  transcendental 
medicine,"  or  of  "  psychic  therapeutics."  They  purpose  to 
minister  to  those  who  "  would  exchange  impotence  for 
power,  weakness  and  suffering  for  health  and  strength,  pain 
and  unrest  for  peace,  poverty  for  fulness  and  plenty." 
They  proclaim  "  the  birthright  of  every  man  born  into  the 
world  to  be  physically  whole  and  mentally  happy."  Their 
claims  have  an  extravagant  sound,  but  no  more  so  than 
those  made  for  "  faith  "  by  the  New  Testament  writers  who 
declared  it  would  remove  mountains  and  secure  eternal 
blessedness  after  death.  Nothing  but  vital  personal  expe- 
riences could  have  inspired  the  enthusiasm  and  the  assur- 

^  Eddy,  Mary  G.  Baker,  Science  and  Health,  1908,  Preface. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS   OF  RELIGION  297 

ance  with  which  these  modern  zealots  proclaim  the  abound- 
ing efficacy  of  their  "truth." 

If  they  call  themselves  Christians,  it  is  not  in  the  tradi- 
tional sense.  Of  traditional  Christianity  they  speak  re- 
spectfully, but  they  want  a  new  dogmatics.  They  say, 
"  The  time  for  thinkers  has  come.  Truth,  independent  of 
doctrines  and  time-honored  systems,  knocks  at  the  portal 
of  humanity."  ^  In  another  of  their  aggressive  little  books 
one  reads  :  "  Unrest  is  universal.  The  old  landmarks  are 
disappearing.  .  .  .  Creed  and  dogma  are  things  of  the 
past ;  religious  ceremonial  and  form  no  longer  interest  the 
masses."  2 

The  impression  these  cults  have  produced  on  thoughtful  religious 
people  is  well  expressed  in  this  passage :  — 

"  Renan  with  his  usual  intuition  declared  that  if  it  [the  religion  of 
the  future]  were  already  in  our  midst,  few  of  us  would  know  it. 

"The  prediction  has  proved  true.  The  new  religious  movement, 
Christain  Science,  has  spoken  a  language  so  foreign  to  cultivated  ears, 
its  interpretation  of  the  Bible  is  so  false,  it  is  so  obviously  committed 
to  errors,  illusions,  and  aberrations  of  every  sort,  that  the  intelligent 
have  been  disposed  to  shrug  their  shoulders  in  contempt  and  to  ignore 
it.  And  yet  they  have  not  been  able  to  ignore  it  altogether.  Every 
once  in  a  while  this  curious  superstition  proves  its  existence  with  un- 
expected power.  We  see  a  hard-headed  business  man  totally  devoid  of 
religious  sentiment  undergo  a  new  kind  of  conversion  which  leaves  him 
as  devout  and  ardent  as  a  Christian  of  the  first  century.  An  ailing  wife 
or  daughter  whom  no  physician  has  been  able  to  help,  through  some 
mysterious  means  is  restored  to  health  and  happiness.  The  victim  of  an 
enslaving  habit,  apparently  with  very  little  effort  and  without  physical 
means,  sufferings,  or  relapse,  finds  himself  free.  We  enter  a  home 
where  the  new  belief  reigns  and  we  find  there  a  peace  to  which  we  are 
strangers. 

"  All  over  the  country  solid  and  enduring  temples  are  reared  by 
grateful  hands  and  consecrated  to  the  ideal  and  name  of  Mrs.  Eddy. 
And  this  strange  phenomenon  has  occurred  in  the  full  light  of  day,  at 

1  Eddy,  Mary  G.  Baker,  Science  and  Health,  1908,  Preface. 
"^  Patterson,  Charles  B.,  A  New  Heaven  and  a  New  Earth,  Preface. 


298       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  end  of  the  nineteeth  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century, 
and  these  extraordinary  doctrines  have  propagated  themselves  not  in 
obscure  corners  of  the  earth,  among  an  ilHterate  and  fanatical  popula- 
tion, but  in  the  chief  centres  of  American  civilization.  Such  facts  may 
well  cause  the  philosophical  student  of  religion  to  reflect."  ^ 

In  these  movements  is  restored  the  alliance  between 
the  art  of  healing  the  body  and  the  art  of  healing  the  soul, 
which  was  always  a  leading  characteristic  of  the  higher 
reHgions  during  their  period  of  greatest  vitality.  To  the 
masses  the  most  impressive  aspect  of  religions  has  always 
been  their  power  to  heal  the  body.  It  was  so  in  the  early 
ministry  of  Christ  and  during  the  first  Christian  centuries. 
It  is  so  now  with  these  psychotherapists.  And  this  re- 
vival acquires  great  significance  from  the  fact  that  it  can 
now  be  grounded  upon  the  deeper  understanding  of  the 
interrelation  of  mind  and  body  which  we  owe  to  modern 
science.^ 

My  chief  effort  will  be  to  get  from  the  writings  of  the 
leaders  of  these  therapeutic  schools  a  clear  idea  of  the 
power  which  they  expect  to  regenerate  humanity,  and  then 
to  consider  its  adequacy.  Whatever  their  affiliations,  these 
writers  practically  agree  on  the  points  that  most  interest  us. 

1  Worcester,  Elwood  ;  McComb,  Samuel ;  Coriat,  Isador  H.,  Religion  and 
Medicine,  New  York,  1908,  pp.  8-10. 

2  Speaking  of  the  four  Satyani  of  Gautama  {i.e.  the  four  axioms  of  certain- 
ties: suffering,  cause,  suppression,  the  path],  Kern  says:  "  It  is  not  difficult 
to  see  that  these  four  Satyas  are  nothing  else  but  the  four  cardinal  articles 
of  Indian  medical  science,  applied  to  the  spiritual  healing  of  mankind,  exactly 
as  in  the  Yoga  doctrine.  This  connection  of  the  Aryasatyas  with  medical 
science  was  apparently  not  unknown  to  the  Buddhists  themselves."  And 
concerning  the  twelvefold  causal  root  of  the  evil  world,  the  twelve  Nidanas 
(causes),  he  declares  that  they  stand  to  the  four  Satyas  "  in  the  same  relation 
as  pathology  to  the  whole  system  of  medical  science."  Now  the  four  truths 
and  the  twelve  causes  are  fundamental  facts  upon  which  Gautama's  scheme 
of  deliverance  is  built.  (Kern,  Manual  of  Buddhism,  Grundriss  der  Indo- 
Arichen  Philologie  und  Altertumskunde,  III  Band,  8  Heft,  pp.  46-47.) 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  299 

I  do  not  shrink  from  beginning  with  brief  quotations  from 
two  of  the  most  extravagant  and  crude  of  them ;  for  even 
they  find  followers  among  people  who  prove  themselves 
intelligent  and  sensible  in  the  affairs  of  Ufe. 

T.  Troward,  a  leader  of  Mental  Science  (not  a  disciple 
of  Mrs.  Eddy),  late  divisional  judge  in  Punjab,  and  Edin- 
burgh Lecturer  on  Mental  Science,  teaches  the  existence  of 
an  unlimited,  impersonal,  though  intelligent  Power,  which 
man  may  press  into  service,  or  appropriate  to  himself. 
His  view  of  man's  relation  to  that  Power  is  curious.  The 
individual  can  call  it  into  action  and  give  it  direction,  "  be- 
cause it  is  in  itself  impersonal  though  intelligent."  "  It 
will  receive  the  impress  of  his  personaUty,  and  can  there- 
fore make  its  influence  felt  far  beyond  the  limits  which 
bound  the  individual's  objective  perception  of  the  circum- 
stances with  which  he  has  to  deal.  It  is  for  this  reason  that 
I  lay  so  much  stress  on  the  combination  of  two  apparent  op- 
posites  in  the  Universal  Mind,  the  union  of  intelligence  with 
impersonality.  .  .  .  How  do  we  know  what  the  intention 
of  the  Universal  Mind  may  be  ?  Here  comes  in  the  ele- 
ment of  impersonality.  It  has  no  intention,  because  it  is 
impersonal.  .  .  .  Combining,  then,  these  two  aspects  of 
the  Universal  Mind,  ...  we  find  precisely  the  sort  of  nat- 
ural force  we  are  in  want  of,  something  which  will  undertake 
whatever  we  put  into  its  hands  without  asking  questions  or 
bargaining  for  terms,  and  which,  having  undertaken  our 
business,  will  bring  to  bear  on  it  an  inteUigence  to  which 
the  united  knowledge  of  the  whole  human  race  is  as  noth- 
ing, and  a  power  equal  to  this  intelHgence.  "  ^ 

I  find  it  difficult  to  conceive  of  an  unlimited  impersonal 
intelligence  which  has  no  intention  and  which  individual 
intelligence  may  direct.     But  in  fairness  to  the  abstruse 

1  Troward,  T.,  T^e  Edinburgh  Lectures  on  Mental  Science,  The  Arcane 
Book  Concern,  1909,  Chicago,  pp.  66-68. 


300       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

Judge,  I  must  add  that  this  difficulty  is  no  greater  than 
that  presented  by  Hegel's  conception  of  the  Absolute 
Mind. 

In  the  work  of  W.  F.  Evans  we  meet  a  consistent  pan- 
theism. He  strives  to  give  to  his  opinions  an  impressive 
background  compounded  of  modern  science,  antique  pan- 
theism, and  modern  idealism.  How  vast  and  accurate  is 
his  knowledge  appears  in  the  following  passage.  "  The 
soul  of  man  is  a  part  of  the  anima  ynundi,  the  soul  of  the 
world."  The  power  of  the  healing  thought  "  issues  from  the 
spiritual  world  of  which  our  minds  are  apart,  for  all  ideas 
belong  to  that  boundless  realm  of  life."  "  It  is  stored  up 
in  exhaustless  and  overflowing  abundance  in  the  bosom  of 
nature  ...  it  can  be  controlled  in  its  lower  degrees  of 
manifestation  by  the  intelligent  will  of  man,  which  is  the 
highest  form  of  its  development  and  expression."  "This 
grand  whole  .  .  .  the  universal  world  of  spiritual  intelli- 
gence is  called  in  Sanscrit,  Addi-Budda.  In  the  writings 
of  Paul  it  is  called  The  Christ.  ...  It  is  identical  with 
what  is  called  magnetism,  and  it  is  also  that  which  the 
philosophers  have  called  the  divine  Jiotis."  ^ 

One  of  the  ablest  and  sanest  writers  of  New  Thought, 
Ralph  Waldo  Trine,  in  a  book  which  has  passed  its  seventy- 
fifth  thousand,  also  announces  a  pantheistic  gospel  of  an 
infinite  power  at  the  service  of  man.  "  The  great  central 
fact  of  the  universe  is  that  spirit  of  Infinite  Life  and 
Power  that  is  back  of  all,  that  animates  all,  that  manifests 
itself  in  and  through  all ;  that  self-existent  principle  of  life 
from  which  all  has  come,  and  not  only  from  which  all  has 
come,  but  from  which  all  is  continually  coming." 

"  This  Infinite  Power  is  creating,  working,  ruling  through 
the  agency  of  great  immutable  laws  and  forces  that  run 

1  Evans,  W.  F.,  The  Primitive  Mind- Cure  :  Elementary  Lessons  in  Chris- 
tian Philosophy  and  Transcendental  Medicine. 


.THE  LATEST  FOR]MS  OF  RELIGION  301 

through  all  the  universe,  that  surround  us  on  every  side. 
Every  act  of  our  every  day  lives  is  governed  by  these 
same  great  laws  and  forces." 

"  In  a  sense  there  is  nothing  in  all  the  great  universe 
but  law."  But  the  presence  of  laws  indicates  a  force  back 
of  them.  "  This  Spirit  of  Infinite  Life  and  Power  that  is 
back  of  all  is  what  I  call  God." 

"  God,  then,  is  this  Infinite  Spirit  which  fills  all  the  uni- 
verse with  Himself  alone,  so  that  all  is  from  Him  and  in 
Him,  and  there  is  nothing  that  is  outside.  .  .  .  He  is  .  .  . 
our  very  life  itself."  "  In  essence  the  life  of  God  and  the 
life  of  man  are  identically  the  same,  and  so  are  one.  They 
differ  not  in  essence,  in  quality  ;  they  differ  in  degree." 

"...  if  the  God-powers  are  without  limit,  does  it  not 
then  follow  that  the  only  limitations  man  has  are  the  limi- 
tations he  sets  to  himself,  by  virtue  of  not  knowing 
himself  .?  " 

"  The  great  central  fact  in  human  life,  in  your  life  and 
in  mine,  is  the  coming  into  a  conscious,  vital  realization  of 
our  oneness  with  this  Infinite  Life,  and  the  openifig  of  our- 
selves to  this  divine  overflow^  This  means  simply  "  that 
we  are  recognizing  our  true  identity,  that  we  are  bringing 
our  lives  into  harmony  with  the  same  great  laws  and  forces, 
and  so  opening  ourselves  to  the  same  great  inspirations  as 
have  all  the  prophets,  seers,  sages,  and  saviours  in  the 
world's  history,  all  men  of  truly  great  and  mighty  power."  ^ 
He  does  not  hesitate  to  use  the  term  "  God-man." 

Christian  Science.  —  It  seems  almost  incredible  that  one 
professing  to  be  a  Christian  should  teach  the  impersonality 
of  the  divine  nature.  And  yet  this  is  undoubtedly  what 
Mrs.  Eddy  does,  and  in  this  respect  she  agrees  with  those 

1  Trine,  Ralph  Waldo,  In  Tune  with  the  Infinite  or  Fulness  of  Peace, 
Power,  and  Plenty,  Thomas  Y.  Crowell  and  Co.,  New  York,  pp.  1 1-20. 


302        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

from  whom  I  have  just  quoted.  The  term  that  she  prefers 
as  a  name  for  the  Divine  Power  is  Principle.  As  syno- 
nyms she  uses  Life,  Truth,  Love,  God.  In  the  earUer  edi- 
tions of  Science  and  Health,  it  is  written  that  God  "  is  not 
a  person,  God  is  Principle."  ^  This  is  undoubtedly  the 
standpoint  of  her  later  writings  also.  But  in  them,  prob- 
ably because  of  the  pressure  of  adverse  public  opinion, 
she  insists  less  than  at  the  beginning  of  her  career  upon 
the  impersonality  of  Principle,  and  the  word  "  person  " 
appears  more  frequently.  "Once  in  1898,  Mrs.  Eddy 
hints  that  God  may  be  personal  *  if  the  term  personality, 
as  applied  to  God,  means  infinite  personality,'  and  Mr. 
Farlow  in  1907  assures  the  Rev.  Edgar  P.  Hill  that  Mrs. 
Eddy  does  believe  that  '  God  is  person  in  the  infinite 
sense.'  "^     Yet  in  the  seventy-third  edition  of  No  and  Yes, 

1  Eddy,  Mary  G.  Baker,  op.  cit.,  3d  ed.,  1881,  I,  67;  II,  97. 

2  Powell,  Lyman  P.,  Christian  Science,  the  Faith  and  its  Founder,  pp. 
139-140. 

I  take  the  following  passages  from  the  same  book.  "  Principle  in  her 
theology  gathers  up  into  itself  all  the  concepts  we  habitually  associate  with 
God,  except  the  most  important  —  personality.  Before  her  book  appeared  in 
1S75,  she  was  telling  her  pupils,  as  two  of  them  informed  me,  that  they  could 
make  no  progress  till  they  had  banished  from  their  minds  the  thought  of  God 
as  a  person.  She  instructed  Richard  Kennedy  '  to  lay  special  stress '  in  heal- 
ing patients  on  the  impersonality  of  God.  This  is  the  commanding  thought 
that  rings  through  the  first  chapter  of  the  first  edition  of  Science  and  Health." 

"  Mrs.  Eddy's  pantheism  is  unnecessary,  and  yet  its  origin  was  inevitable 
in  a  mind  as  literal  as  hers.  Quimby  often  spoke  of  God  as  Principle.  In 
the  Quimby  manuscript  from  which,  for  several  years,  Mrs.  Eddy  taught,  no 
sentence  is  more  startling  than  the  sentence,  '  God  is  Principle.'  " 

"  For  more  than  thirty  years  Mrs.  Eddy  has  been  solemnly  asserting  that  in 
1866  she  received  a  '  final  revelation.'  Now  this  '  final  revelation,'  which 
was  finally  as  well  as  first  expressed  in  1875,  in  Science  and  Health,  is  satu- 
rated with  thought  that  God  is  not  a  person.  In  the  very  first  chapter  we  are 
informed  that  '  God  is  Principle,  not  person  '  [I  do  not  find  that  expression 
in  the  first  chapter  of  the  1908  edition,  but  it  is  in  No  and  Yes,  published  in 
1909],  that  Jesus  preached  the  impersonality  of  God,  that  the  error  of  believ- 
ing in  the  personality  of  God  that  crucified  Jesus,  that  the  trouble  with  con- 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  303 

published  in  1909,  a  pamphlet  intended  "to  correct  invol- 
untary as  well  as  voluntary  error,"  we  read :  "  Is  there  a 
personal  Deity  ?  God  is  Infinite.  He  is  neither  a  limited 
mind  nor  a  limited  body.  God  is  Love  ;  and  Love  is  Prin- 
ciple, not  person.  What  the  person  of  the  Infinite  is,  we 
know  not ;  but  we  are  gratefully  and  lovingly  conscious  of 
the  fatherliness  of  this  Supreme  Being.  God  is  individual, 
and  man  is  his  individualized  idea.  .  .  .  Limitless  person- 
ality is  inconceivable.  ...  Of  God  as  person,  human 
reason,  imagination,  and  revelation  give  us  no  knowledge. 

"  When  the  term  divine  Principle  is  used  to  signify  Deity 
it  may  seem  distant  and  cold,  until  better  apprehended. 
This  Principle  is  Mind,  Substance,  Life,  Truth,  Love. 
When  understood,  Principle  is  found  to  be  the  only  term 
that  fully  conveys  the  ideas  of  God,  —  one  Mind,  a  perfect 
Man,  and  divine  Science."  ^  This  Principle,  though  not  a 
person,  "is  intelligence." 

Although  she  wrote,  "  God  is  All  in  all,"  and  "  All  in  all 
is  God,"  2  she  will  not  be  called  a  pantheist.  In  the  edition 
of  No  and  Yes  already  quoted,  she  claims  that  "  Christian 
Science  refutes  pantheism,  finds  Spirit  neither  in  matter 
nor  in  the  modes  of  mortal  mind.  It  shows  that  matter 
and  mortal  mind  have  neither  origin  nor  existence  in  the 
eternal  Mind.  .  .  .  For  God  to  know,  is  to  be ;  that  is, 
what  He  knows  must  truly  and  eternally  exist.  If  He 
knows  matter,  and  matter  cannot  exist  in  Mind,  then  mor- 
tality and  discord  must  be  eternal."  ^ 

Her  pantheism  is  in  any  case  not  materialistic,  since  she 
holds  matter  to  be  unreal,  a  deception  of  mortal  Mind. 
Hers  is  an  idealistic  pantheism,  such  as  an  ignorant  person 

ventional  Christianity  to-day  is  that  it  makes  God  a  person.  ..."     (Pages 
137-140.)  1  Eddy,  No  and  Yes,  1909,  pp.  19,  20. 

2  Eddy,  Science  and  Health,  1S98,  p.  7. 

8  Eddy,  No  and  Yes,  pp.  15,  16. 


304        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

of  a  thoroughly  optimistic  temperament  might  evolve  on  the 
basis  of  imperfect  knowledge  of  Absolute  Idealism  and 
from  observations  of  the  mastery  of  mind  over  body. 

The  writings  of  Mrs.  Eddy's  disciples  reflect  the  uncriti- 
cal, pantheistic  idealism  of  their  leader.  Their  favorite 
phrases  are  such  as  these  :  "  God's  presence  is  the  presence 
of  love  "  ;  "  God  is  life  everywhere  present "  ;  "  One  life 
fills  all,  it  is  the  Perfect  Life." 

The  similarity  of  the  essential  aspects  of  New  Thought 
and  Christian  Science  to  the  mystical  element  in  Christianity 
is  evident.  Both  give  clear  expression  to  the  anti-isolation 
motive,  to  a  dynamic  belief  in  oneness-with-the-whole,  and 
both  feel  the  essence  of  the  cosmic  plasma  to  be  love, 
Man  is  steeped  in  all-embracing  Love.  He  need  only 
place  himself  in  unison  with  the  everlasting,  all-compre- 
hending life-force  and  the  fulness  of  life  will  be  his.  How 
love  can  be  an  attribute  of  an  impersonal  power  does  not 
seem  to  give  Mrs.  Eddy  one  moment  of  uneasiness. 

In  their  curative  practices,  the  psychotherapic  cults  have 
the  benefit  of  the  recent  discoveries  concerning  the  effects 
of  suggestion.  Regarding  their  methods,  I  may  say  here 
merely  that  they  tend  to  place  the  person,  as  do  the  prac- 
tices of  the  other  ethical  religions,  in  a  state  of  increased 
suggestibility,  a  state  described  in  part  by  the  words  re- 
laxedness,  collectedness,  monoideism,  meditation,  commun- 
ion. This  condition  of  the  subject  aids  greatly  in  the 
realization  of  the  expected  benefits.  The  efficacy  of  these 
curative  methods  is  sufficiently  demonstrated  by  the  won- 
derful extension  of  the  movements.  In  every  walk  of  life 
people  bear  witness  to  the  saving  grace  that  is  in  Christian 
Science  or  in  New  Thought,  The  forces  of  a  new  life 
have  welled  up  within  them ;  the  burdens  of  existence 
have   lightened,  nay,   have   disappeared ;    and   now   they 


THE  LATEST   FORMS   OF   RELIGION  305 

walk   through    life   contented,  hopeful,  and   aggressively 
benevolent.^ 

Unnecessary  importance  is  attached  by  the  critical 
pubHc  to  the  vagaries  of  Christian  Science  and  of  New 
Thought ;  for  instance,  to  the  meaning  and  consequence 
they  ascribe  to  their  denial  of  the  reality  of  matter  as 
they  appear  in  certain  aspects  of  their  treatment  of  disease  ; 
and  in  the  wild  hopes  of  some  of  their  prophets  that  "the 
time  will  certainly  come  when  the  highly  developed  man 
will  have  the  p'ower  to  lay  down  or  take  up  his  life  through 
a  conscious  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  eternal  being  and  the 
direct  application  of  these  laws  to  his  own  life."  ^     But  the 

1  The  following  is  an  example  of  what  people  find  in  Christian  Science 
apart  from  the  cure  of  disease  :  — 

"  I  accepted  Science  and  Health  without  expecting  it  to  offer  more  than  a 
human  theory  about  life, — even  the  name  did  not  lead  me  to  expect  it  to 
be  religious;  in  fact,  the  chief  incentive  to  my  reading  it  at  that  time  was  the 
great  kindness  and  sincere  sympathy  evinced  by  my  friend,  who  placed  a 
copy  at  my  disposal.  ...  I  started  timidly  at  first,  and  prayerfully,  lest  it 
should  be  misleading,  but  before  I  had  gone  very  far  I  experienced  that  won- 
derful spiritual  quickening  which  is  so  often  spoken  of  in  our  meetings.  I 
wish  I  could  tell  exactly  what  that  experience  meant  to  me,  the  wonderful 
awakening  I  had;  how  old  things  vanished  and  all  things  became  new.  It 
seemed  as  if  the  burdens,  perplexities,  doubts,  and  fears  had  all  suddenly 
rolled  away;  as  if  the  sun  had  emerged  from  behind  the  clouds,  and  every- 
thing was  again  bright  and  beautiful. 

"And  what  a  feeling  of  strength,  hope,  and  courage  came!  Those  old 
troublesome  questions,  especially  the  question  of  death,  were  explained,  and 
I  felt  a  wonderful  release  to  know  that  death  was  not  of  God.  I  read  and 
reread  the  latter  part  of  the  chapter  on  Christian  Science  Practice,  where 
that  glorious  truth  is  explained;  it  was  so  beautiful,  so  natural,  and  so  true. 
There  was  such  perfect  joy  to  me  in  that  freedom,  that  I  used  to  declare  over 
and  over  again,  of  those  who  had  just  passed  from  us  (the  members  of  our 
home  circle),  'They  are  not  dead';  and  so  free  was  I  made  from  the  old 
bondage,  that  never  since  then  has  the  thought  of  that  change  affected  me  as 
it  did  before."     {Christian  Science  Sentinel,  December  3,  1901.) 

^  Patterson,  Charles  B.,  op.  cit..  Preface. 

When  I  say  "  wild  hopes,"  I  speak  as  the  prosaic  man  that  I  am.     No  less 

X 


3o6        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

denial  of  the  reality  of  matter,  when  understood  as  a  denial 
of  the  existence  of  a  substance  essentially  different  from 
spirit  and  having  separate  existence,  so  far  from  being 
sheer  nonsense,  is  the  very  doctrine  maintained  by  the 
dominant  philosophical  school,  namely  idealism.  This 
philosophy  holds  that  independent  matter  is  an  illegitimate 
inference  from  sensation  and  feeling,  and  that  the  only 
reality  for  which  "  matter  "  can  stand  is  of  a  nature  one 
with  spirit.  Much  of  the  jeering  leveled  at  the  Christian 
Scientist's  denial  of  the  reahty  of  matter  is  made  possible 
only  by  ignorance  of  that  teaching. 

An  apologist  of  the  psychotherapic  sects  would  be 
justified  in  making  the  following  claims  :  — 

(i)  The  salvation  they  promise  is,  first  of  all,  for  this 
life. 

(2)  The  soul  is  not  saved  independently  of  the  body. 
The  nefarious  asceticism  of  older  faiths  is  impossible  on  the 
principles  of  Christian  Science. 

(3)  Their  ideal  involves  efficiency  in  the  conduct  of  this 
life. 

(4)  Their  conception  of  salvation  is  free  from  anything 
miraculous.  They  dispense  with  the  wonders  of  the  Fall, 
of  the  self-sacrifice  of  a  divine  personage,  and  of  salvation 
by  his  atonement. 

(5)  They  divert  attention  from  the  sense  of  guilt  and 
suffering,  and  direct  it  to  an  immediately  accessible  healing 
and  invigorating  power. 

(6)  Although  they  usually  define  the  aim  of  life  in  terms 
of  power,  happiness,  and  love,  they  cannot  fairly  be  charged 
either  with  insensitiveness  to  moral  values,  or  with  indif- 
ference to  the  ethical  advancement  of  mankind. 

a  philosopher  than  Bergson  has  expressed  that  same  hope  of  overcoming 
death,  in  a  passage  which  I  quote  later  on. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  307 

(7)  Despite  its  extravagance,  their  "  metaphysics  "  may- 
be   resrarded  as   a   crude  and    distorted  formulation  of  a 

o 

Wc/tanschauung  made  unavoidable  by  modern  knowledge, 
—  a  Wcltaiischamtng  opposed  in  several  important  respects 
to  the  traditional,  but  no  longer  acceptable,  Christian  phi- 
losophy. 

(8)  These  cults  have  proved  their  value  by  their  results. 

In  estimating  the  chances  of  continued  life  of  religious 
movements,  one  should  bear  in  mind  that  vitally  beneficial 
beliefs  may  carry  a  heavy  load  of  error  and  even  of  ab- 
surdity. The  Christian  rehgion  was  not  destroyed  by  the 
expectation  of  the  second  coming  of  the  Lord  and  of  the 
end  of  the  world,  by  extravagant  notions  of  the  power  of 
faith,  by  absurd  or  incomprehensible  doctrines  regarding  the 
means  of  salvation,  the  resurrection  of  the  body,  and  the 
like.  There  is  enough  substantial,  practical  truth  in  Chris- 
tianity to  bear  the  enormous  doctrinal  dead-weight  it  carries 
even  to  this  day.  It  may  be  possible  for  the  psychotherapic 
doctrines  to  be  purified  in  a  reformation  which  would 
either  remove  entirely  or  drive  into  side  currents  most  of 
the  offensive  tenets. 

4.  The  religion  of  humanity.  —  The  expression  "  religion 
of  democracy"  is  heard  with  increasing  frequency.  It 
usually  means  merely  devotion  to  the  principles  of  demo- 
cratic government.  In  this  sense  the  "  religion  of  democ- 
racy "  does  not  concern  us.  But  it  is  used  at  times  in  a 
sense  inclusive  of  the  leading  ideas  of  the  Religion  of 
Humanity  of  Auguste  Comte. 

The  founder  of  Positivism  acknowledges  at  the  root  of 
every  ethical  rehgion  two  essential  needs  for  which  religion 
must  provide.  They  find  expression  in  two  common  be- 
liefs:     (<^)  the   belief   in   a   great   universal    Being,   with 


3o8        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL^  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

whom  the  human  soul  may  communicate,  and  from  whom 
it  may  receive  strength  to  overcome  egoism  and  to  work 
for  the  common  good;  {b)  the  beUef  in  personal  immor- 
tality, which  is  the  ordinary  form  of  the  conviction  of  the 
indestructibility  of  the  good,  or,  as  Professor  Hoffding 
would  say,  of  the  "  belief  in  the  persistency  of  value." 

In  the  religion  by  which  Comte  sought  to  complete  his 
philosophical  work,  God  is  replaced  by  the  Grand  Eire, 
Humanity.  This  conception  has  for  him  the  advantage 
of  being  based  upon  facts  and  not  upon  imagination,  as  is 
the  theological  idea  of  God. 

But  does  the  idea  of  Humanity  really  satisfy  the  two 
requirements  of  an  adequate  religion .-'  Yes,  thinks  Comte, 
provided  the  Grand  Eire  is  properly  understood.  Humanity 
thought  of  as  merely  the  collection  of  the  men  actually 
living  could  not  replace  the  idea  of  God.  But  Humanity 
is  to  be  conceived  as  "  a  continuity  ;  a  solidarity  in  time 
composed  of  all  the  good  and  generous  feelings,  thoughts, 
and  deeds  of  men.  It  is  the  supraspatial  Being  in  which 
the  tutelary  influences  and  the  groping  and  transitory 
individual  efforts  are  purified  and  organized,  and  thus, 
becoming  fixed  and  permanent,  acquire  immortal  life." 
"  Humanity  so  understood  is  the  God  whom  men  seek :  a 
real,  immense,  and  eternal  existent  with  whom  they  are  in 
relation  and  in  whom  they  live  and  have  their  being.  Out 
of  the  reservoir  of  moral  forces  accumulated  in  that  Being 
throughout  the  centuries,  great  thoughts  and  noble  feelings 
flow  out  to  man.  Humanity  is  the  Great  Being  who  Hfts 
us  up  above  ourselves  and  communicates  to  us  the  com- 
plements of  strength  we  require  in  order  to  overcome  our 
egotistic  leanings." 

"  In  humanity  the  individuals  see  the  realization  of  their 
desire  for  immortality,  for  it  gathers  up,  preserves,  and  in- 
corporates into  itself  whatever  belongs  to  its  essence,  what- 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  309 

ever  makes  it  greater,  more  beautiful,  and  more  powerful. ^ 
It  is  made  up  entirely  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  real 
men,  and  it  is  composed  much  more  of  the  dead  than  of 
the  living.  The  dead  live  in  the  tender  and  efficacious 
memories  of  the  present  generations.  .  .  ."  2 

This  Great  Being,  who  is  to  perform  towards  humanity 
the  essential  services  of  the  Christian  God,  clearly  differs 
from  the  latter  in  not  being  omnipotent  and  superhuman. 
"  The  idea  of  an  omnipotent  and  superhuman  deity,"  writes 
Frederic  Harrison,  for  many  years  the  leader  of  the  Eng- 
lish Positivists,  "  cannot  be  compared  with  the  idea  of  a 
collective  human  civilization."  "  Humanity  is  an  ideal  as- 
semblage of  human  beings,  living,  dead,  and  unborn,  and 
(presumably)  without  any  collective  personality  or  con- 
sciousness."^ Its  limitations,  errors,  and  disabilities  are 
recognized  ;  yet  its  possibilities  are  indefinitely  great  and 
magnificent. 

Comte,  then,  wanted  to  organize  a  new  religion  around 
the  unifying  conception  of  a  dynamic,  spiritual  power,  ac- 
tualized at  any  moment  in  living  humanity, —  a  power  con- 
taining in  itself  whatever  of  the  past  achievements  of  men 
are  incorporated  in  the  present  civilization ;  a  power, 
furthermore,  growing  with  the  growth  of  every  individual 
and  pointing  forward  towards  a  future  in  which  man's 
dearest  aspirations  will  be  realized  in  the  social  life. 

^  The  form  of  immortality  which  Comte  offers  in  the  Religion  of  Humanity 
will  not  seem  to  Christian  believers  a  satisfactory  substitute  for  the  belief  in  the 
immortality  of  the  individual  soul.  But  if  that  belief  is  one  that  science  can- 
not admit,  man  will  have  to  reconcile  himself  to  its  loss.  What  most  needs 
to  be  repeated  is  that  reconciliation  costs  man,  on  the  whole,  very  little. 
Belief  in  individual  immortality  is  not  as  necessary  to  man  as  the  small  minority 
who  talk  about  it  would  make  it  appear.  Man  gets  along  perfectly  well 
without  it.  Our  behavior  shows  that  we  are  very  well  organized  to  live  an 
individually  finite  life  on  this  temporary  planet. 

2  Boutroux,  Emile,  Science  and  Religion,  Flammarion,  Paris,  1909,  p.  54. 

•  Harrison,  Frederic,  Annual  Address,  1902. 


3IO        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  philosophical  critic  may  say  that  in  this,  the  culmi- 
nating part  of  his  work,  Comte  has  departed  from  the 
positivistic  principles  he  laid  down  at  the  beginning.  But 
the  logical  consistency  of  Comte's  philosophical  and  reli- 
gious construction  does  not  concern  us.  The  questions  we 
have  to  consider  refer  to  the  possibility  of  man's  accepting 
and  laying  hold  of  this  idea  of  Humanity  so  as  to  find  in  it 
the  essential  values  men  seek  in  religion. 

The  assumption  of  the  existence  of  the  power  implied 
in  this  notion  of  Humanity  is  certainly  not  in  opposition 
either  to  science  or  to  logic.  We  do  in  a  very  real  sense 
live  upon  the  material  and  spiritual  inheritance  which  rep- 
resents strivings  and  achievements  of  past  generations,  and 
to  our  descendants  we  shall  pass  on  this  inheritance,  to- 
gether with  that  which  we  shall  have  been  able  to  add  to 
it.  And  the  thought  of  the  great  men  of  the  past  arouses 
in  us  a  stimulating  anticipation  of  still  greater  men  to 
come. 

But  can  this  idea  of  a  power  made  manifest  in  society 
and  leading  to  social  consolidation  and  happiness  take 
hold  of  the  mind  and  heart  of  the  masses  of  men ;  can  it 
inspire  them  with  hope,  trust,  courage ;  can  it  wake  up  in 
them  dormant  possibilities  ?  Comte  believed  that  his  Su- 
preme Being  was  "  more  readily  accessible  to  our  feelings, 
as  well  as  to  our  thinking  "  than  the  "  chimerical  beings  of 
the  existing  religions."  ^  Yet  the  history  of  the  Rehgion  of 
Humanity  seems  to  a  give  negative  answer  to  my  query. 
The  Religion  of  Humanity  has  had  and  still  has  a  number 
of  ardent  disciples,  but  it  has  not  spread  beyond  very  small 
circles,  in  Paris,  London,  and  in  some  of  the  South  Ameri- 
can countries.  Christian  Science,  on  the  other  hand, 
though  loaded  with  delusions,  gives  signs  of  irrepressible 
vitality.      The    Religion    of    Humanity,    even   if    it   were 

1  Comte,  Auguste,  Catechisme  Posiliviste  (1891),  pp.  53,  55. 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF   RELIGION  311 

heavily  handicapped  with  absurd  notions,  would  thrive,  pro- 
vided its  central  idea  got  hold  of  men.  So  long  as  humanity 
remains  divided  in  antagonistic  nations,  and  these  nations 
are  so  far  from  a  fully  organized  brotherhood,  can  it  be 
hoped  that  the  idea  of  the  Great  Being  will  seem  a  reality 
to  the  ordinary  man  ?  Will  he  not  rather  gather  from  his 
experiences  that  antagonistic  selfish  forces  contend  for 
mastery  ?  Just  as  the  physical  world  appears  to  the  un- 
civilized to  be  ruled  by  a  multitude  of  gods,  so  must  the 
present  social  life  appear  to  its  semimoralizcd  members, 
not  the  expression  of  one  great  power,  but  rather  of  a  mul- 
tiplicity of  warring  forces. 

Yet  the  power  that  is  in  the  ideas  of  family,  of  social 
and  business  "set,"  of  country,  cannot  be  doubted.  The 
deplorable  habit  of  referring  to  religion  instead  of  to  the 
common  relations  of  life  as  the  source  of  ethical  enlighten- 
ment and  stimulus  makes  us  blind  to  the  fact  that  to-day 
most  men  and  woman  derive  whatever  strength  they  may 
have  to  maintain  their  integrity  and  to  devote  themselves 
to  the  public  good  from  their  respect  and  love  for  their 
family,  their  friends,  their  business  associates,  and  the 
state,  and  from  their  desire  for  the  respect  and  love  of 
men,  much  more  than  from  any  religious  conviction.  It  is 
no  longer  the  consciousness  of  God,  but  the  consciousness 
of  Man  that  is  the  power  making  for  righteousness.  What 
the  sense  of  human  fellowship  can  do  when  circumstances 
awaken  it  is  a  matter  of  history.  Students  of  the  future 
of  religion,  and  especially  critics  of  the  Religion  of  Human- 
ity, should  not  forget  the  great  patriots,  who  were  just  as 
powerfully  moved  to  action  by  the  thought  of  the  fragment 
of  humanity  to  which  they  belonged  as  were  Loyola, 
Luther,  and  John  Wesley  by  the  thought  of  their  relation 
with  God.  Nor  should  they  forget  the  testimony  which 
nations  have  frequently  borne  to  the  power  of  the  idea  of 


312        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

the  brotherhood  of  man ;  fof  instance,  the  splendid  out- 
burst of  generous  enthusiasm  of  the  early  days  of  the 
French  Revolution,  together  with  the  sadly  misdirected 
devotion  to  the  public  good  which  followed,  and,  to-day,  the 
heroism  of  thousands  in  Russia  who  are  ready  to  make  the 
last  sacrifice  in  order  that  their  fellow-countrymen  may 
live. 

In  the  establishment  of  a  new  religion,  a  most  important 
consideration  is  that  of  the  means  available  to  provide  a 
cult  in  which  all  may  participate.  A  way  must  be  found 
for  keeping  before  men's  minds  the  ideal  Power  and  for 
entering  into  relation  with  it.  The  failure  of  Comtism  is 
to  be  ascribed  partly  to  the  difficulty  of  providing  satisfac- 
tory means  for  collective  devotion.  Comte  was  fully  awake 
to  the  necessity  of  providing  a  cult,  and  he  was  willing  to 
draw  freely  upon  the  resources  of  sentiment  and  imagina- 
tion, for  he  did  not  fear  that  his  disciples  might  mistake 
symbols  for  realities.  Love,  the  cement  of  society,  was  to 
be  symbolized  by  woman.  In  woman  the  beauty  and  the 
power  of  love  was  to  be  objectified  and  celebrated.  He 
would,  further,  poetically  personify  Humanity  under  the 
name  Grand  Eire,  the  earth  as  the  Great  Fetich,  and  space 
as  the  Grand  Milieii.  The  usefulness  of  these  symbols 
may  well  be  questioned.  The  Comtist  cult  as  practised 
now  consists  mainly  of  a  commemoration  of  great  men  and 
of  great  social  events.  Some  of  the  Positivist  societies 
have  instituted  sacraments :  the  sacrament  of  presentation 
of  new  members,  the  sacrament  of  initiation,  and  others. 

It  is  incontestable  that  this  Godless  religion  accomplishes 
for  the  few  who  practise  it  essentially  that  which  Christi- 
anity does  for  its  adherents.  The  following  paragraphs, 
with  which  I  bring  this  chapter  to  a  close,  will  convey  the 
temper  of  the  Positivist  services :  — 


THE  LATEST  FORMS  OF  RELIGION  313 

"  We  meet  here  to-day  to  celebrate  the  festival  of  Human- 
ity. By  thought  and  by  feeling  we  seek  to  enter  into  the 
presence  of  that  assemblage  of  noble  lives  who,  from  the 
earliest  ages  until  now,  have  labored  for  the  benefit  of 
men,  and  have  left  a  store  of  material  and  of  spiritual  good 
from  which  all  the  blessings  of  our  present  life  have  issued. 
Before  the  resistless  power  of  this  unseen  host  we  bow  in 
thankful  submission  ;  knozviug  well  that  of  ourselves  we  are 
insufficient,  either  to  see  or  to  do  what  is  right.  Whatever 
wider  thoughts  or  generous  impulses  prompt  us  to  rise  above 
ourselves,  and  to  live  unselfishly,  come  to  us  from  the  higher 
source.  They  are  the  free  gift  of  humanity  T  In  the  course 
of  the  first  address,  which  begins  with  the  preceding  lines, 
the  speaker  makes  his  point  still  clearer.  *'  Each  one  of  us  has 
now  to  ask  himself  how  far  the  faith  which  he  professes  is  in 
any  true  sense  a  religion  to  him  ;  how  far  it  enables  him  to 
pray.  I  use  that  old  word  because  there  is  absolutely  no 
other  that  expresses  the  facts  of  the  case  so  simply.  After 
every  wish  that  the  laws  of  nature  may  be  suspended  for 
our  individual  benefit  has  been  unflinchingly  set  aside,  the 
final  meaning  of  the  word  remains ;  rather,  it  appears  for 
the  first  time  in  all  its  purity.  To  pray  is  to  form  the  ideal 
of  our  life,  by  entering  into  communion  with  the  Highest." 

"With  this  loftier  and  purer  conception  of  prayer,  it  is 
very  evident  that  Positivists  are  in  complete  sympathy. 
Nay,  it  is  clear  that  so  far  as  such  a  conception  is  formed, 
it  is  not  merely  in  sympathy  with  Positivism,  but  is  itself 
wholly  and  entirely  Positivist."  ^ 

But  do  we  not  detect  here  something  more  than  the  idea 
of  Humanity  as  Comte  framed  it  .^  Has  not  atranshuman 
power  been  smuggled  in  }  We  shall  presently,  in  a  criticism 
of  Comte's  religion,  return  to  this  query. 

1  Bridges,  J.  H.,  M.  B.,  Discourses  on  Positive  Religion,  First  Address. 
The  italics  are  mine. 


CHAPTER   XIII 
THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION 

I.     THE    PRESENT    SITUATION 

The  statement  that  religion  is  a  thing  of  the  past,  or 
that  it  may  do  for  women  and  children  but  not  for  men,  does 
not  mean  that  there  are  no  longer  any  human  needs  which 
religion  might  gratify,  but  merely  that  modern  knowledge 
has  made  the  traditional  religions,  beliefs,  and  practices  in- 
acceptable.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  human  needs  have  not 
grown  fewer  nor  less  urgent.  Civilization  has  not  done 
away  with  the  struggle  for  life,  although  food  and  shelter 
have  become  assured  to  most  people.  Relief  from  anxiety 
for  the  immediate  necessities  of  physical  existence  has  sim- 
ply removed  the  struggle  to  a  higher  level;  higher  cravings 
have  become  more  pressing.  Never  before,  perhaps, 
have  so  many  persons  in  quest  of  a  nobler,  richer  life, 
suffered  so  keenly  from  the  resistance  of  their  in- 
herited animal  instincts  and  from  the  hindering  customs 
of  a  crudely  organized  society.  In  larger  numbers  than 
ever  before,  and,  I  believe,  with  greater  earnestness,  also, 
men  aspire  to  the  fulness  of  life  which  can  come  only 
through  the  freedom  born  of  moral  integrity  and  of  right 
and  sympathetic  relations  with  one's  fellow-men.  So  that 
the  benefits,  material  and  spiritual,  which  it  has  been  the 
function  of  religion  to  confer,  are  desired  now  as  much  as 
ever ;  but  the  number  of  those  who  can  derive  these  bene- 
fits from  the  existing  religions  is  greatly  diminished. 

For  help  in  the  pursuit  of  their  moral  ideals,  men  are 
as  ready  as  ever  to  turn  to  any  available  agent  or  agency. 

314 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  315 

The  willingness  of  our  contemporaries  to  make  use  of  reli- 
gious means  of  assistance  is  strikingly  demonstrated  by  the 
pathetic  efforts  of  thousands  to  continue  in  the  service  of 
religions  in  which  they  no  longer  have  a  rational  belief, 
and  by  the  persistent  gropings  of  those  who  have  severed 
their  connection  with  the  churches  to  recover  their  loss  by 
some  new  faith  and  practice.  Reckless  and  debasing 
compromises  with  intellectual  truth  in  a  short-sighted 
effort  to  secure  moral  good,  and  a  restless  search  after 
rationally  tenable  beliefs  mark  this  age  of  religious  disso- 
lution. The  question  before  the  student  of  religion  is  not 
whether  religion  is  still  needed,  but  what  sort  of  religion 
can  be  accepted  by  the  present  generation. 

The  one  essential  respect  in  which  the  religious  situation 
is  changed  is  the  general  absence  of  a  bona  fide  belief  in 
personal  divinities.  The  leaders  in  philosophy,  science, 
literature,  and  even  in  religion,  as  well  as  increasing  numbers 
of  the  rank  and  file,  reject  openly  or  secretly  the  traditional 
Christian  beUef  in  a  Divine  Father  in  direct  communica- 
tion with  man.  Their  occasional  attempts  to  harmonize 
traditional  practices  with  their  disbelief  make  the  dis- 
crepancy appear  only  the  more  clearly. 

In  the  golden  age  of  Christian  faith,  "God  was  present 
even  physically,  and  at  each  breath  of  wind  He  was  felt  as 
if  behind  a  curtain.  They  believed  then  in  God  in  a  con- 
tinual practical  way,  and  as  if  He  were  present  in  the 
smallest  occurrences  of  life.  Everywhere  was  the  invisible 
Protector.  The  heavens  above  were  open,  peopled  with 
living  figures,  with  patrons  manifest  and  attentive.  The 
bravest  soldier  walked  in  an  habitual  mingling  of  fear  and 
trust,  like  a  little  child."  ^     "  '  If  God  hates  you,  you  are  done 

1  Sainte-Beuve,  quoted  by  Leon  Gautier  in  La  Chevalerie,  p.  34,  abbre- 
viated. 


3i6        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

for,'  says  Gueri  le  Sor  to  Comte  de  Cambrai,  as  he  was 
reproaching  him  for  having  just  burned  a  monastery  to- 
gether with  the  nuns."i  "  Roland,  in  the  Chanson  de  Ro- 
land, dying  on  the  rocks  of  Roncevaux,  reaches  out  his  glove 
to  God  with  a  gesture  which  signifies  the  homage  of  the 
vassal  to  his  lord.  God  was  as  real  to  him  as  his  own 
feudal  lord." 

Contrast  this  simple  belief  and  behavior  with  the  impli- 
cations of  the  following  advice  offered  by  a  prominent 
educator.  He  conceives  of  God  as  "  an  infinite  power, 
immanent  in  all  life  and  all  nature,  but  working  through 
law,  not  under  the  action  of  human-like  motives  and  pur- 
poses." Nevertheless,  he  finds  it  possible  to  write :  "  It 
seems,  therefore,  clear  to  me  that,  in  the  sense  that  I  have 
used  the  words,  all  serious  men,  whatever  their  intellectual 
training,  must  pray,  not  perhaps  for  material  help,  not  in 
expectation  that  the  laws  of  the  universe  shall  be  changed 
at  their  request,  not  even  primarily  for  strength  to  live 
rightly  and  justly,  but  as  the  supreme  effort  of  the  human 
soul  to  know  God.  .  .  .  And  whether  that  which  we  call 
prayer  be  a  direct  communication  with  Him  as  our  Heav- 
enly Father,  or  whether  it  be  a  communion  with  our 
higher  consciousness,  which  is  in  touch  with  Him,  in  either 
case  the  time  can  never  come  when  a  human  soul  will  not 
rise  from  such  a  communion  purified  and  strengthened, 
with  new  hope  and  new  patience,  and  with  a  more  serene 
view  of  his  own  duty  and  his  own  future."  ^  To  pray  to 
an  infinite  Power  who  cannot  be  expected  at  the  request 
of  man  to  change  the  laws  of  nature,  is  not  the  old  child- 
like prayer !  Prayer  is  recommended  here,  even  though 
no  God  is  known  who  can  answer  it,  because,  somehow, 
it  "works."     The  student  of   religion   cannot,  of  course, 

1  Gautier,  Leon,  La  Chevalerie,  p.  51. 

2  Pritchett.  Henry  S.,  What  is  Religion  ?  pp.  86,  93. 


THE  FUTURE  OF   RELIGION  317 

rest  satisfied  with  this  empirical  solution  of  the  problem  of 
prayer. 

2.    PANTHEISM  :    PROS   AND   CONS 

The  attempts  to  formulate  strictly  pantheistic  religions 
have  resulted  in  failure.  The  newest  pantheism,  that  of 
Mrs.  Eddy,  was  stillborn.  Her  followers  have  not  been 
able  to  deal  with  "  Principle"  as  she  intended;  they  have 
identified  it  with  the  Christian  Father. 

The  shortcomings  of  pantheism  have  been  repeatedly 
formulated  under  three  heads  :  pantheism  does  not  satisfy 
the  heart's  demand  for  sympathetic  relations  with  a  Great 
Personal  Being  ;  it  cannot  be  an  ally  in  moral  struggles  ;  it 
involves  a  denial  of  individual  freedom. 

The  argument  in  support  of  the  first  objection  runs  as 
follows :  strict  pantheism  denies  to  God  "  fatherly  love, 
providential  care,  redeeming  mercy."  "  Instead  of  love  and 
communion  in  love,  it  can  only  commend  to  us  the  contem- 
plation of  an  object  which  is  incomprehensible,  devoid  of 
all  affections.  .  .  .  When  feelings  like  love,  gratitude,  and 
trust  are  expressed  in  the  hymns  and  prayers  of  Hindu 
worship,  it  is  in  consequence  of  a  virtual  denial  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  pantheism."  ^ 

That  pantheistic  religions  cannot  provide  the  support 
craved  by  the  ethical  nature  of  man  is  the  strongest  argu- 
ment that  can  be  brought  against  them.  There  can  be  no 
morality  in  a  pantheism,  "since  the  worst  passions  and 
vilest  actions  of  humanity  are  states  and  operations  of  the 
One  Absolute  Being."  When  stoicism  is  offered  as  an  in- 
stance of  sublime  moral  doctrine  rooted  in  a  pantheistic 
interpretation  of  life,  the  retort  is  at  hand  that  "  Stoicism 

1  Flint,  Robert,  Anti-Tkeistic  Theories,  William  Blackwood  and  Sons, 
1899.  P-  388. 


3i8        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

escaped  the  moral  consequences  of  its  pantheism  only  by 
disregarding  speculative  consistency,  and  asserting  the  most 
manifest  contradictions."  ^ 

Frederic  Harrison,  writing  in  the  Nincteetith  Cejitury, 
put  forcibly,  if  somewhat  rhetorically,  both  this  and  the 
former  argument.  "  There  lies  this  original  blot  on  every 
form  of  philosophical  Pantheism,  when  tried  as  a  basis  of 
rehgion,  or  as  the  root  idea  of  our  lives,  that  it  jumbles  up 
the  moral  and  the  immoral,  the  non-human  and  the  ante- 
human  in  the  world  .  .  ,  virtue  and  vice,  suffering  and 
victory,  etc. 

"  Go  then,  with  the  Gospel  of  Pantheism  to  the  father- 
less and  the  widow,  and  console  them  by  talking  of  sunsets, 
or  the  universal  order ;  tell  the  heartbroken  about  the  per- 
mutations of  energy ;  ask  the  rich  tyrant  to  remember  the 
sum  of  all  things  and  to  listen  to  the  teaching  of  the  Anima 
Miindi ;  explain  to  the  debauchee  and  the  glutton  and  the 
cheat,  the  Divine  essence  permeating  all  things  and  causing 
all  things  —  including  his  particular  vice,  his  passions,  his 
tastes,  his  greed,  and  his  lust.  ...  In  agony,  struggle, 
rage  of  passion  and  interest,  the  suffering  look  of  a  child, 
the  sympathetic  voice  of  a  friend,  the  remonstrance  of  a 
teacher,  the  loving  touch  of  a  wife,  is  stronger  than  the 
Force  of  the  solar  system,  more  beautiful  and  soothing 
than  a  sunset  on  the  pinnacles  of  the  Alps."^ 

If  the  only  argument  against  pantheism  were  the  one 
I  have  named  in  third  order  ;  namely,  that  it  denies  indi- 
vidual freedom,  its  religious  usefulness  would  hardly  be 
endangered ;  for  life  is  not  materially  affected  by  specu- 
lations as  obscure  as  those  regarding  Determinism  and 
Free  Will.     In  such  matters  man  walks  by  faith. 

Because  of  these  three  weaknesses  of  pantheism  it  is 

1  Flint,  op.  cit.,  p.  398, 

2  Harrison,  Frederic,  Nineteenth  Century,  Vol.  X,  1 88 1,  pp.  289-290. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  319 

held  that  "  from  the  point  of  view  of  practical  needs  and 
interests  pantheism  is  far  less  satisfactory  than  theism ; 
we  cannot  conceive  of  a  personal,  moral,  or  religious  rela- 
tion to  the  universe  or  an  aspect  of  it,  except  in  a  very- 
confused  and  fanciful  way."  This  opinion,  which  may  be 
found  in  nearly  every  treatise  on  philosophy,  must  be 
accepted  on  the  whole  as  valid. 

But  we  have  not  done  justice  to  pantheism,  considered 
as  a  basis  for  religion,  until  we  have  recognized  its  supe- 
riority over  theism  in  one  important  respect.  The  con- 
sciousness of  the  identity  of  the  self  with  the  Whole  is  for 
people  of  a  certain  temperament  an  experience  so  exquisite 
and  of  so  great  practical  value  that,  had  they  to  choose  be- 
tween theism  and  pantheism,  they  would  prefer  the  latter. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  do  not  choose,  they  make  use  of 
both  conceptions.  Poets  as  well  as  religious  mystics  have 
made  us  familiar  with  this  experience  :  — 

"  And  I  have  felt 
A  presence  that  disturbs  me  with  joy 
Of  elevated  thoughts  :  a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused, 
Whose  dwelling  is  the  light  of  setting  suns, 
And  the  round  ocean  and  the  living  air, 
And  the  blue  sky,  and  in  the  mind  of  man : 
A  motion  and  a  spirit,  that  impels 
All  thinking  things,  all  objects  of  all  thought, 
And  rolls  through  all  things."  ^ 

For  St.  Francis  of  Assisi,  the  odors  and  lights  of  nature 
always  had  an  intimate  message.  He  loved  the  earth  and 
its  creatures  as  he  loved  God  and  man.  When  on  leaving 
Verna  not  long  before  his  death,  he  arrived  at  the  gap 
from  which  one  gets  the  last  sight  of  the  Verna,  "  he 
alighted  from  his  horse  and,  leaning  upon  the  earth,  his 
face  turned  toward  the  mountain,  'Adieu,'  he  said,  'moun- 

1  Wordsworth,  William,  Tiniern  Abbey. 


320        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

tain  of  God,  sacred  mountain,  mons  coa^ulatiis,  mons  pin- 
guis^  mons  in  quo  bene  placituni  est  Deo  habitare ;  adieu 
Monte-Verna,  may  God  bless  thee,  the  Father,  the  Son 
and  the  Holy  Spirit;  abide  in  peace;  we  shall  never  see 
one  another  more.*  "  ^ 

Even  that  valiant  champion  of  theism.  Professor  Robert 
Flint,  admits  that  "  by  inculcating  its  doctrine  of  the  im- 
manence of  God  in  all  human  thought  and  action,  while  at 
the  same  time  especially  insisting  on  the  achievements  of 
power  and  genius  as  the  manifestations  of  the  divine  agency, 
it  has  gained  for  itself  a  sympathy  and  exerted  an  influence 
which  are  far  from  inconsiderable.  The  conqueror,  the  phi- 
losopher, the  poet,  feels  himself  borne  upwards,  as  it  were, 
and  along  a  path  of  glory  and  success,  by  the  force  of  an 
indwelling  God.  The  hours  of  highest  achievement  and 
joy  are  those  in  which  man  is  frequently  least  conscious  of 
his  weaknesses  and  limitations  as  a  man,  and  most  prone 
to  identify  himself  with  God.  Pantheism  may  give  strength 
both  for  endurance  and  action,  although  it  is  more  closely 
connected  with  the  pride  of  power  than  with  power  it- 
self." 2 

The  attraction  of  a  pantheistic  conception  depends  greatly 
upon  the  qualities  with  which  the  Whole,  of  which  man 
makes  himself  a  part,  is  invested.  When  he  conceives  of 
gods,  he  makes  them  ideals ;  he  does  likewise  —  within 
the  limits  set  by  the  form  of  the  conception  —  when  he 
evolves  a  pantheism  for  religious  use.  Not  merely  to  be  a 
part  of  the  Great  All,  but  to  be  a  part  of  the  Great  All 
conceived  as  the  Good  brings  repose,  confidence,  and  self- 
respect.  I  have  already  had  occasion  to  draw  attention  to 
the  invaluable  habit  of  assuming  the  existence  outside  of 
oneself  of  the  values  one  craves,  and  then  of  appropriating 

^  Sabatier,  Paul,  Life  of  Francis  of  Assisi,  p.  298. 
2  Flint,  op.  cit.,  p.  400. 


THE  FUTURE  OF   RELIGION  321 

them  by  identifying  oneself  with  the  bearer  of  these  qual- 
ities. This  tendency  is  so  strong  that,  as  we  know,  the 
Absolute  is  frequently  endowed  with  attributes  belonging 
properly  only  to  a  personal  Being. 

Because  of  the  great  value  of  pantheism.  Christians  have 
at  times  transformed  their  God  into  Nature ;  and  despite 
this  value,  the  pantheists  have  constantly  drifted  into  be- 
liefs in  personal  gods,  for  it  is  easier  to  hold  converse  with 
gods,  saints,  and  devils,  than  with  nature.  The  God  to 
whom  a  glove  can  be  handed  has  a  hold  upon  the  imagi- 
nation incomparably  stronger  than  the  God  who  can  be  wor- 
shipped only  in  the  aspects  of  the  physical  world. 

3.     THE    FUNDAMENTAL    INSUFFICIENCY    OF     POSITIVISM    AS    A 

BASIS    FOR    RELIGION 

Theism  having  become  logically  impossible  and  panthe- 
ism being  practically  insufficient,  where  shall  we  look  for  a 
religion  of  the  future  .■'  In  our  survey  of  contemporary 
religious  movements,  we  have  considered  Comte's  attempt 
to  use  the  idea  of  Humanity,  and  we  have  observed  the 
increasing  strength  which  this  idea  is  gaining  as  a  regula- 
tive power  in  social  intercourse. 

In  the  conception  of  Humanity  as  a  growing,  self-per- 
fecting organism  composed  of  moral  units,  there  is  certainly 
nothing  that  runs  counter  to  the  fundamental  principles 
of  science  nor  to  its  important  conclusions.  But  does  a 
religion  of  Humanity  escape  the  objections  that  have 
proved  fatal  to  pantheism,  and  does  it  possess  the  positive 
qualifications  required  of  a  source  of  religious  life.' 

The  greatest  weakness  of  Comte's  religion  Hes  not  in 
the  very  real  difficulties  of  weaning  man  from  ancient 
habits  of  worship  and  of  introducing  new  religious  forms 
and  symbols,  but  in  its  lack  of  a  philosophical  background 
favorable  to  religion.     The   common   opinion   is  that,  in 


322        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

order  to  live  with  dignity  and  contentment,  man  must 
believe  that  his  life  possesses  an  absolute  and  eternal 
significance,  and  that  devotion  to  an  ideal  must  be  more  than 
a  pedagogical  device  for  the  conduct  of  life.  If  he  is  to  put 
forth  his  best  energies,  man  must  beUeve  that  the  individ- 
ual and  society  are  parts  of  a  whole  moving  towards  a 
blessed  consummation.  And  it  is  also  commonly  supposed 
that  only  in  such  beliefs  can  a  reHgion  in  the  true  sense 
of  the  word  find  root. 

Now,  the  religion  of  Comte  is  wedded,  in  theory  at  least, 
to  a  Naturalism  which  makes  these  beliefs  impossible. 
The  NaturaHsm  of  Positivism  not  only  afifirms  that  the 
whole  of  experience  —  physical  and  psychical  —  can  be 
accounted  for  without  reference  to  a  personal  God ;  but  it 
rejects  all  forms  of  idealism.  It  teaches  that  mechanical 
principles  are  adequate  to  explain  all  things.  Spiritual 
existence  such  as  appears  in  man  is  determined  altogether 
by  mechanical  forces ;  it  is  a  mere  accompaniment  of  ma- 
terial action.  Such  a  philosophy  as  this  involves,  of  course, 
the  rejection  of  personal  immortality.  It  cannot  even 
replace  personal  immortality  by  social  immortality ;  for 
science  points  clearly  to  the  ultimate  disappearance  of  the 
race  of  man  from  the  face  of  the  earth.  The  ethics  of 
Naturalism  is  purely  utilitarian.  It  holds  that  goodness 
has  no  value  in  itself;  it  is  not  an  end,  but  only  a  means 
to  happiness  or  to  the  fulness  of  life.  Ethical  perfection 
cannot  be  a  true  ideal,  but  merely  a  means  to  happiness. 

If  the  moral  law  is  not  a  kind  of  higher  divinity  in  the 
presence  of  which  we  must  bow,  but  simply  "a  recipe 
which  we,  or  society,  may  use  in  the  search  for  happiness 
or  natural  good  "  ;  ^  if  humanity  is  a  transient  manifestation 
of  a  blind,  unfeeling  Force,  and  is  soon  to  disappear  with- 

1  Christie,  R.,  Humanism  as  a  JHe/i^ioK,  The  Contemporary  Review,  1905, 
LXXXVIII,  p.  696. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  323 

out  leaving  a  trace  behind ;  if,  in  short,  man  has  not  an 
absolute  value,  —  then,  it  is  asked,  what  can  a  religion  of 
Humanity  amount  to  ?  It  is  no  more  than  a  rather  clumsy- 
device  for  inducing  men  to  sacrifice  themselves  for  the 
happiness  of  others.  If  any  one  should  find  an  heroic 
satisfaction,  a  noble  dehght,  in  accepting  existence  under 
these  conditions,  and  in  practising  virtue  for  its  own  sake, 
well  and  good,  but  he  would  be  an  exception, 

4.     THE    INDEPENDENCE    OF    MORAL    APPRECIATION    FROM 
TRANSCENDENTAL    BELIEF 

Let  us  consider  somewhat  more  closely  the  opinion 
that  an  idealistic  faith  is  necessary  to  morality.  It  is  the 
problem  of  the  basis  of  moral  judgments.  I  shall  here  do 
little  more  than  state  the  position  which,  in  my  opinion, 
obvious  facts  compel  us  to  take,  and  which  has  long  since 
ceased  to  be  novel. 

Independently  of  a  belief  in  God  or  in  a  Moral  Order, 
the  love  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good  is  bred  in 
man  in  the  course  of  his  social  experience.  Psychologists 
agree  that  moral  feelings  do  not  belong  to  a  different  order 
from  the  other  feelings,  and  that  they  are  all  equally  the 
natural  outcome  of  human  interrelations.  The  human 
individual  unavoidably  finds  satisfaction  in  dignity,  right- 
eousness, and  love,  for  reasons  similar  to  those  which  make 
certain  kinds  of  food  desirable. 

Pleasure  is  on  the  whole  connected  with  efficiency  and 
pain  with  inefficiency  ;  that  is  physically  pleasurable  which 
in  general  makes  for  continuation  and  growth.  If  the  re- 
verse connection  existed,  humanity  would  long  since  have 
disappeared  from  the  earth. ^  Similarly,  in  the  ethical  sphere; 

1  For  a  carefully  formulated  biological  theory  of  pleasure  and  pain,  see 
Henry  Rutgers  Marshall,  Pain,  Pleasure,  and  Esthetics,  Macmillan,  1894, 
pp.  202-205. 


324        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

if  those  actions  which  conduce  to  the  preservation,  ex- 
tension, and  strength  of  the  social  organism  were  not  felt 
as  good,  human  society  would  disintegrate.  The  interre- 
lations of  individuals  living  in  groups  have  produced,  and 
continue  to  produce,  the  moral  likes  and  dislikes ;  that  is, 
likes  and  dislikes  tending  to  the  continuation  and  increased 
happiness  of  the  whole. 

When  an  individual  or  a  society  has  yielded  too  much  to 
morally  bad  tendencies,  either  it  mends  its  ways,  or,  not 
mending  them,  is  destroyed.  The  vices  of  the  Greco- 
Roman  world  led  to  its  perdition.  But  these  vices  did  not 
fasten  upon  the  Greeks  and  Romans,  because  they  had 
lost  the  vision  of  the  ideal.  It  is  the  reverse  :  the  love  of 
vice  having  been  bred  in  them,  they  lost  the  ideal.  Na- 
tions and  individuals  take  warning  from  the  dreadful  fate 
that  has  overtaken  other  peoples  and  persons  and  are 
driven  to  desire  that  which  leads  to  the  opposite  outcome. 
A  nation  defeated  in  war  learns  to  hate  the  defects  to 
which  it  owes  its  defeat.  The  conscience  of  the  ward  poli- 
tician does  not  become  the  ideal  of  the  community,  because 
his  methods  point  to  social  dissolution.  I  despise  his 
practices,  not  because  I  have  a  transcendent  philosophy, 
but  because  of  likes  and  disHkes  that  have  been  bred  in 
me  in  my  home  experiences  and  in  the  larger  world  outside. 
No  will  of  mine  can  change  this,  any  more  than  it  can 
change  my  physical  tastes.  It  is  only  affirming  what  is 
obvious  to  declare  that  the  instincts  and  tendencies,  the 
likes  and  the  dislikes,  developed  in  man  by  his  social  life, 
constitute  the  true  foundation  of  morality. 

Apprehension  of  the  good  is  necessarily  anterior  to  the 
establishment  of  moral  relations  with  a  superhuman  world. 
"  Whoso  loveth  not  his  brother  whom  he  hath  seen,  how 
can  he  love  God  whom  he  hath  not  seen  .-*"  If,  believing 
in  God,  I  accept  his  will  as  mine,  my  act  is  not  ethical  be- 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  325 

cause  of  my  voluntary  subjection  to  a  greater  power.  It  is 
the  quality  of  my  purpose  that  makes  my  action  good  or 
bad  :  if  I  recognize  that  Power  as  good,  my  will  to  sub- 
ordinate myself  to  it  is  a  good  will ;  if  I  think  of  the 
Power  as  bad,  to  accept  its  law  as  mine  is  morally  bad. 
The  attributes  of  the  ideal  can  be  only  those  the  value 
of  which  has  been  discovered  in  social  intercourse. 

The  question  we  have  just  considered  is  not  whether  a 
Moral  Purpose  is  really  of  the  essence  of  the  universe,  but 
only  whether  that  belief  is  a  necessary  condition  of  moral 
feelings  and  judgments.  It  would  not,  therefore,  be  to 
the  point  to  argue  the  existence  of  a  Moral  Architect  from 
the  fact  that  man's  nature  is  such  as  to  make  the  appear- 
ance and  the  development  of  the  moral  life  unavoidable. 
The  granting  of  this  contention  would  leave  my  argument 
untouched :  as  far  as  human  consciousness  is  concerned, 
the  Moral  Order  is  a  product  of  human  society. 

In  the  independence  of  moral  appreciation  from  tran- 
scendental beliefs  Ues  the  very  assurance  needed  to  tide  over 
this  "  unbelieving  generation."  The  best  that  is  in  man  is 
generated  in  the  homely  experiences  of  daily  life,  and 
faith  in  God  and  in  immortality  are  the  outcome  and  not 
the  basis  of  the  discovery  of  human  worth.  Anchored  in 
this  assurance  and  fortified  by  a  sense  of  human  fellow- 
ship, man  is  prepared  to  surrender  if  need  be  the  assist- 
ance which  cruder  generations  have  found  in  superhuman 
beliefs. 

But  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  morality 
from  superhuman  beliefs  does  not  involve  the  uselessness 
of  these  beliefs.  And  upon  this  second  truth  one  has  the 
right  to  insist  as  much  as  upon  the  first. 

It  would  be  idle  to  pretend  that  a  naturalistic  conception 
of  life  is  all  that  man  asks  for  and  that,  for  instance,  be- 


326        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

lief  in  a  Divine  Father  and  in  the  absolute  value  of  the 
person  is  not  comforting  and  elevating.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
getting  rid  of  the  delusion  that  moral  progress  is  inseparable 
from  idealism  does  not  necessarily  commit  one  to  the  type 
of  naturalistic  philosophy  we  have  considered.  For  the 
bare  acceptance  of  the  facts  we  have  touched  upon  leaves 
them  without  final  explanation.  Why  is  the  world  so  con- 
stituted as  to  produce  the  moral  experiences  ?  What  na- 
ture, what  attributes,  are  to  be  ascribed  to  the  power  or 
powers  manifested  in  Humanity.-*  To  recognize  the  legiti- 
macy of  these  questions  is  to  admit  implicitly  the  theoretical 
possibility  of  an  idealistic  complement  to  the  scientific  nat- 
uralistic theory  of  the  origin  in  man  of  moral  values. 

Whether  logically  possible  or  not,  an  idealistic  formula- 
tion is,  as  I  have  already  said,  desirable.  To  the  man 
physically  healthy  and  morally  good  there  is  nought  at- 
tractive in  the  thought  that  he  and  his  fellow-men  are  but 
chance  bubbles,  glistening  for  an  instant  before  the  final 
disappearance.  One  may  be  convinced,  as  I  am,  that 
this  assurance  would  not  prevent  the  formation  of  admi- 
rable characters,  compounded  of  noble  self-sufficiency  and 
active  benevolence,  chastened  by  a  sense  of  cosmic  in- 
significance. But  that  this  origin  and  this  destiny  are  all 
that  the  heart  of  man  desires  is  belied  by  every  page  of 
history,  ancient  and  modern. 

5.     THE    LATENT    IDEALISM    OF    NATURALISTIC    RELIGIOUS 

MOVEMENTS 

A  naturalistic  philosophy  is  so  far  from  satisfying  the 
aspirations  of  the  human  heart  that  most  of  those  who  have 
embraced  Naturalism  have,  unknown  to  themselves,  re- 
tained idealistic  elements.  Examine  the  discourses  of  the 
disciples  of  Comte,  even  those  of  Comte  himself,  and  you 
will  discover  smuggled  in  under  the  names  Grand  Eire  and 


THE  FUTURE  OF   RELIGION  327 

Humanity  the  very  concepts  they  condemn  as  illegitimate. 
The  cult  of  the  present-day  Positivists  is  permeated  with 
the  assumptions  and  the  moods  of  idealism.  These  men 
have  fallen  into  the  inconsistency  we  have  noticed  in  the 
case  of  St.  Augustine  and  of  other  Christians  who  deal 
with  their  God  as  if  he  were  swayed  by  human  feelings, 
although  their  philosophy  declares  him  the  Impassive 
Absolute.  It  is  even  affirmed  —  and  not  without  good 
show  of  evidence  —  that  whatever  foothold  the  Positivist 
and  other  related  movements  have  gained,  they  owe  to  the 
introduction  into  their  naturalistic  philosophy  of  the 
idealism  present  in  every  human  heart. 

In  socialistic  writings  one  meets  with  ringing  declara- 
tions of  idealism  :  — 

"  It  needs  but  a  cursory  view  of  history  to  realize  — 
though  all  history  confirms  the  generalization  —  that  this 
arena  is  not  a  confused  and  aimless  conflict  of  individuals. 
Looked  at  too  closely,  it  may  seem  to  be  that,  a  formless 
web  of  individual  hates  and  loves ;  but  detach  oneself 
but  a  Httle,  and  the  broader  forms  appear.  One  perceives 
something  that  goes  on,  that  is  constantly  working  to 
make  order  out  of  casualty,  beauty  out  of  confusion, 
justice,  kindliness,  mercy,  out  of  cruelty  and  inconsiderate 
pressure.  For  our  present  purpose  it  will  be  sufficient 
to  speak  of  this  force  that  struggles  and  tends  to  make 
and  do,  as  Good  Will.  ...  In  spite  of  all  the  confusions 
and  thwartings  of  life,  the  halts  and  resiliencies  and  the 
counter-strokes  of  fate,  it  is  manifest  that  in  the  long  run 
human  life  becomes  broader  than  it  was,  gentler  than  it 
was,  finer  and  deeper.  On  the  whole  —  and  nowadays 
almost  steadily  —  things  get  better.  There  is  a  secular 
amelioration  of  life,  and  it  is  brought  about  by  Good  Will 
working  through  the  efforts  of  men."^ 

1  Wells,  H.  G.,  New  Worlds  for  Old,  Macmillan,  1908,  pp.  4-5. 


328        A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

The  great  mass  of  enlightened  men  can  get  along  with- 
out the  personal  God  and  immortality,  but  they  agree  with 
the  following  utterance :  "  These  three  ideas,  the  idea  of 
righteousness,  the  idea  that  justice  will  gain  the  ascendant, 
and  that  there  is  a  sublime  purpose  in  things  —  three 
aspects  of  one  idea  —  these  I  would  not  give  up,"i  If, 
on  the  one  hand,  man  refuses  to  have  anything  more  to  do 
with  certain  traditional  behefs,  on  the  other  hand  he  is  ap- 
parently unwilling  to  do  without  beliefs  that  will  perform  the 
essential  function  of  those  he  has  discarded.  Under  these 
circumstances,  we  may  put  aside  as  a  purely  academic 
question  whether  a  form  of  religion,  truly  so-called,  could 
arise  upon  a  consistently  naturalistic  view  of  the  world. 
We  may  do  so  the  more  readily  since,  after  all,  no  system 
of  philosophy  is  less  firmly  established  than  Naturalism. 
The  problem  to  which  our  attention  should  rather  be 
directed  is  the  possibility  of  a  religion  in  which  the  idea 
of  Humanity  would  play  a  role  similar  to  the  one  given 
it  in  Comtism,  but  in  which  Humanity  would  be  regarded 
as  an  expression  of  a  transhuman  Power  realizing  itself  in 
Humanity.  In  this  direction,  at  any  rate,  points  the  Zeit- 
geist. 

6.    THE    ETHICAL    CULTURE    SOCIETIES 

Among  the  most  noteworthy  signs  of  the  times,  I  count 
the  Ethical  Culture  Societies.  They  may  embody  the  first 
stage  of  a  religion  in  which  a  divine  power  objectified  in 
I  Humanity  replaces  the  traditional  God.  They  began  as  a 
protest  against  the  place  given  in  reUgion  to  dogma  and 
the  supernatural,  —  a  protest  inspired  by  the  conviction  of 
the  independence  and  the  supremacy  of  the  moral  ideal. 
In  this  conviction  they  have  remained  steadfast.  The  first 
principle  of  the  West  London  Ethical  Society  is  that  "  the 
good  life  has  supreme  claim  upon  us,  and  this  claim  rests 

1  Adler,  Felix,  The  Religion  of  Duty,  p.  57. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  329 

upon  no  external  authority,  and  upon  no  system  of  super- 
natural rewards  and  punishments,  but  Jias  its  origin  in  the 
nature  of  man  as  a  social  and  rational  being." 

Officially  these  societies  are  no  more  than  their  name 
implies,  ethical  societies,  i.e.  associations  aiming  "  to  in- 
crease among  men  the  knowledge,  the  love,  and  the  prac- 
tice of  the  right."  And  the  only  means  they  sanction  for 
the  realization  of  their  purpose  are  human  means,  —  keep- 
ing the  moral  ideal  above  all  else  before  men,  formulating 
ethical  principles  workable  in  our  social  life,  and  applying 
them  in  theory  and  in  practice  to  the  individual  and  to 
the  social  life.  To  call  them  religious  societies,  therefore, 
would  be  to  misapply  the  term  ;  for  religion  is  not  synony- 
mous with  devotion  to  an  ethical  purpose.  Yet  with  re- 
gard to  the  individual  beliefs  of  their  leaders,  the  matter 
stands  differently.  An  organization  for  ethical  purposes 
resting  upon  a  naturalistic  foundation,  does  not  fulfil  the 
sum  total  of  their  wishes,  although  in  the  present  state  of 
heterogenous  opinions  they  are  content  to  keep  to  them- 
selves whatever  convictions  they  may  have  pointing  reli- 
gionward,  or  at  least  to  keep  them  out  of  the  official 
statements  of  the  society.  The  more  penetrating  and 
philosophical  among  these  men  have  wanted  an  interpreta- 
tion of  the  facts  of  moral  experience  that  would  both  jus- 
tify their  faith  in  the  absolute  value  of  the  moral  ideal  and 
vitally  relate  Humanity  to  the  Universe.  They,  no  more 
than  any  other  thinking  men,  can  help  seeking  beyond  the 
individual  some  underlying  power  which  would  account 
for  man's  presence  on  this  earth,  for  his  moral  cravings, 
and  which  would  point  out  his  destiny. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  writings  of  all  the  leaders  of  this 
movement  reveal  beliefs  in  a  power  underlying — I  avoid 
the  word  "  transcending  "  —  humanity.  They  write  in 
strains  such  as  this  :  "  Be  that  so  or  not  so,  the  fact  remains 


330       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

that  the  very  essence  of  our  human  nature,  which  accounts 
for  its  having  moved  steadily  '  upward,  working  out  the 
beast,'  and  forward  into  juster  laws  and  kindlier  customs, 
is  the  pull  and  strain  of  something  in  our  make-up,  '  the 
procreant  urge  '  of  the  world-spirit  in  us,  our  capacity  for 
conceiving  ideals  and  insisting  upon  realizing  them  in  the 
face  of  all  the  odds  which  Time  and  Fate  have  marshalled 
against  us.  In  this,  with  all  its  implications,  lies  the  glory 
of  manhood.  .  .  .  The  logical  conclusion  to  be  drawn  for 
our  present  purpose  from  this  change  in  our  way  of  think- 
ing about  the  Power  *  behind  the  veil '  is  that  man  is  at 
once  human  and  divine.  Man,  in  the  light  of  this  idea  of 
immanence,  is  the  expression  at  once  of  a  divine  principle 
of  reason,  affection,  and  will  (no  mere  blind  life-force,  the 
characterless  nondescript  Vitalism  of  Bernard  Shaw,  et  al.) 
and  of  a  natural  and  sub-human  principle  (inseparable 
from  it)  of  appetite  and  passion  —  strange  mixture  is  he  of 
'  dust  and  deity,'  of  animal  and  angel,  of  saint  and  satyr  !  "  ^ 
In  an  address  entitled  First  Steps  tozvard  a  Religion, 
Felix  Adler,  the  founder  of  the  movement,  finds  warrant 
for  the  existence  of  a  transhuman  reality,  which,  for  want 
of  a  better  name,  he  calls  Spirit.  This  Spirit  urges 
humanity  onward  towards  a  goal  already  dimly  discern- 
ible ;  a  perfectly  organized  society,  each  member  of  which 
shall  find  the  means  of  his  own  self-realization  in  further- 
ing the  social  end  ;  that  is,  in  discharging  the  duties  of  his 
social  position.^ 

^  Chubb,  Percival,  The  Reinterpretation  of  Thanksgiving,  Ethical  Ad- 
dresses, November,  191 1,  Vol.  XIX,  pp.  74-75. 

2  Adler,  Felix,  op.  cii.,  pp.  3-25.  See  also  this  author's  papers.  The  Moral 
Ideal,  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  XX,  19 10,  pp.  387-394;  The  Re- 
lation of  the  Moral  Ideal  to  Reality,  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  October, 
191 1,  Vol.  XXII,  pp.  1-18.  In  these  papers  Professor  Adler  argues  for  the 
replacement  of  the  ideal  of  individual  perfection  of  Christian  Ethics  by  a 
social  ideal.    The  individual's  perfection  is  relative  to  the  place  he  fills  in  the 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  331 

A  belief  in  a  transhuman  Power  of  the  kind  thus  roughly- 
outlined,  together  with  a  belief  in  the  supremacy  of  the 
ethical  ideal  conceived  as  a  social  goal,  would  constitute  a 
basis  upon  which  a  cult  could  hardly  fail  to  develop,  a 

social  organism.  "  Instead  of  uniformity  of  action  in  the  pursuit  of  common 
ends,  functional  differences  in  reciprocal  adjustment  supply  the  index  of  what 
is  moral." 

The  English  Ethical  Societies  have  just  set  forth  their  understanding  of  the 
principles  and  aims  of  the  Movement  in  a  small  book,  The  Ethical  Move- 
ment;  its  Principles  and  Aims,  edited  by  Horace  J.  Bridges,  Ethical  So- 
cieties, 19,  Buckingham  St.,  W.C,  London. 

The  following  books  and  pamphlets  will  also  be  found  interesting  with 
regard  to  the  religious  aspirations  of  the  Ethical  Societies:  The  Essentials  of 
Spirituality,  Felix  Adler;  Ethical  Religion,  William  Salter  ;  The  Conserva- 
tive and  Liberal  Aspects  af  Ethical  Religion,  an  address  by  Percival  Chubb; 
National  Idealism  and  a  State  Church,  1907,  Stanton  Coit;  National  Ideal- 
ism and  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer,  1908,  Stanton  Coit.  The  two  books  by 
Stanton  Coit  are  published  by  Williams  and  Norgate,  London;  the  others  by 
the  American  Ethical  Union,  1415  Locust  St.,  Philadelphia. 

Transhuman  beHefs  have  been  sedulously  kept  out  of  the  official  state- 
ments of  the  Ethical  Societies,  probably  because  they  could  not  be  formulated 
so  as  to  command  unanimous  approval  within  the  Society  and  might  keep 
out  men  who  would  like  to  cooperate  with  the  members  on  a  merely  practical 
ethical  basis.  There  is,  further,  the  enormous  difficulty  of  formulating  these 
beliefs  so  as  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  those  made  fastidious  by  a  knowl- 
edge of  philosophy  and  of  the  general  conclusions  of  science. 

The  probability  of  a  religion  issuing  directly  or  indirectly  from  these  So- 
cieties seems  to  me  considerable.  One  may  be  hopeful  of  a  movement  spring- 
ing from  keenly  felt  moral  needs,  a  movement  maintained  throughout  thirty-five 
years  with  unswerving  earnestness  and  indifference  to  showy  success,  by  men 
respectful  of  science,  and  convinced  that  whatever  be  the  fate  of  religion,  one 
cannot  dispense  with  intellectual  honesty.  One  may  be  the  more  hopeful  of 
such  a  movement  when,  in  addition,  it  manifests  an  irrepressible  yearning  to 
transform  itself  into  a  religion,  and  when  the  first  steps  towards  an  idealistic 
foundation  have  already  been  taken  individually  by  the  leaders. 

In  becoming  a  religion  of  Humanity  the  Ethical  Societies  would  find  their 
avowed  purpose  widened,  for  a  religion  which  limited  itself  to  the  purpose 
they  have  officially  announced  would  leave  out  much  that  the  human  heart 
demands  and  that  all  ethical  religions  have  included.  In  religion  men  seek 
the  realization  not  only  of  ethical  ideals,  but  also  of  affective  and  aesthetic 
cravings.     Life,  fulness  and  perfection  of  life,  is  the  aim  of  religion. 


332       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

cult  similar  to  Comtism  in  that  the  divine  would  not  be 
personified  in  a  transcendent  personal  God,  but  would  be 
progressively  realized  in  Humanity.  It  would  be  superior 
to  Comtism  in  that  it  would  be  free  from  the  life-inhibiting 
propositions  of  naturalistic  philosophy. 

7.    THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  BASIS  NECESSARY  TO  RELIGION 

There  are,  of  course,  appalling  difficulties  in  the  way  of 
a  formulation  of  a  metaphysical  conception  adequate  for 
present  use  in  rehgion.  How  shall  we  conceive  the  trans- 
human  Force  of  which  humanity  is  an  expression  ?  What 
sort  of  existence  does  it  have  outside  of  human  conscious- 
ness ?  What  relation  does  this  Power  sustain  to  the  ma- 
terial universe  and  to  man,  to  good  and  to  evil  ?  If  it  is 
thought  of  as  Purposive  Intelligence,  we  are  back  in  theism. 
The  hoary  puzzles  all  rise  up  and  clamor  for  solution. 

In  attempting  to  forecast  the  course  of  religious  de- 
velopment, one  must  guard  against  the  common  misap- 
prehension of  the  relation  of  religion  to  philosophy.  The 
traditional  view  of  the  matter  is  that  a  religion  includes 
necessarily  a  complete  philosophical  system.  But  the 
union  of  religion  with  philosophy  is  the  outcome  of  the 
absence  of  specialization  at  the  beginning  of  social  Hfe. 
Magic,  religion,  poetry,  philosophy,  grew  together  in- 
separably. It  was  only  as  different  aims  were  distinctly 
conceived,  and  different  means  and  methods  of  realizing 
them  appeared,  that  the  original  plenum  broke  into  parts. 
Magic  became  clearly  separated  from  religion;  religious 
dogmas  from  myths  and  legends ;  poetry  acquired  an 
existence  independent  of  both  religion  and  myth ;  and 
philosophy  was  seen  to  have  its  own  particular  purpose 
and  another  content  than  religion. 

The  reader  who  has  followed  me  so  far  has,  I  trust, 
admitted  that  the  purpose  of   religion    and   that   of   phi- 


THE  FUTURE  OF   RELIGION  333 

losophy  are  not  identical.  Their  difference  was  set  forth 
in  the  second  chapter  of  this  book ;  it  should  have  become 
more  and  more  evident  in  the  succeeding  chapters.  And 
in  the  discussion  of  the  relation  of  theology  to  psychology 
there  came  to  light  the  vigorous,  if  reckless,  effort  made 
by  contemporary  theologians  to  free  themselves  altogether 
from  general  metaphysics  and  from  science.  This  effort 
is  ill  conceived,  no  doubt,  but  it  indicates  that  the  day 
is  past  for  the  identification  of  a  metaphysical  system 
in  its  entirety  with  the  fundamental  propositions  necessary 
to  religion.  Since  the  purposes  of  religion  and  of  meta- 
physics are  not  identical,  their  theoretical  basis  need  not 
be  the  same.  This  certainly  does  not  mean  that  religion 
is  not  dependent  upon  certain  parts  of  metaphysics  for 
its  intellectual  foundation.  It  means  only  that  religion 
need  load  itself  with  philosophical  burdens  no  further 
than  is  necessary  for  its  practical  purpose.  A  religion 
which  could  accept  and  utilize  in  its  intellectual  foundation 
a  complete  system  of  metaphysics  would  have  by  so  much 
the  advantage.  But  it  should  be  definitely  admitted  that 
this  is  not  necessary :  avowed  agnosticism  with  regard  to 
many  questions  to  which  traditional  religions  give  solutions 
is  not  inconsistent  with  a  workable  religion. 

But  if  the  religion  of  the  future,  conscious  of  its  dis- 
tinctive purpose,  must  keep  itself  free  from  metaphysical 
entanglements,  it  ought  also  not  to  run  counter  to  well- 
established  scientific  or  philosophical  conclusions ;  it  must 
be  free  from  the  dishonest  shifts  to  which  traditional 
Christianity  is  now  driven. 

How  inconsiderable  may  be  the  sufficient  philosophical 
understructure  of  an  efficient  religion,  and  in  what  unfin- 
ished form  it  may  be  left,  is  an  important  matter  upon  which 
a  final  word  must  be  said.     Let  the  reader  remember  the 


334       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

gross  inconsistencies  and  contradictions  which  appear  on 
every  hand  when  one  compares  religious  practices  with  the- 
oretical beliefs.  Much  of  this  we  have  encountered  in  this 
study,  particularly  in  the  chapter  on  "  Theology  and  Psy- 
chology." Let  him  also  think  of  the  indefiniteness,  or  rather 
fluidity,  of  the  God-idea  of  educated  persons,  and  he  will 
realize  to  some  extent  the  resourcefulness  of  man  when  his 
happiness  is  at  stake.  These  facts  must  be  kept  in  mind 
by  one  attempting  to  estimate  the  religious  possibilities 
residing  in  vague  philosophical  conceptions. 

The  religion  of  the  future  will  have  to  rest  content  appar- 
ently with  the  idea  of  a  non-purposive  Creative  Force, 
making  of  the  universe  neither  an  accidental  creation  nor 
one  shaped  in  accordance  with  some  preconceived  plan. 
Would  man  find  what  he  wants  in  a  Power  describable 
as  an  impetus  coursing  through  matter,  and  drawing  from 
it  what  it  can,  a  Power  appearing  in  man  in  the  form 
of  striving  consciousness  ?  "  God,  thus  defined,  has  noth- 
ing of  the  already  made ;  He  is  unceasing  life,  action,  free- 
dom. Creation,  so  conceived,  is  not  a  mystery ;  we  experi- 
ence it  in  ourselves  when  we  act  freely."  ^  Such  at  least  is 
the  doctrine  of  one  of  the  most  remarkable  of  contempo- 
rary philosophers.  It  is  not,  he  holds,  a  doctrine  of  value 
only  in  speculation ;  "  it  gives  us  also  more  power  to  act 
and  to  live.  For,  with  it,  we  feel  ourselves  no  longer  iso- 
lated in  humanity ;  humanity  no  longer  seems  isolated  in 
the  nature  that  it  dominates.  As  the  smallest  grain  of 
dust  is  bound  up  with  our  entire  solar  system,  drawn  along 
with  it  in  that  undivided  movement  of  descent  which  is 
materiality  itself,  so  all  organized  beings,  from  the  humblest 
to  the  highest,  from  the  first  origins  of  life  to  the  time  in 
which  we  are,  and  in  all  places  as  in  all  times,  do  but  evi- 

1  Bergson,  Henri,  Creative  Evolution,  Holt,  New  York,  191 1,  pp.  248,  265. 
See  also  pp.  251,  261,  265. 


THE  FUTURE  OF  RELIGION  335 

dence  a  single  impulsion,  the  inverse  of  the  movement  of 
matter,  and  in  itself  indivisible.  All  the  living  hold  to- 
gether, and  all  yield  to  the  same  tremendous  push.  The 
animal  takes  its  stand  on  the  plant,  man  bestrides  animality, 
and  the  whole  of  humanity,  in  space  and  in  time,  is  one 
immense  army  galloping  beside  and  before  and  behind 
each  of  us  in  an  overwhelming  charge  able  to  beat  down 
every  resistance  and  clear  the  most  formidable  obstacles, 
perhaps  even  death."  ^ 

There  is  no  question  but  that  Humanity  idealized  and 
conceived  as  a  manifestation  of  Creative  Energy  possesses 
surpassing  qualifications  for  a  source  of  religious  inspira- 
tion. Human  relationships  have  always  given  rise  to  the 
noblest  activities  of  man  ;  they  have  been  and  remain  the 
very  fountain  of  life.  In  a  religion  of  Humanity,  man's 
attention  would  be  directed  not  to  a  remote,  intangible 
Perfection,  but  to  a  concrete  reahty  of  which  he  is  a  part 
and  the  perfection  of  which  depends  upon  his  own 
perfection.  In  Humanity  each  person  can  regard  himself 
as  a  link  in  the  chain  connecting  the  hosts  of  the  past  with 
the  hosts  that  are  to  come.  The  recognition  of  this  vast 
relationship  would  give  a  sense  of  fellowship  and  unity, 
a  feeling  of  responsibility  and  dignity ;  it  would  make  a 
world  worthy  of  one's  best  efforts. 

A  rehgion  of  Humanity  need  not  be  lacking  in  the  forms 
and  symbols  necessary  to  a  practical  religion.  Without  vio- 
lence to  reason,  and  with  little  demand  upon  the  imagina- 
tion, it  could  provide  those  human  embodiments  of  power 
and  virtue  which  man  seeks  for  moral  inspiration  and  up- 
lift. Man  has  always  been  a  hero-worshipper.  Expres- 
sions of  admiration  and  gratitude,  of  joy  and  sorrow,  would 

1  Ibid,  pp.  270-271. 


336       A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  STUDY  OF  RELIGION 

find  easily  an  appropriate  place  in  a  religion  of  Humanity.^ 
The  sense  of  weakness  and  imperfection,  the  need  of  com- 
fort and  encouragement,  the  desire  for  the  final  triumph 
of  good,  are  sentiments  which  might  readily  enough  be 
collectively  expressed  in  declarations  addressed  to  the 
religious  brotherhood,  or  even  perhaps  to  the  Ideal  Society. 
And  I  see  no  sufficient  reason  why  a  religion  of  Human- 
ity should  not  incorporate  in  a  modified  form  elements 
of  the  therapeutic  cults  which  have  been  found  effec- 
tive in  the  healing  of  mind  and  body. 

A  religion  in  agreement  with  the  accepted  body  of 
scientific  knowledge,  and  centred  about  Humanity  con- 
ceived as  the  manifestation  of  a  Force  tending  to  the 
creation  of  an  ideal  society,  would  occupy  in  the  social  life 
the  place  that  a  religion  should  normally  hold, — even 
the  place  that  the  Christian  religion  lost  when  its  cardinal 
beliefs  ceased  to  be  in  harmony  with  secular  beliefs. 

^  "  I  want  to  win  fair  recognition  of  that  hitherto  slighted  human  provi- 
dence which  has  been  and  actually  is  operative  in  our  world,  nearer  to  us  and 
more  humanly  appealing  to  us  than  the  august  cosmic  providence  I  have 
spoken  of.  It  is  a  providence  which  has  not  only  increased  the  fruitfulness 
of  the  earth  and  provided  our  material  necessities,  but  gained  by  man's  patient 
and  heroic  effort  knowledge  and  truth,  justice  and  kindness.  .  .  .  We  are 
to  include  in  our  conception  of  our  human  providence  not  only  the  few  great 
men  who  are  held  in  renown  for  the  more  splendid  conquests  of  our  humanity, 
but  also  the  vast  multitude  of  the  unknown  in  all  lands  and  through  all  ages: 
the  slaves  and  serfs  harnessed  to  the  merciless  Juggernaut  of  the  oppressor; 
the  unremembered  artists  and  craftsmen  who  have  adorned  life  with  beauty; 
the  singers,  sages,  inventors,  and  discoverers,  all  the  forgotten  folk  who  have 
added  their  unremembered  increments  of  value  to  our  vast  human  inheritance. 
.  .  .  Strange  that  no  such  note  should  sound  in  our  Thanksgiving  proclama- 
tions ! "  (Percival  Chubb,  The  Reinterpretation  of  Thanksgiving,  Ethical 
Addresses,  November,  191 1,  Vol.  XIX,  No.  2.) 


APPENDIX 

DEFINITIONS    OF    RELIGION    AND 
CRITICAL   COMMENTS 

AN   APPENDIX  TO   PART   I,   CHAPTER  II 

Contents : — 

FAGB 

1.  Intellectualistic  Point  of  View  .        .         •     339 

2.  Affectivistic  Point  of  View         ....     346 

3.  voluntaristic  or  practical  point  of  view         .     352 


APPENDIX 

DEFINITIONS    OF    RELIGION    AND    CRITICAL    COM- 
MENTS 

In  this  appendix  will  be  found  a  large  number  of  definitions  not  given  in 
chapter  ii,  "  Constructive  Criticism  of  Current  Conceptions  of  Religion " 
and  also  a  fuller  exposition  and  criticism  of  a  few  of  those  discussed  in 
that  chapter.  I  have  divided  these  definitions  roughly  into  three  groups, — 
intellectualistic,  affectivistic,  and  voluntaristic  —  and  I  have  added  at  the  end 
Wundt's  classification,  together  with  his  criticism  of  the  three  types  of  con- 
ceptions represented  in  his  classification.  It  need  hardly  be  said  that  no  at- 
tempt has  been  made  to  provide  an  exhaustive  list  of  definitions'. 

I  trust  that  the  perusal  of  these  forty-eight  definitions  will  not  bewilder  the 
reader,  but  that  he  will  see  in  them  a  splendid  illustration  both  of  the  versa- 
tility and  the  one-sidedness  of  the  human  mind  in  the  description  of  a  very 
complex  yet  unitary  manifestation  of  life. 


INTELLECTUALISTIC   POINT  OF  VIEW 

Max  MiJLLER.  (See  p.  25  of  this  book.)  —  In  the  Intro- 
duction to  the  Science  of  Religion,  Miiller  wrote  :  "  ReHgion  is  a 
mental  faculty  or  disposition,  which,  independent  of,  nay  in  spite 
of,  sense  and  reason,  enables  man  to  apprehend  the  Infinite  under 
different  names,  and  under  varying  disguises.  Without  that  faculty 
no  religion,  not  even  the  lowest  worship  of  idols  and  fetiches, 
would  be  possible  ;  and  if  we  will  but  listen  attentively,  we  can  hear 
in  all  religions  a  groaning  of  the  spirit,  a  struggle  to  conceive  the 
inconceivable,  to  utter  the  unutterable,  a  longing  after  the  In- 
finite, a  love  of  God."  (Pp.  13-14.)  This  "mental  faculty"  he 
calls  "  faith." 

This  use  of  the  term  "  faculty "  was  vigorously  attacked. 
Miiller,  yielding  in  a  measure  to  the  objections,  declared,  in  the 

339 


340  APPENDIX 

Origin  of  Religion,  that  he  did  not  mean  to  say  that  there  is  a 
separate  religious  consciousness.  "  When  we  speak  of  faith  as  a  re- 
Hgious  faculty,  in  man,  all  that  we  can  mean  is  our  ordinary  conscious- 
ness so  developed  and  modified  as  to  enable  us  to  take  cognizance 
of  religious  objects.  .  .  .  This  is  not  meant  in  a  new  sense  ...  it 
is  simply  the  old  consciousness  applied  to  new  objects."  If 
"  faculty  "  is  an  ambiguous  or  dangerous  word,  he  is  ready  to  re- 
place it  by  "  potential  energy,"  and  to  define  the  subjective  side 
of  religion  as  "  the  potential  energy  which  enables  man  to  appre- 
hend the  Infinite."  (P.  23.)  That  "faculty"  or  "potential 
energy,"  also  called  "faith,"  is,  like  reason,  a  development  of 
sensuous  perceptions,  but  a  development  of  a  different  kind.  The 
human  mind,  according  to  Miiller,  is  made  up  of  three  "  faculties  " 
or  "  potential  energies  "  :  sense,  reason,  faith.  The  last  two  are 
different  developments  of  sensuous  perception.  "  Our  apprehen- 
sion of  the  Infinite  takes  place  independently  of,  nay  in  spite  of, 
sense  and  reason."  The  facts  of  Religion,  subjective  and  objec- 
tive, can  be  explained  only  by  an  appeal  to  that  third  "  potential 
energy."  "We  have  in  that  perception  of  the  Infinite  the  root  of 
the  whole  historical  development  of  the  human  faith."  He  admits, 
however,  that  this  perception  is  at  first  obscure.  ^ 

To  make  religion  proceed  from  a  special  faculty  or  potential 
energy  is  to  open  a  chasm  between  secular  and  religious  life,  with- 
out any  sufficient  reason  for  so  doing.  One  clear  result  of  the 
psychological  investigations  of  religion  has  been  to  show  that  no 
particular  faculty  is  needed  to  account  for  religious  life. 

Max  Miiller's  use  of  the  words  "  perception  "  and  "  infinite  "  is 
also  open  to  serious  criticism.     At  times  perception  seems  to  be 

^  Tide  cannot  agree  with  Max  Miiller  that  "  the  perception  or  apprehension 
of  the  Infinite,  the  yearning  of  the  soul  after  God,  is  the  source  of  all  religion." 
The  point  he  will  not  admit  is  that  primitive  man  "  perceives  "  the  Infinite 
"  because  such  perception  requires  a  considerable  measure  of  self-knowledge 
and  reflection,  which  is  only  attainable  long  after  religion  has  come  into 
existence,  long  after  the  religious  spirit  has  revealed  itself.  The  origin  of  re- 
ligion consists  in  the  fact  that  man  has  the  Infinite  within  him,  even  before 
he  is  himself  conscious  of  it,  whether  he  recognizes  it  or  not.' ' 

"  It  is  man's  original,  unconscious  innate  sense  of  infinity  that  gives  rise  to 
his  first  stammering  utterances  of  that  sense,  and  to  all  his  beautiful  dreams 
of  the  past  and  the  future."  {Elements  of  the  Science  of  Religiott,  Vol.  II, 
Lecture  IX,  pp.  230,  233.) 


APPENDIX  341 

synonymous  with  feeling,  and  at  other  times  with  apprehension. 
In  the  Origin  of  Religion,  he  writes,  for  instance,  "  With  every 
finite  perception  there  is  a  concomitant  perception,  or,  if  that 
word  should  seem  too  strong,  a  concomitant  sentiment  or  presen- 
timent of  the  Infinite."  (P.  43.)  As  to  the  word  "infinite,"  I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  the  chief  service  it  renders  in  a  definition  of 
religion  is  to  betray  man's  ineradicable  megalomania.  What  other 
function  it  fulfils  in  Max  Miiller's  writings,  I  do  not  know. 

Has  any  one  ever  mistaken  the  principles  of  physiology  for 
therapeutics  or  the  sense  of  beauty  for  art  ?  Max  Miiller  has  to 
admit  that  throughout  a  whole  volume  he  confused  dogma  with 
religion  !  In  his  Gifford  Lectures  on  Natural  Religion,  he  refers 
to  the  critcisms  directed  against  his  conception  of  religion  and  says  : 
"  The  fact  was  that  in  my  former  writings  I  was  chiefly  concerned 
with  dogmatic  Religion.  .  .  .  Still  I  plead  guilty  to  not  having 
laid  sufficient  emphasis  on  the  practical  side  of  religion ;  I  admit 
that  mere  theories  about  the  Infinite,  unless  they  influence  human 
conduct,  have  no  right  to  the  name  of  Religion."  But  although  he 
thus  formally  recognized  this  truth,  it  never  acquired  in  his  mind 
its  full  meaning.  He  continued  to  write  as  if  a  particular  "  per- 
ception "  or  "  apprehension  "  constituted  religion. 

Herbert  Spencer.  (See  p.  26  of  this  book.)  —  Religion  has 
from  the  beginning  dimly  discerned  the  ultimate  verity  and  has 
never  ceased  to  insist  upon  this  truth,  — "  that  all  things  are  mani- 
festations of  a  Power  that  transcends  our  knowledge."  "The 
consciousness  of  a  mystery  is  traceable  to  the  rudest  fetichism. 
Each  higher  religious  creed,  rejecting  those  definite  and  simple 
interpretations  of  Nature  previously  given,  has  become  more  re- 
ligious by  doing  this.  As  the  quite  concrete  and  conceivable 
agencies  alleged  as  the  causes  of  things  have  been  replaced  by 
agencies  less  concrete  and  conceivable,  the  element  of  mystery 
has  of  necessity  become  more  predominant.  .  .  .  And  so  Re- 
ligion has  ever  been  approximating  towards  that  complete  rec- 
ognition of  this  mystery  which  is  its  goal.  .  .  .  No  exposure 
of  the  logical  inconsistency  of  its  conclusions  .  .  .  has  been  able 
to  weaken  its  allegiance  to  that  ultimate  verity  for  which  it 
stands.  .  .  .  there   still   remained   the   consciousness   of  a  truth 


342  APPENDIX 

which,  however  faulty  the  mode  in  which  it  had  been  expressed, 
was  yet  a  truth  beyond  cavil."     {First  Principles,  pp.  99,  100.) 

The  views  of  Miiller  and  Spencer  are  not  so  different  as  they 
might  seem  at  first  glance.  The  two  men  might  have  reached  the 
same  conclusion  if  one  of  them  had  not  remained  entangled  by 
the  way.  Max  MuUer  affirms  nothing  that  cannot  be  brought  into 
agreement  with  Spencer's  opinion,  provided  the  words  "  percep- 
tion "  "apprehension,"  "sentiment,"  used  interchangeably  by 
Miiller,  be  replaced  by  "  recognition  "  ;  and,  provided  that  "  In- 
finite "  be  interpreted  as  meaning  the  ultimate  mystery  of  things. 
This  liberal  interpretation  of  Max  Miiller  will  not  appear  far-fetched 
if  the  fact  is  recalled  that  he  names  the  faculty  by  which  we  appre- 
hend the  infinite  "  faith,"  and  also  that  he  sees  no  objection  to 
regarding  the  infinite  as  an  object  of  "  sentiment  "  rather  than 
as  an  object  of  "  perception." 

What  place  is  occupied  by  feeling  in  Spencer's  intellectual  in- 
terpretation is  not  altogether  clear.  But  this  at  least  is  evident : 
the  feelings  which  "  respond  "  to  religious  ideas  —  the  religious 
feelings  —  are  not  the  "  vital  elements  "  of  religion. 

Eduard  von  Hartmann. —  Hartmann's  utterances  on  religion 
leave  one  with  the  impression  that  he  had  not  reached  complete 
clearness.  According  to  him  religion,  although  it  is  an  "  affair  of 
the  feelings,"  has  for  its  foundation  metaphysical  conceptions.  A 
system  of  metaphysics  must  arouse  feelings  of  a  certain  kind  be- 
fore it  becomes  religion. 

"  The  man  who  carries  within  himself  metaphysical  conceptions 
of  such  a  nature  that  his  emotions  are  positively  affected  by  them 
possesses  religion  .  .  .  every  man  has  need  of  metaphysical  ideas 
in  order  to  satisfy  his  need  of  religion  ...  it  must  be  a  system  of 
metaphysics  which  will  serve  to  satisfy,  even  in  those  persons  who 
are  strangers  to  science,  directly,  the  need  of  metaphysics,  and,  in- 
directly, the  religious  need. 

"  This  metaphysics,  which  we  might  call  popular  metaphysics, 
is  religion.  However,  religion  consists  of  something  more  than 
the  metaphysical  ideas  of  the  masses ;  it  contains  the  capability  of 
discerning  the  means  and  directions  for  arousing  in  a  strong  and 
lasting  form  the  religious  sentiment  with  this  metaphysics  for  its 
foundation,  —  that  is  to  say,  religious  cultus ;  and  secondly,  reli- 


APPENDIX  343 

gion  contains  the  deductions  drawn  from  this  metaphysics  for  the 
practical  conduct  of  men;  in  other  words,  religious  ethics.  .  .  . 

"  Thus  we  see  that  religion  constitutes  the  whole  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  the  masses.  ...  In  fine,  religion  comprises  all  the 
idealism  of  the  masses,  art  not  being  accessible  to  them,  except 
under  a  form  too  coarse  to  elevate  them  to  artistic  idealism.  .  .  . 

"  The  masses  do  not  know  metaphysics  by  name,  but  they  do 
know  what  they  require  of  religion ;  namely,  that  it  should  give 
them  '  the  truth ' ;  not  all  the  truths  as  they  lie  scattered  in  the 
various  special  sciences,  but  the  truth  which  the  universal  science, 
philosophy,  strives  to  attain,  the  one  and  eternal  truth  able  to 
satisfy  their  unconscious  need  of  metaphysics."  {The  Religion  of 
the  Future,  pp.  73,  74,  75.) 

In  another  passage  he  describes  the  nature  of  the  "  metaphys- 
ical"  ideas  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  religion.  Although 
religion  "  needs  ideas  as  a  foundation  for  the  feelings,  yet  these 
ideas  must  be  as  little  abstract  as  possible,  and  the  reverse  of 
distinct  and  definite.  Indeed,  an  idea  which  is  intended  to  rouse 
the  religious  feelings  should  be  intuitive,  figurative,  fantastic,  and 
confused  to  the  last  degree."  {The  Religion  of  the  Future, 
p.  28.) 

Other  passages  in  Hartmann's  work  suggest  a  view  of  religion 
very  like  that  which  I  have  discussed  under  the  third  class;  — 
that  religion  is  "  a  consciousness  of  our  practical  relation  to  an 
invisible  spiritual  order."  He  writes,  for  instance  :  **  Moreover, 
all  tabooes  do  not  belong  to  religion  proper,  that  is,  they  are  not 
always  rules  of  conduct  for  the  regulation  of  man's  contact  with 
deities  that,  when  taken  in  the  right  way,  may  be  counted  on 
as  friendly.  .  .  ."  And  again  he  says  that  religion  in  the  true 
sense  begins  "  with  a  loving  reverence  for  known  gods,  who  are 
knit  to  their  worshippers  by  strong  bonds  of  kinship." 

James  Martineau.  —  Martineau  understands  by  religion  "the 
belief  in  an  ever  living  God,  that  is,  in  a  Divine  Mind  and  Will 
ruling  the  Universe  and  holding  moral  relations  with  mankind." 
{A  Study  of  Religion,  p.  i.) 

G.  J.  Romanes.  — "  The  distinguishing  feature  of  any  theory 
which  can  properly  be  termed  a  religion  is  that  it  should  refer 


344  APPENDIX 

to  the  ultimate  source  or  sources  of  things  ;  that  it  should  suppose 
this  source  to  be  an  objective,  intelligent,  and  personal  nature.  .  .  . 
To  speak  of  the  Religion  of  the  Unknowable,  the  Religion  of 
Cosmism,  the  Religion  of  Humanity,  and  so  forth,  where  the 
personality  of  the  First  Cause  is  not  recognized,  is  as  unmeaning 
as  it  would  be  to  speak  of  the  love  of  a  triangle,  or  the  rationality 
of  the  equator.  ... 

"  Religion  is  a  department  of  thought  having  for  its  object  a 
self-conscious  and  intelligent  Being."  {Thoughts  on  Religion, 
p.  41.) 

Hegel.  —  Hegel  defines  religion  as  "  the  knowledge  possessed 
by  the  finite  mind  of  its  nature  as  absolute  mind." 

In  the  opening  pages  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  he  de- 
scribes religion  in  an  eloquent  passage  :  "  It  is  the  realm  where  all 
enigmatical  problems  of  the  world  are  solved  ;  where  all  contra- 
dictions of  deep  musing  thoughts  are  unveiled  and  all  pangs  of 
feeling  soothed.  .  .  .  The  whole  manifold  of  human  relations, 
activities,  joys,  everything  that  man  values  and  esteems,  wherein 
he  seeks  his  happiness,  his  glory,  and  his  pride — all  find  their 
final  middle  point  in  religion,  in  the  thought,  consciousness,  and 
feeling  of  God.  God  is  therefore  the  beginning  and  the  end  of 
everything.  ...  By  means  of  religion  man  is  placed  in  relation  to 
this  centre,  in  which  all  his  other  relations  converge,  and  is  elevated 
to  the  realm  of  highest  freedom,  which  is  its  own  end  and  aim. 
This  relation  of  freedom  on  the  side  of  feeling  is  joy  which  we  call 
beatitude ;  ...  on  the  side  of  activity  its  sole  office  is  to  man- 
ifest the  honor  and  to  reveal  the  glory  of  God,  so  that  man  in  this 
relation  is  no  longer  chiefly  concerned  with  himself,  his  own  in- 
terests and  vanity,  but  rather  with  the  absolute  end  and  aim." 
(Quoted  from  Sterrett's  Studies  in  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
pp.  38-39.) 

F.  B.  Jevons.  —  "  Religion  as  a  form  of  thought  is  the  percep- 
tion of '  the  invisible  things  of  Him  through  the  things  that  are 
made.'  "     (^History  of  Religion^  pp.  9-10.) 

Ladd,  George  T.  —  In  the  following,  Ladd  identifies  religion 
with  a  theory  of  reality.     "  For  religion  is,  as  a  matter  of  histori- 


APPENDIX  345 

cal  and  psychological  fact,  always  metaphysical.  It  is  always  a 
naive  or  a  reasoned  theory  of  reality.  It  is  an  attempt  to  explain 
human  experience  by  relating  it  to  invisible  existences  that  belong, 
nevertheless,  to  the  real  world.  Indeed,  monotheism  finds  in  its 
One  and  Alone  God  the  Ultimate  Reality,  the  Being  from  whom 
all  finite  beings  proceed,  on  whom  they  all  depend,  and  to  whom 
they  all  owe  the  devotion  of  their  lives  in  a  faithful  allegiance. 
This,  however,  is  ontological  doctrine  —  somehow  postulated  ra- 
tionally, or  reasoned  out,  or  superstitiously  and  vainly  imagined." 
{Jr.  oj  Phil.,  Psy.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  1904,  Vol.  I,  No.  i, 
p.  9.) 

Hugo  Munsterberg.  — "  Thus  we  claim  that  religion  and  phi- 
losophy have  the  same  task.  Both  aim  to  apprehend  the  worlds 
of  values  as  ultimately  identical  with  each  other,  and  therefore  the 
world  —  totality  —  as  absolutely  valuable.  Both  philosophy  and 
religion  must  transcend  the  life-experience  for  that  end.  .  .  .  But 
the  supplementation  of  all  possible  experience  in  religion  and  phi- 
losophy takes  opposite  directions.  .  .  .  We  may  say  that  religion 
transcends  experience,  but  that  philosophy  goes  back  to  the  pre- 
suppositions of  experience.  Religion  constructs  a  superstructure 
which  overarches  the  experienced  world  ;  philosophy  builds  a  sub- 
structure which  supports  the  experienced  world.  For  that  reason 
religion  creates  God,  who  gives  the  value  of  holiness  to  the  world  ; 
philosophy  seeks  the  ultimate  foundation  in  the  external  act, 
which  gives  to  the  world  the  value  of  absoluteness."  And  further  : 
"  Religion  is  accordingly  also  a  form  of  apprehension  through  the 
overpersonal  consciousness.  ...  It  is  the  form  in  which  this  com- 
bined content  must  be  thought  in  order  to  become  a  common  self- 
asserting  world  at  all.  But  religion  is  the  form  of  forms  ;  it  is  the 
absolutely  valid  form  for  the  connection  of  that  which  is  itself 
found  in  various  forms."     {The  Eternal  Values,  p.  358.) 

In  the  above  passage  Professor  Munsterburg  speaks  of  religion 
as  "constructing,"  "creating"  gods,  as  a  "form"  in  which  the 
various  contents  of  consciousness  must  be  thought.  The  term 
"  religion "  as  he  uses  it  there  denotes,  it  is  clear,  the  system  of 
ideas,  of  conceptions,  within  which  religious  life  moves,  and  the 
mental  activities  by  which  it  is  built  up.     Religion  and  philosophy 


346  APPENDIX 

thus  understood  have,  of  course,  the  same  task ;  but,  in  this  sense, 
"  religion  "  means  the  philosophy  of  religious  life,  not  religious  life 
itself. 

A  more  discriminating  use  of  the  term  "  religion  "  appears  in 
the  following  passage  :  — 

"  Religion  is  the  completion  [^Erganzung]  of  experience.  It 
does  not  complete  merely  actual  experience ;  that  is  the  task  of 
science,  and  faith  would  do  more  than  simply  fill  up  the  gaps  in 
science.  Such  gaps  can  be  filled  only  by  means  of  possible  experi- 
ence, while  faith,  not  only  with  transcendent  but  also  with  immanent 
conceptions  of  God,  goes  beyond  all  that  is  given.  The  given 
universe  and  the  given  individual  powers  are  not  sufficient  to  enable 
us  to  experience  the  totality  of  the  ideal.  The  individual  who 
feels  values  completes  the  universe  through  revelation  and  his  own 
powers  through  prayer."     {Gfundziige,  y>'  i66.) 

That  Professor  Mtinsterberg  is  deahng  here  with  religion  itself 
and  no  longer  w-ith  the  concepts  of  religion  is  made  clear  by  the 
sense  given  to  the  word  Erganzung:  it  is  made  to  include  the 
making  of  oneself  whole. 

II 

AFFECTIVISTIC   POINT   OF   VIEW 

F.  ScHLEiERMACHER.  (See  p.  33  of  this  book.) — Schleier- 
macher  does  not  believe  that  feeling  can  exist  independently  of  the 
other  mental  processes.  He  says  expHcitly  of  perception,  feeling, 
and  activity,  that  "  they  are  not  identical  and  yet  are  insep- 
arable." 

For  him  religion  consists  in  certain  feelings  holding  a  definite 
relation  to  the  life  of  action  (morahty),  and  to  the  hfe  of  thought 
(science,  philosophy).  Religion  is  passivity,  contemplation.  By 
itself  it  does  not  urge  men  to  activity.  "  If  you  could  imagine  it 
implanted  in  man  quite  alone,  it  would  produce  neither  these  nor 
any  other  deeds.  The  man  .  .  .  would  not  act,  he  would  only 
feel."  (^Speeches  on  Religion '^.  ^l.)  But  if  religion  does  not  belong 
to  the  world  of  action,  no  more  does  it  belong  to  the  world  of 
thought:  "Religion  cannot  and  will  not  originate  in  the  pure 
impulse  to  know.  What  we  feel  and  are  conscious  of  in  religious 
emotions  is  not  the  nature  of  things,  but  their  operation  upon  us. 


APPENDIX  347 

What  you  may  know  or  believe  about  the  nature  of  things  is  far 
beneath  the  sphere  of  ReUgion."  {Ibid.,  p.  48.)  He  makes,  legiti- 
mately, a  sharp  distinction  between  the  feelings  themselves  and  the 
ideas  which  arise  when  the  feelings  are  made  the  objects  of  reflection  : 
"  If  you  call  these  ideas,"  says  he,  "  religious  principles  and  ideas, 
you  are  not  in  error.  But  do  not  forget  that  this  is  scientific  treat- 
ment of  religion,  knowledge  about  it,  and  not  rehgion  itself." 
{Ibid,  pp.  46,  47.) 

These  two  points  —  namely,  that  religion  is  not  morality,  and 
that  it  is  not  knowledge  —  are  persistently  emphasized  in  Schlei- 
ermacher's  writings.  It  is  not  clearly  explained  how  the  feelings 
which  constitute  religion  are  generated  and  how  they  differ  from 
the  non-religious  feelings.  "Your  feeling,"  he  says,  "is  piety 
[a  word  for  him  synonymous  with  religion],  in  so  far  as  it  expresses 
.  .  •  the  being  and  life  common  to  you  and  to  the  All."  {Ibid., 
p.  45.)  Religion  is  the  feeling  produced  upon  us  by  any  particular 
object,  i.e.  by  any  part  of  the  universe,  when  it  is  received,  felt  as 
a  part  of  the  whole,  "  not  as  limited  and  in  opposition  to  other 
things,  but  as  an  exhibition  of  the  Infinite  in  our  life.  Anything 
beyond  this,  any  effort  to  penetrate  into  the  nature  and  the  sub- 
tance  of  things,  is  no  longer  religion,  but  seeks  to  be  a  science  of 
some  sort."  {Ibid.,  p.  49.)  Further  on,  he  tries  again  to  describe 
the  kind  of  apprehension  which  determines  the  religious  feeling : 
"  The  sum  total  of  Religion  is  to  feel  that,  in  its  highest  unity, 
everything  that  stirs  our  emotions  is  one  in  feeling ;  to  feel  that 
aught  single  and  particular  is  only  possible  by  means  of  this  unity ; 
to  feel,  that  is  to  say,  that  our  being  and  living  is  a  being  and  liv- 
ing in  and  through  God."  He  adds,  "But  it  is  not  necessary  that 
the  Deity  should  be  presented  as  also  one  distinct  object."  {Ibid., 
p.  50.)  Within  the  limits  set  in  the  preceding  quotations,  i.e. 
provided  the  feeling  aroused  by  the  particular  object  reveals  the 
unity  of  the  whole,  every  feeling  is  religion.  This,  then,  is  clearly 
affirmed  in  the  discourse  on  the  Nature  of  Religion,  that  it  is  the 
action  of  particular  things  upon  us  that  underlies  all  religious 
emotions  ;  we  cannot "  have  "  religion  except  through  the  influence 
exercised  upon  us  by  concrete,  particular  things. 

In  the  Christliche  Glaubenslehre,  Schleiermacher  gives  a  defini- 
tion of  rehgion  which  differs  in  its  wording  from  that  found  in  the 
Reden.     It  is  in  this  later  work  that  he  reaches  the  oft-quoted 


348  APPENDIX 

formula  :  "  The  essence  of  religion  consists  in  the  feeling  of  an  ab- 
solute dependence."  To  render  fully  his  thought,  the  words 
"upon  the  Universe,"  or  "upon  God,"  should  be  added.  This 
formula  attempts  to  complete,  not  to  correct,  the  earlier  statement. 
He  had  said,  "  Religion  is  feeling,"  it  is  the  feeling  generated  in 
us  by  single  experiences  when  these  are  viewed  as  intimations  of 
the  whole  of  which  they  are  parts.  But  he  had  not  said  what  kind 
of  feeling  would  be  produced  under  these  circumstances.  In  the 
Glajibenslehre  he  adds  that  the  intuition  of  the  whole  through  the 
presentation  of  a  particular  object  produces  a  feeling  of  dependence. 
It  will  be  a  feeling  of  dependence,  because  in  these  experiences 
man  realizes  that  the  reaction  called  forth  by  the  particular  object 
is  utterly  insufficient,  since  at  bottom  it  is  a  reaction  by  which  he 
tries  to  meet,  not  the  particular  thing  which  has  called  it  forth,  but 
the  whole  which  it  represents. 

In  his  earlier  writings  Schleiermacher  avoided  the  word  "  God  " 
and  was  satisfied  to  use  impersonal  terms  :  the  All,  the  Whole,  the 
Universe,  the  Infinite.  Later  on  the  word  "  God  "  appears,  and  we 
find  him  making  a  distinction  between  the  Universe  and  God  which 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  had  in  mind  previously.  He  distin- 
guishes between  the  Whole  as  an  aggregate  of  mutually  conditioned 
parts  of  which  we  ourselves  are  one,  and  the  Unity  underneath 
this  coherence  which  conditions  all  things  and  conditions  our  re- 
lations to  the  other  parts  of  the  Whole. 

No  criticism  need  be  made  here  other  than  that  which  the 
reader  has  found  in  Chapter  II. 

C.  P.  TiELE.  (See  p.  33.) — "I  am  satisfied  that  a  careful 
analysis  of  religious  phenomena  Compels  us  to  conclude  that  they 
are  all  traceable  to  the  emotions  —  traceable  to  them,  I  say,  but  not 
originating  in  them.  Their  origin  lies  deeper."  {Science  of  Religion, 
Vol.  II,  p.  15.)  He  means  that  in  the  emotion  we  have  the 
"beginning  of  religion,  which  is  merely  the  awakening  of  religious 
consciousness,"  not  its  origin.     {3id.,  p.  25.) 

"  In  the  sphere  of  religion  the  emotion  consists  in  the  conscious- 
ness that  we  are  in  the  power  of  a  Being  whom  we  revere  as  the 
highest,  and  to  whom  we  feel  attracted  and  related ;  it  consists  in 
the  adoration  which  impels  us  to  dedicate  ourselves  entirely  to  the 


APPENDIX  349 

adored  object,  yet  also  to  possess  it  and  to  be  in  union  with  it." 
(^Ibid.,  p.  19.) 

"  We  mean  .  .  .  that  religion  is,  in  truth,  that  pure  and  reveren- 
tial disposition  or  frame  of  mind  which  we  call  piety.  .  .  .  Now, 
whenever  I  discover  piety  ...  I  maintain  that  its  essence,  and 
therefore  the  essence  of  religion  itself,  is  adoration.  In  adoration 
are  united  those  two  phases  of  religion  which  are  termed  by  the 
schools  '  transcendent '  and  '  immanent '  respectively,  or  which,  in 
religious  language,  represent  the  believer  as  '  looking  up  to  God  as 
the  Most  High  '  and  as  '  feeling  himself  akin  to  God  as  his  Father. ' 
For  adoration  necessarily  involves  the  elements  of  holy  awe, 
humble  reverence,  grateful  acknowledgment  of  every  token  of 
love,  hopeful  confidence,  lowly  self-abasement,  a  deep  sense  of 
one's  own  unworthiness  and  shortcomings,  total  self-abnegation, 
and  unconditional  conservation  of  one's  whole  life  and  one's  whole 
faculties.  .  .  .  But  at  the  same  time  —  and  herein  consists  its 
other  phase  —  adoration  includes  a  desire  to  possess  the  adored 
object,  to  call  it  entirely  one's  own."     {Ibid.,  pp.  198,  199.) 

Concerning  the  origin  of  religion,  Tiele  writes  that  it  "  begins 
with  conceptions  awakened  by  emotions  and  experiences,  and 
these  conceptions  awakened  produce  definite  sentiments,  which 
were  already  present  in  germ  in  the  first  religious  emotions,  but 
which  can  only  be  aroused  to  consciousness  by  these  conceptions ; 
and  these  sentiments  manifest  themselves  in  actions."  (Jbid., 
p.  67.) 

John  McTaggart.  —  "  Religion  is  clearly  a  state  of  mind.  It 
is  also  clear  that  it  is  not  exclusively  the  acceptance  of  certain 
propositions  as  true.  It  seems  to  me  that  it  may  best  be  de- 
scribed as  an  emotion  resting  on  a  conviction  of  a  harmony  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  universe  at  large."  This  presupposes, 
in  the  author's  mind,  belief  in  the  ultimate  goodness  of  the  uni- 
verse ;  otherwise  there  would  be,  according  to  him,  no  religion 
possible.  He  holds  that  this  definition  is  wide  enough  to  include 
among  religious  men  Plato,  Spinoza,  and  Hegel,  who  did  not 
accept  any  of  the  historical  religions.  {Sojne  Dogmas  of  Religio7i, 
London,  1906,  p.  3.) 

G.  SiMMEL.  —  "The  religious  life  means  the  whole  existence 
pitched  in  a  certain  key  [  Tonart] .     The  religious  feeling  [  Tonari\ 


350  APPENDIX 

arises  in  the  relation  of  man  to  external  nature,  to  fate,  to  human- 
ity. At  times  certain  sociological  conditions  and  relations  pos- 
sess, as  such,  the  religious  coloring.  The  relation  of  the  pious 
child  to  his  parents,  of  the  enthusiastic  patriot  to  his  country,  or 
of  the  humanitarian  cosmopoHtan  to  mankind,  the  relation  of  the 
workman  to  his  fellow-laborers,  or  of  the  proud  feudal  lord  to 
his  class,  the  relation  of  the  subject  to  the  master  under  whose 
command  he  stands,  or  of  the  faithful  soldier  to  the  army  —  all 
these  relations  have,  regarded  from  the  psychological  standpoint, 
a  common  '  tone,'  which  we  must  call  religious."  (^Die  Religion, 
Frankfurt  a.  M.,  Rutten  u.  Loening,  p.  79.) 

O.  Pfleiderer.  —  "  In  the  religious  consciousness  all  sides  of 
the  whole  personality  participate.  Of  course  we  must  recognize 
that  knowing  and  willing  are  here  not  ends  in  themselves  as  in 
science  and  morality,  but  rather  subordinated  to  feeling  as  the 
real  centre  of  religious  consciousness.  .  .  .  This  is  not  a  simple 
feeling,  but  a  combination  of  feelings  of  freedom  and  independ- 
ence." {The  Notion  and  Problem  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
Phil.  Rev.,  Vol.  II,  1893,  pp.  1-23.) 

Th.  Ribot.  —  "  In  every  religious  belief,  two  things  are  neces- 
sarily included  :  an  intellectual  element,  i.e.  an  item  of  knowledge 
constituting  the  object  of  the  belief  ;  an  effective  state,  i.e.  a 
feeling  which  accompanies  the  former  and  expresses  itself  in  acts. 
Whoever  does  not  possess  this  second  element  knows  not  the 
religious  feeling,  but  only  abstract  and  metaphysical  conceptions." 
(Zfl  Psychologie  des  Sentiments,  pp.  297-298.) 

George  M.  Stratton.  —  Religion  is  the  appreciation  of  an 
unseen  world,  usually  an  unseen  company ;  and  religion  is  also 
whatever  seems  clearly  to  be  moving  toward  such  an  appreciation 
or  to  be  returning  from  it.  Or  perhaps  it  might  better  be  de- 
scribed as  man's  whole  bearing  toward  what  seems  to  him  the 
"  Best  or  Greatest."  "  Religion  is  the  gradual  awakening  to 
the  weight  and  import  of  a  particular  order  of  objects."  {The 
Psychology  of  the  Religious  Life,  pp.  343,  345.) 

A.  RiTSCHL.  — "  In  all  religion  the  endeavor  is  made,  with 
the  help  of  the  exalted  spiritual  power   which   man  adores,   to 


APPENDIX  351 

solve  the  contradiction  in  which  man  finds  himself  as  a  part  of 
the  natural  world,  and  as  a  spiritual  personality,  which  makes 
the  claim  to  rule  nature." 

In  another  place  :  "  All  religion  is  interpretation  of  the  course 
of  the  world,  in  whatever  compass  it  is  recognized,  in  the  sense 
that  the  exalted  spiritual  powers  (or  the  spiritual  power),  which 
rule  in  or  over  it,  maintain  or  confirm  for  the  personal  spirit  its 
claims  or  its  independence  against  limitation  by  nature  or  the 
natural  operations  of  human  society."  (Ritschl,  A.,  Rechtferti- 
guTig  und  Versohnung,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  189,  17,  as  quoted  by  Garvie, 
The  Ritschlian  Theology,  pp.  162,  163.) 

W.  Herrmann.  —  "  The  religious  view  is  an  answer  to  the 
question,  '  How  must  the  world  be  judged,  if  the  highest  good 
is  to  be  real?'  while  metaphysics  deals  with  facts.  In  it 
we  inquire  in  what  universal  forms  all  being  and  happening 
can  be  represented  without  contradiction.  For  the  correctness 
of  these  representations  it  does  not  in  any  way  matter  in  what 
relation  to  the  aims  of  our  wills,  to  our  weal  or  woe,  things 
stand." 

"  For  theology  to  seek  a  basis  in  metaphysics  and  not  in  the 
certainties  of  the  religious  experience,  would  be  to  lean  on  an  arm 
of  flesh  and  to  distrust  '  the  spirit  of  the  living  God.'  " 

"The  concern  of  Religion  is  to  regard  the  multiplicity  of  the 
world  as  the  orderly  whole  of  means  by  which  the  highest  value  of 
the  pious  man,  which  is  expressed  in  feeling,  is  realized."  (Herr- 
mann, W.,  Die  Meiaphysik  in  der  Theologie,  as  reported  by  Garvie, 
The  Ritschlian  Theology,  pp.  64,  65,  174.) 

Daniel  Greenleaf  Thompson.  — "  Religion  is  the  aggregate 
of  those  sentiments  in  the  human  mind  arising  in  connection  with 
the  relations  assumed  to  subsist  between  the  order  of  nature  (in- 
clusive of  the  observer)  and  a  postulated  supernatural."  {The  Re- 
ligious Sentiment  of  the  Humati  Mind.) 

J.  A.  Comenius.  —  "  By  rehgion  we  understand  that  inner  ven- 
eration by  which  the  mind  of  man  attaches  and  binds  itself  to  the 
supreme  Godhead."     {Great  Didactic,  Keatinge  tr.,  p.  190.) 


3S2  APPENDIX 

III 

VOLUNTARISTIC  OR  PRACTICAL  POINT  OF  VIEW 

William  James.  (See  p.  39.)  —  Professor  James  starts  with  a 
very  broad  definition,  which  he  gradually  narrows  until  he  brings 
into  agreement  with  the  common  use  of  the  word  "  religion. "  "  In 
the  broadest  and  nmost  general  terms  possible  one  might  say  that 
religious  life  consists  of  the  belief  that  there  is  an  unseen  order  and 
that  our  supreme  good  lies  in  harmoniously  adjusting  ourselves 
thereto.  This  behef  and  this  adjustment  are  the  religious  attitude 
of  the  soul."     {The  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  p.  53.) 

But  however  justifiable  this  conception  may  be,  it  is  too  inclu- 
sive to  agree  with  the  meaning  generally  given  to  religion.  No 
attitude  is  accounted  religious  unless  it  is  grave  and  serious ;  the 
trifling,  sneering  attitude  of  a  Voltaire  must  be  excluded  if  we 
would  not  strain  too  much  the  ordinary  use  of  the  word.  But  if 
religion  does  not  include  light  irony,  neither  does  it  include 
grumbling  and  complaint.  The  mood  of  a  Schopenhauer  or  of  a 
Nietsche,  though  often  relieved  by  an  ennobling  sadness,  is  almost 
as  often  mere  peevishness  running  away  with  the  bit  between  its 
teeth.  The  sallies  of  such  men  "  lack  the  purgatorial  note  which 
religious  sadness  gives  forth.  .  .  .  There  must  be  something 
solemn,  serious,  and  tender  about  any  attitude  which  we  denominate 
religious.  If  glad,  it  must  not  grin  or  snicker  ;  if  sad,  it  must  not 
scream  or  curse." 

But  still  further  elimination  is  needed  ;  for  the  conception  as  it 
now  stands  would  include  the  chilling  reflections  of  Marcus  Aure- 
lius  on  the  eternal  reason,  as  well  as  the  passionate  outcry  of  Job. 
It  would  encompass  what  we  are  tempted  to  call  philosophical  or 
ethical  rather  than  religious  attitudes ;  the  grave,  austere  submis- 
son  of  the  stoic,  as  well  as  the  "  enthusiastic  temper  of  espousal " 
characteristic  of  the  mood  commonly  -called  reUgious.  {Ibid., 
p.  38.     See  the  whole  of  Lecture  II.) 

A.  Reville.  —  "  Religion  rests  above  all  upon  the  need  of  man 
to  realize  an  harmonious  synthesis  between  his  destiny  and  the  op- 
posing influences  he  meets  in  the  world."  {La  Religion  des peuples 
non-civilises ,  Vol.  I,  p.  120.) 


APPENDIX  353 

H.  BosANQUET.  —  "A  man's  religion,  it  may  be  said,  is  that  set 
of  objects,  habits,  and  convictions,  whatever  it  might  prove  to  be, 
which  he  would  die  for  rather  than  abandon,  or  at  least  would 
feel  himself  excommunicated  from  humanity  if  he  did  abandon. 
It  would  follow  from  this  that  his  actual  religion  may  differ  in  any 
degree  from  his  nominal  creed.  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  be 
contended  by  students  of  the  philosophy  of  religion  that  only 
those  convictions  which  are  called  religious  par  excellence  in  the 
normal  sense  are  capable  of  affording  in  the  fullest  degree  that 
support,  and  that  sense  of  triumphant  unity,  which  seem  to  be  the 
central  facts  of  religious  experience."  (Baldwin's  Dictionary,  art. 
Religion,  Philosophy  of.) 

G.  Sergi. — Religion,  according  to  Sergi,  is  "a  pathological 
manifestation  of  the  protective  function,  a  sort  of  deviation  of 
the  normal  function  .  .  .  ,  a  deviation  caused  by  ignorance  of  nat- 
ural causes  and  of  their  effects."      (Z«  Emotions,  p.  404.) 

Hiram  M.  Stanley.  —  "  We  take  it  then  that  religion  must  be 
biologically  defined  as  a  specific  mode  of  reaction  to  high  supe- 
riorities of  environment,  or  psychologically  as  a  perception  of  a 
highly  superior  being,  leading  to  a  peculiar  mode  of  emotion  and 
will  toward  that  being,  and  thus  securing  the  most  advantageous 
action.  The  reverential  and  worshipful  emotion  spent  is  the 
essence  of  religion,  and  whenever  this  is  found  among  the  lowest 
animals,  or  the  highest  specimens  of  mankind,  there  is  religion." 
{^On  the  Psychology  of  Religion,  Psychol.  Rev.,  1898,  Vol.  V,  p.  258.) 

J.  G.  Frazer.  —  "  By  religion,  then,  I  understand  a  propitiation 
or  conciliation  of  powers  superior  to  man  which  are  believed  to 
direct  and  control  the  course  of  Nature  and  of  human  life."  {The 
Golden  Bough,  2d.  ed.,  Vol.  I,  p.  63.) 

Goblet  d'Alvtella.  — "  These  three  elements,  common  to  all 
organized  religions,  may  be  classed  as  follows  :  — 

"i.  The  belief  in  the  existence  of  superhuman  beings  who  inter- 
vene in  a  mysterious  manner  in  the  destinies  of  man  and  the  course 
of  nature. 

2A 


354  APPENDIX 

"  2.  Attempts  to  draw  near  to  these  beings  or  to  escape  them,  to 
forecast  the  object  of  their  intervention  and  the  form  it  will  take, 
or  to  modify  their  action  by  conciHation  or  compulsion. 

"  3.  Recourse  to  the  mediation  of  certain  individuals  supposed 
to  have  special  qualifications  for  success  in  such  attempts. 

"4.  The  placing  of  certain  customs  under  the  sanction  of  the 
superhuman  powers."     (The  Hibbert  Lectures  for  1891,  p.  4.) 

Henry  Rutgers  Marshall.  —  Considering  religion  objectively, 
Marshall  concludes  that  it  consists  in  those  special  activities  which 
imply  restraint  of  individualism,  and  that  these  activities,  or  at 
least  the  general  tendencies  from  which  they  spring,  are  instinc- 
tive. "  The  restraint  of  individualistic  impulses  to  racial  ones  (the 
suppression  of  our  will  to  a  higher  will)  seems  to  me  to  be  of  the 
very  essence  of  religion:  the  belief  in  the  Deity,  as  usually  found, 
being  from  the  psychological  point  of  view  an  attachment  to,  rather 
than  of  the  essence  of,  the  religious  feeling."  {Instinct  and  Reason, 
Macmillan,  1898,  p.  329.  See,  for  comparison,  Benjamin  Kidd's 
Social  Evolution,  p.  103,  and  Hiram  M.  Stanley's  paper  On  the 
Psychology  of  Religion,  Psychol.  Rev.,  1898,  Vol,  V,  p.  258.) 

Marshall's  argument  in  support  of  the  instinctiveness  of  religion 
runs  somewhat  as  follows.  Religion  is  not,  on  the  whole,  advan- 
tageous to  the  individual ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  in  most  cases 
clearly  detrimental  and  would  therefore  not  have  remained  a  fac- 
tor in  human  societies  unless  it  was  advantageous  to  the  race. 
That  religious  activities  are  detrimental  to  the  individual  and 
advantageous  to  the  race,  is  Marshall's  thesis.  Practices  of  this 
kind  remain  in  existence  through  the  survival  of  the  fittest  race. 
This  implies  the  establishment  of  the  practices,  or  at  least  of  the 
tendencies  leading  to  them,  as  instincts. 

It  appears  in  what  precedes  that  Marshall  includes  under  "  in- 
stinct "  not  only  congenital  activities  relatively  definite,  but  also 
others.  In  instincts,  "  the  definiteness  and  the  fixity  of  the  actions 
is  of  very  secondary  moment,  that  which  is  important  being  the 
fact  that  there  exists  a  biological  end  which  determines  the  trend 
of  these  organized  activities."  In  this  wider  sense  religion 
may  well  be  called  an  instinct,  but  in  this  sense  the  "  instinctive 
nature  "  of  religion  ceases  to  have  any  particular  significance.     For 


APPENDIX  355 

if  only  "  the  tendencies  to  the  main  drift  "  of  religion  are  instinctive, 
then  what  is  true  of  religion  in  this  respect  is  true  also  of  every 
other  human  activity. 

That  religious  activities  are  of  value  to  the  race,  no  one  will 
doubt,  but  the  opinion  that  they  are  on  the  whole  detrimental  to 
the  individual  seems  to  me  the  result  of  an  insufficient  investiga- 
tion of  religious  life.  The  facts  upon  which  Marshall  places 
emphasis  —  seclusion,  vision,  fasting,  one  aspect  of  prayer,  one 
aspect  of  sacrifice  —  do  not  at  all  represent  the  whole  of  religious 
life. 

F.  ToNNiES.  —  Religion  "  is  essentially  social  and  ...  of  a 
twofold  nature,  apparently  contradictory,  and  indeed  very  often 
actually  conflicting.  For  its  function  is  first  to  validate  and  fortify 
authority,  consequently  to  make  the  strong  and  powerful  more 
strong  and  powerful  .  .  . ;  but  second,  it  goes  very  far  in  protect- 
ing and  supporting  the  weak,  notably  women  and  children,  old  age, 
widows  and  orphans.  .  .  .  The  influence  of  the  first  function  is 
eminently /^//V/V^/,  while  the  second  may  be  called  ethical.  {The 
Origin  and  Function  of  Religion,  a  discussion,  by  A.  E.  Crawley 
and  others,  in  Sociological  Papers,  1906,  Macmillan,  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  267.) 

Benj.\min  Kidd.  —  "A  religion  is  a  form  of  belief  providing  an 
ultra-rational  sanction  for  that  large  class  of  conduct  in  the  indi- 
vidual where  his  interests  and  the  interests  of  the  social  organism 
are  antagonistic  and  by  which  the  former  are  rendered  subordinate 
to  the  latter  in  the  general  interests  of  the  evolution  which  the 
race  is  undergoing."     {Social  Evolution,-^.  103.) 

A.  CoMTE.  —  "  Religion,  then,  consists  in  regulating  each  one's 
individual  nature,  and  forms  the  rallying  point  for  all  the  separate 
individuals. 

"To  constitute  a  complete  and  durable  harmony  what  is  wanted 
is  really  to  bind  together  man's  inner  nature  by  love  and  then  to 
bind  the  man  to  the  outer  world  by  faith.  Such,  generally  stated, 
is  the  necessary  participation  of  the  heart  to  the  synthetical  state, 
or  unity,  of  the  individual  or  the  society."  {Catechism  of  Positive 
Religion,  pp.  46,  51.) 


356  APPENDIX 

Thomas  Davidson.  —  "A  religion  is  that  which  places  us  in 
such  harmony  with  our  environment  that  we  attain  the  highest 
possible  development  in  knowledge,  love,  and  will.  But  surely  no 
institution  was  ever  better  calculated  for  this  than  our  republic." 

"  I  think,  then,  we  may  conclude,  not  only  that  Americanism  is 
a  religion,  but  that  it  is  the  noblest  of  all  rehgions,  that  which  best 
insures  the  realization  of  the  highest  manhood  and  womanhood, 
and  points  them  to  the  highest  goal, — a  goal  which  it  is  their 
task  throughout  eternity  to  approach  without  reaching.  It  is  a 
religion,  too,  that  unifies  our  present  life  with  eternal  hfe,  and 
identifies  our  civil  with  our  religious  Hfe.  It  is  a  religion  that  can 
be  taught  to  every  human  being,  and  that,  when  taught,  will  make 
all  men  brothers.  It  can  be  made  the  principle  of  ethical 
life  in  all  its  phases,  —  domestic,  social,  and  political.  Re- 
ligion need  no  longer  be  banished  from  our  public  schools,  as  a 
mere  matter  of  individual  opinion,  when  it  is  really  the  mainspring 
of  social  life.  In  teaching  children  to  lead  the  life  of  true  Ameri- 
cans, we  shall  be  leading  them  in  the  paths  of  eternal  life." 
(American  Democracy  as  a  Religion,  Internal.  Jr.  of  Ethics, 
Vol.  X,  pp.  37,  38,  39.) 

Renan.  —  "  My  religion  is  now  as  ever  the  progress  of  reason ; 
in  other  words,  the  progress  of  science."  {The  Future  of  Science, 
Preface.) 

Edward  Cairo.  — "  Without  as  yet  attempting  to  define  reli- 
gion, ...  we  may  go  as  far  as  to  say  that  a  man's  religion  is  the 
expression  of  his  ultimate  attitude  to  the  universe,  the  summed-up 
meaning   and   purport  of  his   whole    consciousness   of    things." 

"...  it  is  always  the  consciousness,  in  some  more  or  less  ade- 
quate form,  of  a  divine  power  as  the  principle  of  unity  in  a  world 
of  which  we  are  not  only  spectators,  but  parts.  Indeed,  the 
presence  of  this  unity  as  an  element  or  presupposition  of  our  con- 
sciousness is  the  only  reason  of  man's  being  religious  at  all." 
(^Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  I,  pp.  30,  235.) 

William  Ralph  Inge.  —  "  Our  consciousness  of  the  beyond  is, 
I  say,  the  raw  material  of  all  religion."  {Christian  Mysticism, 
Bampton  Lectures  for  1899,  p.  5.) 


APPENDIX  357 

Feldc  Abler.  —  "  Religion  is  that  which  brings  man  into  touch 
with  the  infinite  :  this  is  its  mission.  If  we  put  aside  the  mate- 
riaUstic  explanations  of  morality,  and  see  the  majesty,  the 
inexplicable  augustness  of  it,  we  shall  find  that,  in  the  moral  life 
itself,  the  moral  experience  itself,  we  possess  religion.  Rehgion 
is  at  the  core  of  it,  for  religion  is  the  connection  of  man's  life  with 
the  absolute,  and  the  moral  law  is  an  absolute  law."  {The  Reli- 
gion of  Duty,  p.  94.) 

A.  Sabatier.  —  Religion  "is  a  commerce,  a  conscious  and 
willed  relation  into  which  the  soul  in  distress  enters  with  the 
mysterious  power  on  which  it  feels  that  it  and  its  destiny  depend." 
(^Outlines  of  a  Philosophy  of  Religion,"^.  27.) 

"  What  we  call  the  religious  consciousness  in  a  man  is  the  feel- 
ing of  the  relation  in  which  he  stands,  and  wills  to  stand,  to  the 
universal  principle  on  which  he  knows  himself  to  depend,  and 
with  the  universe  in  which  he  sees  himself  to  be  a  part  of  one 
great  whole." 

"This  feeling,  filial  in  regard  to  God,  fraternal  in  regard  to 
man,  is  that  which  makes  a  Christian."     {Ibid.,  pp.  147,  149.) 

J.  RovcE.  — "  Religion  is  the  consciousness  of  our  practical 
relation  to  an  invisible,  spiritual  order." 

Upton.  — "  It  is  the  felt  relationship  in  which  the  finite  self- 
consciousness  stands  to  the  immanent  and  universal  ground  of  all 
being,  which  constitutes  religion."  {The  Basis  of  Religious  Belief, 
Hibbert  Lectures  for  1893.) 

R.  J.  Campbell.  — "  All  religion  begins  in  cosmic  emotion. 
It  is  the  recognition  of  an  essential  relationship  between  the  human 
soul  and  the  great  whole  of  things  of  which  it  is  the  outcome  and 
expression.  The  mysterious  universe  is  always  calling,  and,  in 
some  form  or  other,  we  are  always  answering.  .  .  .  But  religion, 
properly  so-called,  begins  when  the  soul  consciously  enters  into 
communion  with  this  higher-than-self  as  with  an  all-comprehend- 
ing intelligence ;  it  is  the  soul  instinctively  turning  towards  that 
from  whence  it  came  ...  it  is  the  soul  reaching  forth  to  the 
great  mysterious  whole  of  things,  the  higher-than-self,  and  seeking 


358  APPENDIX 

for  closer  and  ever  closer  communion  therewith."     {The  New 
Theology,  p.  i6.) 

E.  Kant.  —  "  Religion  is  (considered  subjectively)  the  recogni- 
tion of  all  our  duties  as  divine  commands."  {Die  Religion  inner- 
halb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunfty  Viertes  Stuck,  erster 
Theil.) 

Prince  Kropotkin.  —  This  leader  of  the  Anarchist  movement 
stresses  the  social  aspect  of  religion.  For  him,  "  a  passionate  de- 
sire for  working  out  a  new,  better  form  of  society"  is  a  religious 
impulse.  {The  Ethical  Need  of  the  Present  Day, T\it  Nineteenth 
Century,  August,  1904,  Vol.  LVI,  pp.  207-226.) 

F.  W.  H.  Myers.  —  Religion  is  "  the  sane  and  normal  re- 
sponse of  the  human  spirit  to  all  that  we  know  of  cosmic  law  ;  that 
is,  to  the  known  phenomena  of  the  universe,  regarded  as  an  intel- 
ligible whole.  .  .  .  For,  from  my  point  of  view,  man  cannot  be 
too  religious.  I  desire  that  the  environing,  the  interpenetrating 
universe,  —  its  energy,  its  life,  its  love,  —  should  illumine  in  us, 
in  our  low  degree,  that  which  we  ascribe  to  the  World-Soul,  say- 
ing, '  God  is  Love,'  '  God  is  Light.'  The  World-Soul's  infinite 
energy  of  omniscient  benevolence  should  become  in  us  an  en- 
thusiasm of  adoring  cooperation,  —  an  eager  obedience  to  what- 
soever with  our  best  pains  we  can  discern  as  the  justly  ruling  prin- 
ciple—  TO  i7ye/AoviKoi/  —  without  US  and  within."  {Human  Per- 
sonality, Vol.  II,  pp.  284-285.) 

Daniel  G.  Brinton.  —  "  There  is  no  one  belief  or  set  of  beliefs 
which  constitutes  a  religion.  We  are  apt  to  suppose  that  every 
creed  must  teach  a  belief  in  a  god  or  gods,  in  an  immortal  soul, 
and  in  a  divine  government  of  the  world.  .  .  .  No  mistake  could 
be  greater.  The  religion  which  to-day  counts  the  largest  number 
of  adherents.  Buddhism,  rejects  every  one  of  these  items."  {Reli- 
gions of  Primitive  Peoples,  American  Lectures  on  the  History  of 
Religions  for  1896-1897,  p.  28.) 

After  reviewing  the  principal  theories  of  the  origin  of  religion, 
he  expresses  his  own  opinion  as  follows  :  "  The  real  explanation 
of  the  origin  of  religion  is  simple  and  universal.  ...  It  makes 
no  difference  whether  we  analyze  the  superstitions  of  the  rudest 


APPENDIX  359 

savages,  or  the  lofty  utterances  of  John  the  EvangeHst,  or  of 
Spinoza  the  'god-intoxicated  philosopher';  we  shall  find  one  and 
the  same  postulate  to  the  faith  of  all. 

"This  universal  postulate,  the  psychic  origin  of  all  religious 
thought,  is  the  recognition,  or,  if  you  please,  the  assumption,  that 
conscious  volition  is  the  ultimate  source  of  all  Force.  It  is  the 
belief  that  behind  the  sensuous,  phenomenal  world,  distinct  from  it, 
giving  it  form,  existence,  and  activity,  lies  the  ultimate,  invisible, 
immeasurable  power  of  Mind,  of  conscious  Will,  of  Intelligence, 
analogous  in  some  way  to  our  own  ;  and,  —  mark  this  essential 
corollary,  —  that  man  is  in  comtnunication  with  it. 

"  What  the  highest  religions  thus  assume  was  likewise  the  founda- 
tion of  the  earliest  and  most  primitive  cults.  The  one  universal 
trait  amid  their  endless  forms  of  expression  was  the  unalterable 
faith  in  Mind,  in  the  supersensuous,  as  the  ultimate  source  of  all 
force,  all  life,  all  being."  {Religions  of  Primitive  Peoples,  Ameri- 
can Lectures  on  the  History  of  Religions  for  1896-189 7,  pp.  47, 
48.) 

In  an  earlier  book  {The  Religious  Sentiment,  p.  79)  Brinton 
gave  the  following  definition :  "  Expectant  attention  directed 
toward  an  event  not  under  known  control,  with  a  concomitant  idea 
of  Cause  and  Power." 

The  authors  of  the  three  following  quotations  are  concerned 
with  the  origin  of  religion. 

Thomas  Hobbes.  —  "And  in  these  four  things.  Opinions  of 
Ghosts,  Ignorance  of  second  causes.  Devotion  towards  what  men 
fear,  and  Taking  of  things  Casuall  for  Prognostiques,  consisteth 
the  Naturall  seed  of  Religion."      {Leviathan,  Cambridge,   1904, 

P-  73-) 

David  Hume. —  "We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that  in  all  na- 
tions .  .  .  the  first  ideas  of  religion  arose  not  from  a  contemplation 
of  the  works  of  nature,  but  from  a  concern  with  regard  to  the 
events  of  life,  and  fi-om  the  incessant  hopes  and  fears,  which  actu- 
ate the  human  mind."  {Essays,  Vol.  II,  1889,  The  Natural  His- 
tory of  Religions,  p.  315.) 

R.  R.  Marrett —  "Though  open  to  conviction,  therefore,  I  still 
incline  to  regard  awe  as  the  bottom  fact  in  religion,  and  to  suppose 
wonder-working  to  have  become  distinctly  religious  just  in  so  far  as 


360  APPENDIX 

it  came  to  be  regarded  with  awe,  namely,  as  something  supranor- 
mal.  My  counter-hypothesis,  in  short,  is  this,  that  the  essence  of 
religion  is  miracle,  and  that  the  '  miracle  of  grace  '  is  but  one  form 
of  miracle  and  therefore  of  religion."  (  The  Origin  and  Function  of 
Religion^  a  discussion,  by  A.  E.  Crawley  and  others,  in  Sociologi- 
cal Papers,  1906,  Macmillan,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  267.) 

W.  WuNDT. —  "In  my  opinion,  the  question  can  only  be 
answered  in  one  way  :  all  ideas  and  feelings  are  religious  which 
refer  to  ati  ideal  existence,  an  existence  that  fully  corresponds 
to  the  wishes  and  requirements  of  the  human  mind."  "The 
endeavor  after  an  existence  that  shall  satisfy  the  wishes  and 
requirements  of  the  human  mind "  is  "  the  original  source  of 
religious  feeling."  {Ethics,  Vol.  I,  The  Facts  of  the  Moral  Life,  tr. 
by  Gulliver  and  Titchener,  Macmillan,  1S97,  pp.  59,  60.)  This 
ideal  he  characterizes  as  changeable,  —  crude  or  refined  according 
to  the  intellectual  and  aesthetic  culture  of  the  people  concerned. 
It  is  "  a  product  of  human  feehng  and  imagination." 

Wundt's  Classification — Wundt  finds  three  fundamentally 
different  hypotheses  in  the  field.  "  We  may  term  them  iht  auton- 
otnous,  the  metaphysical,  and  the  ethical  theories  of  religion. 

"  (i)  The  autonomous  theory,  plainly  foreshadowed  in  the  views 
of  Hamann  and  Jacobi,  became  explicit  in  the  work  of  Schleier- 
macher.  It  maintains  that  religion  is  an  independent  domain, 
above  and  beyond  those  of  metaphysics  and  ethics.  While  the 
subject  of  metaphysics  is  theoretical  knowledge  of  finite  things, 
and  that  of  ethics  the  relations  of  empirical  conduct,  religion  is  an 
'immediate  consciousness  of  the  universal  existence  of  all  finitude 
in  infinity,  of  all  temporal  things  in  things  eternal,'  or,  as  Schleier- 
macher  expressed  it  later,  '  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence.' 

"(2)  The  metaphysical  theory  identifies  religion  with  specula- 
tive knowledge  of  the  universe.  This  may  either  be  regarded  as 
a  knowledge  to  which  human  thought  attains  by  the  mediation  of 
ideas  (the  older  rationalism),  or  made  a  phase  of  the  dialectical 
development  of  the  absolute  mind  (modern  speculative  idealism). 
Hegel's  definition  of  religion  fits  both  conceptions  equally  well. 
It  runs  as  follows  :  *  Religion  is  the  knowledge  possessed  by  the 
finite  mind  of  its  nature  as  absolute  mind.'      Here  there  is  an 


APPENDIX  361 

express  intention  to  abolish  the  difference  between  religion  and 
philosophy,  or  at  least  to  make  it  appear  unessential  and  merely 
external.  .  .  . 

"(3)  Finally,  the  ethical  theory  sees  in  religion  the  realization 
of  moral  postulates.  This  mode  of  thinking  had  its  roots  in  the 
'  illuminated  '  deism  of  the  eighteenth  century ;  but  its  most  in- 
fluential representative  was  Kant,  whose  doctrines  are  still  widely 
current  in  philosophical  and  theological  circles.  Kant  calls  re- 
ligion '  a  knowledge  of  all  our  duties  as  divine  commands,'  and  so 
makes  it  the  sum-total  of  all  the  hypotheses  that  we  are  compelled 
to  set  up,  whether  to  explain  the  existence  of  the  moral  law  or  to 
assure  its  realization.  As  these  presuppositions  lead  to  transcen- 
dental ideas,  empty  of  experiential  contents,  they  are  objects  of 
faith  and  not  of  knowledge.  .  .  ."  {Ethics,  Vol.  I,  The  Fads  of 
the  Moral  Life,  tr.  by  Gulliver  and  Titchener,  Macmillan,  1897,  pp. 

49-51-) 

Wundt  criticises  these  three  theories  as  follows  : 

"  (i)  The  explanation  proposed  by  the  autonomous  theory  is  too 
indefinite.  While  it  makes  religion  an  immediate  knowledge  of 
God,  or  a  feeling  of  absolute  dependence,  it  leaves  the  object  of 
this  knowledge  or  feeling  entirely  undefined.  (2)  The  answer 
given  by  the  ethical  theory  is  too  narrow.  Even  if  we  incline  to 
see  the  principal  value  of  religion  in  its  ethical  effect,  or  believe 
that  religion  is  completely  contained  in  morality,  we  cannot  avoid 
the  conclusion  that,  as  things  are  now,  ethos  and  religion  are 
really  not  identical  in  the  human  consciousness,  and  that  religion 
is  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  special  ethical  attitude.  (3)  Finally,  the 
fault  of  the  metaphysical  theory,  in  both  its  forms,  is  that  it  con- 
founds religious  ideas  with  intellectual  problems."  {Ibid.,  pp. 
57-58.) 

THE  AUTHOR'S   PUBLICATIONS  ON   THE 
PSYCHOLOGY  OF   RELIGION 

1 .  Studies  in  the  Psychology  of  Religious  Phenomena  [on  conver- 

sion], Amer.  Jr.  of  Psy.,  1896,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  309-385. 

2.  The  Psycho-Physiology  of  the  Categorical  Imperative ;  a  chapter 

in  the  psycho-physiology  of  ethics,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psy.,  1897, 
Vol.  VIII,  pp.  528-559. 


362  APPENDIX 

3.  hitrodtictio7t  to  a  Psychological  Study  of  Religion,  Monist,  1901, 

Vol.  XI,  pp.  195-225. 

4.  The  Cotitents  of  Religious  Consciousness,  Monist,  1901,  Vol.  XI, 

PP-  536-573- 

5.  Religion,  its  Impulses  and  its  Ends,  Bibliotheca   Sacra,  1901, 

Vol.  58,  pp.  751-773- 

6.  Les   Tendances  Religieiise  chez  Ics  Mystiques  Chritiens,  Revue 

Philosophique,  1902,  Vol.  54,  pp.  1-36,  441-487. 

7.  The  State  of  Mystical  Death ;  an  instance  of  internal   adapta- 

tion, Amer.  Jr.  of  Psy.,  Commemorative  number,  1903,  Vol 
14,  pp.  133-146. 

8.  Empirical  Data  on  Immortality,  Internat.  Jr.  of  Ethics,  1903 

Vol.  14,  pp.  90-105. 

9.  Professor   William  fames' s  Interpretation   of  Religiojis   Expe 

rience,  Internat.  Jr.  of  Ethics,  1904,  Vol.  14,  pp.  323-339. 

10.  Faith,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Relig.  Psy.  and  Educ,  1904,  Vol.  I,  pp 

65-82. 

1 1 .  The  Field  and  the  Problems  of  the  Psychology  of  Religion,  Amer, 

Jr.  of  Relig.  Psy.  and  Educ,  1904,  Vol.  I,  pp.  155-167. 

12.  The  Psychology  of  the  Christian  Mystics,  Mind,  N.  S.,  Vol.  14; 

pp.  15-27. 

13.  Fear,  Awe,  and  the  Sublime,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Relig.  Psy.  and  Educ 

1906,  Vol.  2,  pp.  1-23. 

14.  Revue  Generate  de  Psychologic  Religieuse,  Ann^e  Psychologique 

1905,  Vol.  XI,  pp.  482-493- 

15.  Revue  Generate  de  Psychologic  Religieuse,  Annde  Psychologique 

1906,  Vol.  12,  pp.  550-569. 

16.  Religion  as  a  Factor  in  the  Struggle  for  Life,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Relig 

Psy.  and  Educ,  1907,  Vol.  2,  pp.  307-343. 

17.  The  Psychological  Origin  of  Religion,  Monist,  1909,  Vol.  19,  pp 

27-35- 

18.  Magic  and  Religion,  Sociological  Review,  January,   1909,   pp 

20-35. 

19.  The  Psychological  Nattire  of  Religion,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Theol.,  Jan 

uary,  1909,  pp.  77-85- 

20.  Three  Types  of  Behavior,  Amer.  Jr.  of  Psy.,  1909,  Vol.  20,  pp 

107-119. 

21.  La  Religion  con^ue  convne  fonction  biologiqtte,  Sixieme  Congres 

International  de  Psychologic,  Geneve,  Rapports  et  Comptes 
Rendus,  pp.  1 18-125. 

22.  Les  Relations  de  la  Religion  avec  la  Science  et  la  Philosophic, 

ibid.,  pp.  125-137. 

23.  The  Psychological  Origin  and  the  Nature  of  Religion,  Archibald 

Constable  and  Co.,  London,  1909,  p.  95- 


APPENDIX  363 

If  questions  of  priority  were  to  arise  regarding  views  ad- 
vanced in  this  book,  they  should  be  settled  by  reference  to 
the  papers  listed  above  in  which  have  appeared  much  of 
the  substance  of  this  volume. 

The  topics  treated  in  these  publications  cover,  in  a  provisional 
manner,  a  much  wider  field  than  the  present  book.  I  hope  to  be  able 
to  complete,  at  a  not  too  distant  date,  the  task  I  have  set  myself. 


INDEX   OF   AUTHORS 


Abbott,  LjTnan,  218. 

Adler,  Felix,  328,  330,  331,  357. 

Ames,  E.  S.,  51,  53,  54. 

Anselm,  209. 

Aristotle,  43. 

Arr^at,  L.,  30. 

Augustine,  Saint,  32,  248^-249. 

Avebury,  Lord  (Sir  John  Lubbock),  129. 

Bancroft,  H.  H.,  21. 

Barth,  285. 

Barton,  George,  175. 

Belot,  G.,  248. 

Bentley,  I.  M.,  67. 

Bergson,  Henri,  334-335' 

Berguer,  Henri,  235. 

Binet,  A.,  141. 

Biran,  Maine  de,  32. 

Bois,  Henri,  224-227,  241,  243. 

Bosanquet,  H.,  353. 

Boutroux,  Emile,  239,  263,  265,  309. 

Bradley,  F.  H.,  39,  251-2^2. 

Bridges,  Horace  J.,  331. 

Bridges,  J.  H.,  313. 

Brinton,  D.  G.,  24,  72-73.  358^359- 

Budde,  Karl,  175. 

Caird,  Edward,  356. 

Campbell,  R.  J.,  291,  292-294,  357-3S8- 

Chamberlain,  Alexandre,  78. 

Christie,  R.,  322. 

Chubb,  Percival,  330,  331,  336. 

Clodd,  Edward,  91. 

Codrington,  R.  H.,  4,  6,  12,  76,  ior-102, 

115,  117,  119,  174.  230. 
Coit,  Stanton,  331. 
Comenius,  J.  A.,  351. 
Comte,   A.,   38,   65,   307-310,   321-323, 

326,  355. 
Coriat,  Isador,  298. 
Crawley,  A.  E.,  47-48,  51. 
Curr,  E.  M.,  12. 


D'AIviella,  Goblet,  353-354- 
Darwin,  Charles,  58,  67,  167. 


Davenport,  F.  M.,  11,  135,  141. 
Davids,  Rhys,  283,  284,  286-288. 
Davis,  H.  B.,  59. 
Delacroix,  Henri,  272. 
Denney,  Professor,  233. 
Dewey,  John,  43. 
Digamma,  220-222,  243. 
Dorsay,  G.  Owen,  16. 
Durkheim,  E.,  51,  89-90,  93. 

Eddy,  Mary  Baker,  295,  297,  301-304. 
Edwards,  Jonathan,  135. 
Eucken,  Rudolph,  259. 
Evans,  W.  F.,  300. 

Feuerbach,  L.,  32,  38-39,  252-253. 
Fletcher,  Alice  C,  82-83,  162. 
Fletcher,  Horace,  143. 
Flint,  Robert,  290,  317,  318,  320. 
Floumoy,    Theodore,     140,     207,    245- 

246. 
Forsythe,  P.  F.,  229. 
Foucart,  P.,  21,  152. 
Francis  of  Assisi,  Saint,  319. 
Eraser,  A.  C,  29,  32. 
Frazer,  J.   G.,   6,   76-77,   108,   1 19-122, 

152.  153-159,   163-164,  166,  170-171, 

177-180,  188-189,  197,  353. 
Fryer,  A.  T.,  136. 

Garvie,  A.,  208,  210,  232,  233,  259. 

Gautier,  Lton.,  316. 
Gayraud,  Abb6,  247. 
Green,  T.  H.,  252,  293. 
Gros,  Durand  de,  248. 
Guyau,  M.  J.,  41. 
Guyon,  Madame,  36. 

Hall,  Charies  Cuthbert,  216. 
Hall,  G.  Stanley,  68,  139,  143. 
Harrison,  Frederic,  309,  318. 
Hartland,  E.  S.,  109,  no. 
Hartmann,  Eduard  von,  22,  342-343. 
Hebert,  Marcel,  54. 
Hegel,  344. 


36s 


366 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


Herbart,  J.  F.,  32-33. 

Herrmann,  W.,  229,  232,  351. 

Hobbes,  Thomas,  71,  359. 

Hofiding,  H.,  33,  46-47.   107.  202,  252, 

253- 
Howitt,  A.  W.,  12,  76,  108-109,  no,  173, 

178. 
Hume,  David,  359. 
Huxley,  Thomas,  24. 

Inge,  William  Ralph,  256. 

James,  William,  31,  32,  39-40,  44,  103, 
148,  237,  240,  243,  255,  271,  272-274, 
352. 

Jastrow,  Joseph,  81. 

Jevons,  F.  B.,  52,  163,  172,  344. 

Jones,  Rufus,  227,  294-295. 

Kant,  E.,  242-244,  358. 

Kern,  H.,  282,  283,  285,  298. 

Kidd,  Benjamin,  355. 

King,  Irving,  48-52,  75,  I57,   167,   175, 

184-186,  198-199. 
Kingsley,   Mary  H.,  93,   loo-ioi,   106- 

107. 
Kropotkin,  Prince,  358. 
Kuhn,  Adelbert,  96. 

Ladd,  George  T.,  344. 

Lang,  Andrew,   102-103,  no,   I79,   iQQ, 

203-204. 
Lavaud,  Charles,  272. 
L60,  Albert,  265. 
LeRoy,  Mgr.,  loi,  247. 
Leuba,  J.  H.,  88,  95,  126,  140. 
Lichtenstein,  M.  H.  K.,  154. 
Lodge,  Oliver,  295. 
Lotze,  H.,  251. 

Lovejoy,  Arthur  0.,  74-75,  84. 
Lubbock,  Sir  John  (Lord  Avebury),  129. 
Luther,  Martin,  32. 

McComb,  Samuel,  398. 
McDougall,  Wm.,  145,  196. 
McTaggart,  John,  207,  248,  349. 
Marett,   R.  R.,   72,   73-74,   75,   84,   93, 

129,  163,  171,   182-184,  359-360. 
Marshall,  Henry  Rutgers,  323,  354-355- 
Martineau,  Harriet,  139. 
Martineau,  James,  23,  25,  343. 
Maspero,  G.  C,  151-152. 
Matthews,  Dr.  Washington,  19,  20. 
Minault,  Paul,  223. 


Mommsen,  A.,  21. 

Morgan,  C.  Lloyd,  64,  66,  68. 

Morris,  M.,  3. 

Miiller,    Max,    25-26,    41,    85,   96,    203, 

339-341. 
Miinsterberg,  Hugo,  44,  345-346. 
Myers,  F.  W.  H.,  358. 

Newman,  Cardinal,  251. 

Paradon,  Emile,  222. 
Parker,  Mrs.  E.  L.,  loi,  199. 
Pascal,  Blaise,  209-210. 
Patterson,  Charles  B.,  297,  305. 
Paulsen,  Friedrich,  16. 
Pennington,  Isaac,  236. 
Perez,  Emile,  78. 
Petrie,  Flinders,  6,  182. 
Pfleiderer,  O.,  41,  208,  261,  350. 
Ponsoye,  E.,  263. 
Powell,  Lyman  P.,  302. 
Preyer,  W.,  92. 
Pritchett,  Henry  S.,  316. 

Reischle,  Max,  255. 

Renan,  Ernst,  356. 

R6ville,  A.,  38,  352. 

Ribot,  Th.,  128,  145,  350. 

Ritschl,    Albrecht,    208-209,    231,    233, 

258,  350-351. 
Rivers,  W.  H.  R.,  174. 
Romanes,  G.  J.,  23,  24,  25,  68,  343-344- 
Royce,  J.,  357. 

Sabatier,  A.,  38,  40,  217,  295,  357. 
Sainte-Beuve,  133,  315. 
Salter,  William  M.,  331. 
Schian,  Martin,  228. 
SchiUer,  F.  C.  S.,  207,  248. 
Schleiermacher,  F.,  33-34,  35,  249,  346- 

348. 
Schmidt,  Father  Wilhelm,  102,  104,  no. 
Schopenhauer,  38. 

Seeberg,  Reinhold,  228,  243,  269-270. 
Seeley,  J.  R.,  53. 
Sergi,  G.,  24,  353. 
Siebeck,  Hermann,  40. 
Simmel,  G.,  349-350. 
Smith,  Gerald  Boiney,  228. 
Smith,  W.  Robertson,  20,   130-131,  203. 
Soyen  Shaqu,  215. 
Spencer,  Herbert,  24,  26-28,  65-66,  199, 

341-342. 
Spencer  and  Gillen,  loi,  165,  i66,  197. 


INDEX  OF  AUTHORS 


367 


Stanley,  Hiram  M.,  333. 
Starbuck,  E.  D.,  139. 
Stout.  G.  F.,  81,  82. 
Stratton,  George  M.,  38,  350. 
Sully,  James,  78,  80,  92,  94,  170. 
Sutherland,  Alexandre,  196. 

Tertullian,  209. 

Theal,  G.  M'Call,  109. 

Thompson,  Daniel  Greenleaf,  351. 

Thum,  Sir  Everard  im,  90. 

Tiele,  C.  P.,  15,  33,  288,  340,  348-349- 

Tonnies,  F.,  355. 

Tracy,  Frederic,  78. 

Trine,  Ralph  Waldo,  300, 


Troward,  T.,  299. 

Tylor,  Edward  B.,  70-72,  85. 

Upton,  357. 

Van  Gennep,  A.,  no. 
Voltaire,  255. 

Warren,  H.  C,  158. 

Washburn,  M.  F.,  67. 

Wells,  H.  G.,  327. 

Wilson,  George  R.,  144. 

Worcester,  Elwood,  298. 

Wordsworth,  W.,  319. 

Wundt,  W.,  24,  43,  167,  360-361. 


INDEX   OF  SUBJECTS 


Abstract  ideas,  60-61. 

Alcheringa,  loi. 

Animals,   behavior   of,    57-69;    actions 

impossible  to,  62 ;    difference  between 

men  and,  62-65;   worship  of,  116-117. 
Animism,  Tylorian,  70-72  ;   and  belief  in 

non-personal  powers,  76-77. 
Apparitions,  89. 
Australians,    12,    76-77,    loi,    10S-109, 

110,  165,  166,  173,  178,  197. 
Awe,  118,  145-149. 
Awfulness,  117. 

Behavior,    three    types    of,    4-7,    190; 

mechanical,   5;    coerdtive,   5-7;    an- 

thropopathic,      5;       animal,      57-69; 

origins     of     magical,     164-172;      of 

religious  practices,  172-175. 
Benevolence  of  gods,  117. 
Brahmanism,  290. 
Brooke,  Sir  James,  3;   121. 
Buddhism,  281-298. 

Cats,  behavior  of,  59. 

Cause,  child's  conception  of,  96-97. 

Ceremonies,    magical,     12-13,     62;    of 

Catholicism,  21;  religious,  172-175. 
Child,  explanatory  concepts  of  the,  7&- 

81  ;  9^97- 
Chimpanzee,  behavior  of,  58. 
Christian  Science,   295-296,  301-307. 
Classification,  of  wonderful  beings,  122- 

123;   of  magic,  153-164,  190-191. 
Comtism,  307-313,  321-323.  326-328. 
Conscience,  facts  of,  87. 
Conscious   life,    unit   of,    35;     place  of 

thought  and  feeling  in,  42-45. 
Contagious  Magic,  153-154. 
Creation,  problem  of,  96-98. 
Creative  force,  334-335- 
Creator,  conception  of,  87,  96-98. 


Dakota  Indians,  72. 
Dancing,  62,  155-158,  i68. 

2B 


Definitions  of  religion,  intellectualistic, 
25-32,  339-346;  affectivistic,  32-38, 
346-351 ;  voluntaristic,  38-42,  352- 
360;  Wundt's  classification  of,  360- 
361. 

Deification  of  men,  119-124. 

Dieri,  152. 

Disease,  cure  of,  ii. 

Documental  evidence,  inner  exi)eriences, 
212-229. 

Dogs,  behavior  of,  58,  66,  67,  68. 

Dreams,  89-92. 

Ducks,  behavior  of,  64. 

Dyaks,  of  Borneo,  3 ;  of  Sarawak,  121. 

Dynamism,  84.  j 

Edwardian  revivals,  141. 

Emotions,  in  primitive  religion,  126-131; 

in  later  forms  of  religion,  132-148. 
Empirical  God,  246-254,  272-274. 
Empirical  religion,  documents,  212-229. 
Empirical  theolog>',  207-212. 
Ethical  Culture  Societies,  328-332. 

Faith,  261-268. 

Fear,  in  religion,  128-131,  I33-I4S; 
causes  for  decline  of,  140-145 ;  in 
Roman  Church,  150;  in  secular  life, 
150. 

Feeling,  place  of,  in  religion,  35-38;  in 
conscious  life,  42-45;  "feeling  of 
value,"  45-52;  of  effort,  181-183. 

Friends,  Society  of,  294-295. 

Ghosts,  14,  86 ;  origin  of  belief  in,  89-93. 

God,  proofs  for  existence  of,  87-88,  247- 
249;  as  creator,  loo-iio;  the  maimer 
in  which  God  is  supposed  to  act  in  the 
soul,  240-242  ;  failure  of  Wm.  James' 
attempt  to  prove  the  action  of,  272- 
274;  empirical  and  metaphysical 
conceptions  of,  246-254. 

God-incarnate,  123  ;  magic-god,  123. 

Gods,  subjective  existence  of,  10 ;  advan- 


^ 


369 


370 


INDEX  OF  SUBJECTS 


tages  of  belief  in  non-existent,  ii-is; 
dynamic  value  of  belief  in,  14;  origin 
of  idea  of,  85-110;  making  of,  iii- 
113,  124-125;  essential  characteris- 
tics of,  113-118;  function  of,  in  moral 
life,  201-202. 
Gratitude,  128. 

Hebrew  worship,  20. 

Hero-ancestors,  14. 

High  Gods,  102-110. 

Homoeopathic  Magic,  153. 

Humanity,  religion    of,   307-313;    321- 

323,  326-328,  335-336. 
Hysteria,  87. 

Ideas,  free,  64;    in  animals,  65-67;    of 

impersonal  powers,  70-84;   of  unseen, 

personal  powers,  85-110. 
Images,  67. 

Imitation,  in  animal  life,  60. 
Imitative  Magic,  153. 
Immanence  in  theology,  291-295. 
Immediacy  of  religious  knowledge,  234- 

240;   276;  documental  evidence,  212- 

229. 
Inductive  method  in  theology,  255-261. 
Inner    experience,    233,    242,    275-277 ; 
I,  documental  evidence  of  the  existence 

of  God,  212-229;    and  divine  action, 

272-274. 
Invisibility  of  gods,  116-117. 

Law,  of  Contact  or  Contagion,  153;  of 
Similarity,  153,  156. 

Magic,  5-7,  62  ;  origin  of,  77 ;  varieties 
and  classification  of,  1 51-164;  rela- 
tion of,  to  religion,  177-180;  prior  to 
religion,  180-181 ;  associated  with 
religion,  181-184;  duration  of,  186- 
187;   relation  to  science,  187-190. 

Magic-gods,  123. 

Magical  behavior,  origins  of,  164-172. 

Magicians,  119,  122. 

Mana,  definition  of,  76,  122,  123,  163. 

Manitouism,  84. 

Melanesians,  63,  101-102,  115,  119-120. 

Metaphysics,  relation  of,  to  religion,  25- 
32,  206,  207-211. 

Mind-cure,  296,  301-304. 

Monotheism  109;  see  also  under  Theism. 

Moody,  D.  L.,  135. 


MoraUty,  relation  of,  to  religion,  195- 
203  ;  social  origin  of,  196 ;  of  primitive 
man,  196-200;  independent  of  reli- 
gion, 323-326. 

Mysteriousness  of  gods,  117. 

Mythology,  relation  of,  to  religion,  203- 
206. 

Navajo  Great  Mountain  Chant,  19. 

Needs,  aSective  and  moral,  88-8g. 

Negative  religion,  131. 

New  Thought,  304-307. 

Non-personal  powers,  origin  of  belief  in, 
70-84;  prior  to  animism,  76-77; 
children's  conception  of,  79-81. 

North  American  Indians,  religious  prac- 
tices of,  19. 

Origin,  of  idea  of  impersonal  powers,  7c^ 
84 ;  of  ideas  of  unseen  personal  beings, 
85-110;  of  gods,  110-113;  of  magical 
practices,  164-172;  of  reUgious  prac- 
tices, 172-175. 

Pantheism,  289-295;  317-321. 

Passive  religiosity,  191. 

Personal  beings,  85-110. 

Personal  God,  125. 

Personality,  of  God,  250-254;   315-317; 

of  gods,  113-114. 
Personification    of    natural    phenomena, 

94-96. 
Philosophy,  diSerentiated  from  religion, 

29-32;   and  theology,  207-212. 
Positive  religion,  131. 
Positivism,    307-313;     insufficiency    of, 

321-323,  327- 
Prayer,  varieties  of,  16. 
Principle  of  Repetition  in  magic,  159. 
Psychology,  animal,  57 ;  relation  of,  to 

theology,    metaphysics,    and    science, 

207-212;   to  religion,  42-45,  220,  245- 

246,  257-258,  268-275- 
Psychotherapic  cults,  295-307. 

Religion,  nature  and  function  of,  3-22; 
characteristic  impulses  of,  7;  as  an 
instinct,  9 ;  biological  value  of,  14-15. 
16-18 ;  as  gratification  of  human  needs, 
16;  current  conceptions  of,  23-54; 
variety  of  definitions  of,  23-25  ;  defined 
from  intellectual  point  of  view,  25-32  ; 
Miiller's  definition  of,  25-26 ;  Spencer's 
definition    of,    26-28;     difierentiated 


INDEX  OF   SUBJECTS 


371 


from  philosophy,  28-32;  defined  as 
emotion,  32-35  ;  Schleiermacher's  defi- 
nition of,  33-34;  place  of  feeling  in, 
35-38;  defined  from  practical  fx)int  of 
view,  38-42;  Feuerbach's  definition 
of,  38-39 ;  James's  definition  of,  39-40 ; 
Sabatier's  definition  of,  40;  Siebeck's 
definition  of,  40;  thought  and  feeUng 
in,  40-41;  defined  as  "feeling  of 
vsilue,"  45-52;  Hoffding's  definition 
of,  46-47 ;  Crawley's  definition  of,  47- 
48;  King's  definition  of,  48-52; 
differentiated  from  the  rest  of  Ufe,  52- 
54;  fear  in,  128-131,  133-145;  rever- 
ence in,  130-131;  emotions  in  later 
forms  of,  132-148;  awe  and  the  sub- 
lime in,  145-149 ;  relation  of  magic  to, 
176-191 ;  social  and  beneficient  nature 
of,  184-186;  latest  forms  of,  281-313; 
future  of,  314-336;  present  situation 
10,314-317;  independent  of  moraUty, 
323-326;  philosophical  basis  of,  332- 
335  ;  definitions  of,  339-360.  See  also 
imder  ceremonies,  definitions,  docu- 
mental evidence,  empirical,  origin,  psy- 
chology. 

Religion  of  Humanity,  307-313, 321-323  ; 
326-328,  335-336. 

ReUgious,  needs,  8;  emotions,  9;  prac- 
tices, 18-22,  172-175;  consciousness, 
30-31 ;  knowledge,  immediately  given 
in  specific  experiences,  234-240. 

Reverence,  131. 

Ritschlian  theology,  208-210,  231-233, 
258. 

Roberts,  Evan,  136. 


Sacredness,  10;  as  characteristic  of  reli- 
gion, 45-4Q;  of  gods,  117-118. 

Science,  relation  of,  to  religion,  208,  209, 
211,  220,  242-244,  245-246,. 

Sioux  Indians,  82-83. 

Sublime,  sense  of,  146-149. 

Suggestion,  11,  18. 

Supematuralism,  84. 

Sympathetic  Magic,  155,  160,  169. 

Tender  emotion,  127. 

Teratism,  84. 

Theism,  insuflBciency  of,  for  religion,  289- 

291,  319-321. 
Theology,  empirical,  207-212  ;  as  a  body 

of  induced  propositions,  244-245,  255- 

261;  immanence  in,  291-295. 
Thought,  place  of,  in  conscious  life,  42-45. 
Trances,  86,  89. 
Transcendental     belief,     323-326;      the 

transcendental  and  science,  207-212. 
Trial-and-error  method  of  learning,  60- 

62. 
Tuppa,  3. 

Unseen  agents,  no. 

Value,  feeling  of,  45-52 ;    judgment  of, 

231-233- 
Varieties  of  magic,  151-164. 

Wakan,  72. 

Wa-zhin-dhe-dhe,  82-83. 
Welsh  revival,  135-136. 
Wesley,  John,  I34-I3S- 
Will-effort,  81-83,  160. 
Will-Magic,  15&-159,  162-163,  183. 


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